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Foreword
As Bruno Latour (2018) points out, causal linkages between climate triggers 
may follow a path that is difficult to trace and may ultimately be expressed 
in extreme political positions through a combination of isolated decisions, 
policies, perceptions and ideologies. If it were indeed possible to trace a 
chain of causality between unusually protracted droughts in large parts 
of the Middle East and the Maghreb, wide fluctuations in food prices and 
availability, local political conflicts, small-scale migration, national armed 
conflict, and then mass migration to Europe, the initial response of opening 
borders to take in migrants, migratory saturation, the subsequent closing 
of borders and the emergence of xenophobic, nationalist and conservative 
discontent in receiving countries, we could be seeing, on different time 
scales, a relationship between climate change and extreme political positions 
in some developed countries. An example of this is what is happening in 
Europe and the United States, in the latter case fomented by the country’s 
President, who has stigmatized migration towards the southern border.
These positions are also fuelled by certain phenomena typical of 
today’s globalization, such as the long slowdown in economic growth, 
the flight of jobs and taxes, and the unequal appropriation of the fruits of 
technical progress and productivity, an inequality that is long-standing. 
These phenomena could also be an expression of the logic of extending the 
economic life of fossil fuels that prevails in the world’s largest economies. In 
these economies, there are incentives to resist the shift towards an energy 
model based on renewable energies, while rivalry for geopolitical and 
technological dominance is becoming acute.
These pressures combine and reinforce each other in a mixture of 
equilibria that are very fragile at the international level. In the face of the 
climate emergency, which gives the Paris Agreement its meaning, the reluctance 
of some actors to roll out renewable energy on a mass scale and break away 
from the fossil model is becoming apparent. This stands in the way of the 
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achievement of the economies of scale needed for the transition, thereby 
reinforcing the inertia of economies around more carbon-intensive options.
This hegemonic race based on the fossil energy model is only intensifying 
the impact of global climate change and all its consequences, and this is 
exacerbating human insecurity in multiple related dimensions and creating 
a vicious circle. That circle could result in highly adverse conditions for a 
solidarity-based response to a change in the climate which, once a certain 
threshold is crossed, will be reinforced by physical vicious circles due to the 
release of organic methane deposited in the ground and seas, and the loss 
of albedo from planetary ice.
Latour argues that climate change calls into question the promise 
of neoliberalism, hegemonic since the 1990s, that globalization would be 
a vehicle for the welfare of humanity. The author also challenges climate 
denialism as a mechanism for promoting the belief that it is possible to stand 
aside from the global emergency and continue with the inequality-creating 
model, entrenched behind national borders that protect against migrants 
displaced by inequality, conflict and global warming, phenomena that, 
according to Latour, are inextricably linked. Similarly, Greta Thunberg, in 
her 2019 address to the General Assembly, pointed out the shamelessness of 
insisting on “fairy tales” of eternal economic growth in the face of the climate 
emergency. Denialism, stubborn dependence on fossil fuels and nationalistic 
entrenchment in the face of migration triggered by the climate emergency 
itself are other fairy tales deliberately constructed to give the status quo a 
few more years of life, leaving the vulnerable in individual countries and 
around the world to cope as best they can.
In Latin America and the Caribbean, the same frictions are delaying the 
shift to lower-carbon economies, there is a risk of the targets adopted being 
missed, and the challenges for adaptation are increasing, given the inadequacy 
of global and regional responses. With regard to adaptation processes, Magrin 
(2015, p. 9) recognizes that “the countries of the region have made progress 
in incorporating environmental protection into decision-making processes, 
particularly in terms of environmental institutions and legislation, but there 
are still difficulties in effectively incorporating environmental issues into 
relevant public policies”. One of the main challenges of the climate agenda will 
be to achieve coordination between climate policies and development, spatial 
planning and sectoral policies. There are now a number of laws dealing with 
the climate issue, although they are very difficult to effectively implement and 
follow up on. In several countries there are marked contradictions between 
land use regulation policies and incentives to increase productivity. The great 
process of change that the region is undergoing requires planned, consistent, 
non-contradictory policies and interventions in line with development 
objectives. It is important to attain a holistic view of the problem, taking 
advantage of capacities developed for other purposes (such as disaster 
risk management), connecting the climate issue with development actions 
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and pursuing environmentally sound and well-planned land use. Thus, 
effective governments and institutions have a key role to play in facilitating 
planning and implementation and represent the main adaptation opportunity 
or constraint. Governments need to be adequately informed, assess the 
suitability of interventions and make their own decisions (in accordance 
with the specific context of each particular situation), avoiding pressures 
and one-size-fits-all options for developing countries that generate resistance 
and distrust and retard actions. In all cases, it is important to study and 
properly understand the interactions and constraints of the climate change-
development relationship, as government decisions and actions are often 
wide-ranging and take in more than one objective, including climate change.”
Some issues of crucial importance from an adaptation point of view 
require policy decisions that go to the heart of how governments operate. 
For example, it would be desirable to transform regional information on 
the expected effects of climate change into mechanisms that change the 
incentives or rules governing investment. In this regard, it is worth noting 
the potential offered by the formalization of such information as a basis for 
public action, the adaptation of licensing processes and the impact evaluation 
associated with licensing, the updating of land use planning instruments 
and the inclusion of resilience standards applicable to the operation of critical 
infrastructure that serve to internalize the cost of keeping it operational at 
critical times. One of the advances in international negotiations has been to 
ensure that, alongside national efforts, relevant information and additional 
funds are made available to countries to accelerate adaptation to climate 
change. Two extreme scenarios can be envisaged for adaptation to gradual 
climate change and combined in a variety of ways: adaptation which does not 
prevent all the damage and losses that could be caused by the accumulation 
of changes, response deficiencies and limitations outlined, and adaptation 
which adequately and promptly anticipates threats and that successfully 
moderates risk and not only reduces vulnerability but goes further by 
investing in infrastructure and closing gaps derived from the old development 
style. If climate change is not gradual and there are tipping points followed 
by sudden changes and self-reinforcing cycles, adaptation will be clearly 
inadequate and the effects will be unavoidable. For our region, the nationally 
determined contributions (NDCs) of the Paris Agreement and the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) are clear benchmarks for efforts to seize the 
opportunity to progress likewise with the quality and sustainability of national 
and local development, while helping to mitigate the climate emergency.
Alicia Bárcena 
Executive Secretary 
Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)

Preface
After this document was written, in March 2020, the coronavirus disease 
(COVID-19) health crisis erupted. As in the case of the climate emergency, the 
COVID-19 crisis has shown the meaning of a global public bad with planetary 
repercussions —a pandemic in this case— that requires simultaneous, decisive 
collective action.
Two fronts have been aligned to address this crisis: the health front, to 
flatten the curve of exponential growth in cases over time and prevent the 
response capacity of public health systems from being overwhelmed; and the 
socioeconomic front, to reduce the impact of the resulting sharp recession, 
which is eroding people’s income and the productive fabric.
As with global warming, inaction in the face of the pandemic has a cost. 
Following an initial period of indecision in many countries, the will to act and 
a sense of urgency prevailed. Many governments have therefore committed 
to significant fiscal and credit efforts to sustain employment, maintain the 
income of informal sector workers and support the economic viability of micro-, 
small and medium-sized enterprises. In both the environmental crisis and the 
pandemic, countries and their governments are facing problems whose solutions 
are massively expensive, at a time when fiscal resources are being squeezed 
by the suspension or heavy reduction of key economic activities such as air 
transport or tourism.
The efforts made have been diverse, owing to the very different economic 
conditions and fiscal space in each of the countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Few countries had a solid foundation on which to build a response 
to the pandemic, as public health policies had lagged behind. In addition, 
health spending in the region has averaged just 2.2% of GDP, as opposed to 
the 6% recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO). Despite these 
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structural problems, governments have led the response in this situation; 
markets are unable to resolve this emergency because of their failures to 
deliver an adequate supply of public goods amid over-commoditization of 
health services and health inputs.1 
The cost of action or inaction is not the only area in which the COVID-19 
pandemic and the climate emergency can be compared. In the case of 
COVID-19, a sense of urgency and political decisiveness prevailed that have 
yet to appear in the case of the climate emergency. The human and financial 
resources made available to mitigate the pandemic have been significant; 
this is far from being the case for the climate emergency, as reflected by the 
lack of commitment to undertaking the mitigation and adaptation measures 
discussed in this document. Government leadership has a long way to go 
on climate emergency, while market pressures on the global climate system 
continue to mount. Business goes on as if these pressures did not exist 
—pressures that, perhaps more slowly, but just as inexorably, will spread 
through economic and social systems as the pandemic has. As we know, 
the cost of the climate crisis will be much greater if we do not do what is 
needed to prevent its most extreme effects. The pandemic and the climate 
crisis both force us to recognize the value of public goods and services as 
insurance against greater bads and against inequality. The pandemic thus 
obliges us to consider the strategic value of public goods and the need for 
their effective governance. 
Once the pandemic has run its course, the economic and employment 
recovery is expected to occur at a fast pace over a not-too-lengthy period, 
albeit not immediately. In the case of climate change, the exponential curve 
will only continue to rise, with no foreseeable reversal even in the medium 
or long term. In the climate emergency, to date there is no immunity to the 
predatory behaviour of a portion of the human species in the exploitation 
of fossil fuels. Unless such behaviour is made to carry a high political and 
economic cost, we will not be able to halt the upward curve of the climate 
emergency. That is why it is crucial to act now —and this document is a call 
to do precisely that. 
1 For an in-depth analysis, see Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
“Latin America and the Caribbean and the COVID-19 pandemic: economic and social effects”, 
Special Report COVID-19, No. 1, 3 April 2020.
Introduction
The environmental impact of the prevailing development style imperils the 
well-being, and in some cases the survival, of much of humanity. It is one 
of the great challenges of the present, for it puts at risk the world’s common 
resources: the atmosphere, the oceans, the poles and biodiversity. The 
climate is altering to the point where the ranges of sustainable variability in 
temperature and precipitation are being exceeded, and the composition of the 
atmosphere is changing, threatening all living beings on land and in the sea.
The evidence on global warming is unequivocal. One of the main 
causes of this phenomenon is the increase in the concentration of greenhouse 
gases produced by human activities, including the burning of fossil fuels 
and changes in land use.1
Climate change is manifested primarily in a rising average global 
temperature, changing precipitation patterns, continuous sea level rise, 
reduction of the cryosphere2 and heightened patterns of extreme weather 
events. These transformations are having a strong impact on economic 
activities, social welfare and ecosystems. Thus, the main cause of climate 
change, greenhouse gas emissions, is a negative global externality and, as 
Stern (2007) has pointed out, the biggest market failure of all time. We are 
facing a change of era that requires a structural alteration in the forms of 
production and consumption that characterize the current development 
1 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has established the following criteria 
to indicate the degree of probability of an outcome or consequence: virtually certain, 99% to 
100%; very likely, 90% to 100%; likely, 66% to 100%; about as likely as not, 33% to 66%; unlikely, 
0% to 33%; very unlikely, 0% to 10%; and exceptionally unlikely, 0% to 1%. If appropriate, other 
criteria can be used, namely: extremely likely, 95% to 100%; more likely than not, 50% to 100%; 
and highly unlikely, 0% to 5% (IPCC, 2013a).
2 If there is less snow and ice, water reserves for human use decrease and the albedo or reflectivity 
to the sun’s energy of the Earth’s surface is reduced, accelerating heat retention. 
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style. Environmental policies at the margin are not enough: it is essential that 
the international community act collectively and simultaneously to achieve 
goals aimed at mitigating greenhouse gases, and that urgent adaptation 
actions be taken to protect the most vulnerable communities, such as small 
island developing States (SIDS) and the poorest populations in developing 
countries, who will be the most affected. This means embarking on an energy 
transition of enormous proportions to decarbonize the economy. The aim 
must be to decouple emissions from production and consumption, to replace, 
for example, carbon-based energy sources with clean, renewable sources, to 
abandon deforestation practices and adopt sustainable agro-forestry methods, 
and to protect the oceans from pollution and high temperatures in order to 
preserve plankton life, which is important for food chains.
The economic and social dimension must be fully included in the 
debate on climate change. Throughout history, developed economies have 
been able to attain high levels of development based on industrialization 
that is high in carbon and other pollutants. This is a historical debt that 
industrialized economies owe developing countries; accordingly, the 
international community agreed in 1992 that the solution to the problem of 
climate change required common but differentiated responsibilities, entailing 
a greater commitment, as well as more resources and technology transfers, 
from developed countries.
Although growth has enabled humanity to make substantial 
progress in reducing extreme poverty in the world, increasing agricultural 
productivity and developing technology, these benefits have come at a 
high environmental cost and have not spread to everyone, so that global 
income and wealth inequalities have increased to unsustainable levels. In 
the environmental field, the result has been increased air pollution in urban 
areas, the deterioration of biodiversity, native forests and oceans, soil erosion 
and increased water scarcity.
Developing economies need to grow more if their economic and social 
problems are to be solved and if income, technology and infrastructure gaps with 
developed economies are to be reduced. In the region, with its structural gaps 
in infrastructure, taxation, investment and social and distributive inequality, 
the need to strengthen sustainability-oriented development options must 
be addressed. The current style of development is unsustainable because of 
insufficient economic dynamism, the climate pathway, the gradual depletion 
of sources of financing based on the exploitation of natural resources and 
persistent or growing inequality (ECLAC, 2018a).
The production structure, infrastructure, a dominant technological 
paradigm that is short on innovation and heavily dependent on imported 
consumption patterns, the political economy of economic incentives and 
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subsidies, the regressive consumption mix of private goods and the inadequate 
quality of public goods have all contributed to a path of low environmental 
sustainability (ECLAC, 2014a; Stern, 2007 and 2008).
The boom in exports of renewable and non-renewable natural resources 
helped to reduce poverty and improve social conditions; however, it also 
contributed to climate change and caused negative externalities such as air 
pollution and local pollution, a source of increasing conflict. The negative 
cycle tends to be completed when risk extends to things like energy security 
(because hydroelectricity becomes inefficient), security of agricultural 
production, habitability in the event of meteorological disasters, and health. 
Thus, the inertia of the current development style is eroding the foundations 
that sustain it.
In the 27 years since the Earth Summit, substantial technological advances 
have been made in electricity generation in the form of renewable energy 
and significant progress has been achieved with electricity-based mobility, 
waste recycling and waste-to-energy conversion. It is now cheaper to generate 
from non-conventional renewable energy than from fossil fuels. This, coupled 
with best agricultural practices, opens up the prospect of enhancing welfare 
in developing countries and leaving a smaller environmental footprint. 
However, the climate debt between the North and the South is real, as is that 
within countries, where the prevailing inequality means that the wealthiest 
sectors are also those responsible for the greatest emissions of greenhouse 
gases and urban and national pollution.
Altering these trends will require profound transformations in the 
development paradigm and in the investments that make it possible. More 
sustainable development implies greater equality and social cohesion, with 
a mix of high-quality public services and with private consumption whose 
orientation is consistent with the new paradigm. This would make sustainable 
development less vulnerable to climate shocks and enable adaptation and 
mitigation to be pursued more effectively. Thus, the challenge of climate 
change is part of the challenge of achieving more sustainable development 
(ECLAC, 2015a).
In 2015, a milestone for the international community and multilateralism 
was reached: it was recognized that the current style of development was 
unsustainable. The evidence accumulated over the previous decades, 
showing deep economic, social and environmental imbalances, led to 
the negotiation of the most comprehensive and ambitious road map to 
sustainable development so far. Thus, in September that year, heads of State 
and government adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The Agenda recognizes 
equality and sustainability as shared and universal guiding principles 
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for transforming the development path and combining policies to change 
production patterns with the imperatives of caring for the environment. Of 
the SDGs agreed, Goal 13 (climate action) is of particular note. It highlights 
the urgent need to adopt measures to combat climate change and its effects, 
pointing out that no country in the world has been spared these. In addition, 
global warming is causing permanent changes in the climate system, and 
the consequences of these changes may be irreversible if action is not taken 
immediately (ECLAC, 2016c).
Following some earlier efforts of very limited scope, in December 2015 
the Paris Agreement that came out of the twenty-first Conference of the Parties 
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP21) 
was approved.3 The Agreement is a set of measures aimed at reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions through mitigation and adaptation actions to 
increase the resilience of the population and ecosystems to climate change. 
One of its objectives is to “strengthen the global response to the threat of 
climate change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to 
eradicate poverty” (UNFCCC, 2016b, p. 22).
Article 2 of the Paris Agreement reiterates three commitments:
(i) Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well 
below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to 
limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial 
levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks 
and impacts of climate change.
(ii) Increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate 
change and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas 
emissions development, in a manner that does not threaten 
food production.
(iii) Making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low 
greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development.
Article 3 of the Paris Agreement states that each country must take on 
individually determined national mitigation and adaptation commitments. 
These commitments are called nationally determined contributions (NDCs), 
and are intended to stabilize CO2 emissions, prevent the global temperature 
from rising by more than 2 °C and, if possible, hold the increase to below 1.5 °C. 
Countries must report on their progress every five years and the targets must 
be increasingly ambitious. These targets will not be binding; rather, it will 
be public visibility that stimulates or punishes action.
3 The Paris Agreement calls on all countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, regardless of their 
level of development. Prior to the Agreement, the international community had been negotiating 
for years to adopt an instrument that would meet the challenges of climate change. In that process, 
and with a few exceptions, such as the European Union, the Kyoto Protocol did not prove as 
effective as initially expected. The agreements reached in Rio de Janeiro on the basis of common 
but differentiated responsibilities also proved to be very ineffective.
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It is a fragile agreement that was negotiated by 195 member countries of 
the United Nations and opened for signature on 22 April 2016. It was signed by 
97 countries, including the European Union, well over the threshold required 
for it to enter into force, which was that it had to be ratified by more than 
55 Parties accounting for 55% of greenhouse gas emissions. Most positively, 
it recognizes the seriousness of the problem and the urgent need to limit the 
temperature increase and achieve carbon neutrality (i.e. for removal to offset 
emissions) by 2050. The Agreement embodies a consensus on the planet’s 
carrying capacity in terms of concentrations, expressed in the 2 °C limit on 
temperature rise, which in turn requires a reduction in the annual flow of 
emissions. The NDCs are in turn the expression of carbon limits or budgets; 
they are non-binding but no less real for that. In other words, contributions 
represent the total amount of greenhouse gases that should be emitted in 
the course of all a country’s economic activity, which raises the question 
of how to make the best use of that amount. From an economic point of 
view, this means calculating the opportunity cost of alternative uses of the 
atmosphere’s function as a sink.
Less positive is the fact that, although most countries have made a 
commitment to reduce emissions, the targets are not binding and it is up to 
the governments of the day to comply with NDCs. The cost of not meeting 
targets is damage to a country’s reputation and, in terms of the planet, 
continued temperature rise. Non-compliance by any given country implies 
appropriation of the environmental space of all other countries. This is precisely 
what happened in 2017 when the United States announced its withdrawal 
from the Agreement, which also weakened multilateral commitments 
and collective and simultaneous action, particularly by the large carbon-
producing and emitting countries. The shortcomings of the Agreement are 
compounded by the fact that decisions are taken by consensus and not by 
majority, a problem that also afflicts the Convention.
A second problem is that the sum of national actions is insufficient to 
meet the target: it is estimated that annual emissions will reach 55 gigatons of 
CO2e in 2030, which implies that the temperature will increase by 3 °C. It was 
therefore decided to adjust the nationally determined contributions (NDCs), 
an issue that was addressed at COP24 in Katowice, Poland, in 2018. However, 
little was achieved. A package was approved that contains a rulebook 
according to which from 2024 all countries, except the most vulnerable, 
will have to report on their national targets every two years instead of five, 
but no rules were established for carbon trading. Attempts by developing 
countries to secure new and additional funding commitments failed, and 
loss and damage financing mechanisms were not agreed either. Not enough 
progress has been made on policies consistent with the Paris Agreement, 
such as those aimed at drastically reducing high-carbon investments or 
creating sufficient financial guarantees to reduce the risk of lower-emission 
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investments. In addition, progress on climate-sensitive taxation, such as 
agreements to reduce subsidies for activities harmful to the climate, is 
still insufficient.
The Paris Agreement, with its progress and shortfalls, represents a major 
shift in the international policy approach. The universal commitments made 
under it are reducing the differentiation of responsibilities, a process that in 
a few decades could lead to a regime based on the ability of the strongest to 
impose their style of development if global trends in emissions, responsibilities, 
policies and, in general, the internalization of the role of the atmosphere as a 
sink do not change. Similarly, the fact that in the main financial mechanism of 
the Paris Agreement, the Green Climate Fund, donor funds which are meant 
to provide resources for mitigation and adaptation and which are earmarked 
for international compensation have been converted into credits is itself 
highly questionable. The difference is not subtle. Transfer is compensation; 
it is the cost of internalization (partial or total). Credit is internalization by 
the affected party (the developing country itself), smoothed over time. It is 
noteworthy that the global energy problem is not the exhaustion of nature’s 
fossil fuels, as has always been argued in the field of energy security, but 
precisely the limitations of nature’s absorption function, saturated as it is by 
energy waste and the worldwide consequences of this. Global warming is 
probably the first stark universal symptom of the limit human beings have 
come up against in the absorption function of the natural world.4
A. The economics of global warming
Global warming and its consequences bring out the problem of how to deal 
with environmental and social externalities, and the issue of the distribution 
and economic value of the absorption function of the atmosphere.5 From an 
economic point of view, the consequences of climate change and defensive 
measures have been kept out of development and investment accounts, as 
these have not included the toll taken by the effects of climate change on 
the health, output, habitat and even viability of certain nations. But this 
global negative externality imperils the climate, which is a public good for 
the world (ECLAC, 2016).
Whether this externality is acknowledged or denied is crucial. Thus, the 
climate denialism of some governments and business groups has the effect 
of delaying action on this externality, with the effects ultimately falling on 
current and future generations of vulnerable groups in the societies of their 
4 Disturbing levels have also been reached in the global phosphorus and nitrogen cycles, but these 
have not been the subject of international regulation. 
5 It is not the only atmospheric phenomenon affected by this problem. The same tension can be 
seen in cities over air pollution by substances other than greenhouse gases, and when the scale 
of the issue is larger, this tension extends to the national and even international level.
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own and other countries. The struggle to divide, transfer, minimize, avoid 
and measure the burden of this externality is the crux of both international 
negotiations and national climate policy.
Climate change, like other environmentally or socially destructive 
phenomena, is a reminder that income partly depends on externalities being 
actively maintained. This is on top of the short-sightedness that can afflict the 
economic system when it comes to fully considering the costs of reproducing 
the economic-production cycle.6 In the case of climate change, it is evident that 
part of the profitability of fossil fuel use, cement production and farming is 
achieved at the expense of the world’s climate system and atmosphere, and 
of nature’s absorption function more generally. The time it takes nature to 
recover means that this burden is spread within and between generations.
Economic analysts are increasingly interested in studying the causes 
and consequences of climate change; however, in most economic areas 
of national governments, especially in industrialized countries, global 
warming is still treated as an environmental problem rather than as one of 
development style. Its internalization is seen as a brake on the economy and 
not as an opportunity to make it better and more dynamic. It is this that 
gives rise to the very common notion, whether springing from ignorance 
or self-interest, that the planet’s capacity to absorb greenhouse gases is 
limitless and that there is consequently no reason to change the style of 
development. Some developing countries perceive that their contribution to 
emissions is low and thus there is no need to alter their emissions pattern. 
They thereby sacrifice much of the opportunity to provide their populations 
with the additional benefits offered by the absorption of technical progress 
and its effect in creating new engines of industrialization for development. 
The very idea of recognizing limits on freedom of access to the atmosphere 
is only now finding a place in the thinking of the authorities responsible 
for economic management, as demonstrated by the fact that the Helsinki 
Principles coalition, whose mission is to review fiscal policy (CO2 taxes, tax 
spending, net climate expenditure in the public finances and carbon risk in 
investment portfolios) to align it with the Paris Agreement, was created in 
December 2018. Only a few countries in Latin America and the Caribbean 
back this group: Chile (which is one of its joint leaders), Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Mexico, Costa Rica and Colombia.
There is no doubt that many of the countries of Latin America and 
the Caribbean, particularly those in Central America and the Caribbean, 
are highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change, and adaptation is 
therefore among their top development priorities. However, there is a risk of 
generating greater inequalities when adaptation policies are designed. These 
6 It is legitimate to wonder whether the current economic system would be viable if it internalized 
all its costs, i.e. if it had to operate without environmental and social externalities.
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policies require priorities to be identified, and when resources are limited 
this may mean giving preference to the adaptation of people, or sectors, 
in the light of their economic and political position and role. This involves 
making financial transfers and investments between territories and from 
some social groups to others. Adaptation options can be a source of greater 
equality or greater inequality, depending on the decisions taken. Adapting 
an export sector, i.e. a source of foreign exchange, may take precedence over 
the adaptation of populations in vulnerable territories which are marginal 
to the economy and whose adaptation may have a net cost that there is 
no appetite to bear, creating a vicious circle of inequality. Obviously, this 
is not true only of adaptation; mitigation solutions can also be sources of 
greater equality (better public transport or nature-based solutions in poor 
communities) or inequality (subsidies for low-emission private mobility). In 
Latin America and the Caribbean, both because of its geographical location 
within the area of greatest natural productivity on the planet (between the 
tropics of Cancer and Capricorn) and because of its rural population that is 
highly dependent on the integrity of nature and has a high proportion of 
indigenous peoples, nature-based solutions should be a priority.
The Stern Review (Stern, 2007) marked a milestone in thinking on 
the subject and confirmed the relevance and importance of analysing the 
economic impact of climate change and climate action measures by giving 
the future discount rate a major role in present decision-making. Stern’s 
argument is that the discount rate should be very low or even negative, as it 
recognizes the possibility that future generations may not be better placed 
than present ones and that environmental conditions may be more negative 
than they are now, thus moving away from the conventional notion of a better 
future and greater absolute wealth. This approach was highly controversial 
among specialists,7 but the idea of assessing the costs of inaction in the face 
of climate change became an indispensable methodological yardstick.
There have essentially been two stages in the economic analysis of 
both mitigation and adaptation. The first stage was to estimate the costs 
of global inaction for the twenty-first century. Stern was the first to carry 
out this estimation, which was then conducted at the national level in the 
region with the support of ECLAC and, in Brazil’s case, of the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB). These studies were made possible by advances 
in global and regional climate modelling, with the National Autonomous 
University of Mexico (UNAM) carrying out a study on the Mexican case, the 
National Institute for Space Research of Brazil doing another study in which 
it generated climate models for all of Latin America and the Caribbean, and 
7 In 2018, the Nobel Prize in Economics was awarded to William Nordhaus, one of Stern’s critics, 
who argued that action to address the problem would be less urgent in the context of a more 
prosperous future with sufficient environmental space for a slower change of course.
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the Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre (CCCCC) in Belize, generating 
this information for Central America and the Caribbean. The Mexican case 
was a pioneering one in the region, establishing the methodology designed 
by Galindo (2009) that was subsequently reproduced in the ECLAC approach 
from 2009. This first stage, in which the costs of inaction were assessed, was 
then supplemented by approaches that addressed sectoral impact, e.g. on 
agriculture (Mendelsohn, 2008; Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000; ECLAC, 2015a), 
and the impact on poverty. The aim was to analyse the social dimension of 
this impact, since this is expected to be strongest in agriculture, on which 
large vulnerable populations depend. Some of the results are presented in 
chapter II.
The second stage of analysis is more recent and deals with the potential 
effect of applying instruments. For both mitigation and adaptation, the 
economic analysis is based on estimating business as usual development 
and the associated emissions in order to gauge the sensitivity of the existing 
pathway that the policy will need to modify if the relevant climate target is to 
be met (see diagram 1). Thus, each measure will contribute to attainment of 
the national target, with reduction “wedges” in some sectors or through the 
sector-region mix (see figure 1). In the logic of the Paris Agreement, the sum 
of national contributions should lead to the global target being met. Given 
that national commitments are insufficient to achieve the global target of a 
temperature rise of no more than 2 °C, nationally determined contributions 
should be reviewed periodically.
Diagram 1 
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Source: S. Fankhauser, Valuing Climate Change: The Economics of the Greenhouse, Abingdon, 
Routledge, 1995.
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Figure 1 
Business as usual pathway and reduction wedges resulting from public policies 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
The Paris Agreement, besides its environmental content, had a number 
of unprecedented economic consequences:
(i) First, it defined in absolute terms the planet’s carrying capacity 
for carbon, a crucial element of nature. This made it possible to 
establish a global limit or budget for this element for the first time.
(ii) The adoption of national targets under the Paris Agreement 
created voluntary national carbon limits or budgets, the amount 
of which are to decrease until the targets are met and the collective 
achievement of preventing global warming from exceeding 2 °C 
is achieved. National economic activities must be compatible 
with this limit or budget.
(iii) There is an opportunity cost to using the atmosphere as a natural 
resource. In terms of development, the origin of emissions 
matters, since it is not the same for a ton to be emitted to support 
unproductive discretionary consumption as for it to be emitted by 
an activity that generates productive, inclusive and sustainable 
employment. From the point of view of development consistent 
with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris 
Agreement, both the amount and origin of emissions matter, since 
some serve only to satisfy the consumption pattern of a minority 
of the population, while others could stimulate development.
The climate emergency in Latin America and the Caribbean... 29
(iv) The equitable distribution of the remaining carbon budget among 
the countries of the world is crucial to global environmental 
justice. What is emitted by the group of developed countries and 
the largest emitters in the developing world will determine the 
space left for developing countries. In its nationally determined 
contributions (NDCs), each country specifies the emissions level 
it will aim for over the next five years. It is therefore estimated 
that NDCs are still too unambitious to meet the limits imposed 
by the size of the remaining carbon budget for the 2 °C and 
1.5 °C targets. A country that chooses to breach its limit or that 
is unable to restrict its economy in order to abide by its carbon 
limit or budget will be appropriating the environmental limit or 
budget of another country or another population group, now 
and in the future. Every time emissions limits are exceeded, all 
nations are brought that much closer to an ever-warming world.
IPCC (2018a) set a limit on the amount of cumulative global emissions 
that is consistent with the goal of limiting temperature increases to less than 
1.5 °C and 2 °C above pre-industrial levels. This limit is known as the “carbon 
budget”. It is estimated that to keep the temperature increase below 2 °C 
with a confidence level of 66%, the remaining budget is 1,070 gigatons of 
carbon dioxide (Gt of CO2). To limit the temperature increase to just 1.5 °C, 
the budget is much lower: 320 Gt of CO2. Currently, about 50 gigatons of 
carbon dioxide equivalent (Gt of CO2 eq) are emitted per year, so if this flow 
were to continue, the budget remaining for an increase of up to 1.5 °C would 
run out in less than a decade and that for an increase of less than 2 °C in 
about two decades. In order to keep the global economy within the carbon 
budget limits compatible with the 2 °C target, global emissions would have 
to be reduced from the current 50 Gt of CO2 eq to about 40 Gt of CO2 eq 
by 2030. This means reducing the current 7 tons emitted per capita to less 
than 5 tons per capita (4.7 t of CO2 eq) and achieving neutrality by 2070 (for 
the 2 °C scenario). If we want to stay within the carbon budget for 1.5 °C, 
we should have reduced emissions to 24 Gt of CO2 eq by 2030, i.e. from the 
current 7 tons per capita to less than 3 tons per capita (2.8 tons), and neutrality 
should be achieved by the middle of this century.
The emissions reduction commitments that the United States, the 
European Union, China and India, the largest emitters, made around 2015 
leave little space for all other countries, given the 2 °C threshold and the 
remaining carbon budget. On the basis of the distribution shown in figure 2, 
if the successive revisions of the Paris Agreement do not provide for greater 
reductions by the four major emitters, the budget available for the rest of the 
world will run out by 2030.
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Figure 2 
Carbon budget as per nationally determined contributions in the Paris Agreement 
for the 2 °C target, 1990–2050a
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Source: G. Peters and others, “Measuring a fair and ambitious climate agreement using cumulative 
emissions”, Environmental Research Letters, vol. 10, Bristol, IOP Publishing, 2015; Global Carbon 
Project (GCP), Global Carbon Budget 2015, 2015.
a Budget that offers a 66% likelihood of this target being met.
In this scenario, three types of responses can be anticipated:
(i) Countries pulling out of the Paris Agreement because they consider 
the goal of 1.5 °C or 2 °C to be undesirable or unattainable. 
Without a global agreement, global warming would be worse 
and countries pulling out would obtain short-term advantages, 
as they would avoid making the necessary adjustments to their 
economies.8 It remains to be seen whether the countries that did 
carry on complying with the Agreement could impose sanctions. 
For example, disciplinary measures such as border tariffs could 
be imposed on imports of goods from certain economies without 
there being comparable measures applied to the importing country.
(ii) More pressure from society, and especially the young, for major 
emitters to achieve greater reductions, both in countries that 
withdraw from the Agreement and in those that continue to 
comply with it.
8 This is seen especially when there are changes of government and the new administration does 
not perceive the seriousness of the problem or seeks to differentiate itself from the previous 
government. For example, this happened in the Philippines in 2015, when the incoming government 
described the national goal decided upon by the previous government as nonsense. 
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(iii) A change of course in the development models of countries 
to prioritize renewable energies, decouple from fossil fuels 
and redirect their investments towards adaptation through 
technological innovation and solutions based on nature. This 
response implies a deliberate shift in the composition of the energy 
mix, urbanization,9 mobility, agriculture and the carbon content 
of the economy in general.
As noted earlier, global greenhouse gas emissions were 50 Gt CO2 eq 
in 201610 and Latin America and the Caribbean emitted 4.2 Gt of CO2 eq that 
year, meaning that the region contributed 8.3% of global emissions, according 
to IPCC data (see figure 3).
Figure 3 
Distribution of global greenhouse gas emissions by region, 2016
(Percentages)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL), on the basis of J. Gütschow 
and others, “The PRIMAP-hist national historical emissions time series”, Earth System Science 
Data, vol. 8, No. 2, Göttingen, Copernicus Publications, 2016.
If the carbon budget were distributed in accordance with the current 
global emissions share of Latin America and the Caribbean, the region 
would have a budget of around 47 Gt of CO2 eq and 110 Gt of CO2 eq to meet 
the 1.5 °C and 2 °C targets, respectively. If the region continued to grow in 
line with a business as usual scenario, taking emissions of approximately 
4.2 Gt of CO2 in 2016 as the baseline and assuming an annual increase of 
1.1% because of growth in the economy, the budget compatible with the 
9 There are approaches, such as geoengineering, that follow a very different logic, relying on 
technological advances such as carbon sequestration in the earth’s crust or the seas, or manipulation 
of the solar radiation reaching the Earth, to avoid global warming while at the same time maintaining 
current patterns of mobility and energy production and consumption, with only a few specific 
mitigation actions.
10 See Gütschow and others (2016) for information on sectoral emissions and FAO (2019) for 
information on emissions related to land use change.
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1.5 °C objective would be used up in about 11 years and that compatible 
with the 2 °C objective in just over 23 years. Even if the unconditional and 
conditional contributions were to be adhered to (see annex A5 for more 
details on each country’s contributions), the budget would be used up within 
10 years for the 1.5 °C target and within about 20 years for the 2 °C target 
(see figure 4).
Figure 4 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
The way the emissions limit or carbon budget is allocated at the 
national level needs to be discussed internally to identify how best to use 
this allowance and the effects it has on well-being depending on whether it 
is emitted to produce or consume. In other words, the distributive, economic 
and social implications of using the atmosphere as a repository of emissions 
must be reflected on and acted on. The limit to carbon emissions or the carbon 
budget frames the window of opportunity that should determine the speed 
of change in such fundamental areas as energy production, transport and 
mobility, the way cities are built and the limits set on the transformation 
of nature. The world faces the challenge of changing the magnitude and 
speed of emissions to reduce the annual global flow so as to achieve climate 
neutrality, i.e. a zero net global flow, by 2050 (the Paris Agreement aims at 
climate neutrality by then, and some countries in the region, such as Chile 
and Costa Rica, have signed up to this target). This implies an intermediate 
target of less than 24 gigatons by 2030, in order to limit the temperature 
increase to less than 1.5 ºC. Achieving this transformation far transcends 
specific sectoral or technological policies, requiring a worldwide economic 
shift towards a great environmental effort that must be the dominant purpose 
and goal of technology configurations and public policy tools.
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B. Economic instruments for mitigation 
and adaptation
At present, emissions of CO2 by producers and consumers are cost-free, the 
consumption or production of fossil fuels is encouraged through subsidies 
or tax spending, and the destruction of nature does not show up in the 
economic accounts. Moving from this situation to one in which resilient, 
low-carbon development is incentivized requires a consistent and constant 
realignment of regulatory and economic policy.11 The instruments that can 
be used to promote mitigation and adaptation are very different and will be 
discussed in depth over the course of this book. For now, a general overview 
of the topic will be presented.
With regard to mitigation, available instruments include national and 
urban fiscal policy, reports on the carbon risk of investment portfolios, the 
policy orientation of national and international development banks, risk 
management and, of course, technological innovation. A number of coalitions, 
including the Helsinki Principles coalition, formed by some of the world’s 
finance ministries, and the Platform for Cooperation on Carbon Pricing in the 
Americas, participated in by the Pacific Alliance countries and jurisdictions 
with carbon markets in Canada and on the west coast of the United States, 
advocate the introduction of carbon pricing. The most obvious pricing option 
is a CO2 emissions tax, which has already been implemented at very low 
levels in Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Mexico. It works differently in each 
of these countries, but essentially applies either to the carbon content of the 
fuel to be burned or to the carbon content of emissions. The institutional 
consequences of these two ways of applying the tax are very different: in the 
first case, the tax can be collected at the time of the initial sale in the market, 
so that it is then passed on down the chain of buyers; in the second case, 
since it is collected ex post, there need to be institutions to verify it, and the 
charges are passed on to the consumer with some delay.
Other instruments that can be used for mitigation purposes involve 
indirect carbon pricing. The impact of these instruments is distributed more 
evenly over time. Regulations limiting emissions or requiring higher levels 
of efficiency in the use of fossil fuels or electrical appliances entail an implicit 
carbon price, as do the methodologies used to evaluate investment projects, 
be they public, financial or private. In the current situation, if it remains 
unchanged, the price imposed is zero. However, some countries in the region 
have begun to experiment with variations on evaluation methodologies. Thus, 
Chile has set a rate of US$ 40 per ton emitted in public investments carried 
out directly or through concessions. This experiment is being evaluated in 
five Central American countries with a view to possible adoption.
11 The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) advocates an approach 
based on lower-carbon economic drivers in accordance with the idea of the environmental big 
push (ECLAC 2016 and 2018a).
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To analyse climate change mitigation and adaptation processes 
comparably over time, it is customary to use a discount rate that allows 
economic effects to be expressed at present value. There is an intense extra-
economic debate on what discount rate to use, since a higher rate sets a lower 
value on long-term effects (Hanley and Spash, 1995; Brent, 2008; Boardman 
and others, 2010; Aldred, 2009).12 In Peru, for example, a decision was taken 
in 2015 to reduce the discount rate from 9% to 4% for projects with lower 
environmental impacts, including those considered to have lower carbon 
emissions. In both cases, the shadow or social price of carbon and the reduced 
discount rate allow any additional cost to be distributed throughout the 
useful life of the investment to be made.
Development banks have made policy decisions such as not financing 
certain types of projects and, more generally, favouring projects considered 
to have lower carbon emissions. By way of example, in 2017 Brazil’s National 
Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) decided to stop financing 
large hydroelectric plants.
The application of these policies guides producer and consumer 
markets by gradually modifying the relative profitability and prices of 
decisions by investors and consumers, who choose options with lower carbon 
emissions. The change noted, however, is insufficient. The importance of 
simultaneously introducing affordable substitutes for carbon-intensive 
consumption options cannot be underestimated. Disincentives should 
be compensated for by progressive transfers and alternative investments 
to reduce the risk of generating situations of great social discontent. The 
transition to decarbonized economies is complex, especially in a region 
where it is necessary to change the positive correlation between per capita 
income, per capita energy consumption and per capita CO2 emissions. This 
correlation reflects the energy, agricultural and mobility infrastructure 
built in recent decades and the inertia that persists in what is still being 
built now. To change this correlation, investments must be compatible with 
a development style that generates lower carbon emissions. This is what 
ECLAC has called progressive structural change, which provides a way of 
addressing the urgent need for an environmental big push (ECLAC, 2015a).
12 There is a debate in economics about whether it is justifiable to apply a discount rate to the 
future in a situation completely different to the behaviour of returns on private assets, which is 
the field in which this procedure for measuring returns on investment originated. It does not 
seem reasonable to us to discount the value or preferences of future generations (which of course 
cannot be made known), since a world made more uncertain by global warming does not seem 
more desirable than the present one. The higher the discount rate used when thinking about the 
future, the less urgency is assigned to action today. This does not seem the right way forward, 
given that the depletion of the carbon budget calculated for the 2 °C target means that the window 
of opportunity for action is small.
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Adaptation instruments are less varied, being confined essentially to 
the implementation of insurance reflecting risks, including those relating 
to climate, and to more rigorous spatial planning. Land use regulation and 
spatial planning, like legislation that affects mitigation, create signals that 
change the cost of investing in infrastructure or living in areas exposed to 
greater flooding, drought, hurricanes and sea level rises.
The combination of global and national limitations on emissions (of 
sectoral or territorial application) has created the opportunity to set quantitative 
targets that have made mitigation processes highly visible. Adaptation, on 
the other hand, has been more difficult to pin down (ECLAC, 2014a), and 
specific information has been harder to construct, as it tends to be conflated 
with existing infrastructure deficiencies or extreme events that cannot 
be distinguished from climate variability and are difficult to attribute to 
climate change. Only in 2012 was it possible to create a regional database 
for Latin America and the Caribbean that has served to identify the various 
manifestations of the rise in sea levels, which is entirely attributable to the 
thermal expansion induced by global warming and the continued melting 
of continental ice.
Latin America and the Caribbean is now seeing the emergence of 
adaptation measurement techniques serving to distinguish both risks on 
top of the normal development challenges and the local capacity to deal with 
them. This makes it possible to measure adaptation achievements and gaps, 
set targets, fund the necessary work, harmonize measurements regionally 
and give adaptation the visibility and importance it warrants. ECLAC has 
carried out an exercise relating to agriculture consisting in probabilistic 
inference of options for adapting to climate alterations (Galindo, Alatorre and 
Reyes, 2015a; ECLAC, 2016), in a way, furthermore, that prioritizes solutions 
based on natural systems.
The weaker global mitigation is, the greater the demands of local 
adaptation. It is therefore necessary for national adaptation plans (NAPs) to 
be prepared and implemented in response to new climate conditions, even 
as enhanced mitigation actions are undertaken within the international 
framework. Chile and Uruguay, for example, stand out in the region for their 
progress on adaptation policies. Chile has a national adaptation plan and seven 
sectoral plans associated with the biodiversity, fisheries and aquaculture, 
health, infrastructure, cities, energy and agroforestry sectors. Uruguay also 
has national adaptation plans for cities and the coastal zone, and at least five 
countries in the region have systems of payment for ecosystem services, 
including Costa Rica, whose National Forest Financing Fund (FONAFIFO) 
was a pioneer in this area.
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The good news is that adaptation itself provides an opportunity 
not only to lessen the future negative effects of climate change, but also to 
reduce development gaps and energize the region’s economies. Indeed, the 
most recent report of the Global Commission on Adaptation (2019), led by 
Ban Ki-moon, notes that the total rate of return on adaptation investment 
is very high, with a cost-benefit ratio ranging from 2:1 to 10:1 (a return of 
twice to 10 times each unit invested) and sometimes even more (see figure 5).
Figure 5 
Benefits and costs of illustrative investments in adaptation
(Trillions of dollars)



















Source: Global Commission on Adaptation, Adapt Now: A Global Call for Leadership on Climate Resilience, 
Amsterdam, 2019.
Note: This graph is meant to illustrate the broad economic case for investment in a range of adaptation 
approaches. The net benefits illustrate the approximate global net benefits to be gained by 2030 
from an illustrative investment of US$ 1.8 trillion in five areas (the total does not equal the sum of 
the rows because of rounding). Actual returns depend on many factors, such as economic growth 
and demand, policy context, institutional capacities and condition of assets. Also, these investments 
neither address all that may be needed within sectors (e.g. adaptation in the agricultural sector will 
consist of much more than dryland crop production) nor include all sectors (as health, education 
and industry sectors are not included). Owing to data and methodological limitations, this graph 
does not imply full comparability of investments across sectors or countries.
According to the report of the Global Commission on Adaptation (2019), 
investing $1.8 trillion globally, from 2020 to 2030, in five areas with great 
potential for high returns on adaptation investments (early warning systems, 
climate-resilient infrastructure, improved agricultural crop production 
in drylands, global mangrove protection and investments to make water 
resources more resilient) could generate US$ 7.1 trillion in total net benefits.
Investments in adaptation pay a threefold dividend. The first is loss 
avoidance, i.e. the ability of the investment to reduce future losses; the second 
are the economic benefits of reducing risk (increased productivity and 
innovation through adaptation); and the third are the social and environmental 
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benefits. Thus, investments that support adaptation can have positive effects 
on development, as can investments that have effects on mitigation. Any 
investment aimed at restoring the natural heritage and ecosystem services will 
bring benefits on both the adaptation and the mitigation fronts. Investments 
in social welfare and the provision of high-quality public services also create 
jobs and have positive mitigation effects.
In the case of Latin America and the Caribbean, the social benefits of 
investments and policies to restore ecosystems and improve urban mobility, 
land-use planning and urban planning are substantial. All of them generate 
better living conditions for the population. Policies and investments to 
improve urban mobility not only help to cut greenhouse gas emissions, but 
also and especially reduce the negative effects on the health of the most 
vulnerable caused by air pollution, generate employment, reduce travel 
times and accidents, and are inclusive from the point of view of gender and 
older persons. Another example is investment in the proper management 
of solid and liquid waste in cities, which has advantages not only in terms 
of reducing methane emissions but also in the areas of social inclusion and 
disease prevention, and increases the potential for job creation because the 
materials can be reused.
This book presents the results of more than a decade of work carried out 
at the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) 
on the economics of climate change. It analyses the global evidence and the 
impact of climate change in the region, examining sectors such as agriculture, 
health, transport and energy. The links between climate change, sea level, 
biodiversity and the water challenge are studied. In particular, the effects on 
the two most vulnerable subregions, Central America and the Caribbean, are 
addressed and an account is given of the agreements reached in the region 
to tackle the problem of global warming.
The book takes a structuralist approach in which the organizing concept 
is that of progressive structural change, defined as a process of transformation 
towards activities and production processes whose three characteristics are 
that they are intensive in learning and innovation (Schumpeterian efficiency), 
are associated with rapidly expanding markets enabling production and 
employment to increase (Keynesian efficiency) and favour environmental 
sustainability and the decoupling of economic growth from carbon emissions 
(environmental efficiency).
The aim is to promote growth that creates jobs and solves environmental 
problems. This requires institutions and policies that favour expansionary 
fiscal stances and investments in low-carbon technologies, goods, services 
and infrastructure; in particular, it means applying technology to preserve 
the environment and switching from fossil fuel-based energies to renewable 
ones. This in turn requires economic policies that transform relative price 
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structures, regulations and standards. As context, progress on NDCs, climate 
finance flows and public policy innovations aimed at moving towards 
lower-carbon development better suited to a warming world are presented. 
Responding to the challenge of climate change in Latin America and 
the Caribbean represents a financial, economic, social, cultural, distributive 
and innovation effort, but it also provides an opportunity for the region to 
move towards more sustainable and inclusive development (ECLAC, 2016c).
The book consists of five chapters. The first presents the evidence for 
the climate change that is occurring in the world, and includes global analyses 
and projections. The second characterizes the phenomenon in Latin America 
and the Caribbean and links it to the style of development followed in the 
region over the long term. The third chapter focuses on two subregions where 
the social and economic effects of climate change are particularly severe: 
Central America and the Caribbean. The fourth chapter identifies the main 
adaptation measures in the region, including climate-induced migration. 
Lastly, the fifth chapter sets out strategies and policy lines for synergistic 
progress in the sectors and policies that will make it possible to deal with the 
environmental emergency, together with their contributions to development. 
As part of public policy, emphasis is placed on the importance of access to 
information, participation and environmental justice and the relevance of 
the Escazú Agreement to discussions on climate change.
Chapter I
Global climate change
The increase in greenhouse gas emissions resulting from global production 
and consumption decisions is already having a noticeable effect on the climate. 
Temperatures have been rising, and this in turn has led to other changes in 
the climate system.1 Unless prevented, the changes projected will have major 
negative effects on human welfare. This chapter presents empirical data on 
global climate change and projections for different scenarios. It discusses 
the role of the current economic system as the main determinant of fossil 
fuel burning, emissions from this and climate change. 
A. Manifestations of climate change
There is unequivocal scientific evidence that current climate change is 
anthropogenic.2 In just 200 years, human activities have brought about the 
kind of changes in the climate that would have taken millions of years to 
occur naturally. The cause is greenhouse gas emissions derived mainly 
from activities such as the burning of fossil fuels, cement manufacturing 
and changes in land use. Temperature has already increased by about 1 °C 
relative to the average temperature before the industrial revolution that 
began in the eighteenth century. If the temperature continues to rise at the 
same rate as that seen in recent decades, within a few years the terrestrial 
system will be in a state unprecedented in human history, although not in 
geological history. If global emissions continue to grow as fast as they have, 
1 This is a highly complex system consisting of five main components (the atmosphere, the 
hydrosphere, the cryosphere, the lithosphere and the biosphere) and the interactions between 
them. The climate system evolves over time, influenced by its own internal dynamics and by 
external factors such as volcanic eruptions or solar variations and anthropogenic ones such as 
changes in the composition of the atmosphere and land use change.
2 Climate change is a naturally occurring cyclical planetary process. The current phenomenon is 
different because of its great speed and human, i.e. anthropogenic origin. 
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the temperature in 2030 could resemble that experienced about 3 million years 
ago, in the middle of the Pliocene. During that geological era, there were no 
areas of permanent ice in the northern hemisphere and the sea level was 
25 metres higher than it is today.
The increase in the average global temperature (which has large local 
variations, especially at higher latitudes) is being manifested by alterations in 
precipitation patterns, a rising sea level, a reduction in the cryosphere and an 
intensification of extreme weather events (IPCC, 2013b; ECLAC, 2015a). The 
central problem is that the speed of global warming and its consequences 
are outstripping the ability of social and economic systems to adapt, and 
the result is a highly regressive distribution of impact. Failure to alter the 
factors causing it, especially the burning of fossil fuels, is aggravating the 
problem and delaying the significant introduction of alternative patterns of 
investment, production and consumption.
That the climate is altering is obvious (IPCC, 2013a). The average global 
temperature rose by 0.85 °C (between 0.65 °C and 1.06 °C)3 from 1880 to 2012, 
and there is evidence that the last three decades have been progressively 
warming, with the period between 1983 and 2019 being probably the hottest 
in the last 1,400 years. The average temperature increase has been manifested 
in a reduction in the number of cold days and nights and an increase in the 
number of warm days and nights. In addition, the mass of the Greenland 
and Antarctic ice caps has been decreasing, almost all glaciers have retreated 
and Arctic ice cover has declined significantly. The average sea level rose by 
0.19 metres (between 0.17 and 0.21 metres) in the period from 1901 to 2010 
and is currently rising by about 3 millimetres a year (ECLAC/University 
of Cantabria, 2015b), and forest fires have been becoming more intense 
(see figure I.1).
Figure I.1 
Manifestations of climate change, 1880–2019
A. Anomalies in the combined land and ocean surface temperature relative 













































3  Calculated from a linear trend.
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B. Reduction in the extent of Arctic sea ice, 1979–2018b













































































































































































D. Increase in monthly concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere, 1980–2019d
(parts per million)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Goddard 
Institute for Space Studies (GISS), National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC) and National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
a Temperature figures are annual averages for combined global land and ocean surface temperatures over 
the years from 1880 to 2018. Increases are calculated relative to the period 1951–1980. The data are 
from the Goddard Institute for Space Studies (GISS). 
b Data on Arctic sea ice come from the National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC) and are for September of each year. 
c The data on sea level rise were obtained by satellite altimetry and come from the Laboratory for Satellite 
Altimetry of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Seasonality signals were 
eliminated and six-month moving averages taken. 
d The data on atmospheric concentration of CO2 are global measurements and come from the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
Figure I.1 (concluded)
42 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
According to the climate projections of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) (2013b), the temperature will increase by an average 
of between 1 °C and 2 °C by the middle of the twenty-first century relative to 
the average temperature in the period 1986–2005 (see figure I.2). Furthermore, 
by 2100 the temperature is expected to rise by between 1 °C and 3.7 °C, with 
a maximum likely increase of up to 4.8 °C (see table I.1) (ECLAC, 2015a).
Figure I.2 
Anomaly in the annual temperature of the earth’s surface relative to the 1986–2005 average
(Degrees centigrade)
A. Change in the annual temperature of the earth’s surface, 1000–2012
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Simulations of future scenarios (CMIP5)a Uncertainty (RCP8.5)b
Uncertainty (RCP2.6)b
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), The economics of climate 
change in Latin America and the Caribbean: paradoxes and challenges of sustainable development 
(LC/G.2624), Santiago, 2015; P. Jones and others, “High-resolution palaeoclimatic records for the 
last millennium: interpretation, integration and comparison with General Circulation Model control-
run temperatures”, The Holocene, vol. 8, No. 4, Thousand Oaks, SAGE Publishing, 1998; M. Mann 
and P. Jones, “Global surface temperatures over the past two millennia”, Geophysical Research 
Letters, vol. 30, No. 15, Hoboken, Wiley, 2003; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, T. Stocker and others 
(eds.), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013; R. Moss and others, “The next generation 
of scenarios for climate change research and assessment”, Nature, No. 463, Berlin, Springer, 2010.
a Simulated time series based on the multiple models of the fifth phase of the Coupled Model Intercomparison 
Project (CMIP5) for the period 1950–2100.
b RCP stands for representative concentration pathways.
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Table I.1 
Projected increases in the world’s average surface air temperature and average 
sea level relative to 1986–2005, 2046–2065 and 2081–2100
Variable Scenario
2046–2065 2081–2100




RCP2.6 1.0 0.4–1.6 1.0 0.3–1.7
RCP4.5 1.4 0.9–2.0 1.8 1.1–2.6
RCP6.0 1.3 0.8–1.8 2.2 1.4–3.1
RCP8.5 2.0 1.4–2.6 3.7 2.6–4.8
Mean sea levelb 
(metres)
RCP2.6 0.24 0.17–0.32 0.40 0.26–0.55
RCP4.5 0.26 0.19–0.33 0.47 0.32–0.63
RCP6.0 0.25 0.18–0.32 0.48 0.33–0.63
RCP8.5 0.30 0.22–0.38 0.63 0.45–0.82
Source: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), “Summary for policymakers”, Climate Change 
2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, T. Stocker and others (eds.), Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2013; Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC), The economics of climate change in Latin America and the Caribbean: paradoxes and 
challenges of sustainable development (LC/G.2624), Santiago, 2015.
a The fifth phase of the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP5) involves presentation of joint results 
and calculation of temperature anomalies relative to the period 1986–2005. Using the HadCRUT4 model 
and bearing in mind its uncertainty (confidence interval of between 5% and 95%), the average 
warming observed in the period 1986–2005 was 0.61 ºC (between 0.55 ºC and 0.67 ºC) relative to the 
period 1850–1900.
b Based on 21 CMIP5 models. Temperature anomalies are calculated in relation to the period 1986–2005. 
Where CMIP5 results are not available for a particular atmosphere-ocean general circulation model 
(AOGCM) and a scenario, the results are estimated as explained in table 13.5 of chapter 13 of IPCC (2013b). 
Contributions derived from a rapid change in ice cover and from anthropogenic storage of groundwater 
are treated as if they behaved in accordance with a uniform probability distribution and to a great extent 
independently of the scenario. This treatment does not imply that the contributions concerned cannot 
provide the basis for a quantitative assessment of dependence on the different scenarios. On current 
knowledge, only if the Antarctic ice sheet collapsed could the global mean sea level rise considerably 
above the likely range during the twenty-first century. There is a medium level of confidence that this 
additional contribution would not represent a sea level rise of more than a few decimetres during the 
twenty-first century.
c The calculations are based on projections derived from models whose ranges of results fall between 5% 
and 95% of the results distribution. Evaluation is then carried out and the probable range obtained after 
taking account of other uncertainties or different levels of confidence in the models. Where the projections 
for the change in the global mean surface temperature in 2046–2065 are concerned, the confidence level 
is medium because the relative importance of natural internal variability and uncertainty about forcing due 
to non-greenhouse gases and the response are greater than in the period 2081–2100. The likely ranges 
for 2046–2065 do not take into account the possible influence of the factors leading to the resulting range 
for the short-term global mean surface temperature change (2016–2035), which is lower than that of the 
5% to 95% models. This is because scientific knowledge is insufficient for the influence of these factors 
on longer-term projections to be quantified.
d The calculations are based on projections derived from models whose ranges of results fall between 5% 
and 95% of the results distribution. Evaluation is then carried out and the probable range obtained after 
taking account of other uncertainties or different levels of confidence in the models. The confidence level 
for the projections of the average global rise in sea level is medium for both time horizons.
Moreover, in all projected scenarios except the one that assumes 
aggressive mitigation measures (RCP2.6), an average temperature increase 
over the pre-industrial era (1750) of over 1.5 °C, and very probably over 2 °C, 
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is expected by the end of the century.4 The current emissions pathway is close 
to the RCP8.5 scenario, which is associated with an increase greater than 
or equal to 4 °C (World Bank, 2013). If this tendency continues, therefore, it 
seems inevitable that the temperature will rise by 2 °C by the middle of the 
twenty-first century (Vergara and others, 2013), which will make it difficult to 
achieve the goal of complying with the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement.
These projections indicate a high likelihood of the frequency of 
extreme high temperatures increasing and that of extreme cold temperatures 
decreasing (ECLAC, 2015a; IPCC, 2013a). Towards the end of the century, this 
will be accompanied by changes in the intensity and frequency of extreme 
precipitation phenomena (IPCC, 2013a). In addition, the global intensity of 
tropical cyclones is likely to increase, although uncertainty persists as to 
how their frequency will evolve. Arctic ice cover and the size of glaciers will 
continue to decline (IPCC, 2013a), and sea levels will continue to rise, more 
quickly indeed than in 1971–2010 (IPCC, 2013a), so that increases of between 
24 cm and 30 cm and between 40 cm and 63 cm are expected by the middle 
and end of the twenty-first century, respectively.
The changes are also evident in Latin America and the Caribbean. It 
is observed that the average temperature from 2000–2016 was 0.7%, higher 
than the average from 1901–19905 and that extreme weather events, such as 
droughts and floods, have become more frequent (IPCC, 2012; Magrin and 
others, 2007 and 2014; Wang and others, 2014).
According to the climate projections for the most optimistic emissions 
scenario (RCP2.6), the temperature will increase by an average of about 
1 °C by 2100 relative to 1986–2005 in all the subregions of Latin America 
and the Caribbean. Climate projections suggest, with a medium level of 
confidence, that temperatures will rise by between 1.6 °C and 4 °C in Central 
and South America. The level of precipitation in Central America is projected 
to change by between -22% and 7% by the end of the twenty-first century. 
4 The Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) presented 
the following scenarios: one where mitigation processes result in a very low level of radiative 
forcing (RCP2.6); two stabilization scenarios (RCP4.5 and RCP6.0); and one scenario with very 
high levels of greenhouse gases (RCP8.5). RCP2.6 shows an emissions pathway that leads to 
very low levels of greenhouse gas concentrations, with emissions peaking and then gradually 
declining until a substantial reduction is achieved. Scenarios RCP4.5 and RCP6.0 show radiative 
forcing stabilizing after 2100, while scenario RCP8.5 is characterized by a progressive increase 
in greenhouse gas emissions, which reach a high concentration. Radiative forcing is the effect of 
the heat retention of each substance in the atmosphere and thus of the respective combination 
of gases in the atmosphere. The IPCC uses the term radiative forcing to denote an externally 
imposed perturbation in the radiative energy budget (the total available) of the Earth’s climate. In 
the scenarios, which are called representative concentration pathways (RCPs), the total radiative 
forcing by 2100 relative to 1750 is approximately calculated: 2.6 W/m2 in the case of RCP2.6; 
4.5 W/m2 in RCP4.5; 6.0 W/m2 in RCP6.0; and 8.5 W/m2 in RCP8.5.
5 Estimated by the authors based on data from the World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal.
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Projections for South America are heterogeneous and the level of confidence 
is low. For example, it is estimated that rainfall will decrease by 22% in 
north-eastern Brazil and increase by 25% in south-eastern South America.
In addition, climate phenomena such as the intertropical convergence 
zone, the North and South American monsoon system, El Niño-Southern 
Oscillation, Atlantic Ocean oscillations and tropical cyclones occur in 
Latin America and the Caribbean (IPCC, 2013a and 2013b). In this context, 
annual precipitation has increased in south-eastern South America,6 parts of 
the Plurinational State of Bolivia and north-eastern Peru and Ecuador and 
decreased in central-southern Chile, north-eastern Brazil, southern Peru and 
parts of Central America and Mexico (IPCC, 2012 and 2013a; Magrin and 
others, 2007 and 2014). Likewise, glaciers retreated significantly during the 
second half of the twentieth century (IPCC, 2012 and 2013a; Magrin and others, 
2007 and 2014). For more detailed information, see annex A1, which provides 
annual projections for temperature and precipitation in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, divided into the following subregions: Central America and 
Mexico, the Caribbean, the Amazon, north-eastern Brazil, the west coast of 
South America and south-eastern South America.
B. Greenhouse gas emissions
As already noted, anthropogenic activities are the essential cause of 
global warming.7 Concentrations of CO2 increased from 280 parts per 
million (ppm) in the pre-industrial era (1750) to about 407 ppm in 2018 (Tans 
and Keeling, 2014; IPCC, 2013a; NOAA, 2016). In 2016, global greenhouse 
gas emissions were 50 Gt of CO2 eq;8 Latin America and the Caribbean 
emitted 4.2 Gt of CO2 eq that year, giving the region an 8.3% share of total 
emissions (see figure I.3). The region’s emissions increased considerably 
from the mid-nineteenth century to 1992, the year the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted. The 
emissions growth rate has eased since then, and the post-Kyoto period 
(since 2012) has had the lowest emissions growth rate so far (see figure I.4). 
6 South-eastern South America covers south-east Brazil and the centre-east area of Argentina, plus 
Uruguay and Paraguay.
7 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) began to document the evolution of 
global warming in the 1980s, and it was in the Fifth Assessment Report that it finally attributed 
this unequivocally to the burning of fossil fuels and land use change. For specific confidence 
levels, see IPCC (2013a and 2013b).
8  See Gütschow, J. and others (2016) and FAO (2019) for more information on emissions from land 
use change. 
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Figure I.3 
Latin America and the Caribbean and the world: greenhouse  
gas emissions, 1990–2016
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of J. Gütschow 
and others, “The PRIMAP-hist national historical emissions time series”, Earth System Science Data, 
vol. 8, No. 2, Göttingen, Copernicus Publications, 2016; and Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations (FAO), Corporate Database for Substantive Statistical Data (FAOSTAT) [online] 
http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/.
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Figure I.4 
Growth in global greenhouse gas emissions, 1850–2016
(Percentages)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of J. Gütschow 
and others, “The PRIMAP-hist national historical emissions time series”, Earth System Science Data, 
vol. 8, No. 2, Göttingen, Copernicus Publications, 2016; and Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations (FAO), Corporate Database for Substantive Statistical Data (FAOSTAT) [online] 
http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/.
In this context, the emissions of Latin America and the Caribbean 
have four salient characteristics that should be considered (ECLAC, 2014a):
(a) Fundamental asymmetry. As will be discussed in detail in the 
next chapter, although the total emissions of the Latin American 
and  Caribbean region account for 8.3% of global emissions, a 
percentage similar to its share of the world’s population and gross 
domestic product (GDP), it is particularly vulnerable to the impact 
of climate change. 
(b) The structure of emissions. The structure of the region’s emissions 
is different from that of global emissions. Whereas 70% of the 
world’s emissions come from the energy sector, the energy sector 
share in the region is 45% and that of agriculture and livestock is 
23% (see figure I.5). The fact that 19% of emissions in Latin America 
and the Caribbean originate from changes in land use indicates 
that there is significant scope for mitigation in respect of 
deforestation there.
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Figure I.5 
Latin America and the Caribbean and the world: sectoral shares 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of J. Gütschow 
and others, “The PRIMAP-hist national historical emissions time series”, Earth System Science Data, 
vol. 8, No. 2, Göttingen, Copernicus Publications, 2016; and Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations (FAO), Corporate Database for Substantive Statistical Data (FAOSTAT) [online] 
http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/.
(c) The dynamics of emissions. In Latin America and the Caribbean, 
emissions from all sectors continue to rise and, as in the rest of 
the world, the greatest increase has been in the energy sector 
(see figure  I.6). As a result, the energy component is becoming 
increasingly important in the region’s emissions, and transport 
has been one of the fastest-growing sectors within this. At the 
same time, different rates of emissions growth have resulted in 
large relative changes in the positions of emitters, with Asia, and 
particularly China, bulking very large.
(d) Per capita emissions. In 2016, emissions in Latin America and 
the Caribbean were about 4.2 Gt of CO2 eq, or about 6.6 tons per 
capita, on a par with the world average of 6.7 tons per capita (see 
figure I.7). Emissions due to land use change significantly swell the 
total and sustain a per capita average equal to the global average, 
despite the region’s relatively clean energy mix, with limited use 
of coal and extensive use of hydropower.
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Figure I.6 
Latin America and the Caribbean: greenhouse gas emissions,  
1990, 2000 and 2016
A. Latin America and the Caribbean: greenhouse gas emissions
by sector, 1990, 2000 and 2016




























B. Latin America and the Caribbean: CO2 emissions 
by the energy sector, 1990, 2000 and 2016






























Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of J. Gütschow 
and others, “The PRIMAP-hist national historical emissions time series”, Earth System Science 
Data, vol. 8, No. 2, Göttingen, Copernicus Publications, 2016; M. Muntean and others, Fossil CO2 
Emissions of All World Countries: 2018 Report, Luxembourg, European Commission, 2018.
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Figure I.7 
Latin America and the Caribbean: greenhouse gas emissions per capita, 2016
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of J. Gütschow 
and others, “The PRIMAP-hist national historical emissions time series”, Earth System Science 
Data, vol. 8, No. 2, Göttingen, Copernicus Publications, 2016; Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations (FAO), Corporate Database for Substantive Statistical Data (FAOSTAT) 
[online] http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/.
From the dynamic point of view, there are various greenhouse gas 
emission or concentration scenarios that can be used to construct climate 
change projections (ECLAC, 2015a). The Fifth Assessment Report of the 
IPCC (2013a) considers the following scenarios: one where mitigation leads 
to a very low level of radiative forcing (RCP2.6), two stabilization scenarios 
(RCP4.5 and RCP6.0) and a scenario with very high levels of greenhouse 
gases (RCP8.5) (see figure I.8).
Each pathway analysed by the IPCC involves a relationship between 
the concentration of greenhouse gases (the stock deposited in the atmosphere), 
expressed in parts per million, and the likelihood that the temperature 
will rise and other climate alterations will occur (see table I.2). The most 
optimistic scenario, RCP2.6, entails a concentration of greenhouse gases, 
or CO2 equivalent, of 475 parts per million. This concentration would lead to 
a temperature increase of more than 1 °C in 94% of climate models, 1.5 °C in 
56% and 2 °C in 22%. With thermal accumulation of close to 1 °C estimated 
in 2015 compared to 1961–1990, emissions in the coming years are expected 
to further transform the climate system.
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Figure I.8 
Global emissions of CO2, 2000–2100
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of C. Le Quéré 
and others, “Global carbon budget 2014”, Earth System Science Data, vol. 7, Göttingen, Copernicus 
Publications, 2015; P. Kolp and K. Riahi, RCP Database, 2009 [online] http://www.iiasa.ac.at/web-
apps/tnt/RcpDb.
Note: RCP stands for representative concentration pathway.
Table I.2 
Global warming scenarios: proportion of climate models whose projections 






CO2, CH4 and 
N2O in 2100
(parts per million of 
CO2 equivalent)
ΔT>+1.0 °C ΔT>+1.5 °C ΔT>+2.0 °C ΔT>+3.0 °C ΔT>+4.0 °C
RCP2.6b 475 94 56 22 0 0
RCP4.5 630 100 100 79 12 0
RCP6.0 800 100 100 100 36 0
RCP8.5 1 313 100 100 100 100 62
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution 
of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, T. Stocker and others (eds.), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013.
a The projections are for the global models of the fifth phase of the Coupled Model Intercomparison 
Project (CMIP5).
b RCP stands for representative concentration pathway.
At the outer end of the IPCC radiative forcing scenarios (2013b), a 
temperature increase of between 1.7 °C and 4.8 °C is envisaged by the end 
of the century if business as usual continues. Other climate alterations are 
also expected, such as an average sea level rise of between 40 cm and 63 cm. 
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Similarly, projections indicate that the world’ s glaciers will shrink by 15% 
to 55% by the end of the twenty-first century in the RCP2.6 scenario and 
by 35% to 85% in the RCP8.5 scenario, and that precipitation patterns will 
probably intensify (IPCC, 2013a).
The climate and greenhouse gas emissions scenarios show, with 
some degree of uncertainty, that stabilizing the climate at a temperature 
increase of no more than 2 °C would mean reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions from the 47 Gt of CO2 eq emitted in 2016 to 24 Gt of CO2 eq by 
2030 (see figure I.9). This would mean reducing emissions of CO2 equivalent 
per capita from almost seven tons, which is what is currently emitted, to 
about three tons by 2030, given the approximately 7 billion inhabitants the 
planet has at present and the 8.5 billion projected for 2030. The challenge, 
therefore, is to move from approximately seven tons to three tons per capita 
in a decade, while maintaining or increasing the pace of economic growth. 
This would imply that the infrastructure that is currently being built and 
will be in use by 2030 must be compatible with economies that generate 
low CO2 emissions.
Figure I.9 
Global greenhouse gas emissions under different scenarios and the emissions gap by 2030
(Gigatons of CO2 equivalent)
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Source: United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Emissions Gap Report 2018, Nairobi, 2018.
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The agreement reached at the Conference of the Parties to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 2015 was a significant 
step forward, but insufficient to meet the challenge of climate change. The 
countries of Latin America and the Caribbean presented their nationally 
determined contributions (NDCs) at the Conference of the Parties in Paris 
and ratified their commitments during 2016 (see table I.3). The NDCs include 
mitigation and adaptation targets across a broad range of economic sectors 
and activities and in some cases call for early action (before 2020). They 
also include sectoral targets and, in some countries, even specify possible 
public policy instruments and certain market mechanisms that could be 
used. In addition, a distinction is often made between unconditional targets 
(objectives to be achieved using the country’s own resources) and conditional 
targets (to be achieved if additional resources are forthcoming)9. Given that 
targets to stabilize temperature at an increase of no more than 2 °C imply a 
significant reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions between 2020 and 
2030, the effort committed to in the NDCs is insufficient to stabilize climate 
conditions (UNEP, 2018). For this reason, it is necessary for the targets set to 
be raised in future rounds or reviews (Black-Arbeláez, 2018).
Box I.1 shows the main outcomes of the twenty-fifth session of the 
Conference of the Parties, held in Madrid.
Box I.1  
The state of international negotiations under the Paris Agreement  
and related progress
At the twenty-fifth session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 25), held in Madrid in 2019, the main 
points dealt with were as follows:
• Greater ambition when nationally determined contributions (NDCs) are reviewed;
• Inclusion of the oceans and sectors such as electric mobility and the circular 
economy in the negotiations;
• The agreement on carbon markets and their accounting rules (Paris Agreement 
article 6); 
• Revision of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated 
with Climate Change Impacts; 
• The gender action plan;
• Response measures;
• Capacity-building arrangements;
• The enhanced transparency framework for action and support established at 
COP 21 and its reporting format.
9 Nationally determined contributions (NDCs) represent the commitments and initiatives adopted by 
each of the countries vis-à-vis the international community under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate change (UNFCCC). The aim of these commitments and initiatives is 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and keep the increase in the average global temperature 
below 2 °C or even 1.5 °C relative to the pre-industrial era, taking into consideration national 
circumstances, implementation strategies, monitoring mechanisms and information availability 
(UNFCCC, 2016).
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The main advances will now be summarized:
Ambition: A growing number of low-emission countries are supporting the goal 
of carbon neutrality by 2050 as part of the Climate Ambition Alliance. Countries also 
showed their ambition with their updated NDCs for 2020. Ten countries in Latin America 
and the Caribbean (Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Paraguay and Peru) made a commitment to generate 
70% of their electricity from renewable sources by 2030, an initiative presented by 
Colombia. The European Commission announced the European Green Deal, whose 
main objective is to make the European Union climate-neutral. As for the large carbon 
emitters, they are not showing a great level of ambition. As climate culture increases, 
so negotiations are becoming increasingly decoupled from social demands. Social 
urgency is not being reflected in the level of ambition and the dynamics of discussions 
on the Paris Agreement. The Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) made significant progress on the technical documents 
that will enable progress to be made in the run-up to the twenty-sixth session of the 
Conference (COP 26), which will be held in Glasgow (United Kingdom) in 2020. The 
consensus regime means that negotiating issues are at the mercy of shifting agendas 
and progress cannot be made in areas that should be of common interest. However, 
the importance of science for making key decisions on innovation, technology transfer, 
capacity-building and nature-based solutions, as well as for more ambitious, rapid 
and effective climate action, is recognized.
Sectoral issues: The Latin American States recognize their strategic role in 
nature-based solutions, given that they are home to several of the world’s most 
important coastal, mountain, forest and water systems. On Chile’s initiative, the 
issue of oceans and land use was addressed at COP 25. At the session dedicated 
to agriculture and forests, the Latin American and Caribbean Platform for Climate 
Action in Agriculture (PLACA) was launched; nine countries of the region joined it and 
the first meeting will take place in March 2020. At the session dealing with energy, 
the ministers of Chile and Colombia established the regional target for Latin America 
and the Caribbean of obtaining 70% of energy from renewable sources by 2030. A 
session was also devoted to transport. Progress was made in mainstreaming climate 
action into all production sectors so that they would become part of the solution. 
A coalition of finance ministers from 51 countries representing 30% of global GDP 
launched an action plan to address climate change. Recognition of the vulnerability 
of African countries led to tension over the possibility that it would skew the flow of 
financial resources by underplaying the vulnerability of other regions of the world. 
The project to support the strengthening of the designated national Green Climate 
Fund authorities for Argentina, Costa Rica, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay and Uruguay through the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) was presented. This project will help to identify and address the 
main barriers to electric mobility, through assessments and creation of the necessary 
capacities, as well as the provision of financing alternatives to accelerate the adoption 
of electric mobility technology.
Financing: Only US$ 10 billion out of US$ 100 billion is available for the Green 
Climate Fund. Moreover, part of this Fund is being delivered in the form of credit, 
thus diminishing its status as an international transfer mechanism. It is expected that 
by COP 26 there will be more mandates (as a fund-raising mechanism), and that the 
discussion on long-term financing will include a new collective goal of mobilizing 
funding of more than $100 billion per year. This will be done in the framework of the 
Conference of the Parties, and will no longer include only the developed countries listed 
in annex I of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
as donors, but will also include countries at an intermediate level of development. 
Contributions to the Adaptation Fund were renewed, but its source of funding, the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) fee, expired. Funding based on internationally 
transferred mitigation outcomes was not accepted. There is a shortfall in mandates 
associated with adaptation: there were no applications at previous sessions of the 
Conference. There is no mechanism for funding losses and damage, nor is there funding 
for the gender plan. Besides, the real economic and financial discussion takes place 
outside the Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
Box I.1 (continued)
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Transparency in the presentation of progress reports: No progress has been 
made in this area. Another attempt will be made at the United Nations Climate Change 
Conference, to be held in Bonn in June 2020, with the aim of adopting a decision in 
the run-up to COP 26. The Latin American and Caribbean countries support the use 
of common tabular formats, provided that training is provided for their completion and 
for the audit process, as they are highly technical.
Losses and damage: The Warsaw International Mechanism, which supports those 
most vulnerable to climate change, was renewed. In this area, the Santiago Network 
for Averting, Minimizing and Addressing Loss and Damage was created with the aim 
of catalysing technical support to deal with the effects and building capacity in the 
most vulnerable countries. Decisions about the governance of the Warsaw International 
Mechanism and its financing were left pending.
Non-State actors: Local governments are showing greater ambition than national 
ones, as they gain large co-benefits from climate action; however, they are not part of 
the UNFCCC, and their contribution is subsumed in the national effort. The countries 
of the Independent Association for Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC), together 
with Argentina and Uruguay, have expressed interest in addressing climate action at 
the local level, involving cities and the private sector more in their climate goals. The 
Global Climate Action Agenda, aimed at promoting and implementing climate action 
by non-State actors such as local governments and businesses, was extended for 
five more years. An extension of the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action 
climate training and participation programme was agreed. This is an opportunity to 
generate social consensuses over the level of national and international ambition. The 
minimum funding for training will be of the order of some thousands of dollars. There 
is a deficit of mandates related to this area.
The gender action plan: The enhanced Lima work programme on gender and 
its gender action plan were approved for 5 years, with extensive participation by 
Mexico, Costa Rica and Peru, and will be revised in 2022. The plan pays special 
attention to the implementation and scaling up of fair climate solutions from a gender 
perspective. It will strengthen the role and empowerment of women in their respective 
local communities, providing them with tools to better address climate change. It is 
innovative in establishing a central link between the human rights agenda and the different 
types of discrimination suffered by women because of their gender. It was agreed, 
within this framework, to organize a technical workshop on gender, to create a formal 
network of women negotiators in the UNFCCC process and to hold a high-level event 
on gender justice for climate change and biodiversity. There is no funding agreement 
for the gender action plan, but there is a commitment to achieve it. Better collection 
of data and improved use of policy tools (such as gender budgeting) were urged. The 
work of the gender action plan will extend beyond the United Nations.
Markets (Paris Agreement article 6): There were advances with the technical 
documents that will allow progress to be made in the run-up to COP 26; however, 
there is no agreement on markets, so private international financing is uncertain. It 
is possible that de facto solutions will come from transactions, even in the absence 
of a negotiated framework. Interests differ greatly between countries with lower and 
higher mitigation costs, making consensus agreements difficult. There is a persistent 
culture in the developed world of outsourcing efforts to developing countries, using 
arguments of environmental integrity, while developing countries are arguing for the 
need to maintain the integrity of certificates that reflect past mitigation efforts, as well 
as their contractual relationships. The effort to reconcile the economic integrity of past 
efforts with climate ambition is thus becoming fraught, in a context where mitigation 
targets are insufficient in themselves and insignificant if the validity of certificates issued 
during the stage of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change is upheld. The discussion thus veers between raising the ambition of 
the targets and invalidating past reduction certificates, with all the attendant economic 
costs. Costa Rica proposed the San José Principles for High Ambition and Integrity 
in International Carbon Markets, under which the reductions considered under the 
Kyoto Protocol would be eliminated. Several Latin American countries signed up to them, 
but Brazil, Chile and Mexico did not. Several European States also rejected this option.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
Box I.1 (concluded)



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The effects of climate change in the region
There are four characteristics of climate change that hinder efforts towards a 
solution, particularly in developing countries, and most of all in Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC, 2015a).
(i) The time paradox. Climate change is a process whose full effects 
manifest themselves in the long run. Even if present effects are 
difficult to identify, however, there is increasing awareness that 
the solution requires immediate action involving simultaneous 
mitigation and adaptation.
(ii) The fundamental asymmetry between emissions and vulnerability. 
Overall emissions in Latin America and the Caribbean account 
for only 8.3% of the global total,1 but at the same time the 
region’s geographical, climatic, socioeconomic and demographic 
characteristics make it particularly vulnerable to the impacts 
of climate change (ECLAC, 2015c). One example is the great 
sensitivity of its natural assets, such as forests and biodiversity, to 
this change. Estimates put the economic costs of climate change 
in the region at between 1.5% and 5% of current regional gross 
domestic product (GDP) by 2050, adding together the effects of 
losses in agriculture and hydroelectric generation, disease vectors, 
1 Although the level of regional emissions is low by comparison with global emissions, their local 
importance is very great because greenhouse gas emissions from the burning of fossil fuels are 
associated with emissions of other pollutants harmful to health. As will be seen later, this burden 
of pollution is severe in many cities of Latin America and the Caribbean.
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extreme events and other destructive factors.2 This impact is 
non-linear and varies from subregion to subregion and period to 
period (positive effects can even be expected for some periods in 
the south of the Southern Cone).
(iii) Inequality within countries. There is also asymmetry at the national 
level which, in combination with that discussed in the previous 
point, results in a twofold inequality. The poor are generally 
most vulnerable to the negative impacts of climate change, 
while their contribution to greenhouse gas emissions within a 
given country is lower than that of higher-income groups. This 
is the result of segmented and highly differentiated fossil fuel 
consumption patterns.
(iv) The inevitability and urgency of adaptation. Given the increased 
frequency of extreme weather events and the pathway of greenhouse 
gas emissions in a business as usual scenario towards a probable 
temperature increase of at least 2 °C during the twenty-first 
century, adaptation processes must inevitably be implemented 
to reduce the expected harm. However, adaptation has limits, 
faces barriers and can be inefficient, and there will be residual 
and in some cases irreversible damage in the future, as well as 
additional costs. Adaptation can entail measures that improve social 
and environmental conditions in the region, such as restraining 
deforestation, protecting biodiversity, enhancing the resilience 
of economic activities and protecting critical infrastructure 
(ECLAC, 2015a). This very inevitability should be treated as a 
driver of more sustainable development.
A. Some consumption patterns and climate change
The Latin American economy was highly dynamic during the commodity 
price boom, with an average annual GDP growth rate of 3.0% between 1990 
and 2015, yielding an average per capita GDP growth rate of 1.6% for those 
years. This rapid growth, together with the implementation of important social 
policies, helped to lift a significant part of the population out of poverty. The 
poverty rate fell from 48.4% to 29.2% between 1990 and 2015 (ECLAC, 2016). 
Growth and poverty reduction have led to the formation of new low- and 
middle-income groups in Latin America and the Caribbean, some of which 
remain highly vulnerable to macroeconomic or climate shocks, as their 
income is just 1.8 times the poverty line (see figure II.1).
2 This cost may be an underestimate, as it includes only some sectors and does not incorporate all 
potential effects or take account of feedback and adaptation processes.
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Figure II.1 
Latin America and the Caribbean (18 countries): groups vulnerable to poverty, 






























































































































































Not vulnerable Vulnerable to poverty
(income 1.8 times US$ 5.5 a day)US$ 5.5 a day poverty line
US$ 1.9 a day poverty lineUS$ 3.2 a day poverty line
Source: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of World Bank, DataBank [online database] https://databank.
worldbank.org/home.aspx.
a Latest figures available.
This economic dynamism and poverty reduction brought new 
groups of consumers into the consumption structure of the current style of 
development. Although food is one of the main items of household expenditure 
(Gamaletsos,  1973; Lluch, Powell and Williams, 1977), the share of food 
expenditure in total expenditure per decile decreases as incomes rise (see 
figure II.2), as expressed in Engel’s well-known law (Chai and Moneta, 2010; 
Lewbel, 2012). This expands opportunities to consume new goods and services, 
something that is decisive in determining whether or not there is progress 
towards a more sustainable style of development (ECLAC, 2014a; Galindo and 
others, 2015).
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Figure II.2 
Latin America (4 countries): composition of household food expenditure  
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Argentina, 2012–2013 Chile, 2016 Guatemala, 2014 Mexico, 2016
Food expenditure as a share of the decile’s total expenditure (left scale)
Decile share of total food expenditure (right scale)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of National 
Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC), National Household Expenditure Survey 2012–2013; 
National Institute of Statistics, Household Budget Survey 2016; National Institute of Statistics, 
National Survey of Living Conditions 2014; National Institute of Statistics and Geography, National 
Survey of Household Income and Expenditure 2016.
a Data from the latest survey available.
These new consumption opportunities are not consistent with 
sustainable development (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and van den Bergh, 2004) or with 
attainment of the climate goals the countries have espoused in their nationally 
determined contributions (NDCs). With the current consumption pattern, 
higher incomes result in a disproportionate increase in fuel consumption 
(see figure II.3). Consumption of fuels for transport is concentrated in the 
higher income deciles. Households in the tenth decile account for more than 
a quarter of total national fuel expenditure, while the share of transport fuel 
expenditure in total expenditure by decile shows it to be a relatively modest 
item in household budgets.3
3 This combination of highly differentiated responsibility for private vehicle emissions and the 
small share of household budgets they represent indicates that a policy of levying environmental 
taxes on private transport and creating infrastructure for public and active transport would be 
highly progressive. 
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Figure II.3 
Latin America (4 countries): composition of household spending on transport fuels 
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Argentina, 2012–2013 Chile, 2016 Guatemala, 2014 Mexico, 2016
Fuel expenditure as a share of the decile’s total expenditure (left scale)
Decile share of total fuel expenditure (right scale)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of National 
Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC), National Household Expenditure Survey 2012–2013; 
National Institute of Statistics, Household Budget Survey 2016; National Institute of Statistics, 
National Survey of Living Conditions 2014; National Institute of Statistics and Geography, National 
Survey of Household Income and Expenditure 2016.
a Data from the latest survey available.
The concentration of spending on transport fuels in middle- and 
upper-income groups is most evident when the percentage of people per quintile 
who actually consume petrol and have a car is considered (Hernández and 
Antón, 2014; Poterba, 1991; ECLAC, 2014a). This composition of expenditure 
is consistent with various econometric estimates reported in the literature. 
When these results are synthesized in a meta-analysis,4 it is found that the 
income elasticity of demand for petrol is close to or even greater than one 
in certain countries and periods and is higher in developing countries, 
such as those of Latin America, than in the countries of the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (excluding Chile and 
Mexico). Similarly, the price elasticity of demand for petrol yielded by the 
estimates of the meta-analysis is low, and its absolute value is less in Latin 
America than in the OECD countries (see table II.1). In Latin America, these 
results reflect the paucity of adequate substitutes for private transport and 
show that attempting to reduce petrol consumption through the price 
4 Meta-analyses summarize, integrate and interpret the findings of different empirical studies 
with a view to obtaining an approximate impact or the magnitude of the relationship between 
variables by means of a weighted average estimator that incorporates the combined effect of the 
values from each study, with weightings allocated to reflect the accuracy (variance or standard 
error) of their respective results (Sterne, 2009).
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mechanism alone is insufficient in a context of rapid economic growth. 
Consequently, this mechanism needs to be supplemented consistently by 
regulations (ECLAC, 2014a; Galindo and others, 2015) and by investment 
in alternatives.
Table II.1 
Latin America and countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD):a meta-analysis of the income elasticity and  
price elasticity of demand for petrol, by region, around 2014
OECD countries Latin America
Income elasticity
Long-run elasticity 0.55  0.69
Short-run elasticity 0.24  0.26
Price elasticity
Long-run elasticity -0.41  -0.31
Short-run elasticity -0.22  -0.17
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official data 
published in 2014.
Note: Elasticity weighted by the standard deviation was estimated using the random effects model. In 
all cases, the Q test rejects the null hypothesis of homogeneity of the estimates. Similarly, the 
I2 statistic indicates for long-run and short-run income and price elasticity that the proportion 
of the variation observed in the magnitude of the effects attributable to heterogeneity between 
studies is greater than 85%. These results are corrected for potential problems of bias in the 
individual estimates.
a Excluding Mexico and Chile.
The pattern of global and regional consumption is not only increasing 
the share of fossil fuel burning but is leading to land use change, which 
has been a major contributor to global emissions in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, and whose impact on the region is described in the section 
on agriculture and in the section on biodiversity. The combination of 
the Latin American consumption pattern with the pattern of national 
and global consumption driving deforestation in the region points in an 
undesirable direction where the climate is concerned. At the same time, 
the vulnerability of certain social groups with unreliable incomes means 
they have little resilience to shocks. This highlights the tension between 
the need to achieve lasting improvements in well-being and to make sure 
they occur within a framework of less carbon-intensive production and 
consumption patterns.
B. The impact of climate change
The impact of climate change is ongoing and has already manifested itself 
both globally and in Latin America and the Caribbean. This impact is 
significant, non-linear, heterogeneous (there are even some positive effects 
on agriculture in the southern part of the continent) and very likely to 
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increase. For example, there is evidence of effects on agriculture, water, 
biodiversity, the sea level, forests, tourism, health and urban areas (Magrin 
and others, 2014; ECLAC, 2009 and 2010; Galindo and others, 2014). Estimates 
from various studies suggest that the impact will increase exponentially as 
the temperature goes up (Nordhaus and Moffat, 2017), with a rise of between 
2 °C and 3 °C reducing global GDP by about 1.5% (see figure II.4), but that 
it will vary from country to country.
Figure II.4 
Impact of climate change on world gross domestic product (GDP), by temperature 
range, according to different studies























Source: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of W. Nordhaus and A. Moffat, “A survey of global impacts 
of climate change: replication, survey methods, and a statistical analysis”, NBER Working Paper, 
No. 23646, Cambridge, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), 2017.
Studies carried out from 1990 to 2010 put the cost of climate change 
to Latin America and the Caribbean at between 1.5% and 5% of current 
GDP if the temperature rises by 2.5°C, something that is likely to occur by 
about 2050 (Bosello, Carraro and De Cian, 2010). A more recent estimate 
(Vergara and others, 2014) is of a loss of some 2% of GDP. These estimates 
contain uncertainties, are not periodic, are conservative, are confined to 
certain sectors and regions and have a number of methodological limitations, 
such as difficulties in incorporating adaptation processes, loss of biodiversity 
and the potential effects of extreme climate events (Stern, 2013; Galindo and 
others, 2014).
It has been established that, at the global level, there is a non-linear 
relationship between productivity and temperature: temperatures above 
13 °C cause productivity to drop, so that it is estimated that global GDP 
per capita could be 23% lower by 2100 in a scenario without mitigation 
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(Burke, Hsiang and Miguel, 2015). In the case of Latin America and the Caribbean, 
estimates show that significant adverse effects could materialize in a time 
frame of just 10 years (see figure II.5). By 2030, for example, it is estimated 
that per capita GDP in Belize, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Guyana, 
Nicaragua and Suriname could be 10% lower than it would be without climate 
change, with a reduction of over 5% for all the rest of the region’s economies 
except Argentina, Peru, the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay. In 
Chile, GDP is expected to increase (Burke, Hsiang and Miguel, 2015). It is 
important to mention that the impact estimates concern only the increase in 
temperature and leave out costs from natural disasters, water availability or 
losses of agricultural yield, among other factors. By 2050, a greater impact 
is obviously expected.
Figure II.5 
Latin America and the Caribbean (26 countries): projected changes in gross domestic 
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Source: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of M. Burke, S. Hsiang and E. Miguel, “Global non-linear 
effect of temperature on economic production”, Nature, No. 527, Berlin, Springer, 2015.
a Percentage difference between GDP per capita without climate change and GDP per capita in the 
pessimistic scenario for temperature rise.
The transmission channels for the impact of climate change are of 
very different kinds and may include possible collateral or feedback effects 
(ECLAC, 2015a). Some of these effects are summarized in table II.2.
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Table II.2 
Latin America: potential impact and risks of climate change
Impact Key risks Climate drivers
Agriculture Diminished food output and quality, 
lower incomes and higher prices.
 - Rising temperatures and extreme episodes
 - Erratic precipitation outside the biological 
range and extreme episodes
 - Fertilization owing to increased 
concentration of CO2
Water Reduced availability of water 
in semi-arid regions and those 
depending on glacier melt, and 
flooding in rural and urban areas 
as  result of extreme precipitation.
 - Rising temperature trend
 - Tendency to drought
 - Snow cover
 - Rising precipitation
Biodiversity 
and forests 
Disappearance of forests, coral 
bleaching, loss of biodiversity 
and ecosystem services. 
 - Increased deforestation
 - Fertilization owing to increased 
concentration of CO2
 - Rising temperature trend
 - Acidification of oceans
Health Spread of vector-borne diseases at 
greater heights and latitudes than 
in their original distribution.
 - Higher temperatures
 - Increased precipitation 
Tourism Loss of infrastructure, rising sea 
level, appearance of invasive species 
and extreme events in coastal zones.
 - Rising sea level
 - Extreme temperatures
 - Extreme precipitation and flooding
Poverty Falling incomes for vulnerable 
populations, especially 
agricultural incomes, and greater 
income inequality.
 - Rising temperatures and increase 
in extreme episodes
 - Tendency to drought
 - Precipitation that is erratic or outside 
crop physiology parameters
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), “Central and South America”, Climate Change 2014: Impacts, 
Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Volume II: Regional Aspects, V. Barros and others (eds.), Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2014; L. Galindo and others, “Cambio climático, agricultura y pobreza 
en América Latina: una aproximación empírica”, Project Documents (LC/W.620), Santiago, Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2014.
C. The effects on agriculture
The agriculture sector’s share of GDP has been declining in the region, 
dropping from 10% in 1980 to about 4.7% in 2017, although this was a slower 
rate of reduction than in the rest of the world. Agriculture sector employment 
as a percentage of the total has also declined, from 19% in 1992 to 14% in 2017,5 
although this was slower than the decline in the agriculture sector’s share of 
GDP and there were differences between countries. The agriculture sector 
thus acts as a buffer against macroeconomic shocks and their impact on 
social conditions (ECLAC/ILO/FAO, 2012).
5 The data are from World Bank (2019).
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Agriculture is particularly sensitive to climate and thus to climate change. 
In Latin America and the Caribbean, the agriculture sector accounted for 
about 5% of GDP,6 14% of the working population and 29% of regional exports7 
in 2017, and some 20% of the population lives in rural areas. Agriculture is 
also essential for food security, economic dynamism and poverty reduction 
(Galindo and others, 2014; ECLAC, 2019; World Bank, 2019).
The impact of climate change in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
acting upon plant and animal physiology, follows an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between agricultural and livestock output (and hence net 
income in the sector) and temperature and precipitation. The relationship 
has different turning points depending on the product type and region, and 
there is a high degree of uncertainty about the magnitude of the expected 
impact (see table II.3). There is also a negative relationship between extreme 
weather events (days of extreme heat or precipitation, droughts, floods or 
extreme natural events) and agricultural yields, and growing concern about 
desertification and land degradation, intensified by climate change (IPCC, 
2014a; Galindo and others, 2014). This impact also differs by type of production 
unit, e.g., between irrigated and unirrigated farms (Dinar and Mendelsohn, 
2012; Mendelsohn and Dinar, 2009; Massetti and Mendelsohn, 2011; Seo and 
Mendelsohn, 2007; Mendelsohn, 2007; Kurukulasuriya and Mendelsohn, 2007; 
Galindo, Alatorre and Reyes, 2015a).
Differing socioeconomic conditions from one agricultural region to 
another mean that the impact of climate change varies by region and country. 
One way to compare these outcomes is by marginal monetary impact, which 
provides a way of quantifying the effects of climate change on agriculture, 
as can be seen in table II.3.
The results of different studies on Latin America dealing with the 
average marginal impact of temperature and precipitation on farm income 
per hectare and their respective sensitivities or elasticities are summarized 
in table II.4. These elasticities are heterogeneous and show how important 
changes in the climate system are for agriculture. Strikingly, all reported 
temperature elasticities are negative (except in the study by Lozanoff and 
Cap for Argentina), while precipitation elasticities present mixed results.
6 Share of annual GDP by economic activity at current prices.
7 Exports of food and agricultural commodities as a share of all goods exports.
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The losses that climate change can potentially cause in agriculture will 
also be affected by human factors such as land tenure or the application of 
different public policies in the agriculture sector. Regarding the first factor, 
incentives to invest in adaptation are lessened when ownership is decoupled 
from use. Figure II.6 gives estimates of these losses by 2080.
Figure II.6 
Latin America and the Caribbean (17 countries): losses expected in the agriculture 






















































































































Agriculture, 2017 (value added as share of GDP) Agricultural employment, 2017 (share of total)
Impact (crop model), 2080 Impact (Ricardian model), 2080
Impact: preferred estimate
(with fertilization effect), 2080
Impact: preferred estimate
(without fertilization effect), 2080
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of World Bank, 
World Development Indicators [online database] https://databank.bancomundial.org/source/world-
development-indicators; W. Cline, Global Warming and Agriculture: Impact Estimates by Country, 
Washington, D.C., Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE), 2007.
Note: The “Agriculture, 2017” column of the chart shows the share of agricultural value added in total 
GDP. The impact of climate change on agriculture was derived from a linear function of the preferred 
estimate of impact by 2080 included in Cline (2007). The impact for Latin America and the Caribbean 
is a simple average. It was assumed that the impact for Paraguay was that reported under the 
heading “Other South America” (Cline, 2007) and that the impact for Uruguay was the same as 
for Argentina. The crop model estimates the impact of climate variables on crop production or 
yields and thereby forecasts the potential impact of climate change. With the Ricardian model, the 
potential effects of climate change on the economic values of land or net income per hectare are 
estimated, on the assumption that land values in a competitive market reflect productivity. Thus, 
different levels of productivity are the result of a set of control variables, such as electricity and 
fertilizer use and climate conditions (Dinar and Mendelsohn, 2012).
To reduce poverty, it is usually necessary for average individual income 
to change because of economic growth or shifts in income distribution 
(Bourguignon and Morrisson, 2002; Epaulard, 2003; ECLAC, 2013). Assuming 
constant log-normal income distribution, an increase in the average income 
of the population translates into a reduction in poverty (see diagram II.1; 
Datt and Ravallion, 1992; OECD, 2010).
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Diagram II.1 
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Source: F. Bourguignon, “The growth elasticity of poverty reduction: explaining heterogeneity across 
country and time periods”, Inequality and Growth: Theory and Policy Implications, T. Eicher and 
S. Turnovsky (eds.), Cambridge, The MIT Press, 2003.
Changes in weather patterns affect agricultural productivity and 
farmers’ incomes, which also impacts the total income of rural households. 
This being so, climate change can be expected to increase rural poverty 
(Mendelsohn and others, 2007) and inequality in two steps: first, because of 
the impact on agriculture sector growth (Thurlow, Zhu and Diao, 2009) and, 
second, because of the impact of the latter on the evolution of poverty (Thurlow, 
Zhu and Diao, 2009; Christiaensen, Demery and Kuhl, 2011; Christiaensen 
and Demery, 2007). The agriculture sector remains strategically important 
in the region and a significant part of the severest poverty is concentrated 
in rural areas (Byerlee, Diao and Jackson, 2005; Christiaensen, Demery and 
Kuhl, 2011; Nissanke and Thorbecke, 2007; Ravallion and Chen, 2007). See 
box II.1 for a case study dealing with Mexico.
In Latin America, there is found to be an inverse relationship between 
economic growth and poverty, with estimates showing a sensitivity 
(elasticity) of between -1.5 and -1.7 to each percentage point of economic 
growth for indigence and between -0.94 and -1.76 for poverty (depending 
on the indicator used in the latter case). Sensitivity or elasticity to changes 
in income distribution is positive and statistically significant in all cases 
(Galindo and others, 2014). Climate change, compounded by downturns in 
economic cycles, may erode the progress made in combating poverty and 
indigence (see figure II.7).
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Box II.1  
Climate change, income distribution and poverty in Mexico
The impact of climate change on inequality and poverty in Mexico was estimated 
using data from the 2002 National Survey of Rural Households in Mexico 
(ENHRUM) and the models of the Hadley Centre for Climate Prediction and 
Research (Hadley model), the Parallel Climate Model (PCM) and the Center 
for Climate Systems Research (MIMR model) to predict expected changes in 
temperature and precipitation by 2100. The results indicate that a temperature 
increase of 1  °C in all four seasons would result in a decrease of almost 
1,000 Mexican pesos (US$ 50)a in annual per capita agricultural income. Likewise, 
a decrease of one millimetre of rainfall in each season would be associated with 
an increase in agricultural income of just over 100 Mexican pesos (US$ 5) (see 
table 1). The effects of changes in temperature and precipitation on families’ 
farm income are different in each season. An increase of 1 °C in the spring 
temperature could be associated with a decrease of about 2,500 pesos (some 
US$ 125) in the annual per capita agricultural income of farming households.b 
This is a very substantial amount considering that the average total income 
of these households is just over 13,000 pesos (about US$ 650). On the other 
hand, a decrease of one millimetre a month in winter rainfall could lead to an 
increase of just over 200 pesos (US$ 10) in annual per capita farm income, 
whereas such a decrease in spring could result in a decline of almost 130 pesos 
(US$ 6.5) in this income.
Table 1 
Mexico: estimates of marginal changes in per capita agricultural income  
in the event of marginal changes in climate variables, 2100
(Mexican pesos)
Temperature Precipitation
Marginal change Standard error Marginal change Standard error
Spring -2 521.55 1 956.63 126.11* 64.67
Summer -219.99 1 949.08 21.02 27.03
Autumn 2 445.87 2 037.08 -37.08 55.19
Winter -630.09 1 344.15 -215.57** 86.56
Total -927.77** 406.09 -105.51** 50.62
Source: A. López-Feldman, “Cambio climático, distribución del ingreso y la pobreza: el caso de 
México”, Project Documents (LC/W.555), Santiago, Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2014; Programme  for the Study of  Economic Change  and 
Sustainability of Mexican Agriculture (PRECESAM), National Survey of Rural Households in 
Mexico (ENHRUM) 2002.
Note: *p < 0.10, **p <0.05. The “marginal change” concept refers to the change in per capita agricultural 
income in the event of a 1 °C increase in the average temperature and a decline of 1 mm in 
average precipitation in all seasons.
The results of the econometric estimates allow per capita agricultural 
income and total per capita income to be calculated for each of the three 
climate models considered (Hadley, PCM and MIMR). The average per capita 
income of the households included in the sample is just over 15,000 pesos 
(US$ 750) per year. The results of the simulations show total average income 
decreasing for all three climate models owing to a fall in farm income. The 
sharpest drop is presented by the Hadley model, in which income would be 
reduced to almost 12,800 pesos (US$ 640).
The simulations for Mexico show changes in the climate variables 
leading to increases in poverty, as measured by the three variants of the 
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) index, and inequality, as measured by the Gini 
coefficient (see table 2). The results for two of the three models indicate that 
climate change may substantially increase poverty and inequality. The strongest 
negative impact on poverty is yielded by the Hadley model, in which the 
percentage of households in extreme poverty in rural areas would increase by 
11 percentage points as a result of climate change. With regard to inequality, 
the same model indicates an increase of more than 20% in the Gini coefficient.
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Table 2 
Mexico: impact of climate change on poverty and inequality in rural areas  
according to different climate models, 2014
Poverty Inequality
Incidence
(percentages) Depth Severity Gini coefficient
Current level 38 0.221 0.193 0.599
Climate model
Hadley model 49 0.444 0.598 0.737
Parallel Climate 
Model 4 0.254 0.249 0.619
MIMR model 48% 0.439 0.586 0.734
Source: A. López-Feldman, “Cambio climático, distribución del ingreso y la pobreza: el caso de 
México”, Project Documents (LC/W.555), Santiago, Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2014; Programme  for the Study of  Economic Change  and 
Sustainability of Mexican Agriculture (PRECESAM), National Survey of Rural Households in 
Mexico (ENHRUM) 2002. 
Note: The poverty incidence rate is defined as the proportion of the population living below the 
poverty line. The depth of poverty is defined as the average distance from the poverty line 
of the individuals living below it, expressed as a proportion of this line; i.e., it represents the 
amount of aggregate income by which they fall short of the poverty line, normalized by the 
population. The severity of poverty measures the income deficit of individuals living below the 
poverty line, squared; i.e., it is the squared sum of the distance between individuals and the 
poverty line. 
These estimates of the potential magnitude of the impact of climate change 
on poverty and inequality in Mexico support the hypothesis that climate 
change can be expected to have a significant effect on household welfare. It 
is therefore important to take measures to reduce this impact, particularly in 
the case of households whose main source of income is agriculture, as this is 
a vulnerable sector of the population.
Source: L. Galindo and others, “Cambio climático, la distribución del ingreso y la pobreza: 
el caso de México”, Síntesis de políticas públicas sobre cambio climático, Santiago, 
European Union/Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC), 2017; A. López-Feldman, “Cambio climático, distribución del ingreso 
y la pobreza: el caso de México”, Project Documents (LC/W.555), Santiago, 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC),  2014; 
Programme for the Study of Economic Change and Sustainability of Mexican 
Agriculture (PRECESAM), National Survey of Rural Households in Mexico 
(ENHRUM) 2002.
a The exchange rate fluctuated around 20 Mexican pesos to the dollar in 2018 and 2019.
b The change is not statistically significant.
The relationships between economic growth, which reduces poverty, and 
poor income distribution, which exacerbates it (Adams Jr., 2004; Bourguignon, 
2003 and 2004; Datt and Ravallion, 1992; Ravallion, 1995; Fan, Gulati and 
Thorat, 2008), can be used to construct prospective scenarios for the potential 
impact of climate change on poverty in view of its effects on the growth rate 
of the agriculture sector (Epaulard, 2003; Ravallion and Datt, 2002).8
8 There is also another, inverse relationship between economic growth and poverty if it is considered 
that poverty reduction would contribute to long-run economic growth (Aghion, Caroli and 
García-Peñalosa, 1999; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994).
Box II.1 (concluded)
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Figure II.7 
Latin America (16 countries): proportion of the rural population below the extreme 
poverty and poverty lines, around 2007 and 2017
(Percentages)
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Around 2007 Around 2017
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), CEPALSTAT [online database] 
http://estadisticas.cepal.org/cepalstat/WEB_CEPALSTAT/Portada.asp; Compacts for Equality: 
Towards a Sustainable Future (LC/G.2586(SES.35/3)), Santiago, 2014; L. Galindo and others, “El 
cambio climático, la agricultura y la pobreza en América Latina”, Síntesis de políticas públicas 
sobre cambio climático, Santiago, European Union/Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2017.
A baseline or business as usual scenario was constructed to estimate the 
potential climate impact on rural poverty. For this purpose, it was assumed 
that the historical behaviour of each country’s average per capita growth rate 
would remain unchanged up to 2025, the population growth forecasts of the 
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Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE)-Population 
Division of ECLAC were used, and income distribution was left unchanged. 
The projections for this business as usual scenario point to a considerably 
smaller reduction in rural poverty and indigence in Latin America by 2025 
because of the effect of climate change on agriculture.9 This shows that 
climate change affects rural poverty and has an impact on social policy 
objectives in the region.
D. The water challenge and climate change
Latin America and the Caribbean has a high availability of water resources 
distributed unevenly between subregions and countries (Magrin and others, 2007). 
Water availability is around 13,867 trillion cubic meters (m3), equivalent to 
22.162 m3 of water per capita. Water withdrawal was 329.728 billion m3 in 
2014,10 of which 71% was used for agriculture, 17% for domestic consumption 
and 12% for industry (see figure II.8).
Climate change is jeopardizing the availability of water;11 at the same 
time, demand for human consumption is increasing with improved incomes 
and population growth. This demand is influenced by the cost of supply, the 
prices of other goods, the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics 
of households and the climate, particularly temperature and precipitation 
(see table II.5).
Climate change is altering precipitation patterns, soil moisture and 
runoff, and glacier melting is also contributing by affecting water availability 
and consumption trends (see annex A1 for expected variations by subregion 
in Latin America and the Caribbean). An increase in temperature will result 
in a rise in water demand that will intensify the pressure on this resource 
(Sebri, 2014). For example, the number of people in situations of water stress 
is expected to increase as climate change intensifies (IPCC, 2008 and 2014a; 
ECLAC, 2015a).12 This impact is apparent in the region.
9 See Galindo and others (2014) for more model data.
10 See World Bank (2019).
11 Deforestation is another source of pressure. According to Antonio Nobre of Brazil’s National 
Institute for Space Research (INPE), the evapotranspiration of the Amazon rainforest creates a 
large airborne river with a greater flow than the Amazon itself which, after being redirected by 
the Andes mountain range, precipitates into the Southern Cone and supplies urban-rural areas 
such as those of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires. This phenomenon, which could be 
at risk because of ongoing deforestation (Nobre, 2014), explains the radical difference between 
the forested zone to the east of the Andes and the desert to the west, as well as the absence of 
extreme weather events on the Atlantic coast of Brazil.
12 Water stress is a concept that describes the extent to which the population is exposed to the risk 
of water shortage. A basin is considered to suffer water stress when its water availability per 
inhabitant is less than 1,000 m3/year (based on the historical average runoff) or when the ratio 
between water extraction and the historical annual average runoff is greater than 0.4 (IPCC, 2008). 
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Figure II.8 
Latin America and the Caribbean (24 countries): per capita water availability, 
by country, and distribution of use in the regional total, 2014a











































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of World Bank, 
World Development Indicators [online database] https://databank.bancomundial.org/source/world-
development-indicators.
Note: The data on per capita water availability are for national freshwater flows and cover the national 
renewable resources (national river flows and groundwater replenished by rainfall) of each country. 
The data on the distribution of use are for water extracted from its source for a given use. Extraction 
for agriculture is total withdrawals for irrigation and livestock production, domestic use includes 
drinking water, municipal use or supply and use for public services, commercial establishments 
and households, and the industry category covers total extraction for direct industrial use (including 
withdrawals for refrigeration of thermoelectric plants).
a Latest figure available.
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Table II.5 




Espey, Espey and  
Shaw (1997)
Meta-analysis Short run: 0.38
(from 0.03 to 2.23)
Long run: 0.64
(from 0.10 to 3.33)






Survey From 0.1 to 0.4






Worthington and Hoffman 
(2008)
Survey Short run: from 0 to 0.5
Long run: from 0.5 to 1
Nauges and Whittington 
(2009)
Survey From 0.3 to 0.6 From 0.1 to 0.3
Grafton and others (2011) Instrumental variables 0.429 0.11
Sebri (2014) Meta-analysis 0.365
(from 3.054 to 0.002)
0.207
(from 0.440 to 1.560)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), The economics of climate 
change in Latin America and the Caribbean: paradoxes and challenges of sustainable development 
(LC/G.2624), Santiago, 2015; M. Espey, J. Espey and W. Shaw, “Price elasticity of residential 
demand for water: a meta-analysis”, Water Resources Research, vol. 33, No. 6, Hoboken, 
Wiley, 1997; J. Dalhuisen and others, “Price and income elasticities of residential water demand: 
a meta-analysis”, Land Economics, vol. 79, No. 2, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 2003; 
F. Arbués, M. Garcıía-Valiñas and R. Martıínez-Espiñeira, “Estimation of residential water demand: a 
state-of-the-art review”, The Journal of Socio-Economics, vol. 32, No. 1, Amsterdam, Elsevier, 2003; 
J. Strand and I. Walker, “Water markets and demand in Central American cities”, Environment 
and Development Economics, vol. 10, No. 3, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005; 
S. Olmstead, W. Hanemann and R. Stavins, “Water demand under alternative price structures”, 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol. 54, No. 2, Amsterdam, Elsevier, 2007; 
A. Worthington and M. Hoffman, “An empirical survey of residential water demand modelling”, 
Journal of Economic Surveys, vol. 22, No. 5, Hoboken, Wiley, 2008; C. Nauges and D. Whittington, 
“Estimation of water demand in developing countries: an overview”, The World Bank Research 
Observer, vol. 25, No. 2, Washington, D.C., World Bank, 2009; Q. Grafton and others, “Determinants 
of residential water consumption: evidence and analysis from a 10-country household survey”, 
Water Resources Research, vol. 47, No. 8, Hoboken, Wiley, 2011; M. Sebri, “A meta-analysis of 
residential water demand studies”, Environment, Development and Sustainability, vol. 16, No. 3, 
Berlin, Springer, 2014.
Note: Espey, Espey and Shaw (1997) used 24 articles with 124 price elasticities for residential water 
demand in the United States. Dalhuisen and others (2003) used 64 studies that yielded 296 price 
elasticities and 161 income elasticities. Arbués, García-Valiñas and Martínez-Espiñeira (2003) studied 
estimates of residential water demand; however, few of the studies considered were published later 
than 1990. Strand and Walker (2005) calculated water demand in 17 cities of Central America and 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Olmstead, Hanemann, and Stavins (2007) used a structural 
discrete/continuous choice model with household data from 11 urban areas in the United States 
and Canada. Nauges and Whittington (2009) compiled studies from Central America (El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama), the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Africa (Kenya 
and Madagascar) and Asia (Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka and Viet 
Nam). Grafton and others (2011) estimated residential water demand in 10 Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries (Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, France, 
Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, the Republic of Korea and Sweden). Sebri (2014) identified 
100 studies on residential water demand, from which he obtained 638 estimates of price elasticity; 
with regard to income elasticity, he had 72 studies, from which he obtained 332 elasticities.
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For example, the volume of the Magdalena and Cauca rivers in 
Colombia has been decreasing, and the same has happened in Central 
America, where rivers are showing the effects of a tendency towards drought 
(Carmona Duque and Poveda Jaramillo, 2011; Dai, 2011; ECLAC, 2015a). 
Andean glaciers have been rapidly retreating and melting in the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia, with losses of between 20% and 50% in area, mainly 
since the end of the 1970s, associated with rising temperatures. This 
has reduced the availability of water (Magrin and others, 2014; Bradley 
and others, 2009) in their respective basins and a number of cities. The 
Cotacachi glacier in Ecuador has already disappeared, and this has 
affected agriculture and tourism, as well as causing a loss of biodiversity 
(Vergara and others, 2009). In Colombia, the snow-capped volcano of 
Santa Isabel has lost 44% of its ice cover and consequently become less 
attractive to tourists. In Chile, the San Quintín glacier has shrunk rapidly 
(UNEP/ECLAC/GRID-Arendal, 2010).
In contrast, the volume of water in Mar Chiquita lake in the provinces 
of Córdoba and Santiago del Estero in Argentina has increased, as has that in 
Lagoa dos Patos, a lake in southern Brazil, because of higher precipitation and 
reduced evapotranspiration due to land use change (IPCC, 2014a); Doyle and 
Barros, 2011; Saurral, Barros and Lettenmaier, 2008; Magrin and others, 2014; 
Marques, 2012; Bucher and Curto, 2012; Pasquini and others, 2006; Rodrigues 
and others, 2010).
E. Health and climate change
1. Health and cities
Cities emit 70% of greenhouse gases (UN-Habitat, 2011) and consume 
80% of the energy produced worldwide (Sánchez, 2013). In 1950, just 41% 
of the population of Latin America and the Caribbean lived in urban areas 
(ECLAC, 2013), but now the figure is 80% (ECLAC/MINURVI/UN-Habitat, 
2016). This urbanization process has had favourable economic and social 
consequences, such as greater dynamism in production activities, the 
development of services, increased productivity and the harnessing of 
economies of scale (ECLAC/MINURVI/UN-Habitat, 2016; McGranahan and 
Satterthwaite, 2014). However, urbanization has also given rise to negative 
externalities such as air pollution, greenhouse gas generation, road accidents, 
road congestion, health problems and water pollution, which are eroding 
the foundations of economic dynamism (ECLAC, 2015a).
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This complex mix of negative externalities is inseparable from the 
current style of development (Galindo and others, 2015) and suggests that 
business as usual is unsustainable in the long run. For example, transport in 
the region’s urban areas has costs associated with traffic accidents, vehicle 
congestion, the construction of infrastructure that fosters CO2 emissions 
and air pollution, with significant effects on the health and well-being of 
the population (Parry and Small, 2005; Bell and others, 2006; Hernández and 
Antón, 2014; Borja-Aburto and others, 1998; Rosales-Castillo and others, 2001). 
Increased vehicle traffic is negatively affecting productivity (Weisbrod, Vary 
and Treyz, 2003; Hymel, 2009; Harriet, Poku and Emmanuel, 2013; Salon and 
others, 2012; Litman and Laube, 2002; Litman, 2014; Olawale, Adebambo and 
Boye, 2015; Schwartz and Rosen, 2015; Mpogole and Msangi, 2016). Empirical 
research has found a statistically significant positive link between increased 
mobility and urban development, improved productivity and higher incomes 
(Prud’homme and Lee, 1999; Cervero, 2001; Graham, 2007; Broersma and 
Van Dijik, 2007; Hymel, 2009).
In addition, negative externalities are highly likely to intensify if a 
development style that encourages private transport use is maintained. For 
example, in Latin America and the Caribbean there are now 199 vehicles 
per 1,000 inhabitants (see figure II.9). However, this is much lower than the 
average for developed countries (ECLAC, 2014b), which differ significantly 
in motorization rates. The rate in Europe is almost twice as high as in the 
region (577 vehicles per 1,000 inhabitants) but lower than in the United 
States and Canada (806 vehicles per 1,000 inhabitants), which indicates that 
urban layout and the availability and quality of public transport influence 
automobile use, and thus that the region ought to make decisions about its 
system of urban mobility (see figure II.10).
Although the level of motorization is relatively low in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, however, health standards are being dangerously breached 
in a considerable number of cities (see figure II.11). It is also important to 
bear in mind that greenhouse gas emissions from the burning of fossil fuels 
are accompanied by the emission of other locally regulated pollutants (such 
as suspended particles and sulphur and nitrogen oxides) that have major 
negative health effects.
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Figure II.9 
Latin America and the Caribbean (26 countries): motorization rate, 2005 and 2015




















































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from 
the International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers (OICA).
Figure II.10 
Latin America (13 countries): motorization rate, gross domestic product (GDP) per 
capita and comparison with trends in the United States and Norway, 2005–2015

































Pathway towards a 
motorization rate of 80% 
in the United States
Pathway towards 
a motorization rate 
of 60% in Norway
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), The Inefficiency of Inequality 
(LC/SES.37/3-P), Santiago, 2018; International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers (OICA); 
World Bank, World Development Indicators [online database] https://databank.bancomundial.org/
source/world-development-indicators.
a In purchasing power parity at constant 2011 prices.
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Figure II.11 
Latin America and the Caribbean (20 cities): concentrations of coarse particulate 
matter (PM10) and fine particulate matter (PM2.5), around 2016










































































































































































































































A. Average annual concentrations of PM10


























































































































































































































2016 2010 World Health Organization limitEuropean Union limit
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of World Health 
Organization (WHO), Ambient Air Pollution Database, 2017 [online] https://www.who.int/airpollution/
data/cities/en/.
The increase in the use of private transport and the resulting consumption 
of petrol is the main urban contributor to greenhouse gas emissions. The 
associated local pollutants cause respiratory diseases, asthma and bronchitis, 
with the greatest effects being on children and those over the age of 65 (Cropper 
and Sahin, 2009; Lozano, 2004; Pino and others, 2004; Barnett and others, 2005).
Furthermore, the effects of local air pollution on the health of the 
population have intensified as a result of climate change (IPCC, 2013a). It has 
been concluded with medium confidence that a rise in local surface temperatures 
can trigger chemical feedback effects that increase maximum levels of ozone 
and fine particulate matter (PM2.5), which would have adverse consequences 
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for health (IPCC, 2013b).13 Hence, the relatively low level of greenhouse gas 
emissions in the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean should not be 
taken as an argument for inaction on climate change. As manifested locally, 
these emissions are creating a situation that gives cause for great concern 
in the region’s cities. Since emissions of greenhouse gases and local urban 
pollutants go together, acting on one type and not the other simply makes 
no sense. As was shown in the section on consumption patterns, decisive 
action on both infrastructure investment and fiscal measures to improve 
public mobility and restrain private mobility in the cities of Latin America 
and the Caribbean would be highly progressive (see box II.2 for a case study). 
Box II.2 
Ecuador, El Salvador and Mexico: the welfare effects of applying a petrol tax
Since fossil fuel prices are quoted internationally, the differences in the final prices paid for 
petrol by consumers in individual countries are largely explained by taxes. Each country has 
different taxes on petrol, and there are two reasons why these are important. First, they raise 
a great deal of revenue, mitigating the weakness of tax collection systems in Latin America, 
and can be progressive, despite the obstacles introduced by interest groups, if accompanied 
by offsetting measures such as fixed rebates and the construction of alternative transport 
systems. Second, these taxes can be used as instruments to internalize externalities caused by 
pollution, congestion and accidents. These arguments are relevant to Latin America because of 
the low price elasticity of the demand for petrol and the growing rate of motorization in cities.
The methodology of Parry and Small (2005) was used to estimate an optimal petrol tax for 
Mexico, Ecuador and El Salvador in consideration of the negative externalities generated by 
transport. The results for the situation as it was in 2014 show that the optimal tax, disaggregated 
between the Pigovian tax, the Ramsey-optimal taxa and the effect of congestion on the labour 
supply, would have been 48.2 United States cents in Mexico, 31.2 cents in Ecuador and 
28.4 cents in El Salvador (see table 1). These results should be treated with caution because 
of uncertainty about the values of certain parameters. On the basis of a sensitivity analysis, the 
optimal tax was put at between 28 and 90 cents for Mexico, between 21 and 71 for Ecuador 
and between 20 and 64 for El Salvador.
Table 1 
Mexico, Ecuador and El Salvador: estimation of the optimal petrol tax, 2014
(2011 cents per litre)
Elements of the optimal tax Mexico Ecuador El Salvador
(a) Adjusted Pigovian tax: 41.8 20.9 20.8
Pollution from fuel 4.6 4.2 4.6
Pollution from distance travelled 12.0 9.3 9.0
Congestion 11.0 5.8 5.2
Accidents 14.2 1.6 2.0
(b) Ramsey-optimal tax 6.1 9.9 7.5
(c) Effect of congestion on labour supply 0.3 0.4 0.1
Optimal petrol tax 48.2 31.2 28.4
Source: F. Hernández and A. Antón, “El impuesto sobre las gasolinas: una aplicación para el Ecuador, El Salvador y México”, 
Project Documents (LC/W.597), Santiago, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2014.
There are large differences between the countries in the costs associated with congestion 
and accidents, these being lower in Ecuador and El Salvador than in Mexico. The tax on fuel 
pollution is just over 4 cents per litre (similar to that reported in Parry and Small, 2005). In all 
three cases, the effect of congestion on the labour supply is a very small component relative 
to the total tax.
13 PM2.5 are particles with a diameter of less than 2.5 micrometres. 
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In Mexico and Ecuador, applying the optimal tax could bring welfare gains of 12.9% 
and 11.8%, respectively (see table 2). This gain is measured as the percentage change in 
expenditure relative to the original pre-tax expenditure on petrol. In El Salvador, the gain would 
be only 0.6%. This difference is the result of the gap between the current tax and the optimal 
tax. A petrol tax of zero cents would have resulted in a small increase in welfare in Mexico 
in 2014, when there was an occasional subsidy. The tax charged in El Salvador, meanwhile, 
was 2.6 times below the optimal level. Had the tax been zero cents, there would have been 
a small reduction in welfare.
Table 2 
Mexico, Ecuador and El Salvador: welfare effects of applying  
a petrol tax, 2014a
Mexico









0.25 t*F 12.0 8.1
0.50 t*F 24.1 11.1
0.75 t*F 36.1 12.5
1 (t*F) 48.2 12.9
1.25 t*F 60.2 12.6
1.50 t*F 72.2 11.7
Ecuador









0.25 t*F 7.8 6.2
0.50 t*F 15.6 9.7
0.75 t*F 23.4 11.4
1 (t*F) 31.2 11.8
1.25 t*F 39.0 11.4
1.50 t*F 46.8 10.4
El Salvador









0.25 t*F 7.1 -0.3
0.50 t*F 14.2 0.2
0.75 t*F 21.3 0.5
1 (t*F) 28.4 0.6
1.25 t*F 35.5 0.5
1.50 t*F 42.6 0.3
Source: F. Hernández and A. Antón, “El impuesto sobre las gasolinas: una aplicación para el Ecuador, El Salvador y México”, 
Project Documents (LC/W.597), Santiago, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2014.
a With respect to the current rate, as a percentage of initial spending before tax.
Source: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of F. Hernández and A. Antón, “El impuesto sobre las gasolinas: 
una aplicación para el Ecuador, El Salvador y México”, Project Documents (LC/W.597), Santiago, 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2014; I. Parry and K. Small, 
“Does Britain or the United States have the right gasoline tax?”, American Economic Review, vol. 95, 
No. 4, Nashville, American Economic Association (AEA), 2005.
a Ramsey’s (1927) tax rule suggests that goods that are highly complementary with leisure should be 
subject to high taxes. This is because pure leisure is not taxed; therefore, the second-best solution is 
to levy high taxes on market goods that are complements to leisure. In this case, petrol is considered a 
weak substitute for leisure.
Box II.2 (concluded)
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2. Other effects and changes in disease vectors
The effects of climate change on health also include other disease transmission 
channels such as heatwaves, an increase in the distribution areas of malaria 
and dengue vectors because of changes in precipitation and temperature, 
flood-related diarrhoeal diseases (IPCC, 2007a and 2014b; WHO/WMO/
UNEP, 2008) and respiratory diseases, Chagas disease, bronchial asthma 
and bronchopneumonia (McMichael, 1993; Schwartz, Levin and Hodge, 1997; 
Checkley and others, 2000; Patz and others, 2000).
In Latin America, the main health effects associated with climate 
change are malaria, dengue, heat stress and cholera (Magrin and others, 2007). 
The greatest risk of malaria transmission is in the tropical and subtropical 
regions of South America (WHO/WMO/UNEP, 2008). The risk of contracting 
dengue fever, meanwhile, is highly sensitive to even very small changes 
in temperature (WHO, 2004; Hales and others, 2002; Confalonieri and 
others, 2007). Brazil, Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua are the countries 
with the largest number of reported cases of dengue fever between 1990 and 
2007. And although it is not easy to attribute outbreaks to climate change, 
its effect on all these elements creates additional burdens for health systems 
and extra barriers to overcoming poverty.
F. The impact of rising sea levels on coasts
The sea level is currently rising at an average global rate of 3.3 millimetres per 
year, and could rise by between 40 and 63 cm by the end of the twenty-first 
century (IPCC, 2013b). In Latin America and the Caribbean, the sea level rose 
by between 2 and 7 mm a year between 1950 and 2008; the smallest increase 
was off Ecuador and the largest off northern Brazil and the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela. Projections by the Environmental Hydraulics 
Institute of the University of Cantabria (IHCantabria) (ECLAC, 2011b) 
indicate that the greatest increase between 2010 and 2040 will be on the 
Atlantic coast, particularly off the northern coast of South America and the 
Caribbean islands. The average sea level rise is also projected to accelerate 
between 2040 and 2070, perhaps to as much as 3.6 millimetres a year 
(see map II.1).
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Map II.1 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), “Efectos del cambio climático 
en la costa de América Latina y el Caribe: dinámicas, tendencias y variabilidad climática”, Project 
Documents (LC/W.447/Rev.1), Santiago, 2011.
In this context, besides the rise in sea level, changes are occurring in 
wave characteristics and heights, penetration inland, surface water temperature, 
salinity, the meteorological component of tides and the dynamics of extreme 
events (hurricanes and El Niño Southern Oscillation). This will increase the 
complexity of impacts and the vulnerability of the region’s socioeconomic 
and ecological systems. Thus, the expectation is of increased coastal erosion, 
greater bleaching of corals, a reduction in some tourist uses and beach coastal 
defence, a loss of port infrastructure operability, impaired maritime works 
safety and greater flooding of ecosystems (ECLAC, 2012a). Coastal dynamics 
and the possible impacts of alterations to them due to climate change are 
shown in map II.2.
The physical and socioeconomic characteristics of the region, with its 
many island developing countries, a high proportion of the population living 
in coastal areas and the likely increase in the construction of infrastructure in 
vulnerable areas, may intensify the effects of rising sea levels (ECLAC, 2012a). 
This should spur planners to modernize authorization procedures for building 
in zones affected by sea level rise, including adjustments to enforceable 
requirements in environmental impact statements and the land-use planning 
process. Furthermore, given that investment decisions have two-way economic 
effects, for example when it comes to the construction of tourist infrastructure, 
these modernization efforts should be coordinated between countries 
in the region that are recipients of foreign investment in  infrastructure.
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Map II.2 
Latin America and the Caribbean: impact of climate change on coastal areas 
and coastal dynamics
A. Coastal impacts B. Coastal dynamics
>2 to 3 mm/year in 
extreme flooding










Generalized beach erosion 
of 0.16 to 0.3 m/year due 
to sea level rise Interannual variability 
of El Niño Southern 
Oscillation of the same 
order of magnitude as 
sea level rise in the last 
six decades
Flooding
Urban areas affected by flooding
Infrastructure affected below 1 m
>40% of change over the last 60 years in the 
100-year total sea level (excluding hurricanes)
>6 mm/year in extreme coastal flooding
Beach erosion
Changes in potential sediment transport rate
Erosion due to beach rotation
Seaports
Seaport shipping operations may be affected 
due to increase in wave heights
Reduction in the reliability of coastal structures
>0.3 m/year in Hs12
<0.1 m/year in annual mean wave heights
Lower sea level rise detected 
(approximately 1 mm/year)
30% to 40% change in 50-year flooding event 
between decades of 1950 to 1960 and 1998 to 2008
Annual mean energy flux direction shift (°C/year)
Strong trends found in storm surge extremes
-2 mm/year in 
storm surges
Source: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), “Central and South America”, Climate Change 
2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Volume II: Regional Aspects, V. Barros and others 
(eds.), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014.
Note: “Hs12” means significant wave height exceeded 12 hours per year on average, determining how 
robust port infrastructure needs to be to remain operational. A “50-year flooding event” means 
an event whose scale is such that it only occurs once every 50 years. There are also larger events 
that are accordingly less frequent and more spaced out, occurring for example every 100 years 
or more.
Loss of port operability and safety and damage to infrastructure 
have economic, social and environmental costs, and the functionality and 
operability of much port infrastructure will have to be reassessed with a 
view to adaptation. This problem also arises in coastal cities, where most 
defence, transport, water supply, energy and sanitation infrastructure has 
been designed for climatic conditions that are going to change substantially. 
The tourism sector, meanwhile, may be affected by erosion, receding beaches, 
extreme events and the appearance of invasive species, as is already happening 
with the proliferation of sargasso in large areas of the Caribbean. At the 
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same time, the impact of climate change on marine and coastal ecosystems 
is occurring in a context of existing vulnerability resulting from the human 
activities taking place around them (tourism, unplanned urban growth, 
pollution from land-based sources and aquaculture), which threatens fishery 
resources, corals and mangroves (IPCC, 2014a; ECLAC,  2012a). Some of 
these effects are already evident, such as the bleaching of Mesoamerican 
coral, associated with rising sea temperatures and acidification, and 
the loss of mangroves in Central and South America (Magrin and 
others, 2014).
This shows the need to implement adaptation measures that can 
reduce these vulnerabilities. Accordingly, construction sector regulations 
must be improved to accommodate the effects of climate change and ensure 
that infrastructure continues to function when extreme events take place. 
Projections of rising sea levels should be officially included in land-use 
plans for coastal areas, and mechanisms for transferring risks associated 
with port and coastal infrastructure through the insurance market need to 
be developed.
G. Biodiversity, forests and climate change
Latin America and the Caribbean has a variety of climates and ecosystems 
that results in great biological diversity (Magrin and others, 2014; Guevara 
and Laborde, 2008; Mittermeier, Robles and Mittermeier, 1997; Székely, 2009): 
178 ecological regions representing more than 50% of the planet’s biodiversity 
have been identified there, and it contains 21% of the world’s terrestrial 
ecoregions, 22% of freshwater ecoregions and 16% of marine ecoregions 
(ECLAC, 2014b), as well as the habitats of 40% of the world’s species of flora 
and fauna (Galindo and others, 2017a). Between 25% and 50% of species in 
Latin America and the Caribbean are endemic (Herzog and others, 2011) 
and particularly susceptible to the effects of climate change because of the 
difficulty they have adapting to different habitats (IPCC, 2002). There is 
also a great area of forest, totalling 935 million hectares and representing 
23% of the world total as of 2015 (see figure II.12), but dwindling because of 
changing land use. Of this area, 47% was primary forest, equivalent to 34% 
of all the world’s primary forest.14
14  Forested areas were calculated from FAO (2015).
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Figure II.12 
Latin America and the Caribbean: forest cover, 1990-2015 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), Global Forest Resources Assessment 2015: 
Desk Reference, Rome, 2015.
Note: FAO (2015) provides the latest figures available at the time of writing. The regional totals are based 
on figures for the countries that have full time series for the years analysed: 1990, 2000, 2005, 
2010 and 2015.
This natural wealth of the region’s is at risk because of a complex 
mix of factors that is being compounded by climate change. The latter is 
hastening the loss of biodiversity, altering habitats and favouring invasive 
species, on top of which there is the direct harm done by overexploitation 
and pollution. The negative effects on biodiversity in the region are 
explained by the great sensitivity of ecosystems and the difficulty species 
have adapting to new climate conditions (Magrin and others, 2014). Negative 
consequences are therefore expected for populations dependent on agriculture, 
fishing and tourism, which require biological and ecosystem resources to 
be preserved.
The region contains 5 of the 20 countries with the world’s largest 
numbers of threatened species of fauna (Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico 
and Peru) and 7 of the 20 with the largest numbers of threatened plant species 
(Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama and Peru) (UNEP, 2010). 
In other words, biodiversity in the region is already vulnerable and is 
fundamentally threatened by habitat destruction and overexploitation of 
species, on top of which comes the effect of climate change on biomes. 
The transformation of the landscape by land use change is also driving 
climate change. Figure II.13 shows the number of threatened bird and 
fish species.
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Figure II.13 
Latin America and the Caribbean (33 countries): threatened species,  

























































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of World Bank, 
World Development Indicators [online database] https://databank.bancomundial.org/source/world-
development-indicators; International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN).
Note: Threatened species are those that the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) 
has classified as endangered, vulnerable, rare, indeterminate, out of danger or insufficiently known.
Climate change is intensified by processes such as land use change 
and deforestation, the very processes that are having such a strong 
impact on biodiversity in Latin America. For example, land use change 
has already engendered six hotspots for biodiversity loss: Mesoamerica, 
the Chocó-Darién-Western Ecuador Hotspot, the tropical Andes, central 
Chile, the Brazilian Atlantic forest and the Brazilian Cerrado (Mittermeier 
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and others, 2005). Deforestation may take the Amazon rainforest over a 
critical threshold whereby, what with temperature increases and changes in 
precipitation patterns, irreversible harm is done to biodiversity (IPCC, 2014a). 
Thus, climate change will accelerate the loss of species of flora and fauna, 
degrade ecosystems and lead to further losses of the ecosystem goods and 
services these provide. Ecosystems already negatively affected by human 
activities will be damaged yet further (see map II.3).
Map II.3 









by sea level rise
Cities threatened by sea 
level rise
Reduced water availability
Negative effects on fisheries










Increased vulnerability to extreme
atmospheric events
Biodiversity threatened
Coral reefs and 
mangroves threatened
Risk of desertification
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean/United Nations Environment Programme 
(ECLAC/UNEP), Gráficos Vitales del Cambio Climático para América Latina y el Caribe (DEW/1327/PA), 
Santiago, 2010.
In addition, transformations in biodiversity have collateral effects 
on climate. In the Amazon basin, for example, 50% of rainfall originates 
from surface evaporation and water transpired by vegetation. Reducing 
this coverage can be expected to lead to a 20% reduction in rainfall and an 
increase in surface temperature (IPCC, 2007a; Nobre, 2014).
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The economic, social and environmental importance of conserving 
biodiversity lies in the goods and services it provides for economic activities 
and social welfare. Ecosystems provide four types of services (Galindo and 
others, 2017a):
(i) Provisioning in the form of food or production inputs. For example, 
the conservation of coastal areas, mangroves and coral reefs is 
essential to the productivity of fishing activities (Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment, 2005).
(ii) The regulation services generated by natural ecosystem processes, 
such as soil formation, nutrient cycling and primary production, 
which maintain living conditions on the planet (Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment, 2005).
(iii) Support services provided indirectly by natural ecosystem processes, 
such as improved air quality, climate regulation, erosion control, 
maintenance of nutrient cycles, and water purification (López 
and Montes, 2011; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). 
For example, water quality in natural springs and temporary 
water flows are regulated by vegetation, microorganisms and 
the soil itself.
(iv) Cultural services, which are non-material benefits obtained from 
ecosystems in the form of spiritual enrichment, scenic beauty, artistic 
and intellectual inspiration, cognitive development, reflection, 
recreation and aesthetic experiences (Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment, 2005). For example, the aesthetic beauty offered by 
biodiversity is the basis for activities such as ecotourism, which 
accounts for 7% of world tourism (Gómez and Ortega, 2007).
There are a wide range of policies for climate change adaptation and 
mitigation and for biodiversity conservation in the region (see table  II.6) 
(Galindo and others, 2017a), and the region now has 4 million km2 of 
protected areas, representing 20% of the world total (ECLAC/ILO/FAO, 2012; 
UNEP, 2010; ECLAC, 2015a). Strategies, activities and projects related to 
ecosystem-based adaptation have also been progressively incorporated 
into climate change response plans and programmes in several countries 
(Vergara and others, 2014). Given that ecosystems are natural buffers for 
extreme weather events, such measures may ultimately be more efficient 
and effective than the development of physical engineering structures if 
implemented through appropriate management processes (Colls, Ash and 
Ikkala, 2009).15
15 For example, mangroves could be used instead of artificial breakwaters, upper basins could be 
forested to retain soil and prevent sedimentation in low-lying areas, or slopes could be forested 
to protect against landslides, etc.
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H. Management of risk associated with extreme 
weather events
Extreme weather events can prove disastrous for economic activities, social 
conditions and ecosystems. Their effect, then, is that of a shock that is random 
in its scale and geographical location, disrupting economic and social 
stability (Murlidharan and Shah, 2001; ECLAC, 2015a). The overall effects 
will depend on national and local conditions and the period considered. In 
general, extreme weather events have a negative short-term effect on the 
well-being of the population, not necessarily reflected in the path of GDP,16 
and a weak or not easily quantifiable effect in the medium term and long 
term.17 18 The main factors determining the effect are the type and severity 
of the disaster, the sector affected, the structure and composition of the 
economy and per capita income.19
The effects of natural disasters are greater in developing countries than 
in advanced ones, and the agriculture sector usually suffers most (Fomby, 
Ikeda and Loayza, 2013; Benson and Clay, 2004; ECLAC, 2015a). For example, 
the most severe droughts reduce GDP growth by 1% and agricultural growth 
by 2.2% (see table II.7), suggesting that regions such as Central America 
and the Caribbean are particularly sensitive to natural disasters (Martine 
and Guzman, 2002) because of their smaller size and their exposure. Larger 
countries have more options for offsetting the effects. Extreme weather 
events and ecosystem degradation trigger feedback processes; for example, 
deforestation and mangrove destruction increase vulnerability in coastal 
and other geographical areas (Ruth and Ibarrarán, 2009; Mechler, 2009).
Table II.7 
Effects of natural disasters on economic growth 
(Percentages)
Natural disaster Effect on growth of GDP
Effect on growth 
of agriculture
Effect on growth 
of industry
Effect on growth 
of services
Droughts  -1.0***  -2.2***  -1.0*  0.3
Flooding  0.3  0.6  0.1  0.4
Earthquakes  -0.0  -0.1  0.3  0.0
Storms  -0.9**  -0.8**  -0.9  -0.9
Source: N. Loayza and others, “Natural disasters and growth: going beyond the averages”, Policy Research 
Working Paper, No. 4980, Washington, D.C., World Bank, 2009.
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The effects are estimated in relation 
to the output growth rate and not the level of output. Thus, a severe drought might reduce growth 
in overall GDP and industrial GDP by 1%, while reducing agricultural GDP growth by 2.2%.
16 Flooding in some regions is an exception in that it leads to higher agricultural productivity (Loayza 
and others, 2009).
17 By the medium term are meant periods of one to three years. Long-term effects are hard to identify 
because of problems in establishing a baseline (Kahn, 2005). 
18 Albala-Bertrand (1993), Benson and Clay (2003), Hochrainer (2006), Loayza and others (2009), 
Murlidharan and Shah (2001).
19 Haab and McConnell (2003), Freeman, Herriges and Kling (2003), Ruth and Ibarrarán (2009), 
Loayza and others (2009), Hallegatte and Przyluski (2010), Charvériat (2000), Rasmussen (2004).
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Natural disasters also have collateral effects, for example on the 
public finances and infrastructure and in the form of property losses, 
lifestyle changes and disruption of transport and international trade, while 
reinforcing poverty traps (Caballeros-Otero and Zapata, 1995; Murlidharan 
and Shah, 2001; Mechler, 2009). Natural disasters have a negative impact 
on social conditions, with the poor (particularly children and the elderly) 
generally being hardest hit because they usually live in high-risk areas, 
depend on a single income source, do not have a cushion of assets or 
savings, do not have access to credit or insurance and are less educationally 
equipped to deal with such disasters (Kalkstein and Sheridan, 2007; Pelling, 
Özerdem and Barakat, 2002; Kahn, 2005; Kelly and Adger, 2000). Climate 
variability is one of the main factors causing fluctuations in farm incomes, 
as discussed in the section dealing with the impact on agriculture, and this 
most strongly affects lower-income groups, who may require up to a decade 
to replenish their livestock after a climate shock (Dercon, 2006; Rosenzweig 
and Binswanger, 1993; Rasmussen, 2004).
Natural disasters also have long-term repercussions; for example, 
they affect education by increasing school absenteeism, which is not then 
recovered, and they contribute to malnutrition, which reduces cognitive 
skills (World Bank, 2010), with all the attendant effects on productivity and 
long-term incomes (ECLAC, 2015a). The assessment of these effects should 
always take into account the fact that a high proportion of the region’s 
population live in conditions of vulnerability (Cecchini and others, 2012; 
Galindo and others, 2014a).

Chapter III
Central America and the Caribbean: 
two extreme cases of asymmetry between 
low emissions and high vulnerability
In Latin America and the Caribbean, two subregions stand out for their 
great vulnerability to climate change and the small share of emissions they 
generate: Central America and the Caribbean. The climatic, geographical and 
socioeconomic peculiarities of these subregions are justification for analysing 
them separately. This chapter presents the emissions profiles of the countries 
of these two subregions and projects them out to 2030 in the context of their 
nationally determined contributions (NDCs). It also discusses the potential 
effects of climate change, higher temperatures and rising sea levels before 
going on to analyse the occurrence and effects of extreme events and, in 
the particular case of the Caribbean, consider the initiative of the Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) to have debt 
swapped for adaptation to climate change.
A. Greenhouse gas emissions in Central America
Central America is a paradigmatic case of asymmetry between greenhouse 
gas emissions and vulnerability to climate change: it is one of the most 
vulnerable areas in the world despite emitting just 132 megatons or so of CO2 
equivalent (Mt of CO2 eq) in 2016, representing 0.26% of global emissions.1 
1 Emissions in the Central American countries are 2.8 tons of CO2 equivalent (t of CO2 eq) per capita, as 
compared to a global average of 6.7 t of CO2 eq.
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The energy sector2 is the largest source of emissions, accounting for 47% 
of the total, and electricity generation is the activity that is most intensive 
in fossil fuel use. The agriculture and livestock sector is the second-largest 
emitter, with 31%, followed in third place by changes in land use, with 10% 
(see figure III.1).
Emissions increased by 0.2% per year between 1990 and 2016. Emissions 
from the energy and industrial processes sectors grew fastest during this 
period, by an average of about 4.8% per year, while emissions from land use 
change fell at an average annual rate of 6.1%.
Figure III.1 
Central America: greenhouse gas emissions, 1990–2016
A. Emissions by sector, 2016






































2 According to the 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories (IPCC, 2006), the energy 
sector comprises mainly: exploration and exploitation of primary energy sources, conversion of 
primary energy sources into more usable energy forms in refineries and power plants, transmission 
and distribution of fuels, and use of fuels in stationary and mobile applications. Emissions arise 
from these activities by combustion and as fugitive emissions, or escape without combustion.
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of J. Gütschow 
and others, “The PRIMAP-hist national historical emissions time series”, Earth System Science 
Data, vol. 8, Göttingen, Copernicus Publications, 2016; Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO), Corporate Database for Substantive Statistical Data (FAOSTAT) [online] 
http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/. 
The countries’ emissions pathways differ considerably.3 In Costa Rica, 
for example, land use change results in emissions being absorbed, while 
this same process gives rise to large amounts of emissions in Guatemala, 
Panama and Belize. However, energy and agriculture play a large role in 
greenhouse gas emissions in all the countries (see figure III.2). 
Figure III.2 
Central America (7 countries): emissions by sector and country, 2016
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0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of J. Gütschow 
and others, “The PRIMAP-hist national historical emissions time series (1850–2016)”, Potsdam, 2018 
[online] http://dataservices.gfz-potsdam.de/pik/showshort.php?id=escidoc:3842934.
3 Although information on greenhouse gas emissions is available in the countries from national 
inventories, it is not continuous and covers different years. For this reason, Gütschow and others 
(2018) and FAO (2019) are used to harmonize the analysis.
Figure III.1 (concluded)
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Renewables make up a large part of Central America’s energy mix, 
which means less reliance on imported fossil fuels to generate electricity. 
This provides energy security while simultaneously yielding environmental, 
economic and social benefits (see figure III.3).
Figure III.3 
Central America (6 countries): energy mix, 2016
(Percentages)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of International 
Energy Agency (IEA).
1. Emissions and land use change in Central America
Forests and natural ecosystems occupy a considerable portion of the territory 
of the Central American countries. It is estimated that forest areas covered a 
combined 20.1 million hectares as of 2016, or 39% of the region’s land area. 
These forests serve a variety of functions that are important for economic 
activities and social welfare, such as replenishing aquifers, capturing and 
storing carbon, providing cultural and recreational assets and scenic beauty, 
and harbouring species of flora and fauna in a variety of ecosystems. However, 
The climate emergency in Latin America and the Caribbean... 101
it is observed that direct and indirect anthropogenic activity is now putting 
heavy pressure on forested areas and that many of these functions receive 
no monetary compensation, which is contributing to their deterioration.
In 1990, Central America’s forest cover, leaving aside consideration of 
what state it was in, totalled 27 million hectares. An almost linear decrease 
in that area reduced it to 20 million hectares by 2016 (see figure  III.4). 
This suggests an average deforestation rate of 27,000 hectares a year in 
the period 1990–2016. However, the reduction in forest cover has not been 
uniform in the region, but has differed greatly between countries. For 
example, cumulative deforestation in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras 
and Nicaragua since 1990 has been particularly high (see figure III.4). The 
opposite trend can be observed in Costa Rica, where deforestation at a rate 
of 18,800 ha/year between 1990 and 2000 gave way to reforestation at a rate 
of approximately 25,600 ha/year in the period 2001–2016.
Figure III.4  
Central America (7 countries): changes in forest cover, 1990–2016
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of World Bank, 
World Development Indicators [online database] https://databank.bancomundial.org/source/world 
-development-indicators.
The loss of forest has a number of negative consequences, the main 
ones being the five following:
(i) Soil erosion, entailing a loss of economic land value that reflects, 
for example, a decline in agricultural productivity. 
(ii) Loss of ecosystem services. For example, forests contribute to 
surface run-off and the replenishment of aquifers.
(iii) Loss of forest production.
(iv) Loss of forest resources for heating and cooking.
(v) Reduction in the potential for carbon capture and storage, which 
may have an economic cost (Vela Correa, López Blanco and 
Rodríguez Gamiño, 2012). 
Regarding consequence (iv), the use of wood and other biomass as 
fuel is high: they make up approximately 31% of the energy mix, with large 
differences between countries. Consequently, the loss of forest resources 
may compromise energy inputs, especially for the rural poor.
Where point (v) is concerned, vegetation types are very heterogeneous 
in this highly biodiverse region, which means that carbon content per hectare 
varies greatly, from 38.5 tons of CO2 equivalent per hectare (t of CO2 eq/ha) 
in Belize to 170.3 t of CO2 eq/ha in Panama (FAO, 2019), with an average of 
96.6 t of CO2 eq/ha (see box III.1). By way of illustration, it can be estimated 
that in 1990, when there were 27 million hectares of forest in Central America, 
a total of 3 billion t of CO2 eq were stored. However, as a consequence of the 
Figure III.4 (concluded)
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net reduction in cover, and assuming that the remaining ecosystems have 
maintained the same average carbon storage capacity, the retained content 
in the region decreased to 2.316 billion t of CO2 eq (a drop of about 24%) 
during the period 1990–2015.
Box III.1 
Estimation of the monetary value of forest loss
Considering the establishment of a global carbon market with a price per ton, 
the indirect economic cost of the loss of carbon reservoirs can be estimated 
on the basis of the CO2 equivalent content presented in table 1. The indirect 
economic cost is obtained by assigning to the social cost of carbon a monetary 
value of US$ 25.84 for each ton emitted or no longer stored; the range of values 
calculated for this social cost ranges from US$ 6 to US$ 100 per ton of CO2 
equivalent (t of CO2 eq) (Caballero and others, 2019).
Table 1 






(millions of tons of CO2 
equivalent (t of CO2 eq))
Estimated 
carbon content
(millions of t  
of CO2 eq)
1990 2015 1990 2015
Belize 1 616 1 361 38.5 62.2 52.4
Costa Rica 2 564 2 786 89.2 228.7 248.5
El Salvadora 377 261 96.6 36.4 25.2
Guatemala 4 748 3 504 104.5 496.2 366.1
Hondurasa 8 136 4 472 96.6 785.7 431.9
Nicaragua 4 514 3 114 131.2 592.2 408.6
Panama 5 040 4 601 170.3 858.3 783.5
Total 26 995 20 098 96.6b 3 060 2 316
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of World 
Bank, World Development Indicators [online database] https://databank.bancomundial.org/
source/world-development-indicators; Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO), Corporate Database for Substantive Statistical Data (FAOSTAT) [online] http://www.fao.
org/faostat/en/.
a No carbon storage figures are available for El Salvador and Honduras, so these countries have been 
assigned the average value for the others in the region, 96.6 tons of CO2 equivalent per hectare   
(t of CO2 eq/ha).
b Average.
In the period 1990–2015, if carbon is assumed to have a social cost of 
US$ 6, US$ 25.84 and US$ 100 per t of CO2 eq, the indirect cost caused by 
the potential loss due to CO2 emissions is estimated at US$ 4.462 billion, 
US$ 19.215 billion and US$ 74.361 billion, respectively. Of course, these costs 
vary from country to country and there are even countries that potentially profit 
during the period considered (see table 2). 
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Table 2 
Central America (7 countries): loss of carbon reservoirs  
and associated social cost, 1990–2015
Country
Loss of 






t of CO2 eq)












US$ 100/t  
of CO2 eq
Belize -255 -10 -59 -253 -981
Costa Ricaa 222 20 119 512 1 982
El Salvador -116 -11 -67 -290 -1 124
Guatemala -1 244 -130 -780 -3 360 -13 004
Honduras -3 664 -354 -2 123 -9 143 -35 384
Nicaragua -1 400 -184 -1 102 -4 746 -18 368
Panama -439 -75 -449 -1 934 -7 483
Total -6 897 -744 -4 462 -19 215 -74 361
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of World 
Bank, World Development Indicators [online database] https://databank.bancomundial.
org/source/world-development-indicators; Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO), Corporate Database for Substantive Statistical Data (FAOSTAT) [online] http://
www.fao.org/faostat/en/.
a Since net forest cover is reported to have increased in Costa Rica in the period analysed, the social 
cost of carbon is negative and can be interpreted as an expense not incurred or a saving.
This shows that forests are of growing economic importance, and that 
this importance is not only direct, but also relates to the social cost that can 
be assigned to a ton of CO2 and to the role that forests can play in meeting 
mitigation targets set in nationally determined contributions (NDCs).
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of World Bank, World Development Indicators [online database] https://
databank.bancomundial.org/source/world-development-indicators; Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), Corporate Database for 
Substantive Statistical Data (FAOSTAT) [online] http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/; 
K. Caballero and others, “El costo social del carbono: una visión agregada desde 
América  Latina”, Project Documents (LC/TS.2019/10), Santiago, Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2019.
2. Emissions intensity and per capita emissions 
in Central America
The ratio of total emissions to GDP in Central America is 671 t of CO2 eq for 
every million 2010 dollars, just above the world average of 639 t of CO2 eq 
for every million 2010 dollars (see figure III.5). However, the average annual 
decarbonization rate of the Central America region between 1990 and 
2016 was 3.8%, as compared to a global rate of 1.4%. This may represent a 
competitive advantage in the new world economy of the twenty-first century.
Box III.1 (concluded)
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Figure III.5 
Central America (7 countries): carbon intensity of the economy, 1990 and 2016
(Tons of CO2 equivalent for every million 2010 dollars)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of J. Gütschow 
and others, “The PRIMAP-hist national historical emissions time series (1850–2016)”, Potsdam, 2018 
[online] http://dataservices.gfz-potsdam.de/pik/showshort.php?id=escidoc:3842934.
The targets proposed in the nationally determined contributions 
(NDCs) are summarized in table III.1. 
Table III.1 





Belize N/Aa N/A Measured
Costa Rica 44 44 Compared to business as usual
El Salvador N/A N/A Measured
Guatemala 11.2 22.6 Compared to business as usual
Honduras N/A 15 Compared to business as usual
Nicaragua N/A N/A Measured
Panama N/A N/A Measured
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
a N/A: Not applicable.
Per capita emissions by country are shown in figure III.6.
It is estimated that global emissions need to be reduced from the 
50 gigatons (Gt) of CO2 eq currently emitted to 40 Gt of CO2 eq by 2030 if 
international commitments are to be met and the global temperature increase 
is to be stabilized at no more than 2 °C. This means reducing per capita 
emissions from about 7 t of CO2 eq to less than 5 t of CO2 eq per inhabitant 
in the same period (UNEP, 2018). 
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Figure III.6 
Central America (7 countries): emissions per capita, 2016
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 Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of J. Gütschow 
and others, “The PRIMAP-hist national historical emissions time series (1850–2016)”, Potsdam, 2018 
[online] http://dataservices.gfz-potsdam.de/pik/showshort.php?id=escidoc:3842934.
To identify the regional mitigation effort, the following three scenarios 
for 2030 will be constructed:
(i) A business as usual scenario (S1). This will be constructed on the 
basis of historical carbon intensity performance and projected 
GDP growth of 4% per year.
(ii) A scenario without decarbonization and with a 4% annual GDP 
growth rate (S2).
(iii) A nationally determined contributions (NDCs) scenario (S3). With 
this scenario, it is estimated that emissions will be 20% lower than 
with the business as usual scenario by 2030.
The emissions projection relies on the close relationship between 
economic growth and emissions. Thus, it is possible to determine the level 
of emissions using the following equation:
 GHGt = αt * GDPt (1)
where GHGt represents greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, αt represents 
the amount of emissions per unit of GDP or carbon intensity of the economy, 
and GDPt represents GDP. Subscript t represents the year. Thus, if assumptions 
are made about the future behaviour of carbon intensity and GDP in each 
country, it is possible to project the behaviour of GHG emissions.
A useful way of expressing equation (1) is by means of growth rates:
 ∆GHGt ≈ ∆αt + ∆yt (2)
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where ∆ represents the percentage annual change in the variables. 
Thus, the emissions growth rate approximates to the sum of the carbon 
intensity and GDP growth rates. In the absence of a decoupling process in 
the economy, then (∆αt = 0), emissions will grow at the same speed as GDP. 
However, if the goal is to maintain high growth in the economy while 
restraining emissions growth, the carbon intensity of the economy will have 
to be reduced (∆αt < 0). Consequently, reducing the absolute level of emissions 
requires the rate of change of carbon intensity in the economy to be negative 
and greater in absolute terms than GDP growth (∆αt < 0; |∆αt| > ∆GDPt).
The results are summarized in table III.2 and figure III.7.
Table III.2 











(megatons of  
CO2 equivalent)
GHG per capita






Scenario S1 4.1 -3.8 0.34 139 2.4 -
Scenario S2 4.1 0 4.1 233 4.0 67
Scenario S3 4.1 -5.3 -1.2 111 1.9 -20
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Note: S1 is the business as usual scenario, S2 is one in which the decarbonization rate is zero, and in 
S3 emissions are cut by 20% relative to the business as usual scenario.
Figure III.7 
Simulation of greenhouse gas emissions, 2016 and 2030
A. Total emissions
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B. Emissions per capita















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Note: The results illustrated were obtained by applying the formula ∆GHGt ≈ ∆αt + ∆yt, where GHGt 
represents greenhouse gas emissions, αt represents the amount of emissions per unit of GDP 
or carbon intensity of the economy, subscript t represents the year and ∆ represents the annual 
percentage change in the variables. S1  is the business as usual scenario, S2 is one in which 
the decarbonization rate is zero, and in S3 emissions are cut by 20% relative to the business as 
usual scenario.
In the business as usual scenario (S1), in which strong economic 
growth is projected and the aggregate decarbonization rate in the countries 
remains high, a total of 139 Mt of CO2 eq of greenhouse gases would be 
emitted annually by 2030, which is more than at present. In this scenario, 
per capita greenhouse gas emissions are cut from the current 2.8 t of CO2 eq 
to 2.4 t of CO2 eq by 2030. Thus, international commitments would be met if 
the historical decarbonization rate were maintained.
In fact, even in the case of scenario S2, in which the decarbonization 
rate is zero, i.e., in which emissions grow at the same rate as the economy, 
emissions per capita would reach 4.0 t of CO2 eq, which is still lower than 
the value set in international commitments. This offers considerable room 
for manoeuvre in meeting nationally determined contributions (NDCs) in 
the region.
Lastly, scenario E3, in which a policy of accelerated decarbonization 
is applied so that emissions are reduced (or capture is increased) by 20% 
relative to the business as usual scenario, yields a reduction in per capita 
emissions to 1.9 t of CO2 eq per capita by 2030, which is well below the global 
target and very close to carbon neutrality.
By 2030, transport and electricity generation will be the main sources 
of greenhouse gas emissions. There is increasing concern about curbing 
deforestation, improving public mobility infrastructure, avoiding the negative 
impact of private mobility, identifying the determinants of the demand 
Figure III.7 (concluded)
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for petrol and constructing scenarios from the possible paths of these and 
the effect of applying relevant public policies. According to econometric 
estimates of the demand for petrol in the countries of Central America, this 
demand has high income elasticity and low price elasticity, more so than in 
Latin America and the Caribbean as a whole (see table III.3).
Table III.3 
Central America (6 countries): income and price elasticity of long-run 
demand for petrol, 1975–2012
Country Income elasticity Price elasticity
Costa Rica 0.750 -0.299





Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
The way petrol consumption responds to changing incomes suggests 
that economic growth will cause it to increase rapidly, along with air 
pollution and other negative externalities such as vehicle traffic and road 
accidents (Cnossen, 2005). Moreover, the fact that the response (elasticity) to 
price changes is low (inelastic) indicates that applying consumption taxes, 
within reasonable limits, would be insufficient to control this increase, and 
that there is a need to invest in alternative public mobility options. Thus, 
if the development style is maintained, private consumption of fossil fuels 
will continue to increase substantially. As noted above, it is possible that 
Central America’s per capita emissions may be kept below the medium-term 
global threshold (2030) even without major efforts. However, these emissions 
will make it difficult to meet national climate targets (and other sustainable 
development goals) and reduce negative externalities (Galindo and 
others, 2014a).
The Central American countries have the potential to meet their 
international commitments and at the same time avoid the harm associated 
with urban transport pollution. As part of this effort, they should set out 
to restore degraded ecosystems in order to reduce their vulnerability to 
macroeconomic and climate impacts, with social inclusion and preservation of 
natural and environmental resources. Fiscal, regulatory and investment policies 
can contribute decisively to this transition. In the case of Central America, 
the synergy between adaptation and mitigation is very evident, and efforts 
to find solutions based on nature, environmental services and forestation 
are becoming more and more viable.
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3. The impact of climate change in Central America
Extreme events such as drought, cyclones and El Niño Southern Oscillation 
are recurrent in both Central America and the Caribbean, and their severity 
has been increasing with climate change. These events are magnifying the 
region’s socioeconomic vulnerability, and the effects of climate change are 
exposing it to risks relating to agricultural production and food security, 
hydroelectricity, health, ecosystem performance and fiscal contingencies 
(ECLAC, 2018a).
Box III.2 
Central America and the Dominican Republic: vulnerability to climate change
According to the Germanwatch Global Climate Risk Index for 183 countries, the country where 
the impact was greatest in the period 1996–2015 was Honduras. Nicaragua ranked fourth, 
Guatemala ninth, the Dominican Republic eleventh, El Salvador fifteenth, Belize twenty-sixth, 
Costa Rica seventy-eighth and Panama ninety-seventh.
The DARA/CVF Climate Vulnerability Monitor (2012) is based on research and scientific 
information covering the global effects (losses and gains) of climate change and the carbon 
economy in economic, environmental and health terms by 2010 and 2030 (annual averages). 
The indicator of the impact of climate change on a population comprises two parts: the effect 
of climate change and the impact arising from the role played by carbon in society, i.e., carbon 
intensity. With regard to the latter, the economic, environmental and health impact is evaluated 
and the purchase and consumption of fuels is considered, as is the release of greenhouse 
gases due to combustion. The costs and benefits of extraction, production and consumption 
are analysed, irrespective of their effects on climate change. Estimates are presented in table 1.
Table 1 
Central America and the Dominican Republic: Climate Vulnerability Monitor, 



















2010 2030 2010 2030 2010 2030 2010 2030 2010 2030
Belize 7.7 14.2 5.3 10.2 50 60 25 000 30 000 2 000 2 500
Costa Rica 3.1 6.3 0.6 0.9 700 850 75 000 200 000 25 000 30 000
Dominican 
Republic 2.4 4.8 0.3 0.3 3 000 3 500 100 000 150 000 45 000 60 000
El Salvador 3.6 7.2 0.5 0.8 1 500 1 500 1 100 000 1200 000 150 000 250 000
Guatemala 2.9 5.8 0.8 1.2 3 500 5 000 150 000 250 000 100 000 150 000
Honduras 4.6 9.0 1.5 2.5 2 500 3 000 95 000 200 000 55 000 65 000
Nicaragua 6.3 11.7 2.4 4.3 1 500 2 000 200 000 300 000 25 000 25 000
Panama 42 8.4 2.1 3.8 550 650 250 000 400 000 75 000 100 000
Source: International DARA Foundation/Climate Vulnerable Forum (DARA/CVF), Climate Vulnerability Monitor: A Guide to 
the Cold Calculus of a Hot Planet, Madrid, 2012.
Note: Impact is presented as an annual average.
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The Climate Vulnerability Monitor also estimates an indicator of the level of vulnerability 
resulting from the damage caused or lack of it. The impact is significant in relation to the size 
of the economy or population. The greatest impact is the result of high levels of vulnerability. 
The Climate Vulnerability Monitor classifies the level of vulnerability into five categories that 
are statistically determined using standard deviation. The classification ranges from acute (the 
most vulnerable category) to severe, high, moderate and low (the least vulnerable category). For 
example, in countries that have a low level of vulnerability, climate change has no impact or is 
beneficial. The vulnerability levels of the Central American countries are presented in table 2.
Table 2 
Central America and the Dominican Republic: vulnerability levels according 
to the Climate Vulnerability Monitor, 2010 and 2030
Climate change Carbon intensity
2010 2030 2010 2030
Belize Acute Acute High High
Costa Rica Moderate High Low Low
Dominican Republic High Acute High High
El Salvador Severe Acute Low Low
Guatemala Moderate High Low Moderate
Honduras Severe Acute Moderate Moderate
Nicaragua Moderate High Low Moderate
Panama Moderate Severe High Severe
Source: International DARA Foundation/Climate Vulnerable Forum (DARA/CVF), Climate Vulnerability Monitor: A Guide to 
the Cold Calculus of a Hot Planet, Madrid, 2012.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Climate Change in Central 
America: Potential Impacts and Public Policy Options (LC/MEX/L.1196), Mexico City, 2018; 
International DARA Foundation/Climate Vulnerable Forum (DARA/CVF), Climate Vulnerability 
Monitor: A Guide to the Cold Calculus of a Hot Planet, Madrid, 2012.
The average temperature in Central America has increased by 0.54 °C 
in the last half century (SICA, 2011). The RCP6.0 representative concentration 
pathway scenario projects a temperature increase of between 1.8 °C and 3.5 °C 
by 2081–2100 compared to 1986–2005 in Central America and Mexico as a 
whole. In the RCP8.5 scenario, the increase is expected to be between 2.9 °C 
and 5.5 °C. As for precipitation, RCP6.0 estimates a change of between 5% 
and 17% and RCP8.5 one of between 11% and 26% (IPCC, 2013b).
Although there is high availability of water in Central America 
(approximately 21,000 m3/year per capita in 2014),4 it is distributed very 
unevenly between countries. The variability of the interannual pattern 
and geographical differences in precipitation have large effects on this 
stock (SICA, 2011). In the coming decades, the current bimodal interannual 
pattern of precipitation could be distorted: periods of abundant rainfall could 
become longer and the dry spell from July to August shorter. In the longer 
term, the volume of annual precipitation is expected to fall in much of the 
region (ECLAC, 2012b and 2015a). In short, Central America is predicted to 
be hotter and drier.
4 According to World Bank (2019).
Box III.2 (concluded)
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These climatic transformations are affecting economic activities, social 
welfare and ecosystems. Agriculture is particularly sensitive to climate 
change in Central America, since the sector is essential for food security and 
generates 9% of regional GDP, employs 30% of the working population and 
produces key inputs for agro-industrial activities (ECLAC, 2015a and 2019a).
Without adaptation measures, production of staple grains could decline 
significantly in this century and dependence on imports could increase (see 
figure III.8). In scenario B2 (the least bad) of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC), yields of maize, bean and rice crops would be 
reduced by 17%, 19% and 30%, respectively, compared to the last decade; 
the reduction in scenario A2 would be 35%, 43% and 50%. This would have 
negative consequences for economic dynamics, social conditions and poverty 
reduction in the region (ECLAC/CAC/SICA, 2013a). Migration from areas 
that lose their agricultural capacity or where extreme events are recurrent 
may increase.
Figure III.8 
Central America: net production, exports, imports and apparent consumption 
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consumption
 Net production Imports Exports  Apparent
consumption
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), The economics of climate 
change in Latin America and the Caribbean: paradoxes and challenges of sustainable development 
(LC/G.2624), Santiago, 2015.
a The rate of dependence is the imported share of all grains consumed by the countries.
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Central America has a great variety of ecosystems, including tropical 
forests, which in 2005 covered 45% of the territory and contained 7% of the 
planet’s biodiversity. Severe degradation and destruction of biodiversity 
are currently taking place and are likely to intensify with climate change, 
as mentioned above. The potential biodiversity index (PBI) is expected to 
decline by 13% during this century because of land use change, and this 
estimate does not take account of climate change, which can be expected 
to exacerbate the loss. It is estimated that the PBI would fall by 33% in 
IPCC scenario B2 and 58% in scenario A2 by the end of the century (see map III.1) 
(ECLAC, 2011a).
Map III.1 
Central America: potential biodiversity index, baseline, B2 and A2 scenarios  
with land use change, 2005 and 2100
(Differences from baseline scenario)
A. Baseline scenario, 2005 B. Baseline scenario, 2100
C. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) scenario B2, 2100
D. IPCC scenario A2, 2100
Central American total -33% Central American total -58%
Central American total -13%
0.000-0.200 0.201-0.400 0.401-0.600 0.601-0.800 0.801-1.000
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), La economía del cambio 
climático en Centroamérica: reporte técnico 2011 (LC/MEX/L.1016), Mexico City, 2011; The 
economics of climate change in Latin America and the Caribbean: paradoxes and challenges of 
sustainable development (LC/G.2624), Santiago, 2015.
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According to the EM DAT International Disaster Database, there were 
288 extreme weather events between 1990 and 2018, with an increase of 3% 
a year in the last three decades relative to the 1970s. The most recurrent 
events are floods, storms, landslides and avalanches (86% of the total), 
followed by droughts (9%). These events cause significant economic, social 
and environmental losses (ECLAC, 2011a; ECLAC/CAC/SICA, 2013b) (see 
figure III.9).
Figure III.9 
Central America: climate-related disasters, 1969–2018
























































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Centre for 
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), EM-DAT International Disaster Database 
[online] https://www.emdat.be/.
Losses and damage caused by extreme events have been estimated at 
double-digit percentages of GDP in some cases, those resulting from Hurricane 
Iris in Belize being an example. Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador have 
also been affected by events that have caused major disruption to economic 
activities, as well as considerable human losses. The latter is also true of 
Nicaragua (see figures III.10 and III.11). In addition to these costs, extreme 
events intensify the historical tendency to emigration. This is very noticeable 
in the population expulsion effect caused by drought and changing rainfall 
patterns in the “dry corridor” regions, especially in the three countries of 
northern Central America.
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Figure III.10 


































































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Centre for 
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), EM-DAT International Disaster Database 
[online] https://www.emdat.be/.
Note: Natural disasters includes floods, storms, land movements, drought, fires and extreme temperatures.
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Figure III.11 














































































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Centre for 
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), EM-DAT International Disaster Database 
[online] https://www.emdat.be/.
Extreme events also negatively affect women’s economic autonomy by 
depleting their livelihoods and increasing their burden of reproductive and 
unpaid care work. Moreover, women are less likely to be employed in “cash 
for work” programmes implemented after a disaster to rebuild infrastructure 
and provide paid employment, as men generally have more experience in 
infrastructure-related roles. For example, women’s employment was hit hard 
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in Honduras after Hurricane Mitch in 1998 for several reasons. In most of the 
export fruit-growing sector, men continued to work on the reconstruction of 
plantations, while the washing and packing jobs done by women ceased. In 
manufacturing, women workers were laid off (ECLAC, 2019c).
In Central America, policies have been formulated in response to climate 
change at the regional and national levels, and the goal is to mainstream 
this response from environmental institutions to key sectors such as finance, 
agriculture, health and public works. The implementation of sectoral agendas 
would strengthen institutional linkages in a way that maximized co-benefits 
and minimized intersectoral costs. Within this framework, the objective is to 
move towards environmentally sustainable economies with low emissions, 
in addition to overcoming the dichotomy between mitigation and adaptation. 
Moreover, the exposure to threats and the vulnerability of Central American 
societies have made the response to extreme events and climate change one 
of the priorities of the integration process, in recognition of the fact that the 
situation represents both a threat and an opportunity and incentive to move 
towards sustainable development.
Since 2009, ECLAC has been assisting the Central American Integration 
System (SICA) and the governments of the region in obtaining data on the 
actual and potential impact of climate change. It has also helped organize 
policy response dialogues, dealing particularly with the initiative to study 
the economics of climate change in Central America and the Dominican 
Republic. Strengthening the technical capacity of national and regional 
institutions to implement and coordinate public policies is a priority 
working area in the region. In 2018 and 2019, for example, ECLAC carried 
out an analysis of the effects of introducing a CO2 content accounting value 
in public investment projects as part of an effort to modernize project 
evaluation methods. This study was carried out with representatives of the 
National Systems for Public Investment (SNIP) of Costa Rica (chair of the 
SNIP Network during 2018–2019), Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama (and 
in 2019 Guatemala expressed an interest in participating). The experience of 
Chile, where a value for CO2 emissions had been introduced into the public 
project evaluation methodology, was taken as a benchmark.
Improving technical capabilities and coordinating climate change 
policy will make it possible to focus work on the impact experienced by 
vulnerable populations and on investments that are better conceived from 
a climate perspective. It will also reduce the constraints that economic 
considerations place on proposals such as green tax reform and increased 
investment in public and intergenerational common goods and services such 
as water, food and energy security, and public transport.
The nationally determined contributions (NDCs) of the region’s 
countries identify key sectors for strengthening adaptation processes: human 
health, marine-coastal zones, agriculture, livestock and food security, forest 
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resources, biodiversity, protected areas, conservation and management of 
strategic ecosystems, infrastructure, integrated water resources management 
and integrated disaster risk reduction management. To achieve these 
adaptation goals and thereby reduce regional vulnerability, a wide-ranging 
public policy strategy must be implemented.
B. The impact of rising sea levels on the Caribbean 
and Central America
It is on the Atlantic seaboard that the sharpest upward trend in the sea level 
can be observed. On the northern coast of South America and the Caribbean 
coast, the values for 2040 are approximately 3 mm per year, with lower values 
for the Caribbean islands. Maps III.2 and III.3 show the heterogeneous effect 
that would arise in a scenario in which the sea level rose by 1 m and there 
was an effect from El Niño Southern Oscillation. The heterogeneity would 
be due both to the values for the land area affected and to the different ways 
in which the population is distributed in the countries. In any event, the 
places where the greatest areas would be affected are those where there are 
large conurbations, especially in island countries.5
Map III.2 
Central America, the Caribbean and northern South America: land area affected 
if the average sea level rose by 1 metre
(Square metres)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean/University of Cantabria (ECLAC/UC), 
“The effects of climate change in the coastal areas of Latin America and the Caribbean: impacts”, 
Project Documents (LC/W.484), Santiago, 2012; Government of Spain/Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), “The effects of climate change in the coastal areas 
of Latin America and the Caribbean” [online database] https://c3a.ihcantabria.com/.
5 A sea level rise of 1 m could lead to an area of up to 180,000 m2 being flooded in southern states 
of Mexico such as Campeche, Yucatán and Quintana Roo.
The climate emergency in Latin America and the Caribbean... 119
Map III.3 
Central America, the Caribbean and northern South America:  
projected urban area, 2040
 (Square metres)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean/University of Cantabria (ECLAC/UC), 
“The effects of climate change in the coastal areas of Latin America and the Caribbean: impacts”, 
Project Documents (LC/W.484), Santiago, 2012; Government of Spain/Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), “The effects of climate change in the coastal areas 
of Latin America and the Caribbean” [online database] https://c3a.ihcantabria.com/.
The temporary sea level rise historically caused by hurricanes 
(1999–2005), coupled with the scenario of a permanent rise of 1 m by 2040, 
would have various effects (see map III.4):
• The projected flood level (in the absence of hurricanes) would be 
about one metre in the Caribbean.
• There would be a great impact on the population of the Caribbean 
islands, especially the easternmost.6
• The effect of hurricanes would change significantly in countries 
such as Honduras, Panama and Costa Rica, and somewhat less 
in the Dominican Republic.7
6 There would also be a major impact on the population of the Brazilian coasts, with great disruption 
in the large conurbations, and on that of extensive parts of the eastern seaboard of Mexico.
7 The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela would also be strongly affected.
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Map III.4 
Central America, the Caribbean and northern South America:  
projected flood level, 2040
(Metres)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean/University of Cantabria (ECLAC/UC), 
“The effects of climate change in the coastal areas of Latin America and the Caribbean: impacts”, 
Project Documents (LC/W.484), Santiago, 2012; Government of Spain/Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), “The effects of climate change in the coastal areas 
of Latin America and the Caribbean” [online database] https://c3a.ihcantabria.com/.
The beaches of the Atlantic and Caribbean coast are expected to be the 
most affected by the change in sea level and the intensity and direction of 
waves acting on the profile and planform of beaches. Indeed, average annual 
retreat rates are estimated at around 0.16 m (see map III.5). In the region as 
a whole, erosion rates are due to the combined effect of rising sea levels and 
higher waves. The worst hit areas are expected to be the northern Caribbean 
and the southern coasts of Brazil as far as the River Plate.
Under average conditions, the likelihood of adverse navigation 
conditions arising for vessels entering ports will be greater in the future. 
This would mean an increase in the average number of hours per year for 
which ports would have to close. Wave changes could result in breakwaters 
being overtopped. The combination of wave changes and sea level rise is 
likely to reduce the effectiveness of these walls. Map III.6 shows the areas 
that would be most affected in Central America and the Caribbean.8
8 In the rest of the region, the areas most affected would be the west coast from Ecuador northward, 
the north coast of Argentina, Uruguay, and the south and north of Brazil. Southern Peru and 
northern Chile would also be affected, but less severely.
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Map III.5 
Central America, the Caribbean and northern South America: average erosion 
projected because of sea level changes, 2040
(Metres)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean/University of Cantabria (ECLAC/UC), 
“The effects of climate change in the coastal areas of Latin America and the Caribbean: impacts”, 
Project Documents (LC/W.484), Santiago, 2012; Government of Spain/Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), “The effects of climate change in the coastal areas 
of Latin America and the Caribbean” [online database] https://c3a.ihcantabria.com/.
Map III.6 
Central America, the Caribbean and northern South America: change of 0.5 m 
in vertical breakwater overtopping because of sea level rise, 2040
(Percentages)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean/University of Cantabria (ECLAC/UC), 
“The effects of climate change in the coastal areas of Latin America and the Caribbean: impacts”, 
Project Documents (LC/W.484), Santiago, 2012; Government of Spain/Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), “The effects of climate change in the coastal areas 
of Latin America and the Caribbean” [online database] https://c3a.ihcantabria.com/.
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Consequently, strengthening infrastructure with engineering works 
and by restoring systems such as corals and mangroves is critical to the 
proper functioning of the region. As will be seen in the next section, this 
will depend on whether the financial resources are available to meet this 
new demand for adaptation.
C. The Caribbean: negative effects of climate change 
in a context of high borrowing
The Caribbean relies heavily on economic activities such as tourism and 
agriculture, which are particularly sensitive to climatic conditions (ECLAC, 2010). 
Agriculture generates a large number of jobs, and the rural population 
continues to constitute a substantial percentage of the total population 
(ECLAC/MINURVI/UN-HABITAT, 2016). It is therefore relevant that, in 
different climate scenarios, yields of cassava, banana, sweet potato and 
tomato plantations are predicted to fall by between 1% and 30% by 2050, with 
rice crop yields ranging from a 3% decrease to a 2% increase. Lower yields 
would have negative consequences in a number of areas, such as growth in 
output and investment in agriculture, the external sector, poverty reduction 
and food security (Clarke and others, 2013; ECLAC, 2015a).
Between 1950 and 2000, the number of warmer days and nights 
increased, the number of colder days and nights decreased, the number of 
drier days and rainier days increased, and the sea temperature rose by 1.5 ºC. 
The climate scenarios of IPCC (2013b) show representative concentration 
pathways (RCPs) for the period 2016–2035 that would lead to a temperature 
increase of between 0.5 °C and 0.7 °C above the base period average. A 
further increase of between 0.8 °C and 3 °C is forecast by 2081–2100. In the 
first period, annual precipitation would decrease by an average of between 
1% and 3% relative to the base period average, while in the second period 
the decrease would be between 5% and 16% (UNFCCC, 2007; ECLAC, 2015a). 
Like Central America, the Caribbean will be warmer and drier.
As noted in the previous section, Caribbean countries are particularly 
exposed to rising sea levels and extreme weather events, such as hurricanes 
and storms, that exacerbate the loss and erosion of coastal areas, the 
deterioration of marine ecosystems, the alteration of marine habitats and 
the loss of mangroves or corals. In particular, it is estimated that the entire 
coral ecosystem will have collapsed by 2050. Biodiversity loss has negative 
effects on economic activities and the welfare of the population: less tourism, 
destruction of coastal infrastructure, population movements and debt. In 
addition, climate change is expected to affect people’s health through heat 
waves, natural disasters caused by extreme weather events, and communicable 
diseases such as malaria, dengue, leptospirosis and gastroenteritis (Clarke 
and others, 2013).
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1. The emissions of the Caribbean
In contrast to the path being followed in Central America, the energy 
mix of the Caribbean countries is dominated by oil. In the case of Haiti, 
biofuels predominate, while in Trinidad and Tobago it is natural gas (see 
figure III.12).
Figure III.12 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of J. Gütschow 
and others, “The PRIMAP-hist national historical emissions time series”, Earth System Science 
Data, vol. 8, Göttingen, Copernicus Publications, 2016; Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO), Corporate Database for Substantive Statistical Data (FAOSTAT) [online] 
http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/.
The level of emissions by country varies, but energy is usually the 
largest category (see figure III.13).9 Trinidad and Tobago and Cuba are the 
countries with the most emissions, at 87 Mt of CO2 eq and 36 Mt of CO2 eq, 
respectively. At the same time, the forest cover of Cuba and the Dominican 
Republic absorbs emissions.
9 Currently, the information available in the countries on greenhouse gas emissions is based on 
national inventories; however, this information covers different years, so the database of Gütschow 
and others (2018) and FAO (2019) is used to harmonize the analysis.
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Figure III.13 
The Caribbean (13 countries): emissions by country and by sector, 2014
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of J. Gütschow 
and others, “The PRIMAP-hist national historical emissions time series (1850–2016)”, Potsdam, 2018 
[online] http://dataservices.gfz-potsdam.de/pik/showshort.php?id=escidoc:3842934.
With regard to the sectoral composition of emissions, in 2016 the 
burning of fossil fuels accounted for 90% of these: most emissions came 
from the energy sector (74%), followed by industrial processes (16%) and 
agriculture (12%). On the other hand, the subregion captures carbon because 
of land use change (see figures III.14 and III.15). In contrast to other regions 
of Latin America and the Caribbean, the transport sector still accounted for 
a relatively minor share in the Caribbean as of 2017. At the aggregate level, 
179 Mt of CO2 eq were emitted in the Caribbean in 2016,
10 and the average 
annual growth rate was 3.8%. Emissions from the waste sector and the 
industrial processes sector were the fastest-growing between 1990 and 2016, 
and emissions from land use change fell by an average of 2.8% annually over 
the same period (see figure III.16).
10 This means that emissions per capita were 4.6 t of CO2 eq, which compares favourably with the 
world average of 6.7 t of CO2 eq.
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Figure III.14 























Land use change Other Waste
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission, EDGAR database [online] https://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml.
Figure III.15 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission, EDGAR database [online] https://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml.
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Figure III.16 























Land use change Other Waste Total
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of J. Gütschow 
and others, “The PRIMAP-hist national historical emissions time series (1850–2016)”, Potsdam, 2018 
[online] http://dataservices.gfz-potsdam.de/pik/showshort.php?id=escidoc:3842934.
Figure III.17 ranks the countries by their per capita emissions in 2016. 
Several of them have exceeded the limit of 5 tons per capita and it will be 
necessary to reduce emissions to achieve the target of not exceeding that 
value by 2030. However, as noted above, in absolute terms, total emissions 
from the Caribbean represent only those of a medium-sized economy in the 
region, and the emissions of each individual country represent approximately 
10% of those of a medium-sized continental country.
Figure III.17 
The Caribbean (13 countries): emissions per capita, 2016





























Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of J. Gütschow 
and others, “The PRIMAP-hist national historical emissions time series (1850–2016)”, Potsdam, 2018 
[online] http://dataservices.gfz-potsdam.de/pik/showshort.php?id=escidoc:3842934.
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The ratio between total emissions and GDP is 844 t of CO2 eq for 
every million 2010 dollars, which is higher than the world average of 639 t 
of CO2 eq (see figure III.18). The region has also seen a coupling process of 
1% per year since 1990, with the exceptions of Jamaica, Antigua and Barbuda 
and Barbados, where carbon intensity has been reduced.
Figure III.18 
The Caribbean (13 countries): carbon intensity of the economy, 1990 and 2016

















































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of J. Gütschow 
and others, “The PRIMAP-hist national historical emissions time series (1850–2016)”, Potsdam, 2018 
[online] http://dataservices.gfz-potsdam.de/pik/showshort.php?id=escidoc:3842934.
As already mentioned in the section on Central America, it is estimated 
that, in order to meet international commitments and stabilize the global 
temperature increase at no more than 2 °C, it is necessary to reduce global 
emissions from 50 Gt of CO2 eq, which is what is currently emitted, to 
40 Gt of CO2 eq by 2030. This means reducing per capita emissions from 
approximately 7 t of CO2 eq to less than 5 t of CO2 eq per inhabitant in the 
same period (UNEP, 2018). As in the case of Central America, the regional 
mitigation effort can be calculated on the basis of the following three 
hypothetical scenarios for 2030:
(i) A business as usual scenario, which is constructed by taking the 
historical performance of carbon intensity and a GDP projection 
of 2.8% per year (S1).
(ii) A scenario without greater carbonization, which in this case is 
better than the historical performance (S2).
(iii) A scenario of compliance with nationally determined contributions 
(NDCs), in which it is estimated that emissions are reduced by 
20% compared to the business as usual scenario by 2030 (S3). 
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The results of evaluating the above scenarios for 2030 are summarized 
in table III.4 and figure III.19.
Table III.4 


















scenario S1  
(percentages)
Scenario S1 2.8 1 3.8 302 7.3 -
Scenario S2 2.8 0 2.8 264 6.4 -13
Scenario S3 2.8 -0.6 2.2 242 5.8 -20
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Note: S1 is the business as usual scenario, S2 is one in which the decarbonization rate is zero, and in 
S3 emissions are cut by 20% relative to the business as usual scenario.
Figure III.19 
Simulation of greenhouse gas emissions, 2016 and 2030
A. Total emissions
(megatons of CO2 equivalent)














B. Emissions per capita
(tons of CO2 equivalent)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean).
Note: S1 is the business as usual scenario, S2 is one in which the decarbonization rate is zero, and in 
S3 emissions are cut by 20% relative to the business as usual scenario.
The climate emergency in Latin America and the Caribbean... 129
In the business as usual scenario (S1), a total of 302 Mt of CO2 eq 
of greenhouse gases would be emitted by 2030 (it was previously noted 
that 179 Mt of CO2 eq were emitted in 2016), owing to increased carbon 
intensity in the countries. Per capita emissions would increase from the 
current 4.6 t of CO2 eq to 7.3 t of CO2 eq by 2030, and carbon intensity would 
increase at the observed rate of 1% per year. If the observed rate of historical 
decarbonization or evolution of the carbon intensity of GDP were maintained, 
international commitments would be far from being met. In the case of 
scenario S2, where the decarbonization rate is zero, i.e., where the increase 
in the carbon intensity of GDP is zero or emissions are growing at the same 
rate as the economy, per capita emissions would reach 6.4 t of CO2 eq. In 
scenario S3, where the commitment to reduce emissions by 20% compared 
to the business as usual scenario is met, per capita emissions would be 
5.8 t of CO2 eq. However, in order to reach this value, it would be necessary 
for the carbon intensity of GDP to decrease. In this scenario, the goal of 
keeping per capita emissions in the subregion below 5 t of CO2 eq, which is 
what is needed to achieve the climate targets, would be within sight.
This indicates that, with a marginal effort to decarbonize the electricity 
mix, i.e., a modest rate of renewable energy penetration, especially in 
countries with higher carbon intensity, coupled with the electrification of 
industry and an effort to improve the efficiency of mobility systems and 
agriculture, the Caribbean countries would be on track to meet the goal 
of keeping emissions down to 5 tons per capita. Alternatively, restoring 
ecosystems, such as mangrove forests, would increase carbon capture, 
creating scope to burn fossil fuels. The local co-benefits for the subregion 
are obvious, since this would provide gains in terms of energy sufficiency 
and independence in addition to increased space in the external sector in the 
medium term (once the phase of importing equipment for generation with 
renewables had been completed) and improved mobility systems, which 
would be more efficient and emit fewer pollutants hazardous to health. 
The option of improved ecosystem management and afforestation would 
be very helpful in preventing and mitigating the destructive effects of the 
extreme events referred to in the following section. In combination, as can 
be appreciated, these actions would substantially improve the development 
style in the Caribbean countries.
2. Extreme events in the Caribbean
As in the Central American countries, the fundamental asymmetry of climate 
change can be observed in an extreme form in the small island developing 
States of the Caribbean: 0.36% of global greenhouse gas emissions are 
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generated in those States,11 but their vulnerability is particularly high because 
of their socioeconomic, geographical and climatic conditions. Almost all 
the islands are in the hurricane corridor and, naturally, a large proportion 
of the population and economic activities are located in coastal areas 
(see map III.7).
Map III.7 
The Caribbean: historical tracks of category 5 hurricanes, 1980–2018
TS TD ET N/A H1 H2 H3 H4 H5
Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Historical Hurricane Tracks [online] 
https://coast.noaa.gov/hurricanes/#/search/basin/2/filter/categories/H5/pressure/years.
Note: H stands for hurricane, TS for tropical storm, TD for tropical depression and ET for extratropical 
storm, while N/A means “not applicable” (i.e., not corresponding to any of the meteorological 
systems listed here). The tracks of the 14 category 5 hurricanes that occurred in the Caribbean 
between 1980 and 2018 are shown. In date order, they are: Hurricane Allen, 31 July to 
11 August 1980; Hurricane Gilbert, 8 to 20 September 1988; Hurricane Hugo, 10 to 25 September 
1989; Hurricane Mitch, 22 October to 9 November 1998; Hurricane Ivan, 2 to 24 September 2004; 
Hurricane Emily, 11 to 21 July 2005; Hurricane Rita, 18 to 26 September 2005; Hurricane Wilma, 
15 to 26 October 2005; Hurricane Dean, 13 to 23 August 2007; Hurricane Felix, 31 August to 
6 September 2007; Hurricane Matthew, 28 September to 10 October 2016; Hurricane Irma, 30 August 
to 13 September 2017; Hurricane Maria, 16 September to 2 October 2017; and Hurricane Michael, 
6 to 15 October 2018.
11 The Caribbean’s annual emissions are 179,000 tons of CO2 equivalent, about half of this being 
explained by hydrocarbon-related activities in Trinidad and Tobago. Of the other countries, the 
four most populous in the region are, in order, the largest emitters: Cuba, the Dominican Republic, 
Haiti and Jamaica. In all of them, the largest emissions come from the energy sector. This is because 
they depend heavily on imports of fossil fuels and because renewable sources play little part in 
electricity generation. This contrasts with the situation in the countries of Central America, which, 
together with Uruguay, are leaders in renewable electricity generation.
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There were 408 disasters associated with extreme events in the subregion 
between 1990 and 2017, an average of 14.6 a year.12 Disasters were recorded 
every year during this period, but the highest incidence was observed in 
2004 and 2017 (30 and 29 disasters, respectively). The countries suffering the 
most disasters were Haiti (90), the Dominican Republic (59) and Cuba (53). 
In the English-speaking Caribbean, Jamaica was the country with the most 
disasters (26). Of the disasters during this period, 90.4% were associated 
with hydroclimatic hazards, particularly storms (58.1%) and floods (27.2%) 
(see table III.5). The years with the most storm-related disasters were 2017 
and 2004, with 25 and 23 disasters, respectively.
Table III.5 










Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC), on the basis of Centre for Research on the Epidemiology 
of Disasters (CRED), EM-DAT International Disaster Database 
[online] https://www.emdat.be/; Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean/Latin American and Caribbean 
Institute for Economic and Social Planning (ECLAC/ILPES), 
Planning for sustainable territorial development in Latin America 
and the Caribbean (LC/CRP.17/3), Santiago, 2019.
In terms of impact and damage, the highest values were in 2016 and 
2017, when 9 and 11 million people, respectively, were affected by some 
disaster, while 85.9% of all asset destruction in the period from 1990 to 2017 
occurred in those two years. The peak came in 2017 because of the effects 
of Hurricanes Irma and Maria, which caused losses of US$ 80.8 billion or 
63.4% of the total damage for the period (see figure III.20). With respect to 
the types of disasters, storms were responsible for the greatest destruction 
of assets and caused 91.3% of all damage. The set of expected effects is 
shown in box III.3.
12 The data on the frequency of extreme events in the Caribbean countries were taken from 
ECLAC/ILPES (2019).
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Figure III.20 
The Caribbean: damage caused by disasters, 1990–2017
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Centre for 
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), EM-DAT International Disaster Database [online] 
https://www.emdat.be/; Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean/Latin American 
and Caribbean Institute for Economic and Social Planning (ECLAC/ILPES), Planning for sustainable 
territorial development in Latin America and the Caribbean (LC/CRP.17/3), Santiago, 2019.
Box III.3 
The Caribbean: impact expected as a result of vulnerability  
to the effects of climate change, sea level rise and extreme events
• Deterioration of coastal conditions, e.g., beach erosion and coral bleaching 
negatively affecting local resources, such as fisheries, and reducing the value 
of beaches as a tourist destination.
• Floods, storm surges, erosion and other coastal hazards, which are exacerbated 
by rising sea levels and threaten vital infrastructure, settlements and facilities 
that contribute to the livelihoods of local communities.
• Increased invasion of non-native species, such as sargasso in the Caribbean.
• Economic losses from lower agricultural yields.
• Loss of mangrove forests and coral reefs due to rising sea levels. 
• Ocean discoloration and acidification.
• Damage to forests caused by extreme events.
• Reduction in freshwater availability due to reduced precipitation and 
saltwater intrusion. 
• Flooding of coastal settlements and croplands. 
• Decrease in tourism due to the increased frequency and severity of extreme 
weather events.
• Resort to external borrowing to compensate for losses caused by extreme 
weather events.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis 
of Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 2007: 
Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2007; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
“Vulnerability and adaptation to climate change in small island developing states”, 
Bonn, 2007; Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
The economics of climate change in Latin America and the Caribbean: paradoxes 
and challenges of sustainable development (LC/G.2624), Santiago, 2015.
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3. The situation of cities in the Caribbean13
Growing urbanization in the Caribbean is increasing the vulnerability 
of the subregion, as cities are low-lying and exposed to rising sea levels. 
Increasing their resilience is therefore a necessity. Urban growth is expected 
to increase the risk to inhabitants, owing to the exploitation of nearby 
resources (McHardy and Donovan, 2016) and the increasing pace of sea level 
rise (Kopp and others, 2016), which, as measured by satellite altimetry, is 
already taking place at ±3.4 mm per year. For example, in the Bahamas, which 
were terribly affected by Hurricane Dorian in 2019, 82.8% of the population 
live less than 10 m above sea level and 94.9% live within 5 km of the coast 
(Mycoo and Donovan, 2017). The document prepared by the Latin American 
and Caribbean Institute for Economic and Social Planning (ILPES) for the 
2019 Regional Council for Planning states: “In addition to the increased 
risks to low-lying coastal zones and the exposure of people living in coastal 
areas, the vulnerabilities of SIDS are also spreading to other critical sectors 
because of the loss of biodiversity and the destruction of natural protection 
systems such as reefs and mangroves […] Freshwater aquifers in the great 
coastal plains of Belize, Guyana and Suriname are also vulnerable to saline 
intrusion […] At the same time, unsustainable production and consumption 
patterns are putting more and more pressure on resources such as land, water 
and biodiversity.14 Failure to pay attention to these factors may have severe 
environmental and socioeconomic consequences” (ECLAC/ILPES, 2019, p. 52). 
ECLAC/ILPES (2019) points out how heavily the population is concentrated 
in cities, with 18 of the 30 capital cities of the Caribbean being home to more 
than half the urban population of the country or territory concerned. There 
are six capitals that contain the whole of the urban population of the country 
or territory in question, namely Bridgetown, Road Town, Willemstad, Saint 
George’s, Brades Estate and Philipsburg. While 89% of total population of 
Curaçao live in Willemstad, 81.9% of the population of Antigua and Barbuda 
live in Saint John, Nassau is home to 70% of the population of the Bahamas, 
and 67% of the population of Puerto Rico reside in San Juan. In the Cayman 
Islands and the United States Virgin Islands, about half the population lives 
in the capital city (see table III.6).
13 This section takes information and text from ECLAC/ILPES (2019). 
14 Mycoo and Donovan (2017) describe harmful land use practices caused in part by unresolved 
conflicts arising from inherited land tenure systems associated with plantation economies, 
obsolete land records, poor execution of physical development plans and environmental policies 
and regulations, poor site selection for urban settlements, inadequate application of urbanization 
standards and building codes, deep governance and infrastructure deficits, economic and social 
inequality and limited application of tools for measuring the value of environmental resources 
in protecting urban assets (ECLAC/ILPES, 2019).
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With regard to the exposure of settlements to the effect of rising sea 
levels and hurricanes, the Bahamas, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti 
and Jamaica have more than 100 km of urban coastline (see figure III.21), 
and many cities are less than 5 metres above sea level (see map III.8). Flood 
risks are exacerbated by the complexity of water systems and the incipient 
nature of countries’ adaptive capacity.
In addition, according to ILPES, by 2050 the Caribbean will have an 
urbanization rate of 82.5%, higher than the rest of the region’s. This rate will 
represent an increase of at least 15%, in a dispersed pattern that will form 
“city-regions” and “urban corridors”. “Urban expansion in the Caribbean 
will result in a two- to fivefold increase in the current total urban area, in 
response to an estimated increase of some 10 million new urban inhabitants 
by 2050”15 (ECLAC/ILPES, 2019, p. 45).
Figure III.21 






































Source: M. Mycoo and M. Donovan, A Blue Urban Agenda: Adapting to Climate Change in the Coastal 
Cities of Caribbean and Pacific Small Island Developing States, Washington, D.C., Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB), 2017; Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean/
Latin  American and Caribbean Institute for Economic and Social Planning (ECLAC/ILPES), 
Planning for sustainable territorial development in Latin America and the Caribbean (LC/CRP.17/3), 
Santiago, 2019.
15 According to research by McHardy and Donovan, in 2050 the urban area of the Caribbean will 
be equivalent to an area between three times the size of Barbados and the whole of Trinidad and 
Tobago (see McHardy and Donovan, 2016). Studies by Angel and others (2010) have projected 
significant increases in urban land cover in the Caribbean and in Pacific small island developing 
States between 2000 and 2050. For example, Trinidad and Tobago is expected to experience a 
seven-fold increase in urban land cover (ECLAC/ILPES, 2019, p. 45). 
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Map III.8 
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Source: Latin American and Caribbean Institute for Economic and Social Planning (ILPES), on the basis of 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), CEPALSTAT [online database] 
http://estadisticas.cepal.org/cepalstat/WEB_CEPALSTAT/Portada.asp; Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean/Latin American and Caribbean Institute for Economic and 
Social Planning (ECLAC/ILPES), Planning for sustainable territorial development in Latin America 
and the Caribbean (LC/CRP.17/3), Santiago, 2019.
In such a scenario, pressures on land, services and infrastructure will 
also increase, and policies to anticipate these pressures, such as improved 
security of land tenure, public land management, housing policy, transport, 
waste management and water security, will be crucial (see box III.4). As 
long as territories are unprepared and these phenomena are unplanned, 
the development style will multiply existing vulnerabilities by adding those 
created by the uncontrolled growth of informal settlements.
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Box III.4 
Planning and risk
Disaster risk reduction (DRR) has been integrated into a number of development frameworks 
and international agreements, such as the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015: Building the 
Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters, and its successor, the Sendai Framework 
for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030. It was also integrated into the Samoa Pathway and into 
the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In addition, given the Caribbean’s vulnerability 
to disasters, stakeholders in the subregion also need to improve their capacity to incorporate 
disaster risk management components into sectoral and budget planning. Disaster risk 
management consists of five pillars with their respective outcomes (GFDRR, 2013):
(i) Risk identification. Improved identification and understanding of disaster risks through 
building capacity for assessment and analysis.
(ii) Risk reduction. Avoided creation of new risks and reduced risks in society through 
greater disaster risk consideration in policy and investment.
(iii) Preparedness. Improved capacity to manage crises through developing forecasting 
and disaster management capacities.
(iv) Financial protection. Increased financial resilience of governments, private sector and 
households through financial protection strategies (parametric insurance, traditional 
insurance and budgetary provisions).
(v) Resilient recovery. Quicker, more resilient recovery through support for reconstruction planning.
Although progress has been made with disaster risk management planning (Bahamas, 
Barbados, Belize, Dominican Republic, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Suriname and 
Trinidad and Tobago), this approach has not yet permeated the regulatory and institutional 
frameworks governing sectoral and territorial institutions or planning and budgeting processes, 
as reported in the following paragraphs:
• Information for decision-making on disaster risk management. Although most 
development and sectoral policies acknowledge this need for data and identify important 
gaps, there are no clear guidelines for the generation and dissemination of disaster risk 
management-related information. The countries analysed have institutions responsible 
for the study and monitoring of geological and hydrometeorological hazards, but this 
information is not necessarily accessible or used to guide actions and decisions. 
Information is still being primarily used in the academic sector and in early warning 
systems. Nevertheless, it should be noted that most countries already have laws 
ensuring access to public information. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify the role of 
disaster risk management in this regard and build upon the accomplishments of such 
laws. As expressed in most disaster risk management instruments, it is recommended 
that disaster risk management information systems should be implemented, as well as 
technical guidelines to support sectoral and territorial engagement, and that consistency 
in the collection of data should be ensured. It is important to highlight the importance of 
consistently collecting sectoral baseline data, as they are useful not only for identifying 
and reducing risks, but also for assessing the effects and impacts of disasters. On the 
subject of sectoral data, the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
and World Bank have evaluated a number of disasters in the subregion, thereby 
consolidating a baseline in a range of sectors that should be kept continually updated.
• Integration of disaster risk management into the project preparation and 
evaluation cycle. The standards and instruments used in some countries for carrying 
out environmental impact assessments already integrate disaster risk analysis, as 
well as the design and implementation of disaster risk reduction measures. However, 
the lack of national information systems or technical guidelines makes it difficult to 
properly consider disaster risk management in the preparation and evaluation cycle 
of public investment and development projects in general. A combination of improved 
data and strengthened technical capabilities is crucial to incorporating disaster risk 
management into public investment projects. The incorporation of a multi-hazard disaster 
risk management component throughout the life cycle of a project would increase its 
resilience and sustainability, and contribute to protecting public investments, while 
ensuring continuity in the provision of public services and products.
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• Territorial approach. In some countries, the development of regional, provincial or municipal 
disaster risk management plans has been promoted, while in others the approach has been 
to incorporate them into development plans, or for both types of instruments to coexist. 
However, the territorial approach and the definition of sectoral roles and responsibilities 
where disaster risk management is concerned has not always been accompanied by 
the allocation of financial resources or budget incentives. It is suggested that countries 
strengthen the territorial component of their disaster risk management strategies, as it is 
observed that most local authorities are tasked primarily with emergency preparedness 
and response tasks. This requires an update of disaster risk management frameworks 
to establish binding responsibilities for territorial levels and strengthen areas such as 
risk identification, planning of mitigation measures, data gathering and considerations 
for reconstruction processes that do not reproduce recognized risks and vulnerabilities.
• Sectoral approach. The countries of the subregion have evolved from having a 
national institution in charge of disasters to creating national systems of disaster risk 
management. These systems have generated normative and institutional frameworks 
that have gradually defined the roles and responsibilities of the different sectors and 
institutions in charge of matters related to disaster risk management. Some specific 
sectors such as agriculture, environment, infrastructure and health show advances in 
the incorporation of such management. Perhaps one of the strongest links identified 
is between environment, climate change and disaster risk management. It is also 
observed that, to the extent that a country has updated frameworks for climate change 
adaptation and mitigation, there is linkage with the principles and activities of disaster 
risk management. Similarly, several development and sectoral policies recognize the 
importance of land use and territorial planning to increase resilience and adapt to or 
mitigate the effects of climate change. Furthermore, some aspects of disaster risk 
management have been considered in environmental impact studies, in particular the 
identification of natural hazards that may affect a given project, as well as the elaboration 
of mitigation measures to ensure its sustainability. Sectors that have modified their 
norms and structures to incorporate a disaster risk management strategy show better 
performance through the incorporation of specific actions into planning and sectoral budgets.
• Macroeconomic policies. Some normative frameworks for disaster risk management in 
the subregion provide for the creation of national funds. Some of these are qualified for the 
financing of ex ante activities and others are only qualified to meet the emerging needs 
of disaster response. However, the fact that legal frameworks mandate the creation of 
these funds does not necessarily mean that the required resources have been estimated 
or actually allocated. When ministries of economy and finance have well defined disaster 
risk management roles and responsibilities, the design and establishment of national 
financial protection strategies has been facilitated, which also contributes to both the 
sustainability and the acquisition of funds. In addition, many countries have arranged 
catastrophe insurance facilities in the international market.
• Integration of disaster risk management into development policies and other 
instruments. Different degrees of progress have been attained in the countries of the 
subregion, opening up a variety of opportunities for sharing experiences and cooperating. 
Post-disaster recovery processes represent an opportunity to rectify the previously 
followed course and rebuild with resilience by incorporating disaster risk management 
into development strategies.
Source: O. Bello and others, “Mainstreaming disaster risk management strategies in development instruments: 
policy briefs for selected member countries of the Caribbean Development and Cooperation 
Committee”, Studies and Perspectives series, No. 58 (LC/TS.2017/80; LC/CAR/TS.2017/6), Santiago, 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2017; C. Weekes and O. Bello, 
“Mainstreaming disaster risk management strategies in development instruments (II): policy briefs 
for Barbados, Guyana, Saint Lucia, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago”, Studies and Perspectives 
series, No. 75 (LC/TS.2019/7), Santiago, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC), 2019; Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean/Latin American and 
Caribbean Institute for Economic and Social Planning (ECLAC/ILPES), Planning for sustainable territorial 
development in Latin America and the Caribbean (LC/CRP.17/3), Santiago, 2019; Global Facility for 
Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR), Managing Disaster Risks for a Resilient Future: A Strategy 
for the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery 2013–2015, Washington, D.C., 2013.
Box III.4 (concluded)
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As can be seen in relation to the dynamics of human settlements, 
adaptation and mitigation go hand in hand in the urban context, since to 
be less exposed cities would have to have a shorter sea frontage and thus 
a higher density, which would at the same time make them more compact. 
This would reduce the intensity of emissions and allow for mobility options 
that would have a smaller environmental footprint. Similarly, the role of 
natural defences is critical in curbing the impact of climate phenomena, be 
they mangroves, reefs or ground vegetation.
4. Estimates of the economic impact of climate change
The cost of climate-related disasters in the period 2000–2017 was substantial, 
as can be seen in figure III.22, where it is expressed as a proportion of 
GDP. In 2017, the impact of Hurricane Maria in Dominica was estimated 
at 260% of GDP, while in 2004 the effects of Hurricane Ivan in Grenada 
amounted to 148% of GDP. This type of extreme event has caused damage 
equivalent to two-digit percentages of GDP in Antigua and Barbuda, the 
Bahamas, Haiti and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, while in Cuba, the 
Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Saint Lucia and Saint Kitts and Nevis there 
has been at least one event that has cost more than 1% of GDP.
Figure III.22 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Centre for 
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), EM-DAT International Disaster Database 
[online] https://www.emdat.be/.
Figure III.22 (concluded)
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The loss of human life has been high and increasing (see figure III.23). 
In the period 2000–2012 there were more deaths from floods and storms 
than in 1980–1989 (ECLAC, 2019c). Greater urbanization and the increase in 
agricultural land are lethality risk factors in the nations of the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM).
Figure III.23 
The Caribbean: disaster-related fatalities, 2000–2019
(Numbers)
E. Dominica F. Dominican Rep.
G. Grenada H. Haiti
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M. Trinidad and Tobago



















































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Centre for 
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), EM-DAT International Disaster Database 
[online] https://www.emdat.be/.
Another effect of this type of extreme event is to increase the 
pressures that drive emigration, which has a strong female component in 
the region. For example, Hurricane Maria caused between 20.5% and 27.3% 
of Dominica’s total population to migrate, while 861 men and 773 women 
had to be evacuated from Barbuda and taken to Antigua (Lebrechtta, 2019). 
As in Central America, extreme events negatively affect women’s economic 
autonomy, reducing their livelihoods and increasing the burden of reproductive 
work and unpaid care. In the Caribbean, many poor women are employed 
at the lower end of the tourism sector: when disasters cause severe damage 
to the sector, many are left unemployed because they do not have the skills 
to take up other jobs (ECLAC, 2019c).
According to Bello and De Meira (2019), the Caribbean countries were 
more affected than other types of small island developing States in the 
period 1990–2018 in terms of the number of disasters, the ratio of affected 
Figure III.23 (concluded)
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population to total population, and the ratio of damage to GDP. The ratio 
of affected population to total population was 5.8% in Caribbean small 
island developing States, 3.5% in the Pacific and 2.1% in the Atlantic, the 
Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean and the South China Sea. “As regards 
the damage/GDP ratio, the highest average value was in the Caribbean, 
followed by SIDS in the AIMS region (3.7%) and SIDS in the Pacific (2.8%)” 
(ECLAC/ILPES, 2019, p. 47). Where Central America and South America are 
concerned, the average value of the damage-to-GDP ratio in countries where 
a disaster occurred during the period 1970–2010 was 6.9% in the Caribbean, 
3% in Central America and 0.4% in South America (Bello and others, 2017).
The Caribbean is an outlier for the economic impact of disasters relative 
to the size of economies. For example, in four assessments of the disasters16 
occurring in the Atlantic during the 2017 hurricane season, the total cost was 
found to have exceeded 40% of GDP;17 in three of them, it was over 100%. 
External shocks of this magnitude mean that social and economic gains may 
be lost, underscoring the importance of including resilience components in 
development policies.
5. The challenge of debt in the Caribbean
The Caribbean region faces difficulties arising from high debt and slow 
growth. The structurally high level of debt in the countries of the region is 
periodically compounded by economic losses caused by extreme weather 
events. The Caribbean small island developing States are among the most 
indebted in the world, and the level of public debt to GDP is particularly 
severe in Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Grenada, Jamaica and Saint 
Kitts and Nevis. The situation is exacerbated by declining foreign direct 
investment (FDI) flows, high unemployment, especially among youth, and 
slow economic growth.
16 The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) has been a pioneer in 
disaster assessment and the development of a methodology for this purpose. The damage and 
loss assessment (DaLA) methodology serves to calculate the losses, damages and additional costs 
associated with a specific event. The main references used in this section are the disaster assessments 
carried out by ECLAC in the following countries: Bahamas (2015, 2016 and 2017), Belize (2016), 
Anguilla (2017), Turks and Caicos Islands (2017), British Virgin Islands (2017) and Sint Maarten 
(2017). The 2016 assessments of Belize and the Bahamas were conducted jointly with the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the Pan American Health Organization 
(PAHO). The 2015 and 2017 assessments of the Bahamas were conducted in conjunction with 
PAHO, and those of Anguilla and Sint Maarten with the Caribbean Development Bank.
17 Reported damage underestimates the effects of disasters, since the EM-DAT International Disaster 
Database only contains information on damage defined as partially or totally destroyed physical 
assets. ECLAC evaluations include losses (the monetary value of goods that go unproduced and 
services that go unprovided) and additional costs incurred in producing goods and temporarily 
providing interrupted services, in addition to the costs of dealing with the emergency (ECLAC, 
2014a). From this other point of view, losses from hurricanes Irma and Maria in Anguilla, the 
Bahamas, the British Virgin Islands, the Turks and Caicos Islands and Sint Maarten represented 
48% of the total cost.
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In fact, the slowness of growth is partly attributed to the debt burden, 
as it restricts fiscal space and has made it difficult to finance the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). High debt has induced a period of fiscal 
consolidation that restricts the ability to sustain social spending and the 
much-needed investment in infrastructure that precedes private investment. 
The economic situation in the subregion has been aggravated by the long 
decline of foreign direct investment, which is an important source of funding.
Figure III.24 shows the debt path from 2008 to 2017, distinguishing between 
countries that export goods and countries that export services, such as tourism 
or financial services. It should be noted that the debt of goods exporters has 
increased as a result of declining commodity prices and falling tax revenues.
Figure III.24 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official data 
from the countries; Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Fiscal 
Panorama of Latin America and the Caribbean, 2019 (LC/PUB.2019/8-P), Santiago, 2019; Fiscal 
Panorama of Latin America and the Caribbean, 2018 (LC/PUB.2018/4-P), Santiago, 2018; Fiscal 
Panorama of Latin America and the Caribbean, 2017 (LC/PUB.2017/6-P), Santiago, 2017; Fiscal 
Panorama of Latin America and the Caribbean, 2016 (LC/L.4140), Santiago, 2016.
The average debt burden has increased since the global crisis of 
2008–2009 despite the implementation of adjustment programmes, whether 
domestically initiated or agreed with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
In 2017, the average debt in the Caribbean was equivalent to 73.6% of GDP: 
66.4% in goods-producing countries and 75.9% in service providers. Seven 
Caribbean countries had debts exceeding 70% of GDP; considering that 
the debt sustainability threshold according to the IMF is 60% of GDP, it 
is no exaggeration to say that the region is in difficulties. Debt service is 
also critical. Total service represented 27% of the subregion’s GDP: 26% in 
goods-producing countries and 27% in service providers. In one extreme 
case, interest and repayments represented about 60% of government revenue.
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Heavy borrowing is the result of structural weaknesses and vulnerabilities 
inherent in small island developing States, in particular heavy exposure to 
natural disasters. ECLAC therefore recognizes that the build-up of debt is 
explained by several factors and not only by fiscal excesses. These factors 
include the impact of negative external shocks and the effects of climate 
change and extreme events. As demonstrated in the 2017 hurricane season, 
these phenomena represent the greatest threat to Caribbean countries. The 
number of countries affected and the magnitude of the damage caused by 
extreme events in the region has increased significantly since the 1970s. 
“This fiscal situation is a factor that could lead to a vicious circle in which 
reconstruction is not completed after a disaster and such reconstruction as 
is carried out is not resilient because of a lack of financial resources. This 
would increase vulnerability, and the effects and impacts of a further disaster 
would be greater” (ECLAC/ILPES, 2019, p. 70).
In this context, ECLAC is proposing a debt for climate adaptation swap 
initiative to help countries reduce debt burdens while strengthening growth.
6. The ECLAC debt for climate adaptation swap initiative
The ECLAC proposal recognizes that generating the large surpluses needed 
to stabilize debt is also a cause of low growth and that debt servicing limits 
the ability of Caribbean countries to address the sustainable development 
agenda (see figure III.25).
Figure III.25 


























































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Economic Survey of 
Latin America and the Caribbean, 2019 (LC/PUB.2019/12-P), Santiago, 2019.
a The 2018 figures are for the year’s end and the 2019 figures are for March.
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The debt relief approach proposed by ECLAC has two dimensions: 
(i) In the case of countries that are heavily indebted to official 
creditors, funds interested in fostering resilience and adaptation 
would be persuaded to acquire multilateral and bilateral debt at 
negotiated discount rates. 
(ii) In the case of countries that are heavily indebted to private creditors, 
a repurchase and debt swap mechanism would be applied. 
The Caribbean countries’ debt repayments would be deposited 
in a fund earmarked for climate resilience, in order to finance 
investments in green industries clearly aimed at adaptation and 
mitigation projects, in accordance with the countries’ own priorities.
The role of climate funds is crucial, as the funds committed would 
already be discounted in donors’ budgets and would represent a resource 
that could be drawn on. These funds would be among the few sources of 
concessional financing for middle-income countries such as the small island 
developing States of the Caribbean.
The resilience fund would provide financing to obtain a mix of public 
and private resources for green industries able to meet the requirements of 
climate funds and oriented towards the development of greener value chains. 
Such industries would encompass production, marketing, regulation, and 
research and development.
The ECLAC proposal may also be attractive to creditors: it would offer 
lower payment risk, strengthen the resilience of Caribbean countries and help 
to build up a fund that could be gradually increased through investments 
with positive returns. It is also an opportunity for member countries to secure 
the fiscal space needed to generate the requisite investment, while pursuing 
adaptation and mitigation strategies. The proposal could inspire a broad 
approach in the region whereby fiscal management can be improved and a 
future debt build-up prevented, while providing a coordination framework 
for financing more sustainable growth in the region.18
The twenty-sixth meeting of the Caribbean Development and Cooperation 
Committee (CDCC), held in April 2016, supported the ECLAC proposal. 
The initiative was also endorsed by CARICOM heads of government at the 
thirty-eighth session held in July 2017. To move towards the resolution, the 
CDCC recommended the creation of a working group that has now met twice. 
The latest meeting recommended three countries to test the initiative, illustrate 
its benefits and initiate dialogue with major creditors and sources of climate 
financing. The recommended countries were Antigua and Barbuda, Saint 
Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, owing to their debt profile and 
18 ECLAC recognizes the need to improve fiscal management and has worked with several countries 
in the Caribbean to develop their capacity to carry out fiscal expenditure assessments so that 
government priorities are better aligned with budget allocations.
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the impact that Hurricanes Irma and Maria had on Barbuda. The dialogue 
is proceeding cautiously to avoid premature announcements that could 
affect the collaboration of creditors. The respective debts are being analysed 
using the World Bank framework and the IMF debt sustainability analysis 
to determine how the initiative would work. This will provide guidance 
on the level of discount needed to operationalize the proposal. ECLAC is 
to study the impact of debt relief on progress towards compliance with the 
SDGs and contrast the gap between repayment and the financing needed 
to achieve that objective.
The heart of the initiative is that multilateral institutions forgive part 
of the debt of the smaller economies and that an amount equivalent to the 
annual payment be contributed in the local currency of the debtor countries to 
the aforementioned Caribbean Resilience Fund, whose purpose is to finance 
mitigation and adaptation processes for 10 years. This instrument, which 
would advance the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, requires the 
solidarity of Latin American countries that have a vote at IMF, the World 
Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) (ECLAC, 2016a).
Although they are financially fragile and investment efficiency is 
low, many Caribbean countries have limited access to concessional external 
financing because they are considered middle-income. Restricted access to 
financing and adjustments arising from their debt situation make it difficult 
to adopt and implement projects aimed at mitigating and adapting to climate 
change. In addition to debt relief, the external constraint needs to be eased 
in other respects in the Caribbean; for example, reliance on energy-linked 
imports needs to be reduced and mobility and coastal protection based on 
ecosystem solutions need to be improved, all of which would help expand 
the scope for the countries’ development.
D. Conclusions
When it comes to climate change, the countries of Central America and 
the Caribbean are more vulnerable than the rest of the region because of a 
combination of factors such as the occurrence of extreme weather events, 
the small size of their territories, their relatively limited economic structures 
and the constraints of their fiscal position.
This is compounded by a limited capacity for planning, information 
generation and prevention, all of which has cumulative effects that reduce 
the development capacity of these countries. The situation in the Caribbean 
is particularly serious because of the heavy debt burden, the recurrence of 
hurricane damage and losses, and the increasing rate of urbanization. The 
type of urban growth, which is rapid and unplanned and has significant 
infrastructure deficits, increases vulnerability owing to high exposure to 
the sea and the low elevation of human settlements.
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Disaster risk reduction and the response to sea level rise, i.e., adaptation, 
has multiple fronts ranging from information generation to financial protection 
and public participation. In these countries, ecosystem-based adaptation 
plays a particularly important role in coastal protection. At the same time, 
adaptation actions are in some cases inseparable from mitigation actions, 
examples being mangrove and coral recovery and urban densification. A 
pattern of consumption that was less dependent on imports, such as one 
based on renewable energy and better public mobility systems, could help 
alleviate the burden of the external constraint.
In the face of this scenario, it is essential to increase the scope for 
financial action to promote adaptation and resilience in the Caribbean 
countries, whence the ECLAC initiative of reducing debt by swapping it for 
investment in resilience. The idea is that this would break the vicious circle 
of failure to fully address vulnerabilities and lack of resilience because there 
are not enough fiscal resources for investment, which interacts with social 




Adaptation to climate change
Climate change adaptation is the process of adjustment to actual or expected 
climate and its effects. In human systems, adaptation seeks to moderate or 
forestall harm or exploit beneficial opportunities. In natural systems, human 
intervention may facilitate adjustment to expected climate and its effects 
(IPCC, 2014a).1 Adaptation can reduce the risks of climate change impacts, 
but there are limits to its effectiveness, especially with greater magnitudes 
and rates of climate change. Taking a longer-term perspective, in the context 
of sustainable development, increases the likelihood that more immediate 
adaptation actions will also enhance future options and preparedness 
(IPCC, 2014a).
Adaptation can contribute to the well-being of current and future 
populations, the security of assets and the maintenance of ecosystem goods, 
functions and services now and in the future. An important consideration is 
that adaptation is place- and context-specific, and there is no one-size-fits-all 
approach to risk reduction.
As has been shown in previous chapters, the Latin American and 
Caribbean region is extremely vulnerable to climate change because of its 
dependence on highly climate-sensitive activities, its low adaptive capacity 
and its exposure to various extreme hydrometeorological events. Thus, in the 
face of the now unavoidable effects of climate change, the region’s priorities 
include increasing society’s resilience and adaptive capacity and exploring 
synergies between adaptation processes and other development goals. This 
1 This definition, used in the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) (known as AR5), differs in scope and focus from the definition used in previous 
reports, reflecting scientific progress in this area.
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chapter discusses the objective of adaptation and different options for the 
region and presents the sectors mentioned by the countries in their nationally 
determined contributions (NDCs) as priorities for adaptation.
A. Adapting to climate change
The goal of adaptation is to reduce or avoid the negative impact of climate 
variability by increasing resilience in vulnerable sectors (see box IV.1 for 
definitions of key adaptation-related terms). Adaptation determines the net 
physical and economic impact of climate change on production activities, 
society and ecosystems. However, identifying genuine adaptation processes 
is a very complex task entailing a high level of uncertainty, as is shown by 
the great variability of cost estimates.
Box IV.1 
Adaptation glossary
Adaptation. Adaptation involves reducing risk and vulnerability by seeking 
opportunities and building capacity to cope with climate impacts on nations, 
regions, cities, the private sector, communities, individuals and natural systems. 
It also involves implementing decisions and actions to mobilize that capacity.
Adaptation deficit. This is the gap between the current state of a system 
and the state that would minimize the adverse effects of current climatic 
conditions and their variability. Essentially, it is inadequate adaptation to 
current climatic conditions. It has been suggested that it often forms part of 
a large development deficit. 
Adaptation needs. These are circumstances that make it necessary to 
gather information, obtain resources and carry out actions aimed at ensuring 
the security of the population and of assets or resources in response to 
climate impact.
Adaptation options. These are the set of appropriate measures and 
strategies available to meet needs. 
Adaptive capacity. This is the capacity of a system to adjust to climate 
change (in particular climate variability and extreme events), mitigate potential 
damage, capitalize on opportunities and cope with consequences.
Autonomous adaptation. Autonomous adaptation or spontaneous 
adaptation is the adjustment that takes place in ecosystems and human systems 
without external intervention and in response to a changing environment. In 
human systems, this is often referred to as “coping capacity”. The ability 
to adapt autonomously is part of resilience, although not exactly the same 
(Walker and others, 2004). All systems, whether social or ecological, have some 
capacity for autonomous adaptation. Ecosystems that have persisted for a 
long time can be inferred to have a great capacity to adapt autonomously, at 
least to past variability. Environmental change that is faster than in the past 
or accompanied by other stressors may exceed the adaptive capacity that 
the system has demonstrated. The autonomous adaptation mechanisms 
of organisms and ecosystems consist of changes in physiology, behaviour, 
phenology, the genetic composition of populations and the composition of the 
community. Phenological changes occur within the range allowed by genes 
and the variety of genes in the population. Changes in community composition 
occur through migration or local extinction.
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Incremental adaptation. Incremental or gradual adaptation consists of 
actions whose main purpose is to maintain the essence and integrity of what 
already exists: technology, institutions, governance, values or systems. An 
example of this type of adaptation is the adjustment of cropping systems by 
introducing new varieties, changing sowing dates or increasing irrigation efficiency. 
Planned adaptation. Planned or assisted adaptation is a deliberate 
intervention aimed at increasing the ability of the organism, ecosystem or 
socioecological system to survive and function at an acceptable level in the face 
of climate change. Planned adaptation of natural systems involves measures 
such as ensuring an appropriate habitat and dispersal pathways, reducing 
non-climatic stressors and physically moving organisms and establishing 
them in new areas. In ecosystem-based adaptation, the use of biodiversity and 
ecosystem services is integrated into climate change adaptation strategies. 
Resilience. This is the capacity of a social or ecological system to absorb 
shocks while maintaining its basic structure and modes of functioning, capacity 
for self-organization and capacity to adapt to stress and change.
Transformative adaptation. Transformative adaptation seeks to change 
the fundamental attributes of the system in response to current or expected 
climate change, often on a larger and more ambitious scale than incremental 
adaptation. It involves, for example, changes in activities such as agriculture, 
cattle ranching and migration, and in perceptions and paradigms relating to 
the nature of climate change, adaptation and its relationship to other human 
and natural systems. 
Vulnerability. This is the predisposition of a system to be adversely affected. 
Until the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), known as AR4, vulnerability was considered to comprise three 
elements: exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity. However, in the Special 
Report on Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance 
Climate Change Adaptation (IPCC, 2012) and the IPCC Fifth Assessment 
Report (AR5), vulnerability refers only to sensitivity and adaptive capacity, 
while exposure is incorporated into the concept of risk. At the macro level, 
vulnerability has biophysical and socioeconomic determinants. 
Source: G. Magrin, “Adaptación al cambio climático en América Latina y el Caribe”, Project 
Documents (LC/W.692), Santiago, Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2015; B. Walker and others, “Resilience, adaptability 
and transformability in social-ecological systems”, Ecology and Society, vol. 9, 
No. 2, Resilience Alliance, 2014; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate 
Change Adaptation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012.
Climate change adaptation plays a different role in Latin America 
and the Caribbean than in other regions, for several reasons. The first is 
that adaptation offers an additional opportunity to improve quality of life 
in rural areas, with effects as massive as those that could be achieved by 
mitigation based on better urban development. Adaptation in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, unlike other regions of the world, is largely inseparable 
from mitigation and also benefits without exception from the restoration 
of ecosystems, the restoration of soils, the recovery of general, coastal and 
riparian plant cover, and the positive impact on biodiversity. At the same 
Box IV.1 (concluded)
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time, solutions based on better management of nature have numerous 
co-benefits in terms of human security and the resilience and sustainability 
of development. In addition, the length of the region from north to south 
places it among the areas of greatest biological productivity on the planet, 
which can be conducive to ecosystem restoration. Proper management of 
the natural heritage, ecosystems, biodiversity and watersheds will increase 
the resilience of communities, businesses and nations in the region.
Sustainable management of nature is a way of adapting to climate 
change and mitigating its effects. In addition, this way of building adaptation 
helps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in a region where land use change 
remains a major source of emissions, as discussed in chapter II. The continued 
destruction of ecosystems calls into question the overall rationality of the 
region’s current production systems and decision-making mechanisms. These 
are fragmented and are subject to short-term, partial or limited rationalities 
which together add up to an irrationality that seems greater than the human 
capacity to reorganize the economic and social system.
Chapter III showed that when cities grow with a high degree of informality 
and segregation, adaptive capacity is reduced and vulnerability increases 
because the planning and execution of public works is compartmentalized 
by sector. The upside is that adaptation creates a twofold opportunity. First, 
the public works required, including ecosystem restoration, provide an 
economic boost. This suggests that the approach taken to adaptation costs 
needs to be improved, with the net cost for development being measured 
rather than the gross cost of actions, which is what the climate literature 
usually considers. Second, adaptation provides an opportunity to close 
gaps in infrastructure coverage and quality, which is one of the aims of the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
Despite the importance of adaptation for Latin America and the Caribbean, 
its incorporation into investment planning, programming and execution 
has been considerably delayed because of the time being taken to identify 
specific measurement criteria, targets, costs and financing.
B. The inevitability of adaptation
The need to adapt to climate change is a consequence that the developed 
countries of Europe and Oceania, the United States, the countries of the 
former socialist bloc and some developing countries such as China and India 
have inadvertently imposed on the other developing countries because of 
the accumulation of emissions in the atmosphere.2 The measure that would 
2 This was only inadvertent until the negotiation of the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), as formal recognition of global warming made its relationship 
to adaptation evident.
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most benefit the region, then, would be an ambitious mitigation process in 
developed countries and large developing-country emitters.
As discussed in chapter II, it is very likely that, given current pathways 
and the inadequacy of national targets (UNEP, 2018), the concentration of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere will reach 450 ppm, leading with an 80% 
probability to an average global temperature increase of 2 °C relative to the 
pre-industrial era (see table IV.1). Going by the representative concentration 
pathways, it is possible that higher temperatures will be reached towards 
the end of this century compared to the same reference point (Nakićenović 
and Swart, 2000). In Latin America and the Caribbean, it is imperative to 
adapt to the new climate conditions in order to reduce the expected negative 
impact as much as possible.
Table IV.1 






2 °C 3 °C 4 °C 5 °C 6 °C 7 °C
450 78 18 3 1 0 0
500 96 44 11 3 1 0
550 99 69 24 7 2 1
650 100 94 58 24 9 4
750 100 99 82 47 22 9
Source: N. Stern, “The economics of climate change”, American Economic Review, vol. 98, No. 2, Pittsburgh, 
American Economic Association (AEA), 2008.
a Temperature increases are relative to the pre-industrial era.
If greenhouse gases continue to be emitted at the current rate, not only 
will the temperature continue to climb, but data from the different geological 
eras indicate that sea level rise, currently about 3 millimetres per year (Mengel 
and others, 2018), as seen in chapter II, could accelerate if temperatures 
incompatible with polar ice formation are reached (see figure IV.1). If the 
concentration of greenhouse gases continues to increase, the twenty-first 
century could see a return to the temperatures and concentrations of the 
Eocene, a period when the concentration of emissions was comparable and 
the formation of polar ice in the northern hemisphere was intermittent or 
non-existent. In a pessimistic scenario, it is estimated that concentrations 
and temperature in the twenty-third century could be incompatible with the 
formation of permanent ice in both hemispheres. That means that a process 
of emissions capture that occurred on Earth over 10 to 20 million years would 
be reversed in five centuries (Burke and others, 2018).
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Figure IV.1 
Anomalies in the Earth’s average temperature during the past 65 million years 
and potential geohistorical analogues for future climates up to 2300 CE  
relative to the period 1961–1990
(Degrees centigrade)
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Source: K. Burke and others, “Pliocene and Eocene provide best analogs for near-future climates”, 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (PNAS), vol. 115, 
No. 52, Washington, D.C., National Academy of Sciences (NAS), 2018.
On the way to these scenarios, average sea level rise changes. During 
the Eocene, there were no ice sheets at the poles and the sea level was 
75 metres higher than at present; during the Pliocene, the extent of ice was 
limited and the average sea level was 25 metres higher than now (Hansen 
and others, 2008). Although the adaptation required today is on a different 
scale and sea level rise is progressive, this process threatens coastal cities 
and much of the Caribbean’s territory. If efforts to curb emissions fail, the 
consequences for the behaviour of the global climate will be those of the 
most extreme IPCC scenarios. Or they may be unpredictable, owing to the 
multiplicity of interactions between the planet’s different systems.
While adaptation is inescapable, the work of governments will also 
be determined by problems similar to those associated with poverty and 
income inequality. The ethical value judgements made in decision-making 
spheres about the lives and assets of vulnerable and at-risk individuals and 
social groups will determine the effort made to achieve adaptation, which 
will usually be territorially specific.
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C. The benefits and estimated costs of adaptation
1. The costs of adaptation
Latin America and the Caribbean is a region that is highly vulnerable to 
extreme weather events, as was seen in chapter III. According to the Centre 
for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED),3 84,000 people died 
because of them between 1990 and 2017, and over 163 million were directly 
affected (ECLAC, 2019a).
Identifying and measuring the economic cost of adaptation measures 
is a complicated process, not least because it is difficult to identify a specific 
adaptation baseline distinct from existing development gaps (Agrawala 
and Fankhauser, 2008; World Bank, 2010). The Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) underscores the importance of 
progress in implementing climate change adaptation measures as part of 
development strategy: such measures should respond to the nature of climate 
change and the collateral risks it creates, such as growing demand for energy, 
food and raw materials and continuous pressures on the environment. 
Furthermore, conditions of vulnerability and poverty should be considered 
when implementing the measures, as should projected climate trends for 
the twenty-first century (ECLAC, 2018b). The costs of efficient adaptation 
processes for the region are lower than those associated with inaction 
in the face of the impact of climate change. Investing in adaptation is an 
economically efficient option that is consistent with the guidelines of the 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
There are preliminary estimates of the costs of adapting to climate 
change in the region, although they are highly uncertain. In 2010, the 
World Bank estimated these annual costs at between US$ 16.8 billion and 
US$ 21.5 billion between 2010 and 2050.4 The estimate includes agriculture, 
water resources, infrastructure, coastal zones, health, extreme weather events 
and fisheries. This expenditure is equivalent to less than 0.3% of regional 
GDP and would mainly go on protecting coastal zones (World Bank, 2010; 
Galindo and others, 2014c). Agrawala and others (2010) put adaptation costs 
at around 0.24% of regional GDP. This estimate included irrigation, water 
infrastructure, coastal protection, early warning systems, investment in 
climate-resilient settlements, cooling, treatment of diseases and investment 
in adaptation research and development.
3 See Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), EM-DAT International Disaster 
Database [online] http://www.emdat.be/.
4 Undiscounted figures.
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Going by these figures, the cost of adaptation would be less than 
0.5% of the region’s GDP as of the end of the first decade of this century 
(World Bank, 2010; Vergara and others, 2013). However, these estimates have 
limitations, are subject to significant uncertainties, are difficult to compare 
and are likely to underestimate the costs of adaptation, as losses without a 
market value are ignored. They mainly include hard adaptation measures, 
namely infrastructure works (Agrawala and Fankhauser, 2008; Stern, 2007; 
ECLAC, 2014b) and underestimate nature-based options (see figure IV.2).
Figure IV.2 
Latin America and the Caribbean: average annual cost of adaptation, 2010–2050 
(Percentages of regional GDP)










Source: W. Vergara and others, The Climate and Development Challenge for Latin America and the Caribbean: 
Options for Climate-Resilient, Low-Carbon Development, Washington, D.C., Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB), 2013; World Bank, Natural Hazards, UnNatural Disasters: The Economics 
of Effective Prevention, Washington, D.C., 2010; S. Agrawala and others, “Plan or react? Analysis of 
adaptation costs and benefits using integrated assessment models”, OECD Environment Working 
Papers, No. 23, Paris, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 2010.
Note: The total adaptation costs come from World Bank (2010) and Agrawala and others (2010). The 
former reflect the scenarios of the National Centre for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) and the 
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization (CSIRO) and run up to 2050. Those 
of the study by Agrawala and others (2010) are for 2105. AD-WITCH is the adaptation module of the 
WITCH global dynamic model, which integrates interactions between the economy, technological 
options and climate change.
The common ground between adaptation and sustainable development 
make the two processes synergetic (Osman-Elasha and others, 2009). However, 
to achieve these synergies, timely and efficient climate change adaptation 
processes would have to be incorporated into national development plans, 
with their mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating measures implemented 
by local and national governments. In addition, there should be common 
metrics to make adaptation processes and progress with them comparable at 
the regional level (ECLAC, 2017). In a context of rising global temperatures 
and their regional effects, implementing efficient and equitable climate 
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change adaptation processes should be a priority. This means inducing the 
necessary changes in the behaviour of economic and social agents through 
public policies, economic incentives or changes in individual characteristics 
that trigger or induce these adaptation processes (OECD, 2012; Artikov and 
others, 2006; Knowler and Bradshaw, 2007; Prokopy and others, 2008; Galindo 
and others, 2014a).
2. Potential economic benefits
Investment in adaptation, like any investment, has multiplier effects on the 
rest of the economy: it is essentially preventive and offers an opportunity 
not only to reduce the negative impact of climate change but also to narrow 
development gaps and boost economies. The report of the Global Commission on 
Adaptation (2019) led by Ban Ki-moon, which was published in September 2019, 
states that investment in adaptation has a very high total rate of return: the 
cost-benefit ratio ranges from 2:1 to 10:1 and in some cases is even higher 
(see figure IV.3).
Figure IV.3 
Cost-benefit ratios of some illustrative investments in adaptation, 2020–2030
1:1 3:1 5:1 7:1 9:1 11:1 13:1 15:1 17:1
Strengthening early warning systems






Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Global 
Commission on Adaptation, Adapt Now: A Global Call for Leadership on Climate Resilience, 
Amsterdam, 2019.
Note: Approximate global net benefits to be gained by 2030 from an illustrative investment of US$ 1.8 trillion 
in five areas. Actual returns depend on many factors, such as economic growth and demand, 
policy context, institutional capacities and the condition of assets. Also, these investments neither 
address all that may be needed within sectors (e.g. adaptation in the agricultural sector will consist 
of much more than dryland crop production) nor include all sectors (as health, education and 
industry sectors are not included). Data and methodological limitations mean that this graph does 
not imply full comparability of investments across sectors or countries.
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As was seen in chapter I, the work of the Global Commission on 
Adaptation found that if US$ 1.8 trillion were invested globally in five areas 
between 2020 and 2030, US$ 7.1 trillion in total net benefits could be generated. 
The areas where investment in adaptation has the potential to offer a high 
return are early warning systems, climate-resilient infrastructure, improved 
production of dryland agricultural crops, global protection of mangroves 
and investments to increase the resilience of water resources. Investments in 
adaptation pay a threefold dividend. The first is the losses that are avoided, 
i.e. the reduction of future losses. The second is the economic benefits of 
reducing risk, namely increased productivity and innovation. The third 
is the social and environmental benefits. Without the need for adaptation, 
these additional investments would not be made or would be made 
only later.
Thus, investment in adaptation can have positive effects on development, 
as can investment in mitigation. Any investment aimed at restoring natural 
assets and ecosystem services will bring benefits on both fronts, namely 
adaptation and mitigation.
3. Adaptation in nationally determined contributions 
In the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, the fundamental role 
that adaptation processes play in the region’s economies and societies is 
recognized. Accordingly, the nationally determined contributions (NDCs) 
of these countries have included adaptation actions related to the particular 
vulnerabilities of each. Table IV.2 summarizes the sectors mentioned in each 
country’s NDCs in relation to adaptation.5
5 NDCs put more emphasis on mitigation in general. The ommitments made will need to be 
increasingly ambitious if they are to be effective and meet the objectives of the Paris Agreement 
(Diffenbaugh, Singh and Mankin, 2018).
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Diagram IV.1 highlights the key sectors and policies for adaptation. 
The great diversity of sectoral actions relates to both lifestyles and the role 
of ecosystems and natural resources.
Diagram IV.1 
Latin America and the Caribbean (13 countries): adaptation measures included 
 in nationally determined contributions (NDCs), 2016–2018
Energía
Health
• Increase the resilience of the 
population to the health effects 
of climate change.
• Pay attention to problems deriving 
from heat waves.
• Establish health risk 
reductio  strategies.
• Adapt health systems to changing 
patterns of epidemic vectors.
• Adapt to food security and diets.
• Adapt to plagues and to respiratory 
and transmitted diseases arising 
directly from climatic events.
• Contribute to consumption 
of potable water.
Agriculture
• Identify crops resistant to extreme events.
• Develop efficient irrigation technologies.
• Design strategies to support small producers.
• Promote food security and resilience.
• Change agricultural and livestock practices.
• Create soil conservation systems.
Forests and biodiversity
• Quantify the risk of losing biodiversity.
• Improve the adaptive capacity 
of ecosystems.
• Encourage carbon capture: 
conservation and restoration.
• Increase the resilience of ecosystems 
and biodiversity.
• Promote synergies with 
mitigation measures.
• Encourage synergy between 
conservation, sustainable 
management of forests and 
enhancement of forest carbon 
stocks (REDD+).
• Adopt forestry stewardship practices.
Cities
• Analyse infrastructure vulnerability.
• Provide training in climate risk 
management and prevention.
• Set up natural disaster 
warning systems.
• Build infrastructure and services.
• Pursue green sustainability initiatives: 
buildings, water, urban drainage 
and permeable paving. 
• Work to ensure urban sustainability 
and access to urban land.
• Use spatial planning instruments.
• Demarcate urban areas of the 
country where fatal weather 
conditions may arise.
• Incorporate adaptation criteria into 
public investment projects.
Energy
• Analyse water availability 
for electricity generation.
• Build electricity infrastructure 
that is resilient to 
extreme events.
• Design monitoring and 
evaluation systems.
• Generate and analyse 
weather information.
• Develop the security 
and potential of 
renewable energies.
Water
• Carry out integrated watershed 
management to ensure access to water.
• Secure the supply of drinking 
and irrigation water.
• Design water collection systems.
• Identify areas vulnerable to drought.
• Enhance the availability of water 
for hydroelectric plants.
• Build infrastructure to deal with 
river spates.
• Promote the use of treated wastewater.
• Incorporate adaptation into integrated 
water management.
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, the 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Peru and Uruguay 
have reported on measures 
to reduce vulnerability and 
increase resilience to 
climate change.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Measures in the energy sector include analysing the availability of water 
for electricity production, reducing contingencies in energy infrastructure 
and making this infrastructure resilient to extreme events. In the forest sector 
(which in some countries also includes the biodiversity, ecosystems and 
coastal zones subsectors), the measures identified are aimed at increasing 
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adaptive capacity and forest carbon stocks while generating additional forest 
co-benefits, fostering resilience to the effects of climate on ecosystems and 
biodiversity and promoting sustainable forest management practices.
In the case of agriculture, which is a key sector, policies aim to 
produce crops that are resistant to extreme events, employ efficient irrigation 
technologies, implement support strategies for small producers, change 
agricultural and livestock practices and implement soil conservation systems. 
In the case of cities, the main focus is on infrastructure vulnerability analysis, 
climate risk management and prevention, natural disaster warning systems, 
construction of infrastructure and services, green sustainability initiatives, 
urban sustainability, land management and public investment projects. 
As regards adaptation in the water sector, the most important areas are 
integrated watershed management, the supply of water for drinking and 
irrigation, water collection systems, the identification of areas vulnerable to 
drought, hydropower management and integrated water management. In 
the health sector, there are measures and policies to increase the resilience 
of the population, address problems arising from heat waves, reduce health 
risks, adapt health systems to changes in the vectors that transmit epidemics 
and contribute to the consumption of potable water and improvements in 
its quality. There are also measures that pursue additional health benefits 
in different sectors, such as agriculture, housing and transport.
Cross-cutting adaptation measures are also considered, such as 
generation of climate information (research and development), vulnerability 
analysis, the identification of climate risks, the planning, strengthening and 
expansion of early warning systems and monitoring networks, integrated 
land management, reduction of vulnerability, identification and promotion 
of good practices and adaptation tools, institutional strengthening and 
capacity-building, and education and communication.
D. The need for measuring criteria
Mitigation has considerably greater visibility than adaptation in international 
discussions, in the measurement of spending associated with climate change 
and financing, and in the national targets set in nationally determined 
contributions (NDCs). One reason for this is that, while there are clear 
measurement criteria for mitigation, a measuring methodology for adaptation 
that distinguishes it from normal development gaps has yet to be found.
An effort like this is possible in actions taken in response to sea 
level rise and reduced freshwater storage capacity in the glaciers of the 
region that feed cities and river basins. Work has been done in the region 
to measure how water availability has changed in river basins, how crop 
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yields have been affected by changes in temperature and humidity, and how 
the distribution of disease vectors has shifted (ECLAC, 2009b, 2010b, 2012c, 
2013b, 2014c, 2014d, 2014e and 2014f). Figure IV.4 shows, for example, how 
water availability has changed in the Maule River basin (Chile) as a result of 
the combined effect of the rise in the isotherm above which snow settles (so 
that less snow and ice are stored in the Andes and precipitation falls as rain) 
and how water availability has altered over the year owing to the melting of 
stored water.
Figure IV.4 
Chile: future hydrological conditions and historical conditions observed  
in the sub-basin feeding the Melado reservoir of the Maule Alto system  
according to scenario A2, 1976–2099












1976–2000 2001–2040 2041–2070 2071–2099 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), “La economía del cambio 
climático en Chile”, Project Documents (LC/W.472), Santiago, 2012.
Note: Of the scenarios put forward by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), A2 is the 
one that involves the greatest warming. It describes a very heterogeneous world, based on the 
preservation of local identities. Fertility patterns in the regions converge slowly, resulting in a steady 
increase in population. Economic development is regionally oriented, and per capita economic 
growth and technological change are more fragmented.
This phenomenon, which is closely replicated the whole length of the 
Andes, is changing the availability of water for agriculture and in cities that 
depend on this rhythm of storage as ice followed by melting. If a hypothetical 
rise in the urban or agricultural water demand curve, like that represented by 
the climbing black line in figure IV.5, is superimposed on the actual demand 
curve, the risk of water stress in the basin becomes more apparent and the 
conflict between agricultural and urban use and, in cities, between groups 
with more or less access and income, can be appreciated.
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Figure IV.5 
Chile: future hydrological conditions and historical conditions observed  
in the sub-basin feeding the Melado reservoir of the Maule Alto system  
according to scenario A2, 1976–2099












1976–2000 2001–2040 2041–2070 2071–2099 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), “La economía del cambio 
climático en Chile”, Project Documents (LC/W.472), Santiago, 2012.
Note: Of the scenarios put forward by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), A2 is the 
one that involves the greatest warming. It describes a very heterogeneous world, based on the 
preservation of local identities. Fertility patterns in the regions converge slowly, resulting in a steady 
increase in population. Economic development is regionally oriented, and per capita economic 
growth and technological change are more fragmented.
In addition, ECLAC has made available to the region a database on sea 
level rise developed with the support of Spain’s Ministry of the Environment 
(now Ministry for the Ecological Transition) and the Institute of Environmental 
Hydraulics of the University of Cantabria (ECLAC, 2012c). This prospective 
study identifies long-term trends that need to be addressed with adaptation 
measures, such as the loss of working days in ports, shoreline erosion and 
destructive astronomical and meteorological tides because of rising sea 
levels. This information has been applied in adaptation studies in Cuba and 
Brazil. Analyses of the economic impact of climate change and the database 
on sea level rise and its effects on the region’s coasts illustrate the likely 
costs of climate inaction and the routes by which they might be propagated, 
providing a reviewable but firm basis for formulating adaptation policies.
Sectoral adaptation planning documents have been prepared in Chile, 
Colombia, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and other countries in the region, and 
adaptation actions have even been proposed in some of these countries’ NDCs.6
6 See Samaniego and Schneider (2019) for a breakdown of these measures and current adaptation plans.
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However, there remains the challenge of designing an approach 
that can measure adaptation comparably at the regional level and that is 
sufficiently integrated to include national targets. The Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) suggests that adaptation 
measurement and evaluation frameworks should combine qualitative, 
quantitative and binary indicators, as no single category is sufficient. The 
policy framework should also be supplemented by indicators that, for example, 
serve to measure the number of projects implemented in response to the 
policy or the number of households benefiting (OECD, 2012).
Measuring adaptation better would make it possible to prioritize actions, 
target resources and, not least, set goals that provide the sense of urgency 
and visibility which adaptation merits. Without a regionally harmonized 
criterion for measuring adaptation, mitigation will continue to be more 
visible and receive more attention, possibly to the detriment of adaptation. 
Some progress has been made in Latin America, notably the population risk 
index being developed in Colombia (see box IV.2).
Box IV.2 
Colombia: the municipal disaster risk index
Colombia has developed an index of human vulnerability to disasters that is 
adjusted for local capabilities and based on census information. Since 2015, 
the National Planning Department (DNP) has been working on the construction 
of the Municipal Index of Capability-Adjusted Disaster Risk, a tool that serves 
to measure and compare municipalities according to the risk their populations 
are at from hydrometeorological events associated with heavy rainfall and their 
capacity to manage these (DNP, 2019). The Municipal Index is designed to be 
applied in episodes connected with heavy precipitation, such as landslides 
and flooding, and its design and implementation are useful for applying 
similar measurement criteria to other types of extreme events or at different 
territorial levels.
The Index seeks to orient public policies so that they are consistent with 
territorial peculiarities and take account of the heterogeneity of municipalities as 
regards the threats they are exposed to, their vulnerability and their institutional 
capacity to respond. This heterogeneity meant that the application of common, 
standardized strategies in all municipalities and departments was ineffective 
(DNP, 2019).
The Index is constructed from a component that measures risk and one 
that measures capabilities. The risk component includes damage or losses that 
may arise when, in a given territory and at a given time, hazardous physical 
phenomena (threats) coincide with populations at risk (exposure) that are prone 
to be affected by those phenomena (vulnerability). This component quantifies 
the proportion of the population in municipalities that is socially vulnerable 
and exposed to the most critical conditions of hydrometeorological threats.
The second component, the capabilities index, evaluates municipalities 
according to their financial, socioeconomic and institutional capabilities, 
which determine the actions of territorial entities in relation to disaster risk 
management. This index is constructed on the basis of three dimensions and 
six variables, as shown in the table.
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Colombia: dimensions and variables of the capabilities index, 2019
Financial Municipal tools Tax and non-tax revenues per capita, 2012–2015
Disaster risk 
management
Management tools Risk management councils




Per capita investment in risk management (evaluation 
and reduction), 2012–2015 
Socioeconomic Urban population Percentage of population in municipal capitals, 2016
Value added Value added per capita, 2012–2015
Business density Number of firms per 100 000 inhabitants, 2016
Source: National Planning Department (DNP), “Índice Municipal de Riesgo de Desastres Ajustado por 
Capacidades”, Bogotá, 2019.
This measurement serves to compare municipalities and show how 
heterogeneous their risk management capabilities are. Municipalities are 
classed into five groups by their scores on the capabilities index: group 1 has 
the fewest capabilities and group 4 the most. There is also a group that includes 
all 13 major cities. In the capabilities-adjusted risk index, values from zero (0) to 
one hundred (100) are assigned, with 100 indicating the municipalities with the 
greatest capabilities. Given that the index uses historical information, census 
databases and data from technical and scientific institutions at the national 
level, it would be feasible to replicate it in other countries of the region. Fresh 
data and information are needed to update and improve it.
Scope and limitations of the Index:
• It assigns a value to the risk of each of the municipalities and ranks them 
by risk and their ability to manage it. Targets can thus be set with a view 
to reducing vulnerability or increasing capabilities in order to improve 
a municipality’s score.
• It guides national public policy priorities for disaster risk management 
and provides a basis for targeting technical assistance and investment 
from the national and departmental budgets.
• It contributes to the fulfilment of international commitments such as 
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the Sendai Framework for 
Disaster Risk Reduction and the Paris Agreement.
• It is not a predictive tool but a preventive one.
• Its results can be used for threat, vulnerability and risk zoning and could 
be an input for spatial and environmental planning instruments.
• It presents uncertainties related to the scale of the information available 
and the possibility that information in the adjusted multidimensional 
poverty index of the National Administrative Department of Statistics 
(DANE) may not be up to date.
Source: National Planning Department (DNP), “Índice Municipal de Riesgo de Desastres 
Ajustado por Capacidades”, Bogotá, 2019.
By helping to identify criteria for measuring the risk associated 
with extreme events and climate change, the kind of progress achieved in 
Colombia provides an opportunity to move forward and identify adaptation 
targets and timelines that can be communicated easily and followed up on. 
This methodology could be put into practice in other countries, and this 
Box IV.2 (concluded)
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would strengthen adaptation policies in the region, allow efforts to be better 
targeted and facilitate comparisons of countries’ progress. The index could 
be expanded to cover critical infrastructure as well.
E. Cross-cutting issues
1. Adaptation measures
In a broad sense, adaptation includes any deliberate adjustment made in 
response to new climate conditions, whether actual or expected (Agrawala 
and Fankhauser, 2008; IPCC, 2007b). In addition to reducing the negative 
impact of climate change, albeit without completely eliminating it, it can have 
positive economic, social or environmental side effects (World Bank, 2010; 
OECD, 2012; Galindo and others, 2014a; Hepburn and Stern, 2008; Garnaut 
and others, 2010).
There are various adaptation options, ranging from new infrastructure 
to institutional, regulatory or behavioural changes (see diagram IV.2).
Diagram IV.2 



























































Source: G. Magrin, “Adaptación al cambio climático en América Latina y el Caribe”, Project Documents 
(LC/W.692), Santiago, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2015.
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The following are some options for addressing adaptation needs:
• Structural and physical options
 – Environmental engineering and construction. Engineering 
works are usually expensive, long-term alternatives requiring 
acceptance of the uncertainty associated with the projection 
of climate impact.
 – Ecosystem-based adaptation. These options, based on nature’s 
capacity to absorb or limit the impact of climate change, can be 
effective and efficient and depend less on climate projections 
and their uncertainties.
 – Technology. There are numerous technology-based adaptation 
alternatives in the agricultural sector, such as more efficient 
methods of irrigation and fertilization, water storage and 
harvesting, genetic enhancement to build tolerance to 
stress factors, adjustment of the planting schedule based on 
estimated yields, risk mapping, monitoring technologies 
and second-generation biofuels. Digital technologies (mobile 
phones, the Internet) have created opportunities to disseminate 
information (forecasts, alerts, markets, advice) and to 
capture relevant and up-to-date information for analysis and 
decision-making (the advance of floods, disease outbreaks, 
disaster response). Adaptation technologies are known in all 
countries and can generally be applied anywhere on the planet 
because they are easily transferred.
 – Services. Various options have been cited for measures to 
reduce climate vulnerability, including social safety nets to 
meet the basic needs of the most vulnerable people in the 
event of climate disasters (floods, droughts), public health 
services, prevention campaigns, adequate access to services 
(maintenance of drains, diversification of water sources), 
access to agricultural markets, food banks and distribution 
of food surpluses.
• Social options
 – Education. Lack of education is a limiting factor that contributes 
to vulnerability. Education programmes, extramural activities, 
outreach and community meetings are key tools for disseminating 
knowledge on adaptation options and building social capital 
that promotes social resilience. Education should be seen as 
a public good that is conducive to dialogue and networking 
and increases resilience at the individual and socioecological 
system levels. 
 – Information. Information strategies aimed at raising awareness 
of climate risks and encouraging citizens to respond are an 
integral part of adaptation. Examples include early warning 
170 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
systems, risk and vulnerability mapping, systematic monitoring 
and remote sensing, climate services, particularly improved 
forecasting, and local-scale climate scenarios.
 – Behaviour. Behavioural adaptation measures are essential and 
include livelihood diversification, changes in agricultural and 
animal husbandry practices, crop substitution, soil and water 
conservation and labour migration. Government incentives 
can be a good way to encourage changes in human behaviour.
• Institutional options
 – Economic. Among the measures that can be taken in this area are 
financial incentives (including taxes and subsidies), insurance 
(particularly insurance based on climate indices), catastrophe 
bonds, revolving funds, payments for environmental services, 
water tariffs, disaster contingency funds and money transfers. 
 – Laws and regulations. Laws, regulations and planning measures, 
such as the creation of protected areas and land use rezoning, are 
institutional measures that can improve the safety and resilience 
of communities through land use allocation. Other examples 
are legal rights and access to resources that can determine 
adaptive capacity. In several countries, security of land tenure 
is considered a priority for individuals to be able to make 
long-term decisions, such as changing agricultural practices. 
The following are some examples of laws and regulations 
related to the agricultural sector: zoning and spatial planning 
laws; leasing law; water resource regulations and agreements; 
laws to support disaster risk reduction; laws to incentivize the 
purchase of insurance; the establishment of property rights 
and land tenure; protected areas; and fishing quotas.
 – Government policies and programmes. These include national 
and regional adaptation plans (including the mainstreaming 
of climate change), subnational and local adaptation plans, 
disaster planning and preparedness, and sectoral plans. 
These last concern integrated water resources management, 
landscape and watershed management, integrated coastal 
zone management, adaptive management, ecosystem-based 
management, sustainable forest management, fisheries 
management and community-based adaptation, among 
other things.7
Although there is growing recognition of the importance of social and 
institutional measures, most adaptation assessments have been limited to 
determining the impact of adaptation in reducing vulnerability or to analysing 
how it has been integrated into the planning process. The implementation or 
7 See ECLAC (2015a) and IPCC (2014a and 2014b).
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effects of adaptation measures in terms of catalysing development are rarely 
assessed (IPCC, 2014a and 2014b); moreover, adaptation based on ecosystem 
integrity is undervalued.
In taking adaptation measures, significant constraints and inefficiencies, 
as well as technical, economic and social barriers, must be confronted 
(UNFCCC, 2007a and 2007b; Agrawala and Fankhauser, 2008). There are 
adaptation processes that have significant residual effects or costs, some of 
them irreversible. This occurs, for example, when a permanent change in the 
average temperature is perceived as temporary or seasonal and adjustments 
are made to the exploitation of water resources or the expansion of the 
agricultural frontier in the belief that these are temporary, which can result 
in overexploitation of water resources (Easterling and others, 1993; Bosello, 
Carraro and De Cian, 2010; Fankhauser, 1995; Rosenzweig and Parry, 1994; 
Darwin and others, 1995; Galindo, 2009).
Accordingly, an appropriate adaptation strategy should include some 
basic measures (Galindo and others, 2014b) such as the following:
• Building a portfolio of flexible adaptation measures. This portfolio 
should include the precautionary principle to avoid irreversible 
damage, as well as co-beneficial options such as increased energy 
and water efficiency, health protection and reduction of air pollution 
in cities, improved food and energy security, introduction of 
irrigation and crop changes, prevention and early warning of 
extreme weather events, and preservation of biodiversity and 
forests (Galindo and others, 2014b).
• Early adaptation that includes prevention measures (Bosello, 
Carraro and De Cian, 2010; Galindo and others, 2014b).
• Regional integration to reduce local risk and the level of exposure 
to climate change, considering, for example, food and energy 
security issues in the regional context (Galindo and others, 2014b).8
There is now a large portfolio of adaptation measures (see table IV.3) 
that are relatively easy to implement and offer significant co-benefits. Some of 
them involve management improvements that are inexpensive and provide 
significant benefits. An example of a measure that provides co-benefits is 
the use of inputs, such as fertilizers or increased irrigation, which generate 
positive economic effects (Bosello, Carraro and De Cian, 2010). Another 
example is the moving of sowing dates in South America, which offers the 
prospect of an economic benefit estimated at around 38% relative to the 
baseline (Tan and Shibasaki, 2003).
8 For example, a decline in output of a staple crop in a region such as Central America may be 
anticipated, and then international trade can be adapted to deal with that decline through 
agreements with countries or regions that are not similarly affected.
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Table IV.3 
Adaptation measures in selected sectors
Adaptation measures in agriculture Sea level rise
• Mixture of crops and livestock.
• Efficient management of irrigation water.
• Climate monitoring and prediction.
• Development and use of new crops.
• Multiple crop or mixed cropping systems.
• Use of genetic diversity.
• Development and use of varieties or species 
that are resistant to pests and diseases and 
are better adapted to the climate and the 
requirements of hibernation or increased 
resistance to heat and drought.
• Change in farm production and practices:  
use of diversification strategies, such as 
intercropping, agroforestry, integration of animal 
husbandry programmes and adjustments 
to sowing and growing dates.
• Expansion of farmland, changes in agricultural 
spatial distribution and land use management.
• Exploitation of topographical characteristics.
• Intensification of input use: fertilizers, 
irrigation, seeds.
• Adoption of new technologies.
• Insurance schemes.
• Diversification of agricultural incomes 
and activities.
• Integrated planning and management  
of the coastal space.
• Integrated management of watersheds 
and coastal areas.
• Protection of coastal wetlands.
• Flood-resistant construction codes 
and buildings.
• Coastal dikes, defences, barriers and seawalls.
• Land use planning and delimitation of 
risk areas.
• Spatial planning.
• Realignment and planned prohibition, 
hard defences.
• Sediment replenishment and management.
• Replenishment of coastal dunes and beaches.
• Building limits.
• Barriers against saltwater.
• More efficient water use.
• Freshwater injection.
• Upgrading of drainage systems and 
improvements in urban drainage.
• Polders.
• Changes in land use and zoning.
• Flood alert systems.
• Community-based disaster risk reduction.
• Balance between conservation of marine 
fisheries, coral reefs and mangroves.
• Improvements in livelihoods and survival 
of traditional populations.
• Management of non-climatic stress factors.
Health sector Water sector
• Prophylactic measures and sanitation.
• Introduction of public health training, 
emergency response and prevention 
and monitoring programmes.
• Improvements to the adaptive capacity 
of the different social groups.
• Social security networks.
• Building regulations.
• Improvements in public health infrastructure.
• Prevention of waterborne diseases.
• Supply of drinking water.
• Early warning systems to identify the presence 
of infectious diseases.
• Monitoring networks to alert the population 
to heat waves.
• Design of systems to prevent and deal 
with natural disasters.
• Improvements to public health.
• Anti-vector programmes.
• Disease eradication programmes.
• Health education programmes.
• Research.
• Vector control research and development.
• Vaccinations.
• Disease eradication.
• Implementation of local pollution control 
measures and additional co-benefits.
• Water conservation and management of water 
demand (water permits, pricing and taxes).
• Watershed management.
• Land use management.




• Water management infrastructure.
• Import of products for intensive water use.
• Increased use of rainfed agriculture.
• Improvements in institutions and governance 
to ensure the effective application of these 
adaptation measures.
• Sources of improvement:
 - Water storage and conservation techniques.
 - Sustainable groundwater exploration 
and extraction.
 - Reduction of losses (control of leakage, 
retention pipes).
 - Elimination of species that invade 
water storage.
 - Rainwater collection.
 - Water transfers.
 - Risk management to deal with the variability 
of precipitation.
 - Water allocation (e.g. municipal use versus 
agricultural use).
 - Desalinization.
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Biodiversity and ecosystems Glacier retreat
• Increase in the number of protected areas.
• Improved representation and replication within 
networks of protected areas.
• Improved management and restoration 
of existing protected areas to enhance 
recovery capacity.
• Design of new natural areas and 
restoration sites.
• Incorporation of the expected impact of climate 
change into management plans, programmes 
and activities.
• Administration and restoration 
of ecosystem functions.
• Incorporation of good practices  
in the fisheries sector.
• Spatial planning.
• Emphasis on the conservation of endangered 
species and resources.
• Transfer of endangered species. 
• Establishment of populations of species 
in captivity.
• Reduction of pressures independent of climate 
change on species.
• Improvements to existing laws, regulations 
and policies.
• Protection of biological corridors, refugia 
and stepping stones.
• Improvements to monitoring programmes.
• Design of dynamic landscape 
conservation plans.
• Meeting of wildlife and biodiversity needs.
• Management of multiple forest use.
• Design of high-altitude reservoirs.
• Use of drought-tolerant strains  
in high-altitude agriculture.
• Measures to manage demand.
• Extension and design of water 
collection systems.
• Planning of glacial basins.
• Generation of statistical data and information 
on glacier dynamics.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), “El gasto en protección 
ambiental en América Latina y el Caribe: bases conceptuales y experiencia regional”, Project 
Documents (LC/W.634), Santiago, 2014.
As noted, restoring the functions of ecosystems in order to maintain 
or restore the environmental services they provide is a particularly suitable 
adaptation measure in the region’s rural areas, as is making technological 
options for water management available to rural inhabitants, campesinos 
and indigenous peoples. This variant of adaptation has gained ground 
over the present decade and has two constituent elements: ecosystem-based 
adaptation (EbA) and payment for environmental services, which is the occasional 
complement to the former and makes it financially sustainable (Magrin, 2015).
Magrin (2015, p. 28) notes that EbA offers additional benefits for 
biodiversity, agriculture and coastal infrastructure, and further states that 
it “presents less risk of maladaptation than engineering works because it 
conserves ecosystems and their services, is more flexible and sensitive to 
unanticipated environmental changes, can help achieve sustainable development 
objectives, can contribute to mitigation, and produces environmental, social 
and economic co-benefits in the form of ecosystem goods and services [...] EbA 
is often complex to implement as it requires the cooperation of various actors 
and organizations (institutions, sectors and communities), and the benefits it 
Table IV.3 (concluded)
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provides are dispersed among a very wide range of beneficiaries. In addition, 
the standard protocols and comparable methodologies that normally exist 
for other types of options (such as technology and infrastructure) are usually 
lacking.” EbA is achieved in the following ways: “ecological restoration of 
ecosystems; community management of natural resources; conservation and 
establishment of protected areas; increase in biological diversity; afforestation 
and reforestation; prescribed burning and reduction of forest fires; ecological 
corridors; ex situ conservation of seeds and germplasm banks; adaptive 
spatial planning; establishment of diverse agricultural systems with the use 
of indigenous and local knowledge and the maintenance of genetic diversity; 
integrated water resource management (recognizing the role of watersheds, 
forests and associated vegetation in regulating water flows)” (Magrin, 2015, p. 28).
Ecological restoration of degraded ecosystems improves biodiversity 
provision by 44% and that of environmental services by 25%, increases the 
potential for carbon sequestration, promotes community organization, 
economic activities and livelihoods in rural areas, and at the same time 
helps in adapting to and mitigating climate change (Magrin and others, 2014; 
Magrin, 2015). This type of restoration reconciles economic development, 
adaptation and biodiversity conservation and reduces degradation rates 
where adaptive community management is in place.
2. Nature-based solutions and payment for ecosystem 
services: the convergence of adaptation and mitigation
Nature-based solutions (NBS) is the new term used since the 2019 United 
Nations Climate Action Summit to refer to the protection, restoration and 
sustainable management of ecosystems. NBS represent a promising alternative 
for addressing climate change, as they incorporate a comprehensive approach 
to simultaneously addressing mitigation and adaptation challenges while 
protecting biodiversity and human well-being (Seddon and others, 2019). 
Thus, NBS seek to reduce dilemmas and promote synergies between the 
Sustainable Development Goals (Seddon and others, 2020).
NBS are defined as solutions to challenges facing society that are 
inspired and supported by nature; that are cost-effective while providing 
environmental, social and economic benefits; and that help increase resilience. 
They relate to natural features and processes that are incorporated into cities, 
landscapes and marine areas through locally adapted, resource-efficient and 
systemic interventions, and provide benefits to both biodiversity and people 
(Raymond and others, 2017). They therefore encompass a wide range of 
actions, such as the protection and management of natural and semi-natural 
ecosystems, the incorporation of green areas and bodies of water in urban 
areas, and the application of ecosystem-based principles for agricultural 
systems (Seddon and others, 2020).
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The sustainable use, management, conservation and restoration of 
ecosystems play a central role in climate change adaptation and mitigation 
policies by increasing resilience and reducing disaster risks, as well as 
maintaining and increasing carbon stocks and sinks and providing services 
that replace the use of fossil fuels. An example of an NBS that integrates 
mitigation and adaptation actions is the restoration of natural forests in 
upland areas, as these have the potential to protect established communities 
in lower-lying areas from flooding and landslides while serving as carbon 
sinks and protecting biodiversity. Planting trees and increasing green space 
in urban areas is another example, as these can have a cooling effect on 
cities while sequestering carbon, giving protection from air pollution and 
providing other recreational and health services to the population (Seddon 
and others, 2020).
Given that emissions from agriculture, livestock, land use change 
and forestry are large in Latin America and the Caribbean (approximately 
1.8 Gt of CO2 equivalent), accounting for 42% of the total, NBS represent a 
significant mitigation opportunity. Their mitigation potential varies between 
countries: for example, it is estimated that in tropical countries with low 
emissions and extensive forest cover, NBS can mitigate about 50% of national 
emissions through measures to avoid deforestation. It is calculated, albeit 
with a degree of uncertainty, that NBS have the potential to achieve 30% of 
the global emissions reduction needed to maintain an emissions pathway 
that limits the temperature increase to 2 °C by 2030 (Seddon and others, 2020). 
It has been estimated that the implementation of measures including zero 
deforestation, large-scale restoration and reforestation, nutrient management 
in agricultural lands and reduction of methane from livestock in the region 
can contribute to the capture of 1.1 Gt of CO2 equivalent per year by 2050 
(Vergara, Fenhann and Schletz, 2015).
NBS are also an important tool for increasing the region’s adaptive 
capacity, as well as for reducing exposure and sensitivity to the impacts of 
climate change. For example, the protection, restoration or management of 
natural forests and wetlands in watersheds can secure and regulate the water 
supply and reduce the risk of floods and landslides, as well as soil erosion. 
The restoration of mangroves makes it possible to maintain a protective 
barrier for coastal communities against flooding, reducing storm damage 
and coastal erosion (see the case of Cuba in ECLAC, 2018f). In this way, large 
investments in infrastructure are avoided to some extent, while NBS offer 
the advantage of being flexible and easily adaptable to long-term changes 
such as sea level rise, while also entailing much lower conservation costs.
Because of their potential, NBS were one of the 12 topics discussed at the 
2019 Climate Action Summit convened by the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations. A number of initiatives to promote climate action were presented 
at the Summit, including some NBS relating to the region (see table IV.4).
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Despite the advantages of NBS, there are various barriers to their 
implementation; since they can be considered a public good, whose benefits 
are not limited to a single organization, they are not adequately funded. In 
fact, less than 1% of global climate finance focuses on coastal protection, 
infrastructure and risk management (including NBS). For another thing, 
they have benefits that are outside the market, such as effects on health 
and biodiversity, so measurement of their cost-effectiveness is uncertain; it 
is also difficult to measure their long-term effectiveness, and this prevents 
these projects from being compared with more traditional ones (Seddon and 
others, 2020). Moreover, given the mitigation potential of NBS, there may be a 
risk of promoting monoculture or diverting attention from decarbonization 
in other sectors of the economy.
To overcome these challenges, it is important to generate an institutional 
framework that recognizes the value of ecosystems and their potential to 
generate a new type of economy capable of coexisting harmoniously with 
nature. This requires a systemic, science-based interdisciplinary approach 
that allows resources to be redirected towards more efficient uses.
(a) Reorienting financing
NBS do not necessarily require additional financial resources, but they 
do often require existing funds to be redirected and used more effectively. 
The vast majority of agricultural subsidies and probably most public 
funding and almost all private sector investment in agricultural research 
and development support conventional agricultural production patterns that 
increase emissions and degradation of the means of production themselves 
(FAO, 2011). The most effective production development policy would be 
to redirect available resources; this means making current investments 
more sustainable and profitable over time, and recognizing the potential of 
ecosystems to provide solutions for the entire production system.
Encouraging the gradual and progressive reorientation of existing 
investments in accordance with the best international experiences would 
create the conditions for overcoming the initial barriers to the adoption of 
new production systems, until the flows of benefits appeared in a planned 
transition strategy. The reorientation of investments should include labour 
training and the strengthening of technical assistance. One problem to be solved 
is the gap between the capital available for investment and projects capable 
of being implemented. The transition to sustainability requires planning.
180 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
(b) Payment for ecosystem services and enabling conditions 
to support ecosystem-based adaptation measures
Payment for ecosystem services is based on the principle of internalizing 
or reflecting the economic and cultural benefits that accrue from the ability 
of ecosystems to sustain a flow of benefits, such as regulation of water 
flows, carbon storage, provision of habitats for biodiversity and landscape 
beauty. Such initiatives provide monetary and non-monetary incentives to 
communities, farmers and private landowners to protect, restore and conserve 
natural ecosystems and adopt sustainable agricultural, forestry and land 
use practices. In water resource management, these actions generate benefits 
for users of environmental services through water regulation and control of 
flooding, erosion, sediment, etc., ensuring a consistent, high-quality water 
supply and helping to reduce the costs of water treatment and equipment 
maintenance (WWAP, 2018).
The importance of payments for ecosystem services in the region is 
explained by their cost-effectiveness, given that regional and local governments 
have limited capacity for comprehensive diagnosis, control and monitoring, 
and compliance with traditional policies.9 Payments for ecosystem services 
are often implemented through water or conservation funds financed by 
public-private partnerships, government subsidies or contributions paid 
by water or resource users. The funds are usually governed by a contract 
between the founding members designating an independent institution 
to manage the financial resources and ensure that they are used for the 
protection and sustainable management of ecosystems and landscapes 
(Stanton and others, 2010).
In Latin America, about 65% of cases are financed by the public sector, a 
quarter by the private sector and the rest (10%) by the non-commercial private 
sector. In Europe, North America and Asia the pattern is similar, although 
with a greater presence of public models (70%). Africa, by contrast, is where 
private models are most prevalent (85%), with more than half being financed 
by the commercial private sector through ecotourism (Ezzine de Blas, Le Coq 
and Guevara Sanginés, 2017).
Costa Rica was the pioneer of this type of initiative in the region with 
its Forest Act (No. 7575) of 1996, which laid the groundwork for the future 
establishment of the first programme of payments for ecosystem services 
in 1997. For the first time, a definition of “environmental services” was coined: 
they were those “provided by the forest and forest plantations and having 
a direct impact on the protection and improvement of the environment”. 
These services may be “mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions (fixing, 
reduction, sequestration, storage and absorption), protection of water for 
9 There is abundant literature on payment for ecosystem services in the region, which demonstrates 
the efficiency of this approach in terms of environmental, social and economic outcomes (Echavarria 
and others, 2015).
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urban, rural or hydroelectric use, protection of biodiversity for conservation 
and sustainable scientific and pharmaceutical use, research and genetic 
improvement, protection of ecosystems, forms of life and natural scenic 
beauty for tourism and scientific purposes” (article 3, Law No. 7575). This 
law created the National Forestry Financing Fund (FONAFIFO) as the 
institution in charge of financing or attracting funds for the programme 
(article 46). The Government is a central actor in a well-defined environmental 
governance scheme. Through this programme, the 1980s approach to granting 
environmental subsidies or incentives was changed to one of economic 
recognition (Flores Aguilar and others, 2018).
Restoring the natural heritage through reforestation is a fundamental 
step towards the decarbonization of economies. These investments are the 
least costly and safest way to store carbon and could provide a service to 
humanity, paid for by the international community. Furthermore, it is the 
most effective way to recover ecosystem services (such as water supply 
and land use) that are vital for reducing vulnerabilities and avoiding 
ecological disasters. The region could provide these services for humanity, 
and would be compensated on the basis of the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities.
A number of ecosystem service payment systems with multilevel and 
intersectoral structures now operate in the region. For example, between 2001 
and 2015 in Brazil, nine states had laws and decrees specifically regulating 
these programmes, six had some other type of regulation and eight had 
draft laws for their regulation. In total, 418 municipalities were paying for 
environmental services (Garcia Alarcon and others, 2016). In addition to Brazil 
and Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala and Mexico have ecosystem service 
payment initiatives financed by government because they are environmental 
preservation measures (see table IV.5). 
Table IV.5 
Latin America and the Caribbean (5 countries): examples of government-financed 
ecosystem service payment programmes, 1997–2008 
Country Level Start Name Beneficiaries
Brazil State of 
Amazonas
2007 Bolsa Floresta In 2008, 2,700 traditional and indigenous families 
benefited from financial compensation and health 
care in exchange for a halt to deforestation 
in primary forests.
Costa Rica National 1997 National Forest 
Financing Fund
This is an incentive for reforestation and 
agro-forestry ecosystems. Since 2003, more than 
7,000 contracts have been signed and around 
2 million trees planted.
Ecuador National 2008 Forest Partner 
Programme
As of 2010, the programme was protecting over 
500,000 hectares of natural ecosystems and had 
over 60,000 beneficiaries.
Guatemala National 1997 Forest 
Incentives 
Programme
In 2009, the programme included 4,174 beneficiaries 
who planted 94,151 hectares of forest. It also 
covered 155,790 hectares of natural forest that 
had been turned into protected areas thanks  
to the economic incentives. 
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Country Level Start Name Beneficiaries
Mexico National 2003 Payment for 
Environmental 
Services (PSA)
Covers programmes that support communities, 
ejidos, regional forestry associations and 
forest landowners. It includes the Hydrological 
Environmental Services Programme (PSAH), 
the Programme to Develop the Market for 
Environmental Services through Carbon Capture 
and Biodiversity Derivatives and to Promote the 
Establishment and Improvement of Agroforestry 
Systems (PSA-CABSA), the Forest Environmental 
Services Project (PSAB) and ProÁrbol, a programme 
that builds on the experience of PSAH, CABSA 
and PSAB and aims to support hydrological 
environmental services, biodiversity conservation, 
agroforestry systems with shade crops and 
development of the idea of carbon sequestration. 
In 2018, the Sowing Life programme was created 
to encourage rural producers with incomes below 
the rural welfare line to produce agroforestry crops. 
Producers must have a minimum of 2.5 hectares 
to allocate to the project and are given support 
of US$ 250 per month.
Source: G. Magrin, “Adaptación al cambio climático en América Latina y el Caribe”, Project Documents 
(LC/W.692), Santiago, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2015.
There have been specific projects in which the impact of payment for 
environmental services on the adoption of silvopastoral systems has been 
assessed. These include projects in Costa Rica and one funded by the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) that have been implemented by the Tropical 
Agricultural Research and Higher Education Centre (CATIE), the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the Nitlapan Research 
and Development Institute in Nicaragua, the Centre for Research on Sustainable 
Agricultural Production Systems (CIPAV) Foundation in Colombia and the 
World Bank. Between 2003 and 2006, a number of livestock farmers in Colombia, 
Costa Rica and Nicaragua received between US$ 2,000 and US$ 2,400 per 
farm (about 10% to 15% of their net income) to implement the silvopastoral 
systems programme. This programme reduced degraded pastures by 60% 
in the three countries, while the area allocated to silvopastoral systems 
increased significantly. Associated benefits included a 71% increase in carbon 
sequestration, a 10% increase in milk production and a 115% increase in farm 
income. At the same time, herbicide use was reduced by 60% and the use of fire 
to manage pastures became less frequent (FAO, 2015). The complementarity 
between ecosystem-based adaptation and payment for environmental 
services can be strengthened by applying the tools shown in table IV.6.
The design and implementation of payments for ecosystem services 
should consider local aspects to avoid problems that can arise when the 
following occur: the plan is confused and it is not clear whether the goal 
refers to actions or outcomes; the initiative is perceived as a commodification 
of nature and its intangible values; the action is not efficient in reducing 
poverty; difficulties arise in building trust among the beneficiaries of the 
proposal; and there are issues related to gender or land tenure.
Table IV.5 (concluded)
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Table IV.6 
Regulatory instruments and economic incentives that support 
ecosystem-based adaptation
Instruments and incentives Application to ecosystem-based adaptation (EbA)
Financial (market and non-market sources)
Payments for ecosystem 
services (not tradable)
Payments to compensate those maintaining ecosystem services 
(e.g. payments for managing watersheds).
Carbon financing Carbon storage payments, e.g. Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) and voluntary carbon market.
Reducing emissions from 
deforestation and forest 
degradation in developing 
countries (REDD) incentives




Payments based on indirect or representative indicators 
of biodiversity (e.g. area of forest left undisturbed).
Debt for nature swaps Debt write-offs in exchange for ecosystem conservation  
(e.g. creation of protected areas in Costa Rica in exchange  
for debt relief).
Conservation trust funds Funds to improve management and ensure conservation 
of protected areas (e.g. conservation agreements).
Certification and labelling Certification of products and services whose production has minimal 
impact on ecosystems (e.g. ecotourism).
Increased access and 
premium pricing in 
green markets
Increase in the value of sustainable products and services  
(e.g. organic products or organic coffee) and in their market access.
Market development Development of new markets for environmentally friendly products 
and services and expansion of existing ones.
Environmental awards 
or recognition
Public recognition of good environmental stewardship.
Removal of harmful subsidies 
(fisheries, agriculture, energy)
Removal of subsidies that destroy, degrade or lead to unsustainable 
use of ecosystems.
Taxes, fees and charges Taxes on activities that destroy or degrade natural resources 
or involve poor management of them (e.g. taxes on pesticide 
use or unsustainable logging).
Negotiable quotas Quotas for the extraction of natural ecosystem goods, 
such as fuelwood, timber, fish or wildlife, to ensure they 
are sustainably managed.
Non-financial
Determination of land tenure, 
zoning and ownership and of 
usage and management rights
Clarification of land tenure and rights to improve conservation, 
restoration and sustainable management of ecosystems.
Public advocacy and 
capacity-building  
to support EbA 
Increased recognition of the value of EbA and its role in adaptation 
strategies, leading to increased implementation.
Development, improvement 
and enforcement of laws
Laws to promote the implementation of EbA and enforcement 
tools, and laws to promote the sustainable use of ecosystems 
or discourage mismanagement (e.g. protected area legislation, 
pesticide use regulations and water pollution laws).
Institutional strengthening 
and partnerships
Allocation of financial and human resources to relevant institutions 
and the creation of networks involving the different stakeholders.
Development, transfer and 
application of environmentally 
sound technologies
Development of material and non-material technologies that can 
help in implementing EbA (e.g. development of software or early 
warning systems).
Source: G. Magrin, “Adaptación al cambio climático en América Latina y el Caribe”, Project Documents 
(LC/W.692), Santiago, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2015.
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It should also be considered that EbA may require actions to provide 
one ecosystem service at the expense of other services. For example, carbon 
accumulation based on increased net primary production may affect water 
provision (Viglizzo and others, 2012). It is therefore crucial to carefully 
analyse options and consider not only the costs and benefits, but also the 
non-economic value of ecosystem services (Magrin, 2015).
(c) Legislation
Multilateral environmental agreements (the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) and its Paris Agreement, the United Nations Convention to Combat 
Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or 
Desertification, Particularly in Africa, the Sendai Framework for Disaster 
Risk Reduction 2015-2030 and the New Urban Agenda) are opportunities 
to implement nature-based solutions (NBS). The 2030 Agenda summarizes 
many of these agreements and provides a general framework for pursuing 
these solutions.
At the same time, governments need to assess and, where appropriate, 
amend their legal and regulatory regimes to remove barriers to the incorporation 
of NBS and to advance their use. National legislation to facilitate the 
implementation of NBS at the local level is particularly important. A small but 
growing number of countries have adopted policy frameworks that promote 
them (WWAP, 2018). Regional frameworks can also stimulate change. The 
European Union, for example, has significantly increased opportunities for 
the deployment of NBS by harmonizing legislation and policies related to 
agriculture, water resources and the environment.
In 2014, Peru adopted a national legal framework to regulate and 
supervise investment in green infrastructure, the Law on Compensation 
Mechanisms for Ecosystem Services; this is the first national regulatory 
framework specifically for green infrastructure investment in the drinking 
water and sanitation sector in Latin America and the Caribbean. It aims to 
promote, regulate and monitor mechanisms of remuneration for such services 
when ecosystem managers enter into an agreement with those who pay for 
their services or for the conservation, rehabilitation and sustainable use of 
the sources of these services.
(d) Improving intersectoral collaboration and the knowledge base
The implementation of NBS demands higher levels of intersectoral and 
institutional collaboration than grey infrastructure models, particularly when 
applied at the landscape scale. This is an opportunity for the development 
of an integrated public policy agenda. The policy landscape remains highly 
fragmented in many countries; NBS, in addition to benefiting from potential 
harmonization, could also be a means to achieve it. Clear mandates at the 
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highest level are something that can accelerate the adoption of NBS and 
encourage better cross-sectoral coordination. For these to exist, there is a 
need to improve the knowledge base of NBS processes (including through 
greater scientific rigour), to incorporate the traditional knowledge of local 
communities about ecosystem functioning and nature-society interactions, 
and to ensure that those who possess the knowledge are fully and effectively 
involved in assessments, decision-making, implementation and management. 
Ultimately, the viability of NBS depends on the conviction of decision-makers 
and on stakeholders being aware of the expected results, the monitoring 
model, the costs of implementation and their cost-effectiveness.
3. Adaptation to climate change in the agricultural sector
The agricultural sector is of strategic importance in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, as it generates 4.7% of the region’s GDP, employs 14% of 
the population and accounts for 29% of exports. Some 80% of rural farms 
are family-run, accounting for between 27% and 67% of food production 
(ECLAC/ILO/FAO, 2012).10
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has identified 
three types of adaptation options in the agricultural sector to increase its 
resilience and reduce its vulnerability to the effects of climate change: 
structural and physical options, social options and institutional options.
The scope of benefits depends on the type of measure implemented. 
In the agricultural sector, for example, data indicate that some adaptation 
measures reduce financial costs significantly, although there are significant 
differences depending on the type of crop or region (Agrawala and others, 2010; 
Galindo and others, 2014b). The cost of some of these measures, such as 
better management (changes in planting and growing dates or changes 
in the crop mix, among others), is low, and their benefits are substantial, 
making them cost-effective. At the same time, combining them with the use 
of additional inputs such as fertilizers or better irrigation practices generates 
positive economic effects that can outweigh the total impact (Galindo and 
others, 2014b). In other cases, however, such as biodiversity, it is stressed 
that damage is irreversible. Box IV.3 identifies the factors that influence the 
implementation of adaptation measures in United States agriculture.
In the agricultural sector, measuring the benefits of adaptation and 
setting quantitative targets is extremely complex. This is because adaptation 
by agricultural producers simultaneously incorporates practices aimed at 
coping with changes in input and product prices, temperature and water 
availability, as well as various weather events, including extreme ones.
10 This section is based on Magrin (2015).
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Agricultural censuses provide information on the choice of crops, 
agricultural practices and the main characteristics of producers in different 
regions of a country. As climate, geographical and soil quality characteristics 
are also known, in countries that have regions with heterogeneous climates, 
this information makes it possible to construct production patterns for 
different climate characteristics.
Box IV.3 
Adaptation in United States agriculture
Factors contributing to better management practices and conservation 
agriculture in the United States farming sector include information on 
environmental damage and pest infestation, education, income, participation 
in social networks and government programmes, and social capital (Prokopy 
and others, 2008; Knowler and Bradshaw, 2007; Reidsma and others, 2010; 
Galindo and others, 2014b) (see figures 1 and 2).
Figure 1 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of L. Prokopy 
and others, “Determinants of agricultural best management practice adoption: evidence from 
the literature”, Journal of Soil and Water Conservation, vol. 63, No. 5, Ankeny, Soil and Water 
Conservation Society, 2008.
Note: The chart is based on Prokopy and other (2008), who applied the vote count methodology 
to 55 best practice adoption studies over the 25 years prior to publication of the study. 
This methodology involves tallying the number of times a variable is positively significant, 
negatively significant or non-significant. The variables considered are significant with at least 
95% confidence. The blue dots are capacity-related variables, the green dots attitude-related 
variables, the orange dots environmental awareness variables and the grey dots farm 
characteristics variables.
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Figure 2 
United States: factors correlating positively or negatively with the adoption 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Farmer Behaviour, 
Agricultural Management and Climate Change, Paris, 2012; D. Knowler and B. Bradshaw, 
“Farmers’ adoption of conservation agriculture: a review and synthesis of recent research”, 
Food Policy, vol. 32, No. 1, Amsterdam, Elsevier, 2007.
Note: The chart is based on Knowler and Bradshaw (2007) and the observations are based on data 
readings taken close to the date of publication of the study.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of L. Prokopy and others, “Determinants of agricultural best management 
practice adoption: evidence from the literature”, Journal of Soil and Water 
Conservation, vol. 63, No. 5, Ankeny, Soil and Water Conservation Society, 2008; 
D. Knowler and B. Bradshaw, “Farmers’ adoption of conservation agriculture: a 
review and synthesis of recent research”, Food Policy, vol. 32, No. 1, Amsterdam, 
Elsevier, 2007; P. Reidsma and others, “Adaptation to climate change and climate 
variability in European agriculture: the importance of farm level responses”, 
European Journal of Agronomy, vol. 32, No. 1, Amsterdam, Elsevier, 2010; 
L. Galindo and others, “Cambio climático, agricultura y pobreza en América 
Latina: una aproximación empírica”, Project Documents (LC/W.620), Santiago 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2014; 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Farmer 
Behaviour, Agricultural Management and Climate Change, Paris, 2012.
Given the socioeconomic characteristics of agricultural producers, 
it is possible to determine how the climate affects the choice of crops. It 
is therefore possible to identify how a change in climatic conditions may 
affect producers’ choice of crop and likewise their expected incomes, as 
illustrated in box IV.4 in relation to Peruvian agriculture. This methodology 
can be applied at the national level, as though the group of farmers choosing 
different crops according to different climatic conditions behaved like one 
single individual in the whole country. This approach makes it possible 
Box IV.3 (concluded)
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to obtain a predictor or indicator of the route to adaptation: maintaining 
a variety of crops. However, if temperature and humidity continue to 
change, the collective farmer will see this diversity impoverished by 
limits on the adaptive capacity of crops. This will mark the possible path 
of adaptation.
Box IV.4 
Adaptation in Peruvian agriculture
Peru’s fourth National Agricultural Census of 2012 was used to estimate the 
effects of temperature and rainfall on the choice of major crops and the income 
expected from them (Galindo, Alatorre and Reyes, 2015a). The likelihood of 
crops being chosen within a temperature range of 0 ºC to 35 °C is shown in 
figure 1. It can be seen that the crop most likely to be chosen when temperatures 
are low is the white potato, followed by the native potato. As the temperature 
increases, the preference for both types of potato decreases in favour of coffee, 
the two maize varieties considered and, to a lesser extent, alfalfa. Hard yellow 
maize is the crop most likely to be chosen at high temperatures. All other crops 
are unlikely to be chosen. Cassava shows a similar trend to white potatoes, 
being less likely to be chosen as temperatures rise, while the likelihood of 
bananas being chosen increases. Rice and grapes have a practically zero 
likelihood of being chosen. Figure 1 also shows how the likelihood of a crop 
being chosen changes within an average precipitation range of between 0 mm 
and 300 mm per month. A low level of precipitation favours the choice of white 
potatoes and alfalfa. As precipitation increases, so does the likelihood of the 
two species of corn, hard yellow and starchy, being chosen, and the same is 
true for cassava and banana. However, only starchy corn and banana show 
an increasing probability of being chosen over the whole range considered, 
while that of the rest of the crops peaks and then declines.
Figure 1 
Peru: likelihood of crop choice by annual temperature and 
monthly precipitation
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Source: L. Galindo, J. Alatorre and O. Reyes, “Adaptación al cambio climático a través de la elección 
de cultivos en Perú”, El Trimestre Económico, vol. 82, No. 327, Mexico City, Fondo de Cultura 
Económica (FCE), 2015.
In terms of income, the crops that show annual losses when the temperature 
rises by 1 °C are alfalfa, rice, coffee, hard yellow corn, bananas and cassava. 
An increase in the level of precipitation (measured in millimetres per month) 
causes losses in practically all crops, the exceptions being white potatoes 
and cassava (see figure 2B).
Figure 2 
Peru: percentage changes in income per crop
(Percentages)
A. Temperature rise of 1 °C
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B. Monthly precipitation rise of 1 mm











Source: L. Galindo, J. Alatorre and O. Reyes, “Adaptación al cambio climático a través de la elección 
de cultivos en Perú”, El Trimestre Económico, vol. 82, No. 327, Mexico City, Fondo de Cultura 
Económica (FCE), 2015.
When temperature and precipitation scenarios for 2070 are considered, 
the likelihood of both potato species, alfalfa, rice, coffee, grapes and cassava 
being chosen decreases, with the two maize species and bananas gaining. 
A drop in producers’ expected conditional income of between 8% and 13% 
is projected.
Source: L. Galindo, J. Alatorre and O. Reyes, “Adaptación al cambio climático a través 
de la elección de cultivos en Perú”, El Trimestre Económico, vol. 82, No. 327, 
Mexico City, Fondo de Cultura Económica (FCE), 2015.
A wide range of adaptation options are now available for agriculture, 
the water sector, health, biodiversity and protection from extreme weather 
events and for coastal zones. These measures have co-benefits, such as 
energy efficiency, reduction of air pollution, preservation of biodiversity and 
curbing of deforestation. However, they also have limitations, and there are 
obstacles to their implementation. There will always be residual and even 
irreversible damage, as well as inefficient adaptation options that cause 
significant collateral damage.
The following are some of the limiting factors or barriers to planning 
and implementing adaptation options in the sector (IPCC, 2014a):
• Knowledge and technology constraints in rural areas because 
of a lack of impact and vulnerability studies or information 
dissemination channels. They can also arise if these exist but are 
inappropriate because of a lack of integrated or multidisciplinary 
studies on natural and socioeconomic systems or deficiencies in 
research on adaptive capacity and local indigenous knowledge.
Box IV.4 (concluded)
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• Physical constraints. The rate and magnitude of climate change 
and the geographical characteristics of the local environment can 
be an obstacle to adaptation. Adaptation actions in the agricultural 
sector may be limited by water availability and quality, or land 
use change in mountain regions may restrict the migration of 
plant species to higher-altitude areas.
• Constraints related to the biological tolerance of species to climate 
change. Many may present problems with their physiological 
adaptive capacity as they are forced to migrate to areas more 
conducive to survival. In turn, environmental degradation can 
reduce the productivity and resilience of agricultural systems.
• Economic and financial constraints. The short-term dynamics of 
economic systems can undermine the capacity for adaptation. 
While development may alleviate the lack of resources, it can 
also put pressure on natural resources and ecosystems and limit 
their adaptive capacity. Lack of capital can likewise restrict the 
implementation of adaptation measures.
• Human resources. Lack of trained human capital limits 
information-gathering, technology take-up and use, leadership 
in prioritizing and implementing public policies, and 
adaptation measures.
• Social and cultural constraints. Cultural values, world views, 
norms and behaviours can influence the perception of risk, the 
adoption of adaptation measures, the distribution of vulnerability 
and adaptive capacity in society.
• Governance and institutions. The lack of coordination tools is a 
limiting factor when it comes to addressing cross-cutting issues 
and long-term challenges. Also, intersectoral work and institutional 
capacities are limited. These aspects mean a reduced capacity 
to deal with environmental problems that require coordination 
(Samaniego and others, 2017).
F. Adapting to climate change through migration
1. Climate-related migration
Migration has been the subject of extensive discussion and a variety of 
theories in the academic world. Although migration as a form of adaptation 
to the impact of climate change is often mentioned in the literature on the 
subject, it is still hotly debated (Mobjörk and others, 2016). According to 
IPCC (2014a and 2014b), migration is an adaptation strategy widely used 
in response to social and environmental changes. Extreme climate events 
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displace populations in the short term because of the loss of dwellings or 
economic disruption, although only a proportion of those displaced end up 
as permanent migrants.
The Government Office for Science report (2011) lays out a framework 
for climate-driven migration based on theories and empirical studies on 
the topic. It emphasizes that climate change influences migration decisions 
through economic, environmental and to some extent political factors 
(e.g. falling rural wages or rising agricultural prices).
There are different patterns of migration: international or national; 
permanent, circular or temporary; and voluntary or forced. Climate change 
and climate variability seem to be affecting these patterns in different 
ways. It is clear that rising sea levels which render areas uninhabitable 
cause permanent migration, while extreme weather events involve more 
temporary movements within the region. Circular movements seem to be 
associated with drought. However, extreme weather events can also influence 
permanent migration. Places at high risk of extreme weather events could 
be partially or totally abandoned. This could exacerbate the large migratory 
movements that are already taking place, particularly migration from rural 
to urban areas (Mobjörk and others, 2016).
Adaptation through migration perfectly illustrates the interaction 
between the above-mentioned climate risks. It also highlights how responding 
to one risk can create conditions of vulnerability to another. Many factors 
contribute to migration, such as lack of water security, sea level rise, food 
insecurity and extreme events. Most people who move or migrate for reasons 
related to climate change also face difficulties in adapting to the urban 
environment. They often end up in risk-prone areas, like the urban poor. In 
other words, migration because of a lack of arable land or water can lead to 
a new situation in which extreme events are the main risk factor.
Adaptation processes cushion the negative effects of climate change 
on society’s means of subsistence. Lack of or insufficient adaptation threatens 
food security and the viability of some human settlements. Migration then 
becomes an ex situ adaptation option. Climate change is thus a driver of 
major disruptions within and between countries. This can lead to national 
security responses, as has been shown in the matter of migration flows 
magnified by prolonged droughts.
Resilience and adaptive capacity reduce the push factors for 
large-scale migration (loss of livelihoods, food shortages and sea level 
rise). This section presents the relationship between the potential effects 
of climate change on migration and the national security responses 
being considered.
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(a) National security concerns over migration 
and resource disputes
Since the early 2000s, there has been growing interest among researchers 
and policymakers in the impact of climate change on security (Mobjörk 
and others, 2016).11 In 2007, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
Ban Ki-moon, stated in an article that the origin of the conflict in Darfur 
(which resulted in 200,000 deaths and millions of people displaced) was an 
ecological crisis caused in part by climate change.12 Some experts believe 
that the revolts that have taken place in the Middle East and Maghreb were 
also originally related to climate change (IEEE, 2016), a period of drought 
and the failure of agriculture in those years.
ECLAC believes that there is a relationship between migration from 
Central America, particularly the dry northern corridor extending from 
Guatemala to Honduras, and the long-term drying up of that area, aggravated 
by ongoing climate change. This phenomenon has taken a political turn 
because of the confrontation between the President of the United States and 
the Government of Mexico regarding the closure of the United States border 
and the diplomatic and trade actions of 2019 aimed at curbing migration 
by putting pressure on the countries involved. ECLAC, together with the 
governments of these four countries, is promoting a development programme 
aimed at economic revitalization and efficient adaptation to climate change 
with a human security focus. In other words, the focus is on development, 
not national security, throughout the migration cycle: departure, transit and 
return (Bárcena, 2019).
The approach that links national security to climate change is being 
analysed by military circles and security bodies in the United States. In 
January 2019, the United States intelligence community presented a document 
entitled Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence 
Community (Coats, 2019). In this assessment, the intelligence agencies declare 
that climate change is an urgent and growing national security threat and 
that it is contributing to an increase in natural disasters, refugee flows and 
11 In its resolution No. 66/290 (A/RES/66/290), the United Nations General Assembly (2012, p. 1) 
“agrees that human security is an approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing 
widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people. 
Based on this, a common understanding on the notion of human security includes […] the 
right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. All individuals, in 
particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an 
equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential.”
12 In the case of Darfur, the environmental aspects contributing to the crisis were desertification 
and drought, which forced the nations or peoples living there to move to other areas where 
their livestock could graze, resulting in ethnic clashes over land ownership or use. The climate 
dimension of the Arab revolts is the rise in commodity prices resulting from long droughts.
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conflicts over basic resources such as food and water.13 They add that these 
effects are already occurring and are projected to increase in scope, scale 
and intensity over time (Coats, 2019). Inadequate adaptation in situ is part 
of the background to these judgments and has the potential to affect large 
populations seeking ex situ alternatives and to provoke situations of conflict 
with political or military security implications.
The World Economic Forum has also included climate change as 
a global risk in The Global Risks Report 2019 (WEF, 2019). The relationship 
between climate change and security is analysed in greater depth in United 
Nations (2009), which identifies five pathways by which climate change could 
affect security, all with inadequate adaptation as a backdrop:
(i) Vulnerability: climate change threatens food security and human 
health and increases the degree of human exposure to extreme events.
(ii) Development: if climate change slows or reverses development, 
vulnerability will increase and the ability of States to maintain 
stability may be undermined.
(iii) Reactions: migrations occur as a form of adaptation.
(iv) Statelessness: the loss of the territory of a State and its status as 
such and impairment of the rights of individuals.
(v) International conflicts: these can arise if climate change undermines 
shared or undelimited international resources, which can impact 
on international cooperation.
In United Nations (2009), climate change is perceived as a “threat 
multiplier” that exacerbates vulnerabilities arising from persistent poverty. It 
also increases the weakness of resource management and conflict resolution 
institutions. This view of climate change as a threat multiplier rather than a 
direct cause of conflict is widely accepted. From this point of view, the way 
climate change affects security risks (including violent conflicts) depends 
on the capacity of societies to cope with the changes, i.e. to adapt.
Existing vulnerabilities, governance structures and adaptive capacity 
are critical factors influencing the risks associated with the increased threats 
of climate change. The same phenomenon will have different impacts and 
13 Extreme events are not synonymous with natural disasters. The term is used loosely, since an 
extreme event may lead to human disasters because of deficiencies of various kinds that prevent 
harm from being forestalled. These may be “hard” deficiencies, such as investment shortfalls, or 
“soft” deficiencies, as when a low value is set on populations at risk. Sometimes they are even 
the result of the financial strategies of local governments, which neglect to invest in prevention 
and concentrate on rehabilitation, which they expect to be paid for by other levels of government 
(or other governments, through international assistance) as part of the reaction to a humanitarian 
emergency. A negative incentive to externalize the cost of adaptation is that the likelihood of an 
extreme event is perceived to be low, which is an inducement to postpone prevention. Added to 
this is the perception that the political returns to prevention are lower than those to rehabilitation 
after an emergency. 
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consequences depending on the prevailing institutional and social conditions. 
Therefore, while it is not inevitable that climate change will affect security, 
it does increase the risk of insecurity (Mobjörk and others, 2016).
Human insecurity almost never has a single cause, but arises from the 
interaction of multiple factors. According to IPCC (2014a and 2014b), human 
security will be progressively threatened as the climate changes, since this 
jeopardizes livelihoods, culture and identity, triggers migratory movements 
and increases the risk of violent conflict (Adger and others, 2014).
In its analysis of security risks related to climate change, the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (Mobjörk and others, 2016) 
lists six thematic areas where climate change may pose security risks: 
(i) water security, (ii) food security, (iii) sea level rise and coastal degradation, 
(iv) extreme weather events and climate-related disasters, (v) climate-related 
migration and (vi) violent conflict. These security risks interact with one 
another (e.g. water scarcity can affect food security or trigger migration), so 
finding solutions to these threats requires an integrated approach.
(b) Priority areas of adaptation for food and water security
It has already been indicated that the region expects changes in the 
frequency and variability of heat waves, droughts and floods. Together with 
weak governance, these factors increase water and food insecurity, as they 
do throughout the world. This increases the risk of social unrest, migration 
and tension between countries. Latin America and the Caribbean has a 
high average availability of water resources, although they are distributed 
heterogeneously between the different countries. The areas of the region 
that may be most affected by water stress are Mexico, the Caribbean and 
Central America, as they will be drier. Andean cities will suffer from water 
stress and South America will be more exposed to flooding (ECLAC, 2018a). 
The Andean countries are cited as one of the areas of the world where the 
supply of drinking water is of greatest concern, owing to their dependence 
on glaciers and water from snow settling in the mountains. In the Andean 
region, the melting of glaciers and snow on mountains may generate tensions, 
social discontent and migratory and security risks. Increasing water scarcity 
will put agricultural production and power generation at risk, all of which 
could lead people to decide to leave their homes and migrate. The IPCC 
report argues that the region is particularly vulnerable because of its fragile 
ecosystem (Werz and Conley, 2012).
In this respect, adaptation concerns all the dimensions identified in 
the preceding sections and in the chapter on agriculture. For example, water 
deposits could be created where there used to be snow, and freshwater reserves 
could be built up from floods and hurricanes. Technologies for condensing 
atmospheric water in areas of human consumption stress, procedures for 
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recycling the water available and, in other cases, changes in priorities for 
the growth of human settlements in areas of unreliable water supply could 
also be implemented.
Reduced productivity could compromise food security in very poor 
areas that are highly dependent on agriculture, such as north-east Brazil, the 
Andean zones and Central America (especially the Dry Corridor). Increased 
food price volatility can have serious repercussions in import-dependent 
countries, and higher prices for staple foods can increase the risk of conflict 
(Mobjörk and others, 2016).
2. Some estimates for migration in Latin America 
and the Caribbean and its relation to climate change
The report of the Secretary-General mentioned above contains estimates 
of the number of people who could migrate as a result of climate change. 
Those estimates have a very wide range and are considered to be highly 
uncertain. Predictions of the number of people who may have to migrate 
by 2050 because of climate change and environmental degradation range 
from 50 million to 350 million.
According to the findings of a recent report by the World Bank (2018) 
on internal migration (Groundswell: Preparing for Internal Climate Migration), 
the impact of climate change on three densely populated regions of the 
world could result in more than 140 million people relocating within the 
borders of their countries by 2050.14 These regions include Mexico and Central 
America, for which three scenarios are proposed (a more optimistic one, a 
pessimistic one and one with inclusive development). Depending on the 
scenario, the number of migrants ranges from 200,000 to 3.9 million by 2050, 
with averages of between 1.4 million and 2.1 million. In the most pessimistic 
scenario (3.9 million by 2050), climate migrants represent about 1% of the 
population by 2050. Another finding of the study is that climate migrants’ 
share of total internal migration is projected to increase from between 6.3% 
and 8.9% in 2020 to between 8.5% and 12.6% in 2050.
(a) Insecurity associated with climate change policies
Different studies show that climate change mitigation and adaptation 
actions can increase vulnerability in certain populations. The IPCC report 
cited above mentions the importance of resource distribution in conflicts. 
According to this view, in circumstances where property rights and conflict 
management institutions are ineffective or illegitimate, climate mitigation 
or adaptation efforts that involve changing the distribution of access to 
resources have the potential to create and worsen conflicts.
14 The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2009) estimates that internal migrants 
numbered 740 million worldwide at the start of the new millennium, three times the number of 
international migrants.
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Specific case studies are also mentioned, such as the link between 
rising prices for certain foods and the expansion of land given over to 
biofuel production, or the difficulties that may arise in schemes to pay 
for environmental services (reducing emissions from deforestation and 
forest degradation in developing countries (REDD), for example). In certain 
circumstances, these factors have the potential to fuel conflicts over resources 
and property rights.
The issue of conflict and climate change is perhaps the most discussed 
in reflections on the subject. According to IPCC (2014a and 2014b), there is little 
consensus about a direct relationship between climate change and violent 
conflict, although there is agreement about the existence of indirect links (the 
cases of Darfur and the Arab Spring were mentioned at the beginning). As 
noted, climate change is recognized as a threat multiplier that exacerbates 
existing trends, tensions and instability (poverty, ethnic or religious divisions, 
competition for resources and weak institutions).
G. Closing reflections
With regard to Latin America and the Caribbean, and in relation to adaptation 
processes, Magrin (2015, p. 9) acknowledges that:
the countries of the region have made progress in incorporating 
environmental protection into decision-making, particularly when 
it comes to environmental institutions and legislation, but there are 
still difficulties in effectively incorporating environmental issues into 
relevant public policies. One of the main challenges of the climate 
agenda [...] will be to achieve linkage between climate policies and 
development, land use and sectoral policies.
There are now a number of laws associated with the climate issue, 
although actual implementation and monitoring are proving very 
difficult. In several countries there are marked contradictions between 
land use regulation policies and incentives to increase productivity.
And she adds: 
The great process of change that the region is undergoing requires 
planned, consistent, non-contradictory policies and interventions in 
line with development objectives. It is important to attain a holistic 
view of the problem, taking advantage of capacities developed for 
other purposes (such as disaster risk management), connecting the 
climate issue with development actions and pursuing environmentally 
sound and well-planned land use. Thus, effective governments 
and institutions have a key role to play in facilitating planning and 
implementation and represent the main adaptation opportunity or 
constraint. Governments need to be adequately informed, assess the 
suitability of interventions and make their own decisions (in accordance 
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with the specific context of each particular situation), avoiding pressures 
and one-size-fits-all options for developing countries that generate 
resistance and distrust and retard actions. In all cases, it is important 
to study and properly understand the interactions and constraints of 
the climate change-development relationship, as government decisions 
and actions are often wide-ranging and take in more than one objective, 
including climate change (Magrin, 2015, p. 9).
Some issues of crucial importance from an adaptation point of view 
require policy decisions that go to the heart of how governments operate. 
For example, it would be desirable to transform regional information on the 
expected effects of climate change into mechanisms that change the incentives 
or rules governing investment. In this regard, it is worth noting the potential 
offered by the formalization of such information as a basis for public action, 
the adaptation of licensing processes and the impact evaluation associated with 
licensing, the updating of land use planning instruments and the inclusion 
of resilience standards applicable to the operation of critical infrastructure 
that serve to internalize the cost of keeping it operational at critical times. 
One of the advances in international negotiations has been to ensure that, 
alongside national efforts, relevant information and additional funds are 
made available to countries to accelerate adaptation to climate change.
Two extreme scenarios can be envisaged for adaptation to gradual 
climate change and combined in a variety of ways. On the one hand, adaptation 
may not prevent all the damage and losses that could be caused by the 
accumulation of changes, response deficiencies and limitations outlined above. 
On the other hand, adaptation may be taken as a mission that adequately 
and promptly anticipates threats and that successfully moderates risk and 
not only reduces vulnerability but goes further by investing in infrastructure 
and closing gaps derived from the old development style. Lastly, if climate 
change is not gradual and there are tipping points followed by sudden 
changes and self-reinforcing cycles, the adaptation measures discussed in 
this chapter will be clearly inadequate and the effects will be unavoidable.
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Annex IV.A1 
Adaptation projects in the countries of Latin America 
and the Caribbean15 
1. Examples of adaptation projects
(a) Projects financed by the EUROCLIMA+ programme
• Regional and local climate risk management in Brazil and 
Argentina. This project seeks to contribute to climate resilience in 
the area of intervention, reducing the risk of disasters associated 
with floods and droughts, with emphasis on the vulnerable 
populations of the Intermunicipal Consortium of the Western 
Metropolitan Region of São Paulo (CIOESTE) in Brazil and the 
Argentine municipality of Córdoba. Setting out from modelling 
studies and cost analysis of climate threats, priority populations 
for intervention will be identified and plans for adaptation and 
management of the main climate threats will be implemented. The 
initiatives will involve these vulnerable populations in diagnosis, 
the search for solutions and publicization and training activities. 
The project is led by CIOESTE.
• Design and initial implementation of a drought information 
system for southern South America (SISA), which will provide 
governments, non-governmental and private institutions and 
individuals with monitoring, prediction, preparedness and impact 
mitigation tools and information. The participating countries 
are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, the Plurinational State 
of Bolivia and Uruguay. Drought information is complemented 
by improvements in regional institutional capabilities, planning 
and preparedness and the governance of risk management, and 
by reduction of the economic, social and environmental effects 
of drought on agricultural production, hydropower generation 
and river navigation in southern South America. The leading 
entity is the National Meteorological Service (SMN) of Argentina, 
representing the Regional Climate Centre for Southern South 
America (CRC-SAS).
• Binational project to reduce the vulnerability of people and 
livelihoods to the risks of drought and flooding in border territories 
of Ecuador and Peru. The objective of the project is to reduce 
the vulnerability of the Catamayo-Chira cross-border basin by 
strengthening public institutions in the area of risk management 
and by preparing the civilian border population. The project is 
strengthening binational institutions by implementing technical 
and legal tools to enable local governments along the border to 
15 This annex is based on Magrin (2015).
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improve governance and public policy in respect of disaster risk 
reduction in the event of drought and flooding. It also seeks to 
strengthen vulnerable border communities and prepare them for 
risk reduction in the face of natural phenomena (droughts, floods 
and forest fires). Another objective is to bring the flood early 
warning system into operation and equip it with widely available 
information technology at three sites that are particularly prone to 
flooding and drought in the Catamayo-Chira transboundary basin. 
The leading entity is the regional government of Piura (Peru). Its 
partners include the provincial government of Loja (Ecuador) and 
Ecuador’s National Risk and Emergency Management Service 
(formerly the National Secretariat for Risk Management), the 
province of Viterbo (Italy), the department of Meurthe and Moselle 
(France), the department of Aude (France) and the Observatory of 
Climate Change in Latin America (LOCAL) (France). The Spanish 
Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID) is 
the executing agency.
• Strengthening of national and regional systems for monitoring and 
managing the risks of drought and floods in a context of climate 
change and desertification in the Andean countries. Its objective is 
to reduce the social and economic impact associated with flooding 
and drought by capacity-building and coordination of regional, 
national and local institutions involved in drought and flood 
risk management in the countries of western South America. The 
project is contributing to the creation of local information, early 
warning and drought and flood mitigation systems. Participants 
include the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru and the Plurinational State of Bolivia. It is led by 
the Ministry of People’s Power for the Environment and the 
National Institute of Meteorology and Hydrology (INAMEH) in 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; the Office of Meteorology, 
the National Irrigation Corporation, the National Forestry 
Corporation (CONAF) and the Department of Water (DGA) of 
the Ministry of Public Works (MOP) in Chile; the Institute of 
Hydrology, Meteorology and Environmental Studies (IDEAM) in 
Colombia; the Ministry of the Environment, the National Institute 
of Meteorology and Hydrology (INAMHI) and the Secretariat of 
Risk Management in Ecuador; the Ministry of the Environment, 
the National Meteorology and Hydrology Service (SENAMHI) and 
the National Centre for Disaster Risk Estimation, Prevention and 
Reduction (CENEPRED) in Peru; and the International Research 
Centre on El Niño (CIIFEN) in association with the National 
Meteorology and Hydrology Service (SENAMHI) of the Office of 
the Deputy Minister of Civil Defence in the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia. The executing agency of the project is the Spanish Agency 
for International Cooperation for Development (AECID).
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• Information, governance and action for the reduction of drought 
risk in Peru and the Plurinational State of Bolivia in a climate 
change context. The project aims to increase the prevention capacity, 
preparedness and responsiveness to climate change of public bodies, 
social actors and populations in the Peruvian-Bolivian highlands 
through dialogue between national hydrometeorological services 
and users involved in the agricultural sector. The entity leading 
the project is the National Meteorology and Hydrology Service 
(SENAMHI) of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, associated with 
the National Meteorology and Hydrology Service (SENAMHI) of 
Peru, HELVETAS Swiss Intercooperation (programmes for Peru 
and the Plurinational State of Bolivia), Peru’s Centre for Disaster 
Studies and Prevention (PREDES) and other institutions of the 
Peruvian and Bolivian States. The executing agency is the Spanish 
Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID).
• Capacity-building for flood and drought disaster risk reduction 
and promotion of resilience in Central America. The project has 
a regional and inclusive approach for the benefit of the Central 
American population. It aims to create and improve governance 
instruments for risk management and increased resilience in the 
face of flooding and drought in the Central American Integration 
System (SICA) region. It covers Belize, Costa Rica, the Dominican 
Republic, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and 
Panama. The lead entity is the Central American Commission 
on Environment and Development (CCAD), associated with the 
Coordination Centre for the Prevention of Natural Disasters in 
Central America (CEPREDENAC), the Regional Committee on 
Water Resources (CRRH) and the Global Water Partnership in 
Central America. The executing agency is the Spanish Agency 
for International Development Cooperation (AECID).
• Disaster risk reduction and adaptation to the effects of climate 
change against the dangers of floods and droughts in north-central 
Cuba affected by Hurricane Irma. The project is strengthening 
integrated management capacity for preparedness, response, 
prevention and adaptation to the risks of floods and droughts. It 
is inclusive and gender-sensitive. It strengthens the surveillance 
and monitoring system of the hydrometeorological early 
warning system for cases of drought and flooding. The aim is 
to promote the integration of disaster risk reduction and climate 
change adaptation agendas from the national to the local levels, 
working on the ground with a pilot of the early warning system 
and integrated water management model. The leading entity is 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the 
project partners are the National Institute of Hydraulic Resources 
(INRH), the National Civil Defence Staff (EMNDC), the Institute 
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of Meteorology (INSMET), the National Hazard, Vulnerability and 
Risk Studies Group of the Environment Agency (AMA) and the 
Provincial Administration Councils (CAP) of the governments 
of Ciego de Ávila and Camagüey. The executing agency is the 
French Development Agency (AFD).
(b) Projects relating to ecosystem-based adaptation
• Agriculture and water resources in the Colombian, Ecuadorian and 
Peruvian Andes. This is a project targeting the Andean regions of 
Colombia, Ecuador and Peru (CIAT, 2014a and 2014b) and aimed 
at reducing the vulnerability of agriculture and water resources. 
Its objectives are:
 – To conserve and restore upper river basins in order to preserve 
regulatory power (increase the time that water is retained in 
the soil and regulate runoff levels to avoid spates and increase 
return flows, thereby augmenting water volume in dry spells).
 – To promote conservation agriculture in upper and middle basins 
(in order to improve the water retention capacity of the soil, 
decrease erosion and reduce contamination of water sources).
 – To encourage traditional and customary practices in family 
agriculture, especially those that contribute to resilience (native 
varieties and species that are tolerant of climatic conditions), 
and management practices that do not affect the soil and 
favour crop rotation and good nutrient use. It is also proposed 
that consideration be given to agroforestry systems for some 
crops (e.g. maize, coffee and beans) in order to moderate 
temperature increases.
(i) Replacement of slash-and-burn agriculture in Central America: 
since 2000, FAO has been implementing special food security 
programmes with the Governments of Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua and El Salvador, among others. Practices, experiences 
and results in the subregion’s agroforestry systems are being 
shared and the traditional slash-and-burn system is being replaced, 
especially on slopes. Agroforestry systems are more efficient and 
resilient, as they reduce the land area needed to support a family, 
increase the variety of production, allow yields to be sustained over 
time, increase labour and capital productivity, reduce fertilization 
costs and boost the development of local markets (FAO, 2015).
• Cuba’s silvopastoral system: in Cuba, the silvopastoral system 
composed of Leucaena (at low density: 595 trees/ha) and Panicum 
maximum increases the availability and nutritional value of 
fodder in comparison with monoculture, and gains of more than 
500 g per animal per day can be achieved without supplementation. 
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For milk production, a system involving a variety of grasses 
and herbaceous leguminous plants associated with Leucaena at 
high density (25,000 trees/ha) greatly increased the availability 
of dry matter and production in comparison with monoculture. 
Soil macrofauna and carbon sequestration have also been found 
to be significantly higher in silvopastoral systems (Milera, 2013).
• The Coffee and Subsistence Agriculture in Central America 
and Ecosystem-based Adaptation (CASCADA) project, led by 
Conservation International and CATIE with the collaboration of 
the Agricultural Research Centre for International Development 
(CIRAD) and Bioversity International, aimed at adaptation 
of smallholder production systems to climate change and 
capacity-building in communities in Costa Rica, Honduras and 
Guatemala. See [online] http://www.conservation.org/projects/
Pages/sobre-cascada.aspx.
• The EcoAdapt project for research and action in three model 
forests (Jujuy in Argentina, Chiquitano in the Plurinational State 
of Bolivia and Araucarias de Alto Malleco in Chile) to ensure 
that water management contributes to local development and 
reduces the vulnerability of populations to climate change. The 
project is based on capacity-building, knowledge sharing, conflict 
prevention and mitigation and the promotion of joint work with 
key local and national actors.
• CRISTAL (Community-based Risk Screening Tool – Adaptation 
and Livelihoods) is an assessment tool to help project planners and 
managers integrate risk reduction and climate change adaptation 
into community projects. It has been applied in Costa Rica, the 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Peru and the Plurinational State of Bolivia. According 
to users, the tool helps local communities to identify climate- and 
gender-related adaptation measures that respect local and cultural 
traditions. See [online] http://www.iisd.org/cristaltool.
• The Climate Vulnerability and Capacity Analysis (CVCA) 
methodology, developed by CARE International, analyses 
vulnerability to climate change and community resilience. It 
combines community knowledge with scientific information 
for a better understanding of the local impact of climate change. 
This methodology is used in CARE Case Study: Application of 
Climate Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment (CVCA) Methodology 
in Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia: Regional Project for Adaptation to the 
Impact of Rapid Glacier Retreat in the Tropical Andes (PRAA). See 
[online] https://insights.careinternational.org.uk/media/k2/
attachments/PRAA_CVCA_CS_0611-FINAL.pdf.
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• The Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in 
the Legal Amazon and its policies to control illegal deforestation, 
and establishment and reinforcement of protected areas. By 2015, 
protected areas (indigenous territories, strictly protected areas and 
sustainably managed areas) covered 54% of the remaining forest 
in the Amazon (Soares-Filho and others, 2010). Deforestation rates, 
which had reached one of their highest levels in 2004 (27,772 km2), 
then fell back slowly to 4,571 km2 in 2012 and 5,891 km2 in 2013. 
The expansion of the protected area network is a conservation 
paradigm centred on maintaining biodiversity and leaving large 
blocks of forest that act as “green barriers” to deforestation. These 
areas also serve to sustain traditional livelihoods and maintain 
climate-vegetation balance and hydrological regimes, as well as 
helping to prevent forest fires. Prompt financial support is needed 
to expand the model and thus continue to provide protection to 
regions under immediate threat. Conservation initiatives aimed 
at private landowners are also required, such as:
(i) Development of agricultural and forestry markets in a way that 
takes account of environmental and social conditions; 
(ii) Land use planning to prevent the expansion of agribusiness and 
cattle ranching; 
(iii) Strengthened monitoring and capacity-building in government 
agencies; 
(iv) Economic and technical incentives for compliance with the 
country’s forest code (Soares-Filho and others, 2010). 
The Ibero-American Programme on Science and Technology for 
Development (CYTED) has implemented several projects in the area of 
sustainable development, global change and ecosystems through EbA and 
payment for ecosystem services (see table IV.A1.1).
Table IV.A1.1 
Projects of the Ibero-American Programme of Science and Technology 








To model the effects of climate change on food 
production and propose adaptation measures 
that will increase local, regional and global 
food security.






and Rural Land 
Use Planning) 
network (2016) 
To contribute to the sharing of experiences on the 
comprehensive assessment of ecosystem services, 
including quantification, modelling, valuation and 
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Project Aim Countries
CYTED network for 
monitoring the state 
of conservation and 
recovery of humid 
and dry forests 
in Latin America 




To encourage cooperation among specialists with 
a view to sharing experiences and transferring 
knowledge on the conservation and recovery 
of Ibero-American humid and dry forests as 
a tool for carbon capture in the context of the 
World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Facility 
(FCPF), the United Nations REDD+ programme 
(reducing emissions from deforestation and 
forest degradation and the role of conservation, 
sustainable management of forests and 
enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing 
countries) and other related programmes.









To strengthen the region’s ability to study its 
biodiversity and to conserve and manage 
the environment through online access 
to biodiversity information.
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, 





and Resilience of 
Coupled Human and 
Natural Systems 
in Major Cases in 
South America
To develop scientific knowledge of the mechanisms 
involved in coupled natural and human systems 
that help determine the long-term sustainability 
of ecosystem services.
Argentina, Bolivia 
(Plurinational State of), 
Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
Netherlands, Spain, 













To develop new methodological tools, innovative 
environmental management experiences and 
relevant scientific knowledge for the comprehensive 
assessment, monitoring and restoration of 
degraded ecosystems; to homogenize the level 
of knowledge of degraded ecosystems and 
standardize assessment and analysis criteria in 
order to facilitate comparison between functionally 
different ecosystems; to transfer the results 
to the productive sector, management bodies, 
governments and regional organizations in order 
to improve policies, strategies, methodologies 
and programmes aimed at the improvement and 
sustainable use of the goods and services provided 
by these ecosystems to human systems.
Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa 








the Development of 
Agricultural Systems 
Resilient to Climate 
Change (REDAGRES) 
(2015)
To promote the sharing of scientific knowledge 
related to the area of agroecology, climate change 
and resilience, train a critical mass of professionals 
and technicians and open lines of research and 
outreach at research institutes and universities.
Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Cuba, 
Mexico, Peru, Spain
Network on Climate 
Change Adaptation 
and Ecosystems as an 
Adaptation Strategy 
(RACC) (2014)
To form a climate change adaptation network that 
contributes to the understanding and management 
of ecosystems as an adaptation strategy in the 
Latin America region, which is particularly sensitive 




Source: Ibero-American Programme on Science and Technology for Development.
Table IV.A1.1 (concluded)
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(c) Examples of environmental services payment projects
The Payment for Environmental Services Programme of Costa Rica’s 
National Forestry Financing Fund (FONAFIFO) was established in 1997 and 
is the oldest in Latin America and the Caribbean. Producers receive payments 
for specific land uses, including natural forests, natural regeneration areas 
and forest plantations. They must register a sustainable forest management 
plan and sign a contract with FONAFIFO. Payments are received annually, 
subject to verification of compliance with the plan, and contracts are for five 
years, with the option of renewal for a further period. The payment amounts 
are set annually. Generally, adjustments are made for inflation over the 
previous year’s amounts (Magrin, 2015). Payment for ecosystem services is 
recognized by area and number of trees, depending on the scheme, and the 
2019 contract amounts were as follows:16
• Reforestation with fast-growth species: 699,024 colones per 
hectare, distributed over the first 5 years and with contracts lasting 
10 years,17 from 1 to 300 ha, with the species Gmelina arborea, Acacia 
mangium, Vochysia guatemalensis and Vochysia hondurensis. 
• Reforestation with medium-growth species: 788,166 colones 
per hectare, distributed over the first 5 years and with contracts 
lasting 16 years, from 1 to 300 ha, with the species Tectona grandis, 
Pinus sp., Cordia alliodora, Vochysia ferruginea, Eucalyptus sp. and 
Cedrela odorata.
• Forestry plantations with short rotation periods: 376,100 colones 
per hectare, distributed over the first four years. Contract duration: 
six years, from 1 to 300 ha.
• Agroforestry systems: 968 colones per tree, distributed over the 
first five years of the contract. From 350 to 10,000 trees.
• Mixed agroforestry systems for small producers: 35,435 colones 
per hectare per year (forest protection); 22,700 colones per hectare 
per year (natural regeneration); 57,392 colones for every 200 trees 
per year, distributed over the five years of the contract.
• Forest protection: 354,350 colones, distributed over the five years 
of the contract, from 2 to 300 ha.
• Natural regeneration: 113,503 colones per hectare, distributed 
over the five years of the contract, from 2 to 300 ha.
• Post-harvest protection: 138,420 colones per hectare, distributed 
over the five years of the contract, from 2 to 300 ha.
Global Environment Facility (GEF) project carried out by CATIE, FAO, 
the Nitlapan Research and Development Institute in Nicaragua, CIPAV in 
16 See National Forest Office, “Monto por modalidad”, 2018 [online] https://onfcr.org/monto- 
por-modalidad/.
17 At the time of writing, the exchange rate was 578.84 colones to the dollar.
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Colombia and the World Bank between 2003 and 2006. The effects of payment 
for environmental services on the adoption of silvopastoral systems were 
evaluated. Livestock farmers in Colombia, Costa Rica and Nicaragua received 
between US$ 2,000 and US$ 2,400 per farm (about 10% to 15% of their net 
income) to implement the silvopastoral systems programme. This programme 
led to a 60% reduction in degraded pastures in the three countries, while the 
area given over to silvopastoral systems increased significantly. The benefits 
associated with the project included increases of 71% in carbon sequestration, 
10% in milk production and 115% in farm income. Meanwhile, the use of 
herbicides was reduced by 60% and the use of fire to manage pastures became 
less frequent (FAO, 2015; Magrin, 2015).
The Regional Gateway for Technology Transfer and Climate Change 
Action in Latin America and the Caribbean (REGATTA) carried out four 
projects in Central America (Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, 
Nicaragua and Panama), the Caribbean (Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica 
and Haiti), the Andes (Colombia, Ecuador and Peru) and the Gran Chaco 
(Argentina, Paraguay and the Plurinational State of Bolivia).
(d) Adaptation plans in the countries of Latin America 
and the Caribbean
Argentina
Argentina has adaptation measures designed for forests, water, crop 
management, health, biodiversity conservation and extreme events. It is 
expected that both the National Mitigation Plan and the National Adaptation 
Plan will be finalized in 2019, forming the National Climate Change Response 
Plan. The Federal Commitment on Climate Change was signed in 2017. This 
instrument adds 22 jurisdictions and sets out 182 provincial mitigation and 
adaptation measures. In addition, as of 2019 it has received a donation of 
US$ 2,992,042 from the Readiness Programme for the preparation of the 
National Adaptation Plan.
National Action Plan for Forests and Climate Change, 2017. See [online] 
https://www.argentina.gob.ar/ambiente/sustentabilidad/planes-sectoriales.
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela has given national priority to 
adapting to the adverse effects of climate change. It is planning measures 
and actions in the following areas: electricity, industry, housing, transport, 
health, popular participation and organization, biological diversity, food 
sovereignty and sustainable agriculture, water conservation and management, 
conservation and sustainable management of forests, research, monitoring 
and systematic observation, education and culture, waste management, 
land use planning, and risk, emergency and disaster management. It is 
encouraging the development of municipal and local adaptation plans 
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for risk management that involve shared responsibility between the State 
and the People’s Power through eco-socialist technical committees, so that 
actions aimed at adapting to climate change, with a gender and vulnerable 
populations perspective, can be applied locally.
Brazil
Brazil has an NDC for adaptation, but it does not specify the sectors 
where actions will be prioritized. The Brazilian NDC presented in Paris 
was announced in a decree that subdivides it into different thematic areas: 
adaptation, risk management and resilience; forests, biodiversity, agriculture 
and fisheries; energy; transport; industry; cities and waste; defence and 
security; science, technology and innovation; and long-term vision. It also 
envisages a Biodiversity and Climate Protection in the Mata Atlântica project 
contributing to the conservation of biodiversity, the reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions and climate change adaptation in that biome. Work is being 
done with local communities to include small landowners in an environmental 
land registry. Attempts are being made to unlock forest finance in order to 
mobilize large-scale public-private financing through innovative funding 
mechanisms that promote the conservation and sustainable use of forests 
as natural capital, a resource for adaptation to climate change and a source 
of development. Its AdaptaClima platform is a collaborative portal to 
systematize and share initiatives on climate change adaptation through 
increased access to knowledge and coordination of the actors involved with 
this agenda in Brazil.
(i) National Policy on Climate Change (2009-2020). Includes adaptation 
policies. See [online] https://www.mma.gov.br/clima/politica-
nacional-sobre-mudanca-do-clima.
(ii) Health Sector Plan for Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation 
(instrument of the National Policy on Climate Change, 2013 to 2020). 
See [online] https://www.mma.gov.br/images/arquivo/80076/
Saude.pdf.
(iii) Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the 
Legal Amazon, 2016. See [online] http://combateaodesmatamento.
mma.gov.br/images/conteudo/Planos_ultima_fase.pdf.
(iv) Sectoral Plan for Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation 
for the Consolidation of a Low Carbon Emissions Economy in 
Agriculture (instrument of the National Policy on Climate Change, 
2016 to 2020). See [online] https://www.mma.gov.br/images/
arquivo/80076/Plano_ABC_VERSAO_FINAL_13jan2012.pdf.
(v) Urban Transport and Mobility Plan (includes adaptation), 2011. 
See [online] https://www.mma.gov.br/images/consultasclima/ 
3-mineracao.pdf.
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Chile
Chile has an adaptation NDC aimed at increasing resilience in the 
country, with sector-specific adaptation plans that have been developed 
separately. The NDC envisages a specific contribution from forestry and 
land use change, centring on the sustainable management and recovery of 
100,000 ha of mainly native forest and the afforestation of 100,000 ha, mostly 
with native species, providing mitigation and adaptation benefits. Chile has 
developed a National Climate Change Adaptation Plan as well as sectoral 
plans in the forestry, agriculture, biodiversity, fisheries and aquaculture, 
health, infrastructure, and cities and energy sectors. In 2008, it prepared 
a Plan for Adaptation to Climate Change in the Forestry and Agriculture 
Sector. In farming, this involves 12 institutions of the Ministry of Agriculture 
and presents 21 adaptation measures in the agriculture and forestry sectors.
At the local level, there is the Chilean Network of Municipalities Coping 
with Climate Change and adaptation actions sponsored by Adapt Chile, a 
specialized non-governmental organization (NGO), which has access to 
international cooperation funds. The network is made up of 45 municipalities 
and is open to any other Chilean municipality that wishes to commit to 
planning and managing its territory. With its help, municipal climate profiles 
are being prepared, compiling information with a view to gaining a better 
understanding of the negative effects that climate change produces locally, 
and so are local climate change plans to serve as internal planning tools of 
the municipalities, being designed to integrate and implement climate change 
adaptation in local management. The network has funding of US$ 9,960,000 
from the Climate Change Adaptation Fund, implemented by the Ministry of 
the Environment, the Ministry of Agriculture and the regional government 
(intendencia). For cities it has developed the Cities Fit for Climate Change 
project to support municipal governments in adapting their development 
plans to climate change. Another example is EcoLogística, a project that 
promotes low-carbon urban freight transport policies and practices.
(i) Infrastructure Services Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation 
Plan, 2017–2022.
(ii) Climate Change Adaptation Plan for Cities, 2017–2022.
(iii) Climate Change Adaptation Plan for the Energy Sector, 2017−2022.
(iv) National Climate Change Adaptation Plan for the Health Sector, 
2018, see [online] https://www.minsal.cl/minsal-presento-el-plan-
nacional-de-adaptacion-al-cambio-climatico-del-sector-salud/.
(v) National Strategy for Climate Change and Plant Resources 
2017–2025, see [online] https://www.enccrv-chile.cl/index.php/
descargas/publicaciones/87-enccrv-2017-2025-v2/file.
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Colombia
Colombia has an adaptation NDC focused on the same sectors as in 
the area of mitigation. Colombia has adopted comprehensive climate change 
plans to address climate change in its territories. These plans set out from 
vulnerability analysis and an inventory of regional greenhouse gases to 
identify, evaluate and recommend measures and actions for greenhouse 
gas emissions mitigation and adaptation so that they can be implemented 
by public and private entities on the ground. To date, 13 departmental plans 
have been formulated and are being implemented (Atlántico, Cauca, Cesar, 
Cundinamarca, Choco, Huila, Magdalena, Quindio, Santander, Arauca, 
Casanare, Vichada and Meta).
(i) National Climate Change Policy, 2017, see [online] https://
redjusticiaambientalcolombia.files.wordpress.com/2018/01/
politica-crisis-climatica-colombia-2017.pdf.
(ii) Programme to Integrate Agriculture into National Adaptation 




(iii) Climate Change Management Plan for Colombian Seaports, 
2017, see [online] http://www.minambiente.gov.co/index.php/
component/content/article/476-plantilla-cambio-climatico-%20
32#documentos.
(iv) Agreement to develop and implement a Strategic Agenda for 
Disaster Management in the Transport Sector, as established in 




Costa Rica has an adaptation NDC centred on the development of a 
National Adaptation Plan that covers disaster risk reduction, community-based 
adaptation, ecosystem-based adaptation, local planning and management for 
territorial adaptation, public infrastructure adaptation, environmental health, 
capacity-building, technology transfer and financing for adaptation. The process of 
formulating the National Adaptation Plan was initiated in 2017 with the assistance 
of the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID).
The National Climate Change Adaptation Policy of Costa Rica 
2018–2030 includes six sectors: water, biodiversity and forests, agriculture 
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Cuba
Cuba’s priority is adaptation, and mitigation is seen as part of a 
commitment to international solidarity and as an opportunity for the 
country’s development. Adaptation and mitigation measures are present in 
new legislation, namely Law No. 124 on Inland Waters, adopted in 2017. It 
establishes a framework of standards relating to the resilience of the country’s 
inland waters and adaptation to climate change, which is named as a central 
objective. There are also important national and international projects, such 
as one to reduce vulnerability to coastal flooding through ecosystem-based 
adaptation. With resources from the adaptation fund, this project aims to 
reduce the vulnerability of communities in the coastal areas of Artemisa and 
Mayabeque, provinces in southern Cuba that are highly sensitive to climate 
change. The country has also developed a programme of communication, 
education and public awareness on climate change and hazard, vulnerability 
and risk studies in response to the need to foster a culture associated with 
this issue, its consequences and adaptation measures. Various organizations 
and associations, representing large sectors of Cuban society, are involved 
in the development of the programme.
(i) National Economic and Social Development Plan to 2030: Proposed 
Vision for the Nation, Priorities and Strategic Sectors, including 
agriculture, 2016.
(ii) State Plan to Address Climate Change (Project Life), which includes 
protection for people living in coastal zones and adaptation of 




(iii) Document entitled Conceptualización del modelo económico y social 




National Strategy for Adaptation to Climate Change in the Agricultural 
Sector of the Dominican Republic, 2014–2020.
Ecuador
Ecuador has an adaptation NDC centred on agriculture and other 
land uses, water, ecosystems, risk and capacity-building. Through the project 
Strengthening Community Resilience to the Adverse Effects of Climate 
Change with an Emphasis on Food Security and Gender Considerations 
(FORECCSA), policies are being implemented to enable populations to 
develop their adaptive capacities (access to water, food sovereignty). A 
bottom-up approach is applied. At the territorial level, climate change is 
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being managed in the working groups of REDD+, the citizen participation 
council. In communities, it is being managed through the community-based 
adaptation approach.
National Climate Change Adaptation Plan, 2019, centred on the 
sectoral and local scale. The six priority sectors for adaptation in the country 
are: (i) natural assets, (ii) water assets, (iii) health, (iv) human settlements, 
(v) productive and strategic sectors and (vi) food sovereignty, agriculture, 






The formulation of the Initial Plan for Adaptation to Climate Change 
in the San Salvador Metropolitan Area was developed with the support of 
UNDP and the Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources. As a 
follow-up to this, workshops were held with municipal, central government 
and civil society specialists, followed by an open online consultation with the 
main objective of formulating adaptation measures. The Council of Mayors 
and the Planning Office of the San Salvador Metropolitan Area (OPAMSS) 
are interested in promoting the adaptation measures of the San Salvador 
Metropolitan Area.
National Plan for Climate Change and Agroclimatic Risk Management 




Guatemala has an NDC geared towards reducing vulnerability across 
the board and improving adaptation processes in key sectors by strengthening 
adaptation in areas related to human health, marine-coastal zones, agriculture, 
livestock and food security, forest resources, protected areas, the conservation 
and management of strategic ecosystems, infrastructure, integrated water 
resource management, the quality of productive infrastructure, soil protection 
and comprehensive disaster risk reduction management. Guatemala has a 
Framework Law to Regulate Vulnerability Reduction, Mandatory Adaptation to 
the Effects of Climate Change and Greenhouse Gas Mitigation (Congressional 
Decree No. 7-2013), a National Climate Change Policy and a National Climate 
Change Action Plan. The country is promoting the Latin American Network 
of Territories, Municipalities and Cities against Climate Change, in which 
several municipalities participate jointly in the form of an association. It 
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focuses on a model of climate adaptation through municipal development 
councils in the east of the country. Its Gender Environmental Policy treats 
gender as mainly linked to climate change adaptation.
(i) The National Climate Change Action Plan, which includes the 
areas of human health, marine and coastal zones, agriculture, 
livestock and food security, forests, ecosystems and protected 
areas, water resource management and infrastructure. It also 
includes five strategic sectors: energy, industrial processes, 
agriculture, land use, land use change and forestry, and waste, 
2016, see [online] https://www.segeplan.gob.gt/nportal/index.
php/sala-de-prensa/731-guatemala-cuenta-con-plan-de-accion-
nacional-de-cambio-climatico.
(ii) Plan for Reducing Vulnerability to Climate Change in the Coastal 
Marine Zone, 2018.
Honduras
The NDC treats adaptation to climate change as a priority to reduce 
the country’s vulnerability. The priority sectors are water resources, risk 
management, agriculture and food security, forests and biodiversity, marine 
coastal systems, human health and infrastructure. At the territorial level, the 
Honduras Component of the Urban Adaptation to Climate Change in Central 
America Programme was developed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
the German Development Bank (KfW) and the Central District Municipal 
Mayor’s Office. The programme includes vulnerable neighbourhoods and 
settlements in the Central District of Tegucigalpa and Comayagüela. The 
Presidential Office for Climate Change and the Honduran Coffee Institute 
(IHCAFE) are working on restoration of 250,000 ha of conventional coffee 
using multi-layer agroforestry systems with native species. Ecosystem-
based adaptation practices are being incorporated in buffer zones around 
protected areas occupied by coffee plantations. Efforts are likewise being 
made to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the coffee sector, which is 
the most productive and socially important sector in the country, in order 
to contribute to the goal set by the NDC of restoring 1 million productive 
hectares. One of the initiatives of the Secretariat of Natural Resources and 
Environment (MiAmbiente+), Climat and IHCAFE is aimed at increasing 
the energy efficiency of the coffee processing and value added process.
(i) Road map (NDC Partnership action plan), which includes 
adaptation measures, 2018, see [online] http://ndcpartnership.
org/news/honduras-lanza-el-primer-plan-de-acción-climática-
del-ndc-partnership.
(ii) Municipal Climate Change Adaptation Plans for Santa Rita and 
Cabañas, 2018, see [online] http://www.resilientcentralamerica.
org/mejoran-produccion-de-cafe-y-frijol-entre-un-17-y-23-gracias-
a-estrategias-de-adaptacion-al-cambio-climatico/.
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Mexico
Mexico is prioritizing actions to protect communities from climate 
change and to increase the resilience of infrastructure and the ecosystems 
that are home to the country’s biodiversity. The adaptation priorities are 
the social sector, ecosystem-based adaptation, strategic infrastructure and 
productive systems. In view of Mexico’s vulnerability to climate effects, its 
Climate Change Act places great emphasis on adaptation measures.
National Climate Change Strategy Vision 10-20-40, which includes a 
chapter on adaptation in areas such as the social sector, strategic infrastructure, 




Nicaragua has a National Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation 
Policy, and its NDC is a synthesis of its policy. Both the policy and the NDC 
were formulated within the framework of a model of partnerships, dialogue 
and consensus with the different production sectors: Nicaragua’s Superior 
Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP), municipal governments, the productive 
sector and universities and government entities, during 2017–2018. The country 
recognizes that it requires financial support to implement priority adaptation 
measures in the areas of infrastructure, health, forests, agriculture, water 
and sanitation, disaster risk management, early warning systems, resilient 
ecosystem management and sustainable use and management of protected 
areas. The country has identified 13 priority actions in the framework of 
climate change adaptation.
National Forests and Climate Change Strategy to Address Poverty 
in Nicaragua, 2017, see [online] https://plataformacelac.org/politica/481.
Panama
Between 2009 and 2011, the Integration of Climate Change Adaptation 
and Mitigation Measures in the Management of Natural Resources in Two 
Priority Watersheds of Panama Programme was implemented, financed by 
the Millennium Development Goals Fund (MDG-F) and executed by four 
Panamanian State institutions (the National Environment Authority (ANAM), 
the Ministry of Agricultural Development (MIDA), the Ministry of Health 
(MINSA) and the National Civil Protection System (SINAPROC)), together 
with four United Nations agencies (UNDP, the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP), FAO and the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO)). 
The basins prioritized were those of the Chucunaque and Tabasará rivers. 
The main objective was to increase climate change adaptation and mitigation 
capacity to contribute to poverty reduction and environmental sustainability 
for the population in the implementation area. A National Adaptation Fund 
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was established under Law No. 8 of 2015 and became operational in 2017 to 
invest in the 10 most vulnerable districts. Another project, the Productive 
Investment for Climate Change Adaptation Initiative (CAMBio II), which 
is also being implemented in Panama and six other countries, has been 
allocated US$ 28 million.
National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (EPANB) 2018-2050, 
2018. See [online] https://www.cbd.int/doc/world/pa/pa-nbsap-v2-es.pdf.
Paraguay
Paraguay’s adaptation NDC prioritizes water resources, forests, 
agriculture and livestock, energy, infrastructure, health and sanitation, 
risk and natural disaster management and early warning systems. The 
National Climate Change Act (2017) established the regulatory framework 
for mitigation and adaptation and created the National Climate Change 
Commission, the National Directorate for Climate Change and the Climate 
Change Fund. In addition, Paraguay already had 11 sets of regulations on 
issues related to the energy sector, institutional arrangements, forests, REDD+ 
and land use change.
Paraguay has plans and strategies that can serve as a regulatory 
framework for climate-related issues. At the national level, adaptation is a 
priority established in the National Development Plan 2014–2030. On that 
basis, the National Plan for Adaptation to Climate Change was approved in 
October 2016 and the National Strategy for Adaptation to Climate Change 
(2015) was drawn up. At the sectoral level, the National Plan for Disaster 
Risk Management and Adaptation to Climate Change in the Paraguayan 
Agricultural Sector has been implemented, a vulnerability analysis has 
been conducted and action plans have been developed for the agriculture, 
livestock, health and water resources sectors.
As part of the National Plan for Adaptation to Climate Change, guides 
to the preparation of local and sectoral adaptation plans are being generated 
in a participatory manner. Working through the National Directorate for 
Climate Change, the Ministry of the Environment (SEAM) has trained over 
3,000 people in 10 departments so that they can advise key actors on the 
preparation of local adaptation plans.
The National Plan for Adaptation to Climate Change of 2016 includes 
the sectors of agricultural production and food security, water resources, 
risk management and reduction, infrastructure, transport and energy, health 
and epidemiology, environment, forests and fragile ecosystems, regulatory 
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Peru
In its adaptation NDC, Peru notes that priority is being given to the 
water, agriculture, fisheries, forestry and health sectors in order to reduce 
vulnerability to climate change.
Sectoral work has been carried out in the framework of the Multisectoral 
Working Group for the Implementation of NDCs, where “tentative schedules” 
or work plans have been developed with a view to implementing actions 
derived from NDCs in the sectors requiring mitigation (energy, transport, 
industry, waste, forests) and adaptation (forests, health, agriculture, water, 
fisheries and aquaculture).
Technical assistance for climate change management, including 
capacity-building activities, is being provided through the General Directorate 
for Climate Change and Desertification of the Ministry of the Environment 
(MINAM). Since 2014, these activities have been part of the National Climate 
Change Training Plan (PNCCC) 2013-2017. This plan is aimed at public 
officials and regional technical groups and addresses adaptation issues such 
as ecosystem and natural resource management, climate risk management, 
soil and water management and technology management. International 
cooperation projects have also contributed to capacity-building, as they 
provide financial support and promote initiatives, seeking to link up with 
national planning instruments.
At the local level, the technological adaptation measures promoted by 
the Climate Change Adaptation Programme (PACC) have been implemented 
and are having an impact on communities. They are supporting adaptation 
to climate change in two micro-basins: Huacrahuacho, in Cusco, and 
Mollebamba, in Apurímac.
National Climate Change Adaptation Plan and NDCs. For 2019, priority 
has been given to disseminating the NDCs and linking them to the Regional 
Climate Change Strategies (ERCC), 2019 (discussion of the conceptual model 
and the road map). The priority sectors are: water, agriculture, health, 




Plurinational State of Bolivia
The NDC was created in the framework of a National Development Plan 
that gives equal importance to adaptation, mitigation and risk management 
and treats territorial linkage as crucial. In the forest sector, the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia has been developing the Joint Mitigation and Adaptation 
Mechanism for the Comprehensive and Sustainable Management of Forests 
and Mother Earth, an alternative to the REDD+ approach designed for the 
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comprehensive management and sustainable use of the forests and life systems 
of Mother Earth, conservation, protection and restoration of biodiversity life 
systems, and environmental functions through the development of sustainable 
production systems, including agricultural systems.
The sectors for implementing the Living Well Adaptation Mechanism 
are listed below:
(i) Programme of Life Systems Resilience for Food Security 
with Sovereignty.
(ii) Programme for the Prevention and Reduction of Risk from the 
Impact of Climate Change.
(iii) Comprehensive Water Management Programme, as part of the 
2016-2020 Economic and Social Development Plan, see [online] 
https://www.mmaya.gob.bo/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/
ANTEPROYECTO_POA-PPTTO_2019_5-9-181.pdf.
(iv) Education and health programmes related to climate change.
(v) Joint Mitigation and Adaptation Mechanism for the Comprehensive 
and Sustainable Management of Forests and Mother Earth, as 




Uruguay has established its main priorities, implementation and 
support needs, plans and measures for adaptation to the adverse effects 
of climate change. Its NDC centres on the issues of social vulnerability, 
health, disaster risk reduction, cities, infrastructure and land use planning, 
biodiversity and ecosystems, coastal zones, water resources, agriculture, 
energy, tourism, and climate services.
Uruguay has its National Climate Change Adaptation Plan for Cities, 
which is supported by the Green Climate Fund and UNDP and is intended to 
meet the needs of adaptation and resilience to climate change in urban centres, 
protect their infrastructure and environments, and facilitate their integration 
into policies, programmes and activities. The plan will be implemented in a 
participatory manner, involving local actors and seeking to build capacity 
in communities. It addresses the main shortcomings in climate change 
adaptation in cities and in local government planning and budgets. At the 
municipal level, a Municipal Climate Change Adaptation Plan has been 
developed for the departments of Rivera and Tacuarembó. The plan was 
presented in 2019 and will be implemented by the municipal government 
(intendencia) of the Rivera department with financial support from AECID 
and technical support from the Río Negro Institute Foundation (INDRA) 
(Uruguay), the Nativa Foundation (Plurinational State of Bolivia) and the 
Avina Foundation.
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(i) National Plan of Adaptation to Climate Variability and Change for 
the Agricultural Sector (PNA-Agro), 2019, involving the following 
lines of action: sustainable production, protection of ecosystems, 





(ii) National Coastal Zone Adaptation Plan (NAP Costas), 2019, see 
[online] https://www.mvotma.gub.uy/napcostas#que-es-el-plan-
nacional-de-adaptacion-costera.
(iii) National Climate Change Adaptation Plan for Cities and Infrastructure 
(NAP Ciudades), 2018, see [online] http://www.uy.undp.
org/content/uruguay/es/home/projects/napciudades.html.
Chapter V
Public policies to mitigate climate change
As discussed in previous chapters, the changes needed to transition to a 
resilient low-carbon development style are not spontaneous and are not 
occurring as quickly as they need to, which means there is no choice but 
to design policy measures that can provide the regulatory frameworks and 
incentives needed to ensure the transition is both prompt and as far-reaching 
as required.
A. Creating the pathway to low-carbon investment
The transition to lower-carbon development is not happening spontaneously, 
and nor will it under the institutional and social arrangements that currently 
shape and determine the operating rules of financial markets, goods and 
services markets and capital markets and their respective regulatory 
frameworks. This is particularly true if it is hoped that the transition will be 
as rapid and far-reaching as required. The path to change involves putting 
in place a new social, institutional and regulatory framework, reorienting 
incentives and meeting private and social costs; there needs to be consistent 
movement towards sustainable development, accompanied by the construction 
of resilient, lower-carbon societies. And this concerted effort can only be 
deliberate, coordinated and coherent: this is a task that governments alone 
can perform, within an international framework of shared values in relation 
to this new orientation.
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All other social actors will support, resist or go along with the new 
direction of development and its policies of renewal as their interests and 
breadth of vision determine. The main lever of change is the redirection of 
investment and consumption. The former is driven by profitability, the latter 
by the whole gamut of basic, superstructural and psychological needs, such 
as the need for prestige, security and others. Profitability is determined by 
the sum of costs that are internalized and the subtraction or rejection of 
costs that are externalized in economic activity. Internalized costs include 
technology and wage costs, the financial cost of credit and insurance, the 
fiscal cost determined by the structure of taxes and fiscal expenditure, and 
rates of return or surplus, which have a significant cultural component.
External costs are the costs or consequences that fall on social actors 
other than those generating them and that do not enter into the latter’s 
economic calculations precisely because they are transferred to those other 
actors (Lorenzo, 2018). Paradigmatic external costs arise from the destruction 
or degradation of the natural heritage, health and well-being, and include 
activities such as the discharge of polluting waste from production processes 
into water, soil and air, and greenhouse gas emissions; costs caused by the 
disruption of the economic structure, which affect workers’ levels of social 
protection and livelihoods; the use or abuse of society’s time because of 
spatial segregation and congestion; the effect of inequality in exacerbating 
social frictions; and future costs associated with productivity, cohesion and 
democratic solidarity, among others.
These external costs are tolerated or inflicted on the basis of factors 
such as narratives about development and its imperatives; the discourse 
that prioritizes growth over well-being; the disorganization of society in its 
various manifestations; the information asymmetries between those inflicting 
damage for profit and those suffering it and bearing the consequences; the 
culture of privilege; the absence of channels for making decisions with 
broad social support; and the weakness of mechanisms for reparation and 
the application of justice.
This chapter analyses some institutional barriers and opportunities 
relating to the transition to production and consumption patterns that will 
make it possible to carry out economic activity within the environmental 
frontiers needed to mitigate global warming. The situation with other natural 
resources, whether extractive or related to nature’s absorption function, has 
essentially similar determinants.
The transition to less destructive, lower-carbon economies will occur 
as investment choices are made to employ lower-emission technologies, 
pursue greater energy efficiency, move away from fossil fuel use, increase 
carbon capture in ecosystems or adopt technological solutions. Since 
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investment decisions in the economic system are primarily profit-driven, 
the transition depends on how profitable the lower-emission investment 
options are compared to the business as usual options that are driving 
the world’s temperature above the 2 °C threshold representing relative 
climate security.
There are different options for penalizing carbon, and all of them 
contribute to the partial or total internalization of the social cost of emitting 
(directly or indirectly) a unit of carbon, so that responsibility for the 
damage is assigned to whoever causes it (Goulder and Schein, 2013; Aldy 
and Stavins, 2012; Edenhofer and others, 2015; Metcalf and Weisbach, 2009; 
Schmalensee and Stavins, 2017). Economic and regulatory instruments create 
signals consisting of explicit or implicit prices that lead economic actors 
to decide how to respond to the damage they cause, whether by reducing 
emissions, offsetting them or paying a price for their social cost.
Both tax and non-tax systems are used to assign values to carbon. They 
generally provide options for meeting environmental policy objectives in 
a way that complements regulation. The main carbon pricing instruments 
include taxes, subsidies and tradable emission permits.
Tradable emission permits and carbon taxes are intended to internalize 
the costs that carbon emissions impose on society. The difference between 
them is that, with the tax, the government sets a price by fiat and lets the 
market determine total emissions, while with a tradable emission permit 
system the government caps emissions and creates a market that ultimately 
determines the price. There are also hybrid systems that take elements from 
the design of both pure instruments. For example, there are tax regimes in 
which emission reduction units are accepted as payment of tax liabilities, 
and there are tradable emission permit systems that have maximum 
and minimum prices; however, all variants are based on the principle of 
internalizing environmental damage (Goulder and Schein, 2013).
The use of these instruments has been increasing worldwide since the 
1990s, initially in the United States, Canada and European countries, and 
more recently in some developing economies (see figure V.1).
Setting an emissions cap, as is done in emission standards or the 
broader version of the Paris Agreement, is a regulatory instrument that has 
economic implications, as it reveals the opportunity cost of activities subject 
to emission limits. The main public policies on mitigation that are associated 
with carbon budgets, fiscal policies (both tax and non-tax), climate financing 
and improvements in the framework making public participation possible 
will now be discussed.
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Figure V.1 
Jurisdictions around the world where carbon pricing instruments  

















































Tradable emission permits Carbon tax
Source: World Bank, Carbon Pricing Dashboard, 2019 [online database] https://carbonpricingdashboard.
worldbank.org/.
B. Regulatory measures
1. The Paris Agreement as a regulatory measure
The Paris Agreement has the virtue of being one of the few globally agreed 
environmental standards, and it sets the objective of keeping the global 
average temperature increase well below 2 °C and as close as possible to 1.5 °C 
above the pre-industrial level. As discussed in chapter I above, this means 
reducing current emissions (which in 2018 totalled 50 gigatons worldwide) to 
a level consistent with those targets; i.e. setting an overall emissions budget 
that enables these two objectives to be achieved.
The remaining carbon budget or environmental leeway for the 
emission of greenhouse gases raises ethical and economic issues of the 
utmost importance. The Paris Agreement and the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol and the 
corpus of international law all aim to apply a shared values approach to the 
apportionment of the carbon budget. However, defections from this corpus, 
such as that announced by the Government of the United States, the failure of 
parties to meet their commitments, announced or otherwise, and the growth 
in emissions themselves reflect another reality: de facto appropriation of the 
remaining budget, leading in the medium or long term either to warming as 
uncontrolled as the emissions themselves, or to the law of the jungle. This 
will operate when the role the carbon budget plays in the different levels of 
global warming becomes clear and emitting becomes the privilege of the 
strongest. This is the risk if the multilateral regime is allowed to deteriorate.
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Nationally determined contributions (NDCs) are the national expression 
of the global carbon budget and are the result of each country’s commitment 
to limit or reduce the rate of emissions growth. They pose similar dilemmas 
for national actors: either an internal division is made between individuals, 
sectors or territories on the basis of an agreement on shared values, or the 
leeway available is appropriated in an exercise more or less determined 
by the balance of relative strength within each country. To the extent that 
NDCs aspire to set stricter carbon budgets, the dilemma between applying 
values or force to access the function of the atmosphere as a repository of 
emissions will intensify and expose the priorities and forces operating within 
economies and their contribution to collective well-being.
The global and national carbon budget highlights the difference between 
emitting to achieve greater social welfare, employment and development, 
or to satisfy the consumption pattern of a minority of the population that 
makes direct use of fossil fuels. How the carbon budget is applied will have 
consequences that either contribute to greater environmental and economic 
justice and the possibility of moving in the right direction, or generate 
environmental poverty between and within countries. The carbon budget 
reveals the physical and economic scarcity of the global carbon absorption 
function and shows at the appropriate scale the direction and type of 
climate action needed to orient structural change so that it is compatible 
with this budget.
2. The state and progress of nationally 
determined contributions
As a result of the international agreement on the temperature threshold and 
its relationship to concentrations and emissions, governments pledged to 
contribute to the achievement of the global target through nationally determined 
contributions (NDCs) which, as seen above, are insufficient to meet this 
target and will be regularly reviewed. The region’s governments have also 
committed to complying with their NDCs under the Paris Agreement, both 
by mitigating greenhouse gas emissions and by taking adaptation measures 
to lessen the negative effects of climate change. How do the mitigation 
commitments submitted by the Latin American and Caribbean countries 
relate to their respective carbon budgets and global climate objectives?
An exercise will now be presented with the objective of quantifying 
the mitigation effort committed to at the regional level, i.e. the region’s 
carbon budget, and comparing it with the current situation. This will give 
an idea of the gap that separates us from the climate target estimated for 
achieving the objectives stipulated in the Paris Agreement. That gap is an 
indicator of the extent and possible effectiveness of the measures that need 
to be taken to harmonize aspirations and actions.Emissions are projected 
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by calculating a business as usual scenario and comparing it with four 
alternative scenarios. Two of them are constructed on the basis of the 
national mitigation commitments established in the NDCs, some of which 
are unconditional and others conditional on financial and technical support. 
The third and fourth scenarios assume emission pathways compatible with 
the global target of 2 °C and 1.5 °C, respectively. In this way, the speed of 
the trend decarbonization required to reach the target committed to in the 
NDCs can be compared with the speed required to meet the previous global 
targets, set in the Paris Agreement, and the absolute emissions gap can be 
quantified. The increase in greenhouse gas emissions is closely linked to 
economic growth (see figure V.2). More dynamic economic activity increases 
demand for electricity, transport, production and food, among other things, 
which leads to the consumption of fossil energy and accelerates deforestation 
to accommodate urban dynamics and international demand.
Figure V.2 
GDP and greenhouse gas emissions worldwide, 2014
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of World Bank, 
World Development Indicators (WDI) [online] http://datatopics.worldbank.org/world-development-
indicators/.
a Logarithmic scale.
The carbon intensity of GDP, i.e. the amount of emissions produced 
per unit of monetary wealth, has declined somewhat in the region from 
1990  levels, in a gentle process of decoupling between the economy and 
emissions. In 1990, the region emitted about 1.2 kg of CO2 per dollar produced; 
by 2014, carbon intensity had fallen to 0.7 kg per dollar (see figure V.3). This 
meant an average annual reduction of 2.4% over the period. The main cause 
of this dynamic was the fall in emissions associated with land use change.
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Figure V.3 
Latin America and the Caribbean: carbon intensity of GDP, 1990–2014



























































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of World 
Resources Institute (WRI), CAIT Climate Data Explorer [online database] http://cait2.wri.org.
As was seen in chapter III, the relationship between emissions and 
economic growth is used to project the level of emissions, determined by 
the following equation:
 GHGit = αt * yit (1)
where GHGt represents greenhouse gas emissions,  represents the amount of 
emissions per unit of GDP produced, i.e. the carbon intensity of the economy, 
and yt represents GDP. Subscript i and t represent country i in year t. Thus, 
assuming a certain future behaviour of each country’s carbon intensity and 
GDP, it is possible to project the behaviour of greenhouse gas emissions. A 
useful way to express equation (1) is by growth rates:
 ∆GHGit ≈ ∆αt + ∆yit (2)
where ∆ represents the annual percentage change in the variables. Thus, 
the rate of emissions growth approximates to the sum of the rates of carbon 
intensity and GDP growth. Accordingly, in the absence of decoupling in the 
economy (∆αit = 0), emissions will grow at the same speed as GDP; conversely, 
if the aim is to reduce emissions while still maintaining high growth in the 
economy, it will be necessary to reduce the latter’s carbon intensity (∆αit < 0).
226 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
Equation (2) is used to estimate a business as usual scenario by making 
assumptions about the evolution of each country’s GDP and carbon intensity 
and then aggregating the results at the regional level. To construct the business 
as usual scenario, it is assumed that the economy’s GDP and carbon intensity 
will maintain the historical growth they had from 1990 to 2014. The estimates 
for the scenarios represented by the NDCs will depend on the target set in 
each country. In the case of the countries where the target was to reduce 
emissions relative to the business as usual scenario, the percentage reduction 
was taken directly. For countries where an absolute reduction target was set, 
the proposed reduction was estimated relative to the base year indicated 
in each NDC. Lastly, for countries where a target for reducing the carbon 
intensity of the economy was set, the carbon intensity targeted for 2030 
was calculated and the level of emissions was estimated on the basis of the 
GDP estimate made to obtain the business as usual scenario.1 The scenarios 
compatible with the 2 °C and 1.5 °C targets were calculated on the basis of 
an absolute reduction of 25% and 45%, respectively, from 2010 emissions, 
as indicated by the scientists of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC, 2018a).
To aggregate the reduction commitments established in the countries 
of the region, the different types of commitments (reduction relative to the 
business as usual scenario, absolute reduction and reduction of carbon 
intensity) and time horizons (2025 and 2030) were homogenized to create 
a business as usual scenario up to 2030. To calculate the unconditional and 
conditional scenarios, the reduction target for the sectors included in the 
commitments was set and then the sectors not included were added, with a 
growth rate equal to that of the business as usual scenario being assumed 
for the latter. For countries with negative emissions from land use change 
and forestry, these emissions were kept constant up to 2030.2 The basic data 
used to construct the business as usual scenario are presented in table V.1.
Tables V.2 and V.3 present the results of the exercise by country and 
for the whole region, respectively. In the business as usual scenario, regional 
emissions would total 4.7 GtCO2eq in 2030. If the unconditional national 
mitigation commitments accepted in each country’s NDC are added in, 
emissions would be 4.1 GtCO2eq or 13% lower than in the business as usual 
scenario. In the case of the conditional scenario, emissions would be 23% 
lower than in the business as usual scenario, at 3.6 GtCO2eq. The scenarios 
compatible with the 2 °C and 1.5 °C targets represent a reduction of 32% 
and 50% relative to the business as usual scenario, with emissions of 3.2 
and 2.3 GtCO2eq, respectively.
1 In the case of Chile and Uruguay, which have a carbon intensity target, a trend GDP figure was 
calculated and then the emissions compatible with the proposed intensity were calculated.
2 The reduction potential of countries where policy measures were taken is not accounted for.
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Table V.3 
Latin America and the Caribbean: aggregate projections, 2030
Scenario












Annual speed of 
decarbonization
(percentages)








3.6 -1.1 -23 -3.6
2 °C 3.4 -1.5 -32 -4.4
1.5 °C 2.3 -2.4 -50 -6.3
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Quadrennial report on 
regional progress and challenges in relation to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in 
Latin America and the Caribbean (LC/FDS.3/3/Rev.1), Santiago, 2019.
The aggregate information for Latin America and the Caribbean is 
also shown in figure V.4. As can be seen, only conditional commitments on 
a regional scale would make it possible to achieve a level of emissions closer 
to that needed to meet the 2 °C target.
Figure V.4 
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Historical Business as usual Unconditional nationally 
determined contributions (NDCs)
Conditional nationally determined 
contributions (NDCs)
Consistent with the 2 °C target
Consistent with the 1.5 °C target
A. Emissions pathway, 2014–2030
(gigatons of CO2 equivalent)
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B. Greenhouse gas emissions, 2014 and different scenarios for 2030
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Quadrennial report on 
regional progress and challenges in relation to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in 
Latin America and the Caribbean (LC/FDS.3/3/Rev.1), Santiago, 2019.
To evaluate the effort of change, from the point of view not of emissions 
at the end of the period but of the annual effort, the speed of decarbonization 
or decoupling of greenhouse gas emissions from the evolution of GDP 
was calculated. Studying the annual rate should allow adjustments to be 
made as necessary to monitor performance and increase the likelihood of 
compliance with NDCs.
The business as usual scenario assumed a speed or rate equal to that 
observed in the period 1990–2014, when there was a reduction of about 
2% a year.3 This will have to increase to 2.8% for the region to meet the 
unconditional commitments, 3.6% for the conditional ones and 4.4% and 6.3% 
for the pathway compatible with the 2 °C and 1.5 °C targets, respectively (see 
figure V.5). Following a path compatible with 2 °C means doubling the region’s 
decarbonization rate, while a path compatible with 1.5 °C means tripling it.
3 This rate of decarbonization was due to a decrease in deforestation, but forest cover scenarios 
involve significant levels of uncertainty. Given the construction of the business as usual scenario 
and assuming constant negative emissions, the aggregate rate of decoupling up to 2030 is slightly 
lower than the historical rate, namely -2% versus -2.4%.
Figure V.4 (concluded)
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Figure V.5 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Quadrennial report on 
regional progress and challenges in relation to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in 
Latin America and the Caribbean (LC/FDS.3/3/Rev.1), Santiago, 2019.
A faster rate of decarbonization is needed to achieve the regional 
mitigation targets set in the NDCs, which means increasing the share of 
renewable energies in the energy mix and modernizing the production structure 
in order to make progress with all three pillars of sustainable development 
(see ECLAC, 2018a). The extent to which the speed of decarbonization falls 
short of the target will guide the additional policy effort and action required 
to achieve it.
For NDCs to be fulfilled with the necessary speed and thoroughness, 
they need to be matched with specific policies. A key policy is the allocation 
and legal enforcement of contribution responsibilities in different sectors 
and territories of the country. This makes it possible to adopt complementary 
cross-cutting measures or create internal markets to lower compliance costs, 
and to combine simultaneous actions in different sectors and territories. 
Although the assignment of internal compliance responsibilities should be 
the norm in the region, discussion of it is only in the very earliest stages 
and the first review is scheduled for 2020. This inertia and the consequent 
inaction threaten the effectiveness of NDCs as a lever for structural change 
leading to lower-carbon development that is potentially inclusive, dynamic 
and of better quality.
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C. Measuring climate expenditure
The fiscal arrangements and resources that governments put in place can 
contribute to or delay attainment of the objectives of the Paris Agreement, 
and it is therefore important to measure the expenditure that helps to fulfil 
them. However, focusing only on the measurement of supporting expenditure 
may give a misleading idea of the role the government plays by applying the 
fiscal instrument. A more appropriate measure is net pro-Paris Agreement 
spending or net climate spending, arrived at by measuring pro-Paris 
Agreement spending and then deducting from it spending that increases 
emissions or the carbon intensity of public spending. This is a measure that 
more clearly reflects the actions and financial commitments of governments 
in the effort to achieve the goals of the Agreement.
Measuring spending is a complex process because the institutions whose 
expenditures affect climate change, whether on the mitigation or adaptation 
side, are widely dispersed. In addition, there are difficulties in defining what 
is favourable or unfavourable to the Paris Agreement, harmonizing these 
definitions, agreeing on criteria for updating them, creating classifiers and 
agreeing on statistical practices. This involves a major institutional challenge.
Analysis of budget information involves reviewing national and 
international classifications. In the case of climate spending, innovation will 
be needed in the specific classification, although the Rio markers and the 
classifications of the International Development Finance Club (IDFC) and 
periodic improvements to these can be taken as a basis. Development banks 
have definitions of climate finance that they use to report on the composition 
of their portfolios, and the system of definitions should be dynamic to capture 
technological changes and improve information on net climate financing. 
An inter-agency team needs to work on this, given the existence of multiple 
budget classifications and climate and economic definitions.
One development that provides guidance on how to calculate net 
climate spending is the progress made in countries and institutions where 
methodologies for collecting and measuring information on environmental 
protection spending have been designed and adopted. Various agencies, such 
as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the 
Statistical Office of the European Union (Eurostat) and the United Nations 
Statistical Office, have developed guidelines and methodologies aimed at 
creating a coherent, standardized system for measuring environmental 
protection expenditure. However, the calculation of environmental protection 
expenditure has been irregular and there are differences in the methods and 
concepts used in the countries.
ECLAC has designed a line of research aimed at encouraging countries 
to produce regular, systematic official statistics on environmental protection 
expenditure, using the System of Environmental-Economic Accounting 
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(SEEA) as a basis. This line of research has been extended to include 
applications for measuring public spending on climate change. This exercise 
in quantifying public and private spending on the prevention and mitigation 
of environmental damage shows the way forward for the measurement of 
climate spending.
1. Environmental protection spending as an approach 
to climate expenditure
Although there are homogeneous criteria for classifying environmental 
protection activities, measurements of public spending for environmental 
purposes are heterogeneous in the region.4 Systematic, ongoing work to 
estimate environmental protection spending is carried out in only a few 
countries, although environmental accounting systems have been implemented 
in Mexico, Colombia and Guatemala (ECLAC, 2014a).
The data available indicate that spending on environmental protection 
is still low. In Colombia, total environmental protection spending by both 
general government and part of the private sector in 2015 was estimated 
at 0.6% of GDP (DANE, 2016). In Mexico, a figure of 0.8% of GDP for 
environmental protection was published that same year, including general 
government and households (INEGI, 2016). According to Eurostat, spending 
on environmental protection in the 28 countries of the European Union was 
0.67% of GDP in 2013. Among those countries, Serbia had the lowest figure, 
at 0.07% of GDP (ECLAC, 2018c).
To obtain more standardized results, ECLAC prepared a guide to 
measuring central government spending on environmental protection 
(ECLAC/INEGI, 2015). Applying this guide shows that environmental protection 
expenditure in Chile was 0.1% of GDP in 2012 (ECLAC/MMA, 2015), while 
in Costa Rica it represented 0.19% of GDP in 2015 (ECLAC, 2018c). However, 
these figures are only a lower bound, since central government alone was 
analysed. Because environmental protection spending is conceptually broader 
than climate spending, it can be assumed that the latter will be lower than 
the figures reported for gross environmental spending.
4 A climate expenditure classifier would make it possible to homogenize and standardize measurements 
and make international comparisons. Environmental fiscal labels exist in most countries thanks to 
the use of the Classification of Environmental Protection Activities (CEPA) and the Classification 
of the Functions of Government (COFOG) in the environmental subheading. The classification 
of climate expenditure should match the classifications already defined in international manuals 
and standards.
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2. Applying the Climate Public Expenditure and 
Institutional Review methodology in Latin America 
and the Caribbean
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has developed a method 
for measuring climate expenditure called the Climate Public Expenditures 
and Institutional Review.5 It takes in the direct and indirect impact of climate 
change policies, programmes and projects. Direct expenditure meets the 
primary purpose criterion, while various weights and criteria are applied to 
indirect expenditure to incorporate it into the measurement of expenditure. 
Direct expenditure is internationally comparable, but indirect expenditure 
needs to be analysed and validated more thoroughly. This method provides 
general recommendations for organizing and classifying information that 
are based on existing definitions, such as those of the Rio markers for climate 
change mitigation and adaptation.
Applying the Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional Review 
methodology has made it possible to estimate climate change expenditure 
in some Latin American and Caribbean countries thanks to the work done 
by multidisciplinary teams and committees to standardize approaches and 
concepts. The dilemma between comparability and progress was settled 
in favour of the latter, and it was decided that each country should define 
what is meant by climate expenditure, how the types of expenditure are 
classified and how the budget is allocated in accordance with adaptation 
and mitigation needs. The methodology was thus adapted to each country’s 
definitions and particular ministerial structure, so that the figures are not 
strictly comparable from country to country.
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador and Honduras began applying 
this methodology around 2015. Chile does not publish aggregate climate 
change spending; public climate change spending ranges from 0.27% to 2.24% 
of GDP in the other countries. In the period 2011–2015, Colombia averaged 
spending of 0.27% of GDP, while Ecuador and El Salvador averaged 1.39% and 
1.07%, respectively. Honduras spent 2.24% of GDP in the period 2014–2015.
Disaggregating this figure shows which are the main ministries 
implementing climate spending. In Chile, these are the Ministry of Energy 
and the Ministry of Agriculture, which account for 24.4% and 9.3% of 
this expenditure, respectively. In Ecuador, the Ministry of Electricity and 
Renewable Energy accounts for the bulk of climate expenditure, almost 76%. 
In El Salvador, the Ministry of Economy (27.4%) and the National Water and 
Sewerage Administration (19.1%) are the largest spenders. In Honduras, the 
National Electric Power Company is responsible for over 44% of climate 
spending. The financing of public climate expenditure comes mainly from 
5 This section is based on UNDP (2019).
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domestic resources, spent chiefly on implementing national development 
plans and managing the institutions analysed. In Ecuador, 60% of funding 
is domestic, while in El Salvador and Honduras the figure is close to 80%.
Adaptation spending exceeds mitigation spending in the following 
cases.6 In El Salvador, it is reported that 63% of climate expenditure goes 
on adaptation, 27% on mitigation and the remaining 10% on the losses and 
damages category. In Honduras, 64.3% goes on adaptation and 34.4% on 
mitigation. In Chile, 63% of expenditure is considered to be on adaptation 
and 19% on mitigation, with the remaining 18% being mixed expenditure. 
The country’s adaptation expenditures go on infrastructure and the 
promotion of more resilient agriculture. Also considered are the Climate 
Change Adaptation Plan of the Forestry and Agricultural Sector, the Plan 
for Adaptation to Climate Change in Biodiversity and the National Climate 
Change Adaptation Plan, among others. In Ecuador, on the other hand, 79.3% 
of climate expenditure is on mitigation, going mainly on investing more in 
hydroelectric infrastructure and introducing changes in the energy mix that 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions; adaptation expenditure accounts for 20.7%.
Ecuador and Honduras have budget classifiers that provide real-time 
information on climate spending. With respect to the Climate Public 
Expenditure and Institutional Review methodology, however, there is 
the challenge of standardizing measurement in order to achieve greater 
comparability between countries and ensure that comparison works as an 
incentive for improvement.
3. Constraints on the measurement 
of net climate spending
In sum, difficulties in identifying and classifying the information needed to 
estimate climate spending stem from the following factors, among others:
• A lack of disaggregated information to distinguish this type of 
expenditure from other types
• A lack of stable funding for spending estimation.
• difficulties in identifying funding sources.
• Heterogeneity in environmental expenditure information at the 
different levels of government.
• Difficulties in constructing historical series.
• A lack of spending concepts and methodologies covering both 
expenditure that advances the goals of the Paris Agreement and 
expenditure that acts against these (i.e. net climate spending).
6 This greater expenditure on adaptation is accounted for by prevention activities and responses 
to changes in extreme weather events, such as hurricanes.
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• A lack of regular information and dispersion of spending 
implementation at the sectoral level.




(a) The environmental discount rate
The discount rate establishes a value relationship between the present 
and the future. When evaluating private investment, it can be used to 
recalculate earnings at present value and thence evaluate the profitability 
of that investment over time once all the costs associated with it, including 
financial costs, are taken into account. In the public sector, since there is 
no owner of the investment resource and this is not financed in the private 
capital market and does not create tradable goods in international markets, the 
discount rate is simply a filter to distinguish projects that yield social benefits 
sooner rather than later. This reflects what finance ministries consider to be 
the opportunity cost of public investment. What is not considered, though, 
is whether or not social benefits are properly captured in the accounts, 
something that depends on how environmental and health externalities are 
internalized in the formula used to evaluate public investment.
A positive discount rate means that the future is discounted in favour 
of the present. This makes sense from the individual point of view of an 
investor whose priority is monetary gain and its evaluation today, even if the 
future is devalued. From the government’s point of view, it makes less sense 
to undervalue the nation of the future and its inhabitants by prioritizing 
short-term actions above those that yield welfare over long periods. The 
higher the rate, the more the nation of the future is undervalued, the more 
short-term the thinking of the public decision-maker and the stricter the 
filter, with the investment required to show a return in a shorter time.
In an area such as the environment, this results in a bias towards 
investments that may lead to higher emissions but that can be built and operated 
in a shorter time frame. This is what is happening when thermoelectric plants 
are built instead of hydroelectric ones, which have longer payback periods, 
or when roads are built instead of metros, trains and trams, which yield 
their benefits in the longer term.7 The practice of screening investments by 
a discount rate is universal; however, governments can use lower discount 
7 Metros, trains and trams are further disadvantaged by the way investment is accounted for, as 
rail options include internalization of the cost of rolling stock and the creation of new rights of 
way, while neither these costs nor the constant renewal they are subject to as part of operating 
costs are internalized in the case of roads.
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rates when it comes to public investment that brings climate or broader 
environmental benefits. Revising discount rates in this way is a sovereign 
right when investments are administered with public resources. 
Environmentally important investments, particularly those related 
to climate change, have intertemporal effects; in fact, they are motivated 
by their intertemporal and even intergenerational effects and, therefore, by 
considerations of intergenerational equity (Azqueta, 2007). The importance of 
environmental sustainability has led several Latin American and Caribbean 
countries to consider climate change criteria when evaluating public investment 
projects, such as the social cost of carbon, which is discussed below, or the 
modification of social discount rates, as has been done by Peru’s Ministry 
of Economy and Finance.
In 2017, the general social discount rate or opportunity cost that the 
Peruvian Ministry of Economy and Finance used to evaluate public investment 
projects was 8%. However, for projects that generated positive externalities, 
such as environmental services to reduce or mitigate greenhouse gas 
emissions, the specific social discount rate was 4%. In the social evaluation 
of public investment projects, a long-term social discount rate (SDR) is also 
applied when projects extend beyond one generation. Using the long-term 
SDR solves the drawbacks of the constant 8% discount rate, according to 
which more distant flows of net benefits are subject to a larger discount that 
brings down their present value to close to zero (MEF, 2019). To overcome 
the difficulty of applying a constant discount rate, the most recent economic 
literature has proposed a time-decreasing long-term SDR (Kamiche and 
Diderot, 2018; MEF, 2019).
The social project evaluation carried out by the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance (MEF, 2019) applies the social discount rate of 8% to calculate the net 
flows of social benefits over the first 20 years of the evaluation horizon, while 
the rates shown in table V.4 are applied from the twenty-first year onward.
Table V.4 
Peru: long-term social discount rate of the Ministry  





Less than 20 8.0
21 to 49 5.5
50 to 74 4.0
75 to 99 3.0
100 to 149 2.0
150 to 199 2.0
200 and over 1.0
Source: Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), “Anexo N° 11: parámetros 
de evaluación social”, Lima, 2019; J. Kamiche and J. Diderot, 
Actualización de la tasa social de descuento de largo plazo, Lima, 
Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), 2018.
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The 20 years that have to elapse before the initial discount rate changes 
means that the relative profitability of high- and low-carbon projects is not 
altered in favour of the latter when periods within that time are compared, 
and it is only afterwards that the handicap on the profitability of long-term 
projects is compensated for. Applying differentiated rates to low-carbon 
projects from the outset when project comparisons are made seems a 
promising way to move relative returns in favour of these types of projects. 
The shift in their favour could be reinforced by measures such as efficiency 
standards and the tax or non-tax price of carbon, which is discussed below.
(b) The social cost of carbon
Emissions of polluting and greenhouse gases are a public bad that is 
non-rivalrous and non-excludable,8 a negative externality whose effects are 
universal. Hence, the case for internationally concerted action on carbon 
pricing to help shift relative profitability in favour of lower-emission projects 
has gained new strength. One mechanism is taxation, which will be discussed 
below. A pair of international bodies have been set up to advance the discussion 
on carbon pricing. One is the High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices, 
which argues that a well-designed carbon price is an indispensable part of 
a strategy for reducing emissions in an efficient way and can be usefully 
complemented by shadow pricing in public sector activities (High-Level 
Commission on Carbon Prices, 2017, pp. 1–2). Another is the coalition created 
in December 2018 and chaired by the finance ministries of Chile and Finland, 
which also advocates the introduction of carbon pricing. 
Taxes are not the only way to introduce a carbon price or value. 
Compliance with rules or regulations involves assigning an implicit price 
to carbon: an infinite price when the restriction is absolute and a price above 
zero when there are regulations on emissions or the energy efficiency of 
machines and processes. Another way of introducing a carbon price, which 
is discussed below, is by assigning a value to emissions (as to any externality) 
in the investment appraisal process in the financial sector or in public or 
private investment appraisal methodologies. This is known as the shadow 
or social cost of carbon.
Unlike a carbon tax, which is distributed over a short period of time 
(i.e. the current generation), the social price makes it possible to discriminate 
between high- and low-carbon investments, depending on their value. 
Excluding investments with large externalities or high emissions may mean 
opting for higher-cost alternatives or not, as the case may be. Either way, 
the additional cost or savings achieved will be distributed over the life of 
the investment considered. The social price concept implies the principle of 
8 A public good or bad is non-excludable because no-one can be excluded from its effects and 
non-rivalrous in that more than one person can be affected at the same time.
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internalization of damage and the effort that society is willing to make to 
obtain the good or service in question. The underlying idea is that public 
investments, whether made directly by governments or under concessions 
granted by them, should be oriented towards lower-emission options, and that 
the evaluation process should serve to rule out investments that are cheaper 
but more polluting, by including at least part of the social cost involved, 
namely that associated with greenhouse gas emissions. In other words, the 
profitability of investment options is modified in favour of those with lower 
carbon emissions. When the latter are associated with other emissions that 
could substantially affect local health, this also prevents some of the health 
damage that would occur in the absence of the social price.
In the economic literature, a shadow price is the reference price of a 
good or service including social and private costs; it represents the real cost 
or true opportunity cost of producing or consuming a good or service and 
is often not the same as the market price. Most national public investment 
systems in Latin America and the Caribbean use the term “social price” 
for this concept. According to the literature, there are three methods of 
valuing social prices: (i) taking a market price as a reference; (ii) making a 
monetary calculation of the social cost of the carbon; and (iii) estimating the 
additional (marginal) costs of reducing emissions. Each of these methods 
is explained below.
One of the internationally available methods for calculating the social 
cost of carbon takes the price of carbon credits as an indirect or approximate 
value for what people are willing to pay to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
However, the market price of carbon credits currently underestimates the 
value of a ton of traded carbon dioxide to society because the market is not 
competitive and supply and demand in it present design problems. As a 
result, this methodology is not widely used, and in the countries where it 
has been, such as Chile, it has been discarded.
An alternative to the market price method is to estimate the social 
cost of carbon, which expresses in monetary terms the damage caused by 
increased emissions to, for example, agricultural productivity or human 
health, or property damage due to the increased destructive potential of 
extreme natural events, among other things.
The social cost of carbon method considers not only the total cost 
that an additional unit of carbon generates today, but also the total cost of 
the damage that carbon causes by remaining in the atmosphere. It then 
considers the present value of the impact that emitting an additional metric 
ton of carbon would have, using a 100-year horizon (Watkiss, 2006). In this 
way, the externality of this emission can be accounted for and incorporated 
into project assessments and other decisions.
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Box V.1 
Methodological approaches for determining the social cost of carbon
Nordhaus (2007) defines the social cost of carbon as the market price assigned to the right 
to emit one ton of carbon by burning fossil fuels. This price usually reflects the social cost 
associated with the damage caused by the increase in greenhouse gas emissions, usually over 
a 100-year horizon. In public policy terms, the social cost of carbon offers more application 
options than a tax.
The social cost of carbon is obtained by monetizing the economic costs of climate change 
on the basis of simulations of various future emissions pathways (Anthoff and others, 2011). 
Normally, this additional carbon impact is derived from the difference between the business 
as usual scenario and the scenario being considered over various periods (Golosov and 
others, 2014; Nordhaus, 2014). The monetary economic costs associated with an additional 
unit of carbon emissions are identified (Greenstone, Kopits and Wolverton, 2013; Golosov 
and others, 2014; Anthoff and others, 2009; Watkiss, 2006). Stern (2007) estimates the social 
cost of carbon derived from greenhouse gas emissions by calculating the damage caused 
by climate change in comparison with a path where emissions do not cause any damage, a 
procedure that is defined as the balanced growth equivalent (Hope, 2006). The social cost 
of carbon is then understood as the marginal cost of the damage from climate change (Kuik 
and others, 2008) and expresses the present value of the present and future social costs (the 
present and future marginal social damage) caused by emitting an extra ton of carbon into 
the atmosphere (Hope, 2006).
There are two methods of estimating the social cost of carbon based on the damage 
caused by emissions. A first method directly estimates the difference in damage caused by 
climate change due to a marginal change in CO2 emissions, but the impact does not have to 
be linear. A second method estimates the marginal cost of emissions at the point where it is 
equal to the marginal cost of reducing them, taking the paths of these curves as a reference. 
Thus, the optimum point is defined as the point at which the marginal damage curve and that 
of the marginal cost of reducing emissions intersect (Clarkson and Deyes, 2002). The greater 
economic impact caused by higher carbon emissions represents the additional cost of the 
damage that can be avoided if a ton of carbon is removed or never emitted at a given point 
in time (Anthoff and others, 2011).
Alternatively, the benchmark taken can be just the cost of avoiding additional emissions to 
achieve a reduction target, rather than the damage caused. This is estimated using integrated 
assessment modelling that incorporates different scientific disciplines and employs simplified 
representations of society, the climate and the interactions between climate change, its impact 
on natural and social systems, and the cost of policies to mitigate that impact. The end result of 
these models is a monetary estimate of the cost to society today of emitting one ton of carbon.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of W. Nordhaus, 
The Challenge of Global Warming: Economic Models and Environmental Policy, New Haven, Yale 
University, 2007; D. Anthoff and others, “Regional and sectoral estimates of the social cost of 
carbon: an application of FUND”, Discussion Paper, No. 2011-18, Kiel, Kiel Institute for the World 
Economy, 2011; “Equity weighting and the marginal damage costs of climate change”, Ecological 
Economics, vol. 68, No. 3, Amsterdam, Elsevier, 2009; P. Watkiss, “The social cost of carbon”, 
Paris, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 2006; W. Nordhaus, 
“Estimates of the social cost of carbon: concepts and results from the DICE-2013R model and 
alternative approaches”, Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, 
vol. 1, Nos. 1–2, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2014; N. Stern, The Economics of Climate 
Change: The Stern Review, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007; M. Greenstone, E. 
Kopits and A. Wolverston, “Developing a social cost of carbon for US regulatory analysis: a 
methodology and interpretation”, Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, vol. 7, No. 1, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013; M. Golosov and others, “Optimal taxes on fossil fuel in 
general equilibrium”, Econometrica, vol. 82, No. 1, Hoboken, Wiley, 2014; C. Hope, “The social 
cost of carbon following the Stern Review”, Cambridge, University of Cambridge, 2006; O. Kuik 
and others, “Methodological aspects of recent climate change damage cost studies”, Integrated 
Assessment Journal, vol. 8, No. 1, Vancouver, Public Knowledge Project (PKP), 2008; R. Clarkson 
and K. Deyes, “Estimating the social cost of carbon emissions”, Government Economic Service 
Working Paper, No. 140, London, HM Treasury, 2002.
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There are now a number of estimates derived from integrated models. 
Among the best-known models are the following:
(i) Dynamic integrated climate-economy (DICE) and regional 
integrated climate-economy (RICE) models, which are perhaps the 
most widely used in climate change economics (Nordhaus, 1992; 
Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000).9
(ii) The policy analysis of the greenhouse effect (PAGE) model 
(Hope, 2006), which has received wide recognition since the 
Stern report (2007).
(iii) The computable dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) 
model developed by Golosov and others (2014), which is technically 
very sound.
(iv) The climate framework for uncertainty, negotiation and distribution 
(FUND) model (Tol, 1997), which, together with that of Golosov 
and others (2014), can be used to simulate different scenarios in 
order to estimate the social cost of carbon.
These models are used with a great variety of specifications and scenarios 
that enable a range of specific results to be obtained (Li and Nordhaus, 2013).10 
However, they have some major limitations, such as incomplete treatment 
of non-catastrophic effects and potential catastrophic effects, the discount 
rate problem and climate sensitivity.11
The third and last method of gauging the social price uses the marginal 
abatement cost curves as a quantitative basis for comparing the cost of reducing 
emissions among the available alternatives in terms of their effectiveness 
rather than the damage caused by the emission. Each alternative represents 
the additional cost of replacing a benchmark technology with a low-emission 
alternative. Some limitations of these curves are mentioned in the literature:
9 The DICE model contains a macroeconomic growth model in which fossil fuels are a production 
input that causes CO2 emissions. The increase in emissions in the different blocks of the model 
results in a rise in temperature that, over time, has negative effects on the economy. There is also 
the (low) possibility of a catastrophic loss of 30% of total output (Ackerman and Finlayson, 2006). 
10 See Clarke and others (2009) for a description of the 10 most used integrated analysis models.
11 The discount rate is a controversial issue, as its rationale is purely ethical and value-based, as 
seen in the previous section. High discount rates assume a more prosperous future with more 
technological capacity, making it advisable to postpone climate action in the present. They favour 
present welfare and minimize the diversion of resources towards climate action. Conversely, 
those who advocate low and even negative discount rates assume scenarios in which there is no 
such prosperity owing, among other things, to climate change itself, and in which technological 
solutions have neither the scale nor the power required. They therefore apply the precautionary 
principle that, in the face of uncertainty, it is preferable to act decisively now. This approach finds 
no justification for undervaluing future generations. The discussion between Nordhaus and Stern 
on this subject, which took place in the first decade of the twenty-first century, is an example 
of this polarity. Global warming has no historical precedent at these levels, so it seems wiser to 
apply the precautionary principle. 
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• They do not capture institutional or non-commercial barriers to 
implementation, particularly indirect costs and those not related 
to the transaction.
• They involve a very limited treatment of the uncertainties in 
the underlying analyses and the assumptions used (such as the 
economic life of the options, risk and return properties, and the 
treatment of the discount rate).
• There are difficulties in capturing the interactions between the 
different measures, which could limit the total abatement potential.
• They do not address dimensions other than direct costs, e.g., 
strategic, operational or political factors. 
Despite these limitations, the marginal abatement cost method is the 
one used in Chile, the only country in Latin America and the Caribbean to 
have implemented a social cost of carbon in the national public investment 
system. One of the most positive aspects of this method is that it reflects 
the additional (or marginal) cost of removing a ton of carbon. The social 
price indicates what the government estimates the country is willing to pay 
to restrict the amount of carbon that can be emitted into the atmosphere, 
i.e. to not emit an additional ton. Depending on the social cost of carbon, 
investment options in which the cost of removing a ton of carbon is lower 
than that price in the national investment system become viable in the 
absence of other barriers.
The map of possible investments ranked by the cost of avoiding carbon 
emissions and their potential emission savings is known as the marginal 
abatement cost (MAC) curve, with the costs being regional, national or 
sectoral. Marginal abatement cost curves have been developed in some 
Latin American and Caribbean countries: in Chile, Brazil, Colombia and 
Peru under the Mitigation Action Plans and Scenarios (MAPS) project, and 
in Mexico, where this project was not carried out. The marginal abatement 
costs (or cost-effectiveness) method makes it possible to quantify the cost 
of public investment decisions and to compare their effectiveness when it 
comes to meeting each country’s targets and commitments under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Table V.5 presents some applications of the social cost of carbon at 
development and investment banks around the world.
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Table V.5 





A price of US$ 36.3 per ton of carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO2eq) was used 
in 2016. This price increases by 2% a year in real terms to reflect the growing 





A carbon price of 35 euros (US$ 43) per tCO2eq has been applied with effect 
from the greenhouse gas emissions of 2014, rising by 2% a year in real 





The price applied to carbon emissions in 2018 was 38 euros (US$ 47) per 
tCO2eq. This price has been increasing annually in real terms since 2016, rising 
to between 121 and 150 euros per tCO2e by 2050. EIB also uses low and high 
carbon price scenarios in its sensitivity tests.
World Bank A low price and a high price are applied in economic project analyses. These 
prices are US$ 40 and US$ 80 per tCO2eq, respectively, in 2020, rising to 
US$ 50 and US$ 100 per tCO2eq, respectively, by 2030. After 2030, they rise 
at a rate of 2.25% a year up to 2050.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official 
international data.
The methods used to apply the social price of carbon in two countries 
of the region, Peru and Chile, will now be described. In the former, the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) applies this price when evaluating 
public investment projects. In doing so, it incorporates the social benefits or 
costs of reducing or increasing greenhouse gas emissions (MEF, 2019). The 
damage calculation methodology (social cost of carbon methodology) of 
the Nordhaus dynamic optimization model (DICE), serving to estimate the 
optimal production path for capital stock and emissions, was used to estimate 
the social price of carbon. The DICE model offered the following advantages:
• It is easy to calibrate and simulate, so reference pathways could 
be constructed from aggregate projections to 2030 made by the 
country’s institutions. 
• It requires only a few parameters whose values could be obtained 
from available studies on the Peruvian economy. 
• Emissions from land use change and deforestation can be managed 
exogenously, while emissions associated with energy production 
and transport are modelled endogenously.
The following procedure was used to calculate the social price of carbon:
(i) Input emission pathways, GDP and population, and calculate 
the temperature and per capita consumption associated with the 
baseline scenario year by year.
(ii) Add one unit of carbon emissions in year t and recalculate year by 
year, from t onwards, the temperature and per capita consumption 
pathways resulting from this emissions adjustment.
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(iii) Compute the marginal damage caused in each year on the basis 
of the per capita consumption calculated in steps (i) and (ii).
(iv) Discount the resulting marginal damage series from the base year 
using a fixed discount rate and calculate the social price of carbon 
as the net present value of the damage series.
Because Peruvian emissions are only a small share of the global total, 
the temperature change due to the country’s contribution is not substantial 
and so was omitted from the calculation. The objective taken was to limit 
the marginal increase in emissions to 100,000 tons of carbon. In this way, 
the values presented in table V.6 were obtained for the discount rate and 
time horizons chosen (2050 and 2100). The social price of carbon in Peru was 
calculated at US$ 6.38 per ton of carbon in 2014, in the scenario where the 
social discount rate is 9% and the horizon is 2100.
Table V.6 
Peru: social price of carbon depending on the discount rate and time horizon chosen, 2014
(Dollars per ton of carbon)
Time horizon
Discount rate (percentages)
9 5 3 2.50
To 2050 (37 years) 5.15 7.08 8.49 8.9
To 2100 (87 years) 6.38 10.99 15.79 17.48
Source: F. Cartes, “Metodología de inclusión de precio social de carbono en proyectos de inversión pública”, 
document presented at the Regional Seminar on Instruments of Green Fiscal Policy, Climate 
Change and Environmental Sustainability, San José, Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (ECLAC), 7–8 November 2018; University of the Pacific Research Centre (CIUP), 
Estimación del precio social del carbono para la evaluación social de proyectos en el Perú, Lima, 
University of the Pacific, 2016.
Chile uses the methodological approach of the United Kingdom, which 
is based on the willingness to reduce, and therefore pay for, greenhouse 
gas emissions in a way that is compatible with the mitigation target set in 
the NDC. The social price of carbon was estimated in Chile by analysing 
the marginal cost of reducing carbon dioxide emissions to meet the NDC. 
This analysis was carried out in the framework of the MAPS Chile project. 
Diagram V.1 provides a schematic illustration of the methodology used 
in the country. In the MAPS Chile project, more than 96 greenhouse gas 
emission reduction measures were evaluated. Multisectoral groups developed 
mitigation scenarios to analyse the cost of abatement, the potential for 
mitigation and the feasibility of each measure, such as promoting energy 
efficiency, increasing the share of non-conventional renewable energies and 
using nuclear power. Specific scenarios were used (baseline, mid-range and 
high) along with an 80/20 effectiveness scenario to identify measures leading 
to 80% compliance with the target (compared to the 20% left unanalysed), 
which groups together a small set of mitigation measures that together have 
high mitigation potential. For each of these scenarios, CO2eq emissions were 
projected and marginal abatement cost curves were constructed, such as the 
one shown in figure V.6.
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Diagram V.1 
Chile: methodology for estimating the social price of carbon, 2014
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Source: Ministry of Social Development, Integrando el cambio climático en el sistema nacional de inversión 
pública de Chile, Santiago, 2017.
Figure V.6 
Chile: marginal greenhouse gas abatement cost curve according to the abatement 
potential of each measure in the non-conventional renewable energy scenario  
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Source: MAPS Chile, Resultados de fase 2, Santiago, 2014.
There is a social price for carbon associated with each of the targets 
in each specific scenario. For example, in the non-conventional renewable 
energies scenario, if the targets of reducing emissions by 30%12 and 35% 
are taken, the social price or marginal cost of the reduction is US$ 47.3 and 
US$ 49.5 per tCO2, respectively.
12 This reduction represents 75% of what would have to be abated or offset in Chile to reach carbon 
neutrality, considering emissions and captures in 2017.
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In this calculation of marginal costs, negative values (representing 
savings) are disregarded and treated as zero, since these savings result 
from profitable measures that do not require additional support, although 
in reality there are a number of barriers that may limit their implementation. 
The scenarios for Chile’s social prices were constructed on the basis of this 
information and are presented in table V.7, which shows the average for 
each target. These social prices or marginal costs range from US$ 20.2 to 
US$ 43.2 per tCO2. 
Table V.7 
Chile: marginal costs associated with emission reduction targets set in nationally 
determined contributions (NDCs), under different scenarios
(Dollars per ton)
Abatement 
target in NDCs  
(percentages)
80/20 scenario: no 
hydroelectricity in 





High scenario without 
hydroelectricity 
in Aysén or 
regional trading
Average
30 27.4 33.2 0 20.2
35 35.9 35.9 25.6 32.5
45 Target not met Target not met 34.1 43.2
Source: Ministry of Social Development, Integrando el cambio climático en el sistema nacional de inversión 
pública de Chile, Santiago, 2017.
Alatorre and others (2019) conducted a meta-analysis to estimate the 
social cost of carbon globally, based on a literature review in which they 
found 37 documents with 261 observations. The social cost values were 
standardized to 2014 dollars and a value of US$ 25.83 per ton of carbon was 
obtained.13 This value is sensitive to the discount rate used: for example, the 
social cost of carbon is US$ 100 per ton when the discount rate is close to 
zero and US$ 6 per ton when the discount rate is above 3%. These estimates 
normally exclude the possible effects of extreme catastrophic events, which 
it is important to include in Latin America and the Caribbean.
(c) Carbon markets to arbitrate compliance costs
When emitting CO2 has a cost, emitters are faced with the decision 
as to whether to reduce emissions by changing fuels, altering processes or 
paying the social cost of emitting. In the absence of other considerations, the 
level of reduction will be determined by the opportunity cost of the change. 
As a complement to tax options, which have their political difficulties, 
emission permit systems offer an alternative that is considered efficient: 
allowing emitters whose reduction costs are higher to trade or swap reduction 
13 This value is very similar to the spot price in Europe’s emissions trading system, which is 
24.97  euros per ton. See European Energy Exchange, European Emission Allowances (EUA) 
[online database] https://www.eex.com/en/market-data/environmental-markets/spot-market/
european-emission-allowances.
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obligations with those whose costs are lower. Like the other mechanisms 
outlined, the ultimate goal of this one is to help shift investment returns 
towards lower-carbon options.
The carbon markets provided for in the Kyoto Protocol14 materialized in 
several formats: official markets based on the allocation of emission permits 
in various guises (sale of permits and issuance at zero cost), voluntary 
markets that are subject to stricter certification rules, markets derived from 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and joint implementation.15 The 
strictness or laxity of the allocation rules, interacting with the strictness 
or laxity of the compliance rules, have determined pricing, supply and 
demand in these markets, based on the costs of reducing emissions by a 
ton in different locations. These markets have been chronically weaker than 
expected and their role as an incentive to promote change has therefore been 
limited. The European market, which is the oldest and largest, clearly reflects 
the over-allocation of permits that hampered its early development and its 
potential to incentivize decarbonization until it was revised after the Paris 
Agreement; there are expected to be further adjustments that will improve 
its effectiveness (see figure V.7).
Figure V.7 











Source: Markets Insider, “CO2 European emission allowances in USD: historical prices” [online] https://
markets.businessinsider.com/commodities/historical-prices/co2-european-emission-allowances/euro.
14 The Kyoto Protocol, in turn, was inspired by the emissions market created by the United States 
Clean Air Act to reduce sulphur emissions from thermal power plants and the good results 
achieved in terms of the cost of securing these reductions. 
15 Joint implementation is defined in article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol. It allows a country with an 
emission reduction or limitation commitment under the Protocol to obtain emission reduction 
units through an emission reduction or elimination project implemented in another country, each 
unit being equivalent to one ton of CO2, which can count towards its Kyoto target.
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(d) Tradable emission permits
The tradable emission permit system sets the maximum limit for total 
allowable emissions in an area, sector or system, regardless of who makes 
the emission reduction effort within the system boundary.16 The emphasis is 
on the amount of CO2 emissions, and the implicit price of these is revealed 
by the market thus constructed (Goulder and Schein, 2013). This is the main 
advantage of the system: it allows the public policy objective, i.e. the reduction 
of emissions, to be clearly established.
The allocation of permits can be contentious. There is no theoretical 
reason not to give out permits for free and in perpetuity (as in Chile’s 
problematic and regressive model of water rights allocation), but from a 
practical and political perspective this is not feasible and initiatives have 
opted to auction permits and restrict the period of compliance to three 
years. This has allowed the authorities to maintain control, but has limited 
the development of the secondary market, so that, in practice, the system is 
more like a tax than a tradable emission permit system.
In the same way as taxes, a tradable emission permit system may 
include only carbon dioxide emissions, as with the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (RGGI), or it may include all greenhouse gases, as in California. 
First, governments set an emissions cap for a limited geographic area 
(a  jurisdiction, in the cases known to date) and then allocate emission 
permits to specific establishments, either for free or for a consideration, by 
purchase or auction.17 Once the emission permits have been delivered or 
auctioned, companies can trade them. If the market works, and there is no 
incentive to accumulate or speculate because of uncertainty, the companies 
with lower abatement costs will sell their emission allowances in secondary 
markets to companies with higher costs, and the total emissions target 
will generally be met at a lower cost (Goulder and Shein, 2013; Aldy and 
Stavins, 2012). 
The system is more complex than that needed to implement a tax, but 
it can lead to greater cost efficiency. Designing a tradable emission permit 
system involves determining which emissions and sectors or areas will be 
regulated, what the emission limit will be, at what point emissions will be 
regulated (upstream or downstream) and how the permits will be allocated 
16 Tradable emission permits set an upper limit on total emissions, and limited permits are allocated to emitters 
to make up the maximum established. Emitters can trade the allocated permits on secondary markets, which 
enables a market price to be established for emissions by creating supply and demand for permits.
17 In the case of the sulphur reduction market created in the United States as a result of the Clean Air Act, those 
regulated were participants in the coal-fired power generation sector, regardless of location. Discussions 
on the rules and instruments to be used to control aviation and bunker fuels will have to focus on mobile 
emission sources within a sector. One approach would be to identify territorial sectoral combinations 
within a country or even in global sectors, such as cement manufacture, regardless of where in the world 
production takes place. 
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and distributed. As with taxes, the use to which the revenues will be put 
if the permits are sold or auctioned must be resolved and the impact on 
competitiveness determined.
Measures can be taken to complement the tradable emission permit 
system, such as allowing emission credits to be taken up between compliance 
periods or permits to be accumulated or loaned for future compliance 
periods, creating a reserve to stabilize prices and ensure liquidity, creating 
trading registries to monitor and track carbon offsets, accounting for carbon 
offsetting, and linking various systems internationally.18 Emission permits 
present an institutional challenge, as it is necessary to build an additional 
market, create an institutional infrastructure and resolve issues related to 
measurement, reporting and verification of emissions, permits, abatements 
and trading.19
Carbon pricing instruments involving emission reduction markets 
have been implemented in several countries and subnational jurisdictions 
(states) of the Americas to support climate change mitigation efforts. Because 
of the potential for synergies between carbon pricing systems, this section 
considers not only some Latin American countries but also some North 
American jurisdictions.
The two main systems in the Americas are the Western Climate 
Initiative (WCI) and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI).
The Western Climate Initiative, Inc. is an initiative of some states in the 
United States and some provinces in Canada to coordinate mitigation policies 
and jointly implement a system of tradable emission permits. In 2019, British 
Columbia, California, Manitoba, Nova Scotia and Quebec were members of 
the initiative, but only California and Quebec established tradable emission 
permit systems linked to joint auctions. Beginning in January 2013, tradable 
emission permit systems were established independently in these two 
jurisdictions. One year later, on 1 January 2014, the systems were linked and 
the first tradable emission permit system connected internationally between 
two subnational jurisdictions was created. In 2017, Ontario launched its 
tradable emission permit system with the goal of linking it to the California 
and Quebec carbon market; however, its prime minister decided not to 
link it. At present, only Nova Scotia is considering establishing a tradable 
emission permit system.
Western Climate Initiative had an initial compliance period of two 
years, since when each compliance and permit allocation period has lasted 
three calendar years. Permits for each period’s emissions are issued by 1 
18 Linking means integrating emission permit markets.
19 Like all markets, tradable emission permit markets are the product of a regulatory structure within which 
they operate. 
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November (or the first business day thereafter) of the second year of the 
period. To date, the compliance periods have been as follows: 2013–2014, 
2015–2017 and 2018–2020.
In both California and Quebec, the permit allocation system is complex, 
with permits being distributed by auction or free allocation, depending on 
the sector, and transition periods are set so that affected businesses can 
adjust more readily. Electricity distribution services and natural gas suppliers 
receive permits on behalf of their customers. Investor-owned electric services 
access permits through state auctions. In California, the programme initially 
covered six greenhouse gases within the industrial and electricity sectors. 
In 2015, coverage was expanded to include transportation fuels and natural 
gas (CARB/MDDELCC, 2017).
The Government of Canada is pursuing an initiative to bring together 
the carbon pricing criteria of the various market initiatives in some Canadian 
provinces. This includes the tradable emission permits already mentioned 
and the British Columbia CO2 tax, among other things.
Mexico has moved towards the creation of an institutional framework 
that will enable a national market to be established and declared its intention 
of joining WCI, and in October 2019 it published the ground rules for the 
Emissions Trading System Test Programme (SEMARNAT, 2019).
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), which includes the 
states of Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island and Vermont, was the first mandatory 
tradable emission permit programme in the United States, covering only 
CO2 emissions and the electricity sector. The system sets an emissions cap 
that falls by 2.5% per year until 2020 and 3% thereafter. Permits are acquired 
mainly through quarterly auctions, with a standardized price format and 
closed bidding.
The Initiative is notable for its transparency and commitment to the 
periodic review programme designed to make adjustments to the tradable 
emission permit market (Rahim, 2017). The implementation of the Initiative 
was accompanied by a 57% reduction in CO2 emissions in the region in 
the period 2005–2016. Although not all the reduction in emissions can be 
attributed exclusively to the Initiative, given that other policies have operated, 
one estimate found that total emissions would have been at least 24% higher 
if the programme had not been implemented (Murray and Maniloff, 2015). 
Table V.8 shows the main characteristics of tradable emission permits in 
the Americas.
The climate emergency in Latin America and the Caribbean... 253
Table V.8 
The Americas: characteristics of tradable emission permits in selected jurisdictions, 















California Linked tradable CO2eq 
emission permits, 
minimum price, offsetting, 
free permits and auctions
Emissions 2014 14 and rising 85
Quebec Linked tradable CO2eq 
emission permits, 
minimum price, offsetting, 
free permits and auctions






CO2eq emission permits, 
minimum price, offsetting, 
permit auctions, 
electricity sector only
Emissions 2012 2.15 23
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official 
international data.
While policies and regulations aimed at mitigating greenhouse gases 
exist in every country and in subnational jurisdictions, it is estimated that 
initiatives can have a significant synergistic impact in terms of reducing 
greenhouse gas mitigation costs, and market instruments (permits and 
certificates) are expected to be an important complementary element in 
efforts to implement the Paris Agreement climate agenda.
The practical difficulties of implementing the two pure carbon pricing 
instruments described above have been addressed by designing systems 
that combine features of both, or hybrid systems combining taxation and 
emissions trading. For example, in a tax system there may also be emission 
caps, or offsets may be incorporated as a complementary mechanism to 
reduce abatement costs, as with the Mexican tax. Likewise, in a system of 
tradable emission permits, a price band can be established in the market 
to provide certainty about the long-term price and avoid variability. The 
decision will ultimately depend on the political feasibility of implementing 
one or the other system and on the willingness of the authorities to provide 
markets with long-term certainties while offering a degree of flexibility in 
short-term operations.
In essence, hybrid tradable emission permit systems with price bands 
and auctions are equivalent to tax systems. In turn, tax systems with an 
emissions cap and offsetting are equivalent to a tradable emission permit 
system. Hybrid systems can incorporate the advantages and mitigate the 
disadvantages of both instruments. Moreover, not only do they help to 
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prevent price volatility and ensure that emissions are effectively reduced, but 
they can reduce the potential for error of each of the two pure instruments 
(Goulder and Schein, 2013). Notwithstanding the advantages they offer 
from an economic perspective, hybrid systems necessarily involve a greater 
administrative effort, which means that the cost of implementation is higher 
and that a more advanced institutional infrastructure and a more complex 
measurement, reporting and verification system must be in place.
Diagram V.2 schematically compares and equates the various hybrid 
systems in which carbon pricing applies. The lower arrow represents taxes 
and the upper arrow tradable emission permit systems. Pure carbon pricing 
instruments are located at either end of the arrows, where the carbon tax, or 
green tax, and tradable emission permits with ownership rights are shown. 
As changes are made to the two instruments, they move closer together 
and are comparable. For example, a tradable emission permit system with 
annual auctions is closer to a tax than to a pure permit system, while a tax 
with offsets is closer to a pure permit system than to a tax.
Diagram V.2 
Equivalence between selected types of hybrid carbon pricing systems
System of tradable 
emission permits with 
annual auctions, 
ceiling and floor
System of tradable 
emission permits 
with auctions System of tradable 








Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official 
international data.
In 2018, following the formation of the platform for cooperation on 
carbon pricing in the Americas, both entities or jurisdictions of the Western 
Climate Initiative and Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico and its state 
of Sonora, and Peru have held regular meetings with the support of the 
World Bank Partnership for Market Readiness (PMR) and ECLAC, and with 
funding from EUROCLIMA+, a European Union project, to support the 
harmonization of their measurement, reporting and verification systems so 
that emissions trading in an expanded market is facilitated by the mutual 
acceptance of procedures.
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2. Tax measures
(a) Environment-related taxes in the region
The application of economic policy instruments to protect the environment 
in general and promote climate change mitigation and adaptation in particular 
is based on the idea that making sustainable use of natural resources has 
benefits or that destroying those resources has costs which are not fully 
reflected when market prices are formed (Lorenzo, 2018). Environmental 
taxes are a price assigned to carbon and are intended to change the behaviour 
of consumers and producers and to internalize the cost of environmental 
side effects that have a cost to society. The ultimate effect of the tax is to 
change the profitability of production and consumption patterns in favour 
of lower-carbon options by sending a signal to society as a whole.
The economic literature recognizes that environmental pollution 
problems, such as deteriorating air quality and global warming, can be 
corrected, albeit partially, through excise taxes on the consumption of 
goods such as petrol and cars (Ferrer and Escalante, 2014). These taxes are 
sources of revenue for government and can be designed to reflect the cost of 
externalities that consumers and producers of polluting goods and services 
pass on to others. In the context of a profound change in production and 
consumption patterns, such designs are part of a reorientation that should 
be consistent and comprehensive and encompass much more than fiscal 
policy instruments.
In the international context, environmental taxes have gained 
importance as part of fiscal reforms, particularly in the most developed 
countries. In the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, although 
there is no history of fiscal reforms whose central objective is environmental, 
an increasing number of taxes that provide environmental benefits have been 
introduced, such as taxes on the carbon content of fossil fuels, energy, energy 
emissions and vehicles, as well as traditional taxes levied on fuels because 
of the revenue-raising potential resulting from their low price elasticity 
(see figure V.8).20
Fuel tax is the main environment-related tax in the countries of the 
region and usually generates the bulk of the revenue from such taxes. In 
addition, several countries have adopted measures to curb the use of private 
urban transport, which is also a greenhouse gas emission reduction measure 
(Lorenzo, 2016).
20 Low price elasticity is a characteristic that fossil fuels have traditionally shared with other goods 
that are addictive, such as alcohol and tobacco. More recently, it has been recognized that the 
sugar contained in food and beverages also has this characteristic. Sugar is of interest not because 
it is polluting, but because the problems it causes, such as obesity and diabetes, have to be dealt 
with by public health systems and affect society’s productive capacity.
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Figure V.8 

























































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Fiscal Panorama of 
Latin America and the Caribbean, 2019 (LC/PUB.2019/8-P), Santiago, 2019.
Automobile use and the associated fuel consumption produce problems 
and externalities in the form not only of poorer air quality and consequences 
for people’s health, but also of traffic congestion, road accidents in major urban 
centres and indeed the costs associated with the provision and maintenance 
of infrastructure for private motor transport. These externalities make 
taxes on cars and fuels an important issue for public decision-makers and 
a challenge for those designing the tax.
Estimating the optimal level of the tax is complex, as it depends on 
technical, scientific and public policy considerations as well as on the estimation 
methodology used. Many estimates exist, but according to the Report of the 
High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices, led by economists Joseph Stiglitz and 
Nicolas Stern, a price that would be compatible with the Paris Agreement 
goals would be between US$ 40 and US$ 80 per ton of CO2 in 2020, and 
between US$ 50 and US$ 100 by 2030 (High-Level Commission on Carbon 
Prices, 2017). Other considerations include the effects on competitiveness, 
distributive impact, consistency with other instruments and, above all, 
political feasibility.
Currently, taxes vary greatly by country and jurisdiction (see table V.9). 
Each of the countries considered has regulations that actually reduce the tax 
base. In British Columbia, for example, all revenue is recycled to economic 
agents; as a result, the final burden is considerably lower than the values in 
the table would indicate, since the revenue allows other taxes to be lowered 
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(Murray and Rivers, 2015). Another example is Sweden: the world’s highest 
CO2 tax was implemented there in 1991, but exemptions and other benefits 
brought the effective rate down to 11 euros per tCO2 in 1990–2004 (Lundgren 
and Marklund, 2010). The tax was 105 euros and 132 euros per tCO2 in 2001 
and 2017, respectively.
Table V.9 
British Colombia (Canada) and 15 selected countries: carbon tax rates, 2017
(Dollars per tCO2eq)
Jurisdiction Jurisdiction
British Columbia 24 Japan 3
Chile 5 Mexico 1–3
Denmark 27 Norway 3–56
Finland 69–73 Portugal 8
France 36 United Kingdom 24
Iceland 12 South Africa 8.5
India 6 Sweden 132
Ireland 24 Switzerland 87
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators [online database] https://databank.bancomundial.org/
source/world-development-indicators.
It can be seen that the value of the carbon tax on fossil fuels in the 
region (US$ 3 in Mexico, US$ 5 in Chile) is not significant enough to change 
consumer behaviour. Nevertheless, this tax is still a sign of the direction 
society wishes to move in as regards the use of these fuels. For this tax to 
act as a deterrent and approach the value of the externality, it would have 
to be at least US$ 40 to US$ 100 per ton. Low price elasticity means that 
governments choose to assign a very low value to this tax, and this is why 
it raises only modest revenues and is not very decarbonizing.
In 2008, the Canadian province of British Columbia began to apply a 
wide-ranging tax to all fuels at a rate calculated on the basis of their carbon 
content. This was the first experiment with a CO2 tax in the Americas and 
its main feature is that it is revenue-neutral. Virtually all the revenue from 
it is returned to households and economic agents. This made it possible to 
reach broad political agreement on its implementation. Consequently, it is 
a fairly high tax compared to those applied in other jurisdictions: it was 
US$ 24 per tCO2eq in 2017 and is scheduled to increase to US$ 39 in 2022 
(Murray and Rivers, 2015).
Although almost all jurisdictions in the Americas have fuel taxes, 
especially for transport fuels, only five countries have implemented an 
explicit CO2 tax, for reasons that differ from country to country. These 
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countries are Argentina, Canada, Chile, Colombia and Mexico. There 
are minor though significant differences in the structure of the tax and 
the institutional infrastructure in the five countries. The Latin American 
countries that have implemented fuel taxes based on carbon content are 
Argentina, Colombia and Mexico. In the first two, the tax rises progressively to 
US$ 10 per tCO2eq. Colombia’s tax is relatively limited: it covers all fuels 
except natural gas (in power generation) and coal, which means that it 
only covers 20% of emissions (40 million tons). It does, however, have the 
innovative feature that all revenues, estimated at US$ 160 million per year, 
will go into an environmental fund.
In Mexico, the tax is only US$ 1 to 3 per tCO2eq and, as in Colombia, 
natural gas is exempt. The tax was a first step in the design of other systems 
of instruments to set a carbon price and has served to create an institutional 
infrastructure capable of accommodating the tradable emission permit 
systems of the Western Climate Initiative, which has been declared the 
main objective. On 1 October 2019, the ground rules for the operation of an 
emissions market were published (SEMARNAT, 2019). If the country joins the 
Western Climate Initiative system, the CO2 price will have to be increased, 
at least implicitly. The system of tradable emission permits operated by 
California and Quebec has a minimum price of US$ 14 per tCO2. Changing 
the value of the tax is likely to be difficult, however, as both the previous 
and the current governments have pledged not to alter the level of taxation, 
as part of a policy of not increasing the tax burden.
In Chile, the carbon tax is based on emissions at source, regardless 
of the carbon content of the fuel or the sector emitting. This model is more 
complicated than taking the carbon content of fossil fuels as the basis for the 
tax. Applying this tax meant adapting the institutional system to measure 
or estimate emissions at source, in order to be able to collect the tax in 
coordination with the Ministry of Finance. This could pave the way for the 
country to move towards complementary systems, such as offsetting or even 
tradable emission permits (Pizarro, Pinto and Ainzúa, 2018a and 2018b). 
Table V.10 presents the main characteristics of these taxes.
Figure V.9 presents estimates of the optimum level for a petrol tax 
that incorporates the social cost of local pollution, accidents and health 
effects, among other things. For example, there are estimates for El Salvador 
and Guatemala indicating that road congestion and local pollution are the 
most important elements when a fuel tax is considered (Hernández and 
Antón, 2014).
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Table V.10 
British Columbia (Canada) and Latin America (4 countries): characteristics  















Argentina Tax on fuel, carbon 
content. Section III 
of Law No. 23966.
Purchase and sale of 
fossil fuels. All sectors 
except biofuels.
2018 1–10  
(2019–2028)
40
Colombia Tax on fuel, carbon 
content. Art. 221 
of Law No. 1819, 
December 2016.
Purchase and sale 
of fossil fuels. All 
fuels except coal 
and natural gas for 
electricity generation.
2017 5 20
Chile Tax on emissions. 
Art. 8 of Law 
No. 20780 
and the later 
simplified version, 
Law No. 20899.
Emission in boilers or 
turbines (>50 MW). All 
sectors and fossil fuels 
except biomass.
2017 5 42
Mexico Tax on fuel, 
carbon content.
Purchase and sale 





Revenue-neutral tax. All fuels with minimal 
exceptions.
2008 24 70
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official 
international data.
Figure V.9 
Latin America (6 countries): level a petrol tax should have to reflect 










Brazil Chile Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala Mexico
Accidents Congestion Local pollution
Ramsey tax Pollution from fuel
Source: F. Hernández and A. Sarabia, “El impuesto óptimo a la gasolina en Guatemala”, Project Documents 
(LC/TS.2018/65), Santiago, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
2018; I. Parry and others, Getting Energy Prices Right: From Principle to Practice, Washington, D.C., 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2014; A. Sarabia and F. Hernández, “Optimal gasoline tax in developing, 
oil-producing countries: the case of Mexico”, Energy Policy, vol. 67, Amsterdam, Elsevier, 2014.
Note: Taxes are in 2011 prices for Mexico, El Salvador and Ecuador, 2010 prices for Brazil and Chile and 
2016 prices for Guatemala.
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Table V.11 presents a summary of the environment-related taxes or 
fiscal instruments applied in Latin America and the Caribbean countries 
between 1991 and 2018.
Table V.11 
Latin America and the Caribbean (19 countries): fiscal instruments benefiting 
the environment, 1991–2018
Country Years Tax measure
Argentina 2013 
and 2018
• Average tax of 10%, ranging from 30% to 50% depending on vehicle 
type, on high-end cars and motorcycles, boats and sport aircraft.










• Increase in tax rates on industrialized products for passenger 
transport vehicles.
Chile 2005, 2014 
and 2017
• The 2014 tax reform included a tax on new vehicles sales, varying 
with the urban energy efficiency of each vehicle in km/l, with the 
objective of charging for the environmental damage caused by 
vehicles over their lifetimes.
• Tax of US$ 5 per ton of carbon emitted by generating companies 
with installed capacity over 50 MW.
• Progressive tax on mining operations whose sales exceed 
12,000 tons of fine copper per year. The tax varies between 0.5% 
and 34.5% depending on the amount of sales and, from 50,000 tons 
upward, on the operating margin. 
Colombia 1993, 2014 
and 2018
• Creation of a parafiscal contribution to mitigate fuel 
price fluctuations
• Application of compensatory taxes for water pollution.
• Application of royalties for oil production.
• Application of logging taxes when reforestation does not 
compensate for the depletion of the resource.
• Tax on the carbon contained in hydrocarbons.
Costa Rica 2009 
and 2013
• Tax of US$ 25 on each overland goods export shipment.




2012–2013 • Increase in the excise duty on hydrocarbons with the introduction 
of an ad valorem rate.
Ecuador 2011 
and 2014
• Vehicle pollution tax.
• New progressive excise tax rate, which is lower for hybrid 
and electric vehicles.
• Tax of US$ 0.02 per unit on non-returnable plastic bottles.
El Salvador 2009 
and 2013
• New ad valorem tax on first registration of vehicles: automobiles: 
1% to 8%; boats: 2% to 10%; aircraft: 2% to 5%.




• A special tax was introduced for the first registration of land 
motor vehicles.
• Tax on the use of land, sea and air vehicles. 
Honduras 2011, 2012 
and 2013
• Introduction of a surcharge (eco-tax) on used vehicle imports 
of between 5,000 and 10,000 lempiras.
• Increase in the tax on imports of oil and oil products.
• Reduction of the electricity subsidy.
• Tax on the revenue of foreign air, land and sea transport 
companies. The rate is 10% of total annual gross income originating 
in Honduras. 
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Country Years Tax measure
Mexico 1991, 2013 
and 2014
• Creation of a tax on the sale and import of fossil fuels, according 
to their carbon content. The tax averages US$ 3 per ton of carbon 
emitted (2013 fiscal reform); natural gas is exempt because it is 
considered clean. 
• Reform of value added tax: a 16% rate is applied to foreign 
passenger transport. 
• Tax on hydrocarbon exploitation and extraction.
• Tax on wastewater disposal in any receiving body (land, rivers, 
seas, etc.).
• Payment of fees to protect reefs.
Nicaragua 2009 
and 2012
• Increase in the vehicle tax rate.




• Introduction of differentiated rates in the selective consumption 
tax (ISC). These rates apply to fuels such as diesel, petrol and 
kerosene, according to how harmful they are.
• Abolition of the 10% rate for this tax on imports of new cars that run 
on natural gas or petrol.
Trinidad and 
Tobago
2000 • Tax of 0.1% on the gross revenues of oil companies. The proceeds 
of the tax go into a green fund.
Uruguay 2012 
and 2013
• Increase in the top rates of the specific domestic tax (IMESI) 




2006 • Tax of 33.33% on hydrocarbon extraction. 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Panorama Fiscal de 
América Latina y el Caribe, 2014: hacia una mayor calidad de las finanzas públicas (LC/L.3766), 
Santiago, 2014.
One of the advantages of production and consumption taxes is that 
they are easy to implement, especially when applied to fuels. Unlike more 
sophisticated systems, such as tradable emission permits (emission tax), they 
do not require a complex system of measurement, reporting and verification 
and can be implemented through the existing tax administration system. 
A carbon tax is a Pigouvian tax par excellence, enabling the unaccounted 
external cost of the CO2 emitted from an economic activity to be internalized 
(Metcalf and Weisbach, 2009).
One of the lessons learned from the cases of Mexico and Chile is that 
carbon taxes should not be designed as one-time changes: it is better to plan 
for a progressive increase over time, starting as soon as they are introduced, 
as this sends out a much more powerful directional signal. If a tax is adopted 
at a low rate and no such increase is envisaged, it will be politically more 
difficult to agree on increases that will make it an effective lever for change, 
especially at a time of sluggish economic growth in the region such as the 
second half of the 2010s.
Map V.1 shows the jurisdictions in the world where there have been 
carbon pricing initiatives.
Table V.11 (concluded)
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Map V.1 
Jurisdictions with carbon pricing initiatives, 2019
Emissions trading system implemented or scheduled 
for implementation
Carbon tax implemented or scheduled for implementation
Emissions trading system or carbon tax under consideration
Emissions trading system and carbon tax implemented 
or scheduled
Carbon tax implemented or scheduled, emissions trading 
system under consideration
Emissions trading system implemented or scheduled, 











































Source: World Bank, State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2019, Washington, D.C., 2019.
Cities can use the fiscal instruments available to them to strengthen 
climate action. Credit secured against higher future property tax revenues 
reflecting the effects of public works has been successfully applied to flood 
adaptation in central Barranquilla, Colombia. Property values in run-down 
areas of Mexico City’s historic centre have increased (gentrification) as 
a result of public investment in the introduction of the Metrobús, which 
reduced vehicle traffic, improved public and pedestrian mobility and lowered 
noise and pollution levels, thus attracting higher-income residents and 
businesses.21 This produces a virtuous circle (assuming there are measures 
to compensate those affected) in which public investment and local finances 
are strengthened, the usability of the city is restored, emissions are mitigated 
by lower demand for travel, lower-carbon mobility options become viable 
in consolidated areas, and urban quality of life is enhanced. 
21 Gentrification or the expulsion of low-income inhabitants must be compensated for. In Mexico 
City, regulatory restrictions are being considered to maintain a balance between social housing 
and higher-income housing in buildings that improve habitability and densify the city. However, 
rising property values have other undesirable effects, such as the expulsion of homeowners who 
do not have the income to pay the new property taxes; in these cases, value should be recovered 
when the properties are sold and not from the property tax applied to established residents’ 
properties whose value has risen. 
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Another option for using fiscal instruments in a more climate-friendly 
way is for the city government to create land banks with a view to the 
construction of modal services and exchanges in public transport systems 
and for private investment in the creation of these services to be authorized 
in exchange for fees paid to the local treasury. In this way, public transport 
nodes equipped with services and car parks that provide revenues to the 
public treasury could help fund improvements to public transport systems 
via the fees and charges paid by tenants, customers and private transport 
users who switch to the node services, given that 30% of car users could 
make part of their journeys by public transport and thus finance the city. 
This effect is similar to that of the carbon tax, with the difference that it 
offers direct user benefits.
There are new instruments available for cities to increase urban density 
while at the same time raising funds that fall within the tax category of fees. 
The importance of these instruments is growing rapidly where they have 
been implemented. This is the case with the issue of building permits for a 
fee (OODC) and certificates of additional building potential (CEPAC). Both 
are equivalent to creating land at height, and the city sells them to the private 
sector for a pre-set price (OODC) or by auction (CEPAC).22 Combining these 
mechanisms with local land use plans, if the latter promote development 
based on mass transit along with densification and diversification of uses, 
could be an effective aid in reducing demand for private travel in cities and 
emissions of local pollutants and greenhouse gases.
(b) Reducing energy subsidies in Latin America
Subsidies are direct fiscal expenditures (actually disbursed) or tax 
expenditures (resources foregone) which, when applied to energy, increase the 
producer’s profitability by lowering the prices paid by consumers, favouring 
consumption and expanding the producer’s market. They are established on 
the grounds that they benefit the poorest consumers, but in fact they do so 
in a highly regressive context, since the greatest benefit is obtained by those 
who consume the most, namely higher-income households and those with 
the highest rates of motorization, where direct consumption is concerned 
(see figure V.10). In the case of intermediate consumption, i.e. consumption 
for generation, the process is the same except that the price reduction is 
assumed to be reflected in the electricity tariffs paid by consumers. Normally, 
subsidies are also provided for electricity consumption, creating a twofold 
incentive for energy consumption when they coexist with the others.
22 This carries the risk of creating oligopolies of owners of urban development rights once the scale 
of these processes becomes large enough.
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Figure V.10 
Argentina, Chile, Guatemala and Mexico: structure of direct consumption of fossil 
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Argentina Chile Guatemala Mexico
Fuel spending as share of total spending in decile (left scale)
Decile’s share of total fuel spending (right scale)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of household 
income and expenditure surveys.
Note: The data for Argentina were obtained from the National Household Expenditure Survey (ENGHo) 
covering the period 2012–2013, those for Chile are from the 2016 Family Budget Survey (EPF), 
those for Guatemala are from the 2014 National Living Conditions Survey (ENCOVI) and those for 
Mexico are from the 2016 National Household Income and Expenditure Survey.
Consumption subsidies, particularly for companies (intermediate 
consumption) and households (final consumption), exist when the price is 
set below an international benchmark price, resulting in tax expenditure, or 
when the country importing hydrocarbons pays a portion of the consumer 
price. Producer subsidies exist when the prices suppliers receive are above 
the benchmark price (IMF, 2013). Subsidies encourage the production of 
fossil fuels by making them more profitable, or encourage consumption by 
making them cheaper.
Energy subsidies are a global phenomenon, and in Latin America 
and the Caribbean many countries subsidize consumption of oil, gas and 
electricity products. In most countries, subsidies begin to be applied after 
exchange-rate devaluation or to soften the impact on the domestic economy of 
major increases or large fluctuations in oil prices (which also affect electricity 
generation costs) (Fanelli, Jiménez and López, 2015), after which they are 
never removed. They are also provided to sustain the profitability of certain 
activities considered economically or socially beneficial, examples being 
subsidies for road transport or small-scale fishing. From an environmental 
perspective, this increases the destructive effect on the natural production 
of ecosystems and their capacity for absorption and regeneration.
The relevance of maintaining fossil fuel subsidies has been questioned 
because of concerns about global warming due to worldwide consumption of 
hydrocarbons and its impact on pollution, as well as the regressive nature of 
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subsidies and the cost of reaching the target population. New international 
conditions point to the need to curb the demand for these fuels by means of 
fiscal instruments or to meet it instead from less polluting energy sources 
(United Nations, 2012; Mendoza, 2014).
Fossil fuel subsidies are estimated to have represented about 6.5% 
of world GDP in 2017 (Coady and others, 2019), with the percentage being 
higher in oil-exporting countries. Energy subsidies are high in a number of 
Latin American countries, averaging 3.4% of GDP in 2015 (see figure V.11). 
Subsidies, which are regressive, together with tax evasion and avoidance, 
which are also regressive, total about 10% of GDP in Latin America and 
the Caribbean (ECLAC, 2019a).
Figure V.11 















































































































































































General government health spending Energy subsidies
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of D. Coady and 
others, “How large are global energy subsidies?”, IMF Working Paper, No. 15/105, Washington, D.C., 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2015; World Bank, World Development Indicators [online 
database] https://databank.bancomundial.org/source/world-development-indicators.
The high oil prices of the 2000s were an incentive to subsidize hydrocarbon 
prices and consumption despite the high fiscal cost, non-transparent effects 
on efficiency, and the regressiveness of distribution (Di Bella and others, 2015).
However, the temporary decline in fuel prices in the period 2012–2016 
(see figure V.12), the demand for more fiscal space and the belief that fossil 
fuel consumption has an effect on global warming have strengthened the case 
for using fiscal policy to reduce this consumption through various methods 
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of applying a fiscal value to carbon. The idea that hydrocarbon subsidies are 
not an ideal tool is gradually gaining ground. However, society is strongly 
wedded to fossil fuels, which have a low price elasticity and high income 
elasticity as a result. Reducing or abolishing subsidies poses a great many 
challenges, and efforts to address the issue have often been clumsy. This 
could be seen in France in 2019, when the yellow vest rebellion emerged in 
the face of increasing diesel prices as a result of a rise in its hydrocarbon 
tax, and more recently in Ecuador, when diesel and petrol subsidies were 
abruptly withdrawn without any transitional social compensation, without 
sequencing and without any information on the use the resources saved 
would be put to.23
Figure V.12 

























































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
Note: The prices shown in the chart are for United Kingdom Brent crude oil, light blend, API gravity 38°, 
spot price, free on board (FOB) in United Kingdom ports.
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its Sustainable 
Development Goals, together with the agenda that came out of the Paris 
Agreement, which gave rise to the NDCs to tackle climate change, have put 
the reform of energy subsidies more clearly on the public agenda. However, 
23 The reduction of these subsidies, which inform many consumption and investment decisions, 
should be accompanied by the creation of substitute and complementary goods and monetary 
compensation for the most affected groups. For example, making a straightforward transfer to 
people in place of the fuel subsidy would have a progressive compensatory effect, since it would 
represent a larger portion of the income of low-income people than of high-income people. Some 
of the tax savings could be allocated to this compensation measure. Substitutes could be modes 
of transport that offer the quality, reliability and safety required to effectively replace the demand 
for private motorized mobility. 
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there are economic policy measures that must be considered if viable reform 
is to be achieved, most notably the following: (i) create alternative options as 
fossil fuel consumption declines, such as improving public transport systems 
and electrifying them on the basis of renewable sources; (ii) depoliticize fuel 
prices in resource-rich countries; (iii) combine the reduction with compensation 
for the transition, differentiating between consumers and producers; and 
(iv) carry out these reforms at a time of low consumption or prices, in order 
to reduce the direct impact and resistance to them (Cottrell, 2014).
In summary, the elimination of subsidies reduces the profitability of 
hydrocarbon production, as well as sales and consumption, depending on 
price and income sensitivity in each country, in addition to improving the 
profitability of renewable energies relative to fossil fuels.
E. Climate financing flows in the region
1. The role of development banking
The financial sector has a key role to play in shifting relative returns towards 
lower-carbon investment so that progress can be made towards the Paris 
Agreement targets. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) was negotiated in the belief that the supply of climate 
finance to developing countries should be increased, with resources from 
the countries listed in annex II of that document. The prevailing assumption 
was that there would not be sufficient resources available to make low-carbon 
investments, as these are less profitable than others because of the additional 
cost involved. Over the history of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, 
small funds have appeared to finance the many variants of mitigation and 
an adaptation fund has been established.
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the push for recovery based on 
increased global liquidity and the decline in the profitability of non-climate 
projects, the argument that there is a lack of funds has become untenable 
and has given way to two positions. One is that there are no projects which 
offer adequate returns and are structured in such a way that the financial 
system can support them. This position assumes that the functioning of the 
financial system is neutral and that its procedures do not have to be adapted 
to the climate emergency, it being rather up to those in charge of projects to 
find a way to make them profitable. The other position is that the financial 
system does not account for damage or risks that have no market value or 
recognize the contributions and risk reduction entailed by lower-carbon 
investments. On this view, the financial system must adjust to the new reality 
posed by climate change.
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The first position has given rise to the creation of small climate funds 
which, with fiscal resources from developed countries, help to make otherwise 
unprofitable projects profitable. These funds are mainly managed by the 
World Bank and based on the model established by the Global Environment 
Facility, the financial mechanism of several environmental conventions. 
Thanks to climate funds, first the international financial system and then 
development banks have learned to finance projects on the basis of the risk 
reduction they offer and have pursued initiatives in this area. These funds 
are designed to initiate and sustain a pilot project phase that has already 
lasted a generation. In their absence, banks would not be financing climate 
projects unless they were profitable for other reasons, such as technological 
advances in wind and photovoltaic energy. Following the same logic as 
these earlier funds, but more ambitiously, the Green Climate Fund was 
created under the Paris Agreement to mobilize US$ 100 billion per year of 
medium-term financing.
As regards the second position, the G20 working group on the financial 
sector chaired by China renewed the discussion on the sector’s role and 
highlighted the existence of new types of risk it would have to address: the 
physical risks that global warming poses to infrastructure and investment 
(e.g., sea level rise, drought and water stress); the technological risks of 
activities whose markets could suddenly disappear and whose investments 
could quickly turn from assets into liabilities (stranded assets); and changes 
in investor preferences for reputational reasons. Reference was also made 
to the advisability of combining instruments such as bonds with credit in 
order to match project maturities and move forward with the identification 
of climate financing and risks.
The International Development Finance Club (IDFC) was also required 
to report on its alignment with the objectives of the UNFCCC and the Paris 
Agreement and to quantify the proportion of its portfolios committed to 
the financing of lower-carbon projects. Definitions have been progressively 
agreed regarding the suitability of projects for mitigation and adaptation, 
albeit with major limitations. To date, no bank has reported on net climate 
financing and few have developed exclusion lists of projects no longer being 
financed because they are harmful to climate efforts.
The Helsinki principles coalition is a further step in the right direction. 
These principles call above all for progress towards the implementation of 
carbon pricing mechanisms, the reduction of subsidies that are harmful to 
the fight against climate change and better monitoring of climate finance 
by governments and financial systems.
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The development of the second approach, whose tendency is to 
improve processes and capacities in the financial sector, clearly reveals the 
potential for internalizing climate risk, applying a social price to carbon, 
distinguishing between discount rates, diversifying guarantees for this type 
of project, establishing technological floors or minimums and operating 
techniques for certain types of projects in relation to emissions, and ruling out 
investments with high carbon emissions even if they are profitable, helping 
to bring financiers and projects closer together. In this way, the financial 
sector is becoming a driver of change in relative returns as opposed to an 
onlooker in a changing world.
Strengthening the second position, which presupposes an active 
financial system, implies that financing as a whole will become climate-smart, 
and not just the meagre funds made available by international cooperation, 
which are totally inadequate for change on the scale required by the 
Paris Agreement.
2. Some estimates of the investment required
Globally, the amount of resources spent to meet the financial needs of the 
conditional and unconditional commitments set forth in NDCs could exceed 
US$ 4 trillion (Weischer and others, 2016). According to Engle (2016), the 
World Bank puts the needs of International Development Association (IDA)24 
member countries at between US$ 800 billion and US$ 900 billion by 2030, 
representing more than US$ 60 billion per year until then.25
The level of climate investment is far from adequate to meet the needs 
arising from these estimates and from what IPCC has proposed. Global 
investment totalled US$ 437 billion in 2015 and US$ 383 billion in 2016 
(Buchner and others, 2017). Set against the trillions of dollars estimated to 
be required, these amounts are still tentative.
The quantification of the funds needed to make the transition to the 
agreed level of decarbonization is a pending issue in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, and only a few countries, such as Colombia and Chile, have 
financial strategies in place. There is still a long way to go to determine the 
difference between gross financing, in which the estimated figures are usually 
very high because investment that has to be made anyway is attributed to the 
change, and net financing, which represents only the additional part needed 
24 IDA is the part of the World Bank that helps the poorest countries. It is overseen by 173 nations 
and aims to reduce poverty by providing loans (called credits) and grants for programmes that 
drive economic growth, reduce inequality and improve living standards. See World Bank, “What 
is IDA?” [online] https://ida.worldbank.org/about/what-ida.
25 These values represent the sum total of the amounts declared in the NDCs.
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to decarbonize investments.26 As was seen in the section on the social price, 
that cost can actually be a saving.
There are 10 countries in the region whose commitments under the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
included information on the investments needed to comply with their NDCs.27 
These investments totalled US$ 51 billion (World Bank, 2019b). The other 
countries did not include this information. In the case of Brazil, the cost of 
implementing the country’s NDC is put at 1% of annual GDP, amounting to 
between US$ 240 billion and US$ 260 billion by 2030 (IDB, 2017).
3. The flow of climate financing in Latin America 
and the Caribbean
Monitoring of climate finance in the region helps to put into perspective the 
change needed and the means to carry it out. This section reviews the sources 
and resources mobilized for climate change. ECLAC has been monitoring the 
performance of climate finance flows since 2013, and its reports indicate that they 
have averaged US$ 20.5 billion per year between 2013 and 2017 (see figure V.13). 
Contrary to the global trend, the flow of these resources has been increasing in 
the region. The falls observed in 2015 and 2016 were due to factors exogenous 
to the climate context and were mainly attributable to the behaviour of Brazil, 
whose political and economic crisis has significantly affected investment.
According to the data for the various financial institutions and 
instruments for which it is possible to distinguish information relating to 
Latin America and the Caribbean, resources approved for climate purposes 
in 2017 amounted to US$ 22.3 billion, 40% more than in 2016 and the largest 
annual amount mobilized in the period reported on by ECLAC. The increase 
in 2017 was significantly greater than the global increase. According to IDFC 
data, the 2017 total for the 18 development banks that declared climate finance 
commitments was 23% higher than that of 2016, with investment being 
3% higher in the case of clean energy and 2% in that of renewable energy, 
according to data from Bloomberg (2019) and REN21 (2018), respectively.
26 IPCC (2018a) estimates that annual gross investment worth 1% to 1.5% of global gross fixed capital 
formation needs to be allocated to the energy sector, and 1.7% to 2.5% to other development 
infrastructure. It is further estimated that, in the energy system alone, average annual investment 
needs between 2016 and 2035 will be around US$ 2.4 trillion in 2010 dollars, which is about 2.5% of 
global GDP. It is also estimated that the increase in total energy-related investment by 2050 would 
have to be about 12% for the 1.5 °C pathway to be kept to, and that average annual investment in 
energy technologies yielding low carbon emissions and leading to energy efficiency would have 
to increase sixfold compared to 2015. Adaptation costs are difficult to calculate because they vary 
according to the degrees of temperature increase and the way they would affect the climate, and 
it has not yet been possible to establish them. The lack of data for estimating climate-resilient 
investment needs also complicates the calculation, given the underinvestment in basic infrastructure 
that characterizes many countries.
27 The countries are Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, 
Guyana, Haiti, Saint Lucia, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago.
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Figure V.13 
Latin America and the Caribbean: climate financing, 2013–2017
(Millions of current dollars)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from the 
different institutions; J. Samaniego and H. Schneider, “Cuarto informe sobre financiamiento para el 
cambio climático en América Latina y el Caribe, 2013–2016”, Project Documents (LC/TS.2019/15), 
Santiago, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2019.
Note: The figures are for approved funding for climate change projects at 11 financial institutions and 
for resources mobilized by way of bilateral and multilateral climate funds, green bonds and other 
local resources. The financial institutions are the French Development Agency (AFD), the Central 
American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI), the Colombian Foreign Trade Bank (BANCOLDEX), 
the Development Bank of Latin America (CAF), the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), the Banco 
del Estado de Chile, the European Investment Bank (EIB), the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB), the National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) of Brazil, the World Bank 
and Mexico’s Nacional Financiera (NAFIN) and Trust Funds for Agriculture (FIRA).
Brazil accounts for a large share of the region’s financial flows, as 
shown in figure V.14. Without Brazil, the amount of resources managed by 
the rest of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean grew by just 
under 50% between 2016 and 2017, and in the latter year the amount was 
almost double that of 2013.
Table V.12 shows the behaviour and composition of the climate 
resources approved in the region. The supply of resources managed by 
national development banks and other local resources has been declining, 
with their share of total resources mobilized falling significantly. In contrast 
to 2013, the multilateral banks have become the most important financial 
actors. This change in positions is due not only to the slowdown in the 
Brazilian economy already mentioned, but seemingly also to the internal 
policies of the multilateral institutions, which have set ambitious targets 
for the allocation of their resources. Thus, for example, IDB and the World 
Bank have committed themselves to allocating up to 30% of their portfolio 
for climate purposes by 2020.
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Figure V.14 
Latin America and the Caribbean: climate finance with and without Brazil, 2013–2017
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from the 
different institutions; J. Samaniego and H. Schneider, “Cuarto informe sobre financiamiento para el 
cambio climático en América Latina y el Caribe, 2013–2016”, Project Documents (LC/TS.2019/15), 
Santiago, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2019. 
Note: Because of the importance of the National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) 
in mobilizing resources to combat climate change in Brazil, this analysis only subtracted resources 
owed to that institution.
Table V.12 
Latin America and the Caribbean: amount and composition of climate financing, 2013–2017












2013 Amount 350.25 5 923.49 11 884.00 2 142.75 - 20 300.49 
Share of total 1.7 29.2 58.5 10.6 0.0 100.0 
2014 Amount 543.11 7 857.32 11 783.00 1 523.07 242.00 21 948.5 
Share of total 2.4 35.4 53.2 7.9 1.1 100.0
2015 Amount 436.07 8 293.15 9 622.55 1 558.22 1 063.75 20 973.70
Share of total 2.1 39.5 46.0 7.4 5.1 100.0 
2016 Amount 523.38 7 308.56 4 561.21 623.11 3 689.37 16 705.63 
Share of total 3.1 43.7 27.3 3.7 22.1 100.0
2017 Amount 435.51 11 827.20 5 567.47 320.99 4 189.2 22 340.35
Share of total 1.9 53.0 25.0 1.4 18.8 100.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from the 
different institutions; J. Samaniego and H. Schneider, “Cuarto informe sobre financiamiento para el 
cambio climático en América Latina y el Caribe, 2013–2016”, Project Documents (LC/TS.2019/15), 
Santiago, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2019.
a Multilateral climate funds were considered. Data for 2013 do not include resources from the NAMA Facility. 
Where the Amazon Fund is concerned, resources provided by international donors were included, while 
the Fund’s other resources were counted among those managed by the National Bank for Economic and 
Social Development (BNDES).
b The data declared by the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI) to the International 
Development Finance Club (IDFC) were included, as were the data reported by the Caribbean Development 
Bank (CDB) on its website.
c No climate bonds were issued in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2013.
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Multilateral climate funds are the smallest participants in climate 
finance, their contribution of US$ 435 million in 2017 being US$ 88 million less 
than in 2016. This limited participation is due to the difficulties involved in 
accessing these types of resources, especially at the application stages, which 
require skills that potential clients and public and private institutions in the 
region do not always have. These funds are rather meant to act as catalysts 
and show the way, and are not the mainstay of investments.
In 2015, 19% of total funding from multilateral climate funds came 
from the Amazon Fund, 15% from the Clean Technology Fund and 17% 
from climate investment funds, namely the Forest Investment Programme 
(FIP), the Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience (PPCR) and the Scaling 
Up Renewable Energy in Low Income Countries Programme (SREP). Among 
the catalytic climate funds, the most important is the Green Climate Fund 
(GCF). In 2015, the resources of this fund represented only 8% of the total 
for multilateral climate funds; its share increased to 75% of the total in 2016 
before dropping back to 30% in 2017.
When funds are classified by origin as national, international or mixed, 
as shown in table V.13 and figure V.15, it is possible to see that the share of 
national funds has decreased since 2013, when they represented 69% of the 
total. The decrease was due to the growing weight of mixed funds, which are 
the private resources used to purchase climate bonds. In absolute terms, the 
amount of international resources grew substantially between 2016 and 2017.
Table V.13 
Latin America and the Caribbean: climate funding by origin of resources, 2013–2017









2013 30.9  6 274 69.1  14 027  -  - 20 300.5 
2014 38.3  8 400 60.6  13 306  1.1  0.242 21 948.5 
2015 41.6  8 729 53.3  11 181  5.1  1 064 20 973.8 
2016 46.9  7 832 31.0  5 184 22.1  3 689 16.705.6
2017 54.9  12 263 26.4  5 888 18.8  4 189 22 340 .3
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from 
the different institutions.
Some countries’ currencies depreciated significantly during the period 
under review, which affected the amounts reported. In Colombia, for example, 
the dollar was quoted at 1,833 pesos in 2013, 2,000 pesos in 2014, 2,742 pesos 
in 2015, 3,054 pesos in 2016 and 2,951 pesos in 2017.
As in previous years, Brazil mobilized the largest amount of resources 
in 2017. However, the country’s share has declined in relative terms, from 
54.5% in 2015 to 39% in 2017. It is followed by Argentina (16.2%), Mexico 
(10.8%), Colombia (6.5%) and Chile (5.7%).
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Figure V.15 
Latin America and the Caribbean: climate financing by origin, 2013–2017
(Billions of current dollars)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from the 
different institutions; J. Samaniego and H. Schneider, “Cuarto informe sobre financiamiento para el 
cambio climático en América Latina y el Caribe, 2013–2016”, Project Documents (LC/TS.2019/15), 
Santiago, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2019. 
Among the sources reviewed, no information was found on any type 
of financial initiative to combat climate change in the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Sao Tome and Principe or Trinidad 
and Tobago. This does not mean that this type of action does not exist in 
these countries, but that it may have been carried out by institutions other 
than those analysed or may be included among the regional initiatives of the 
institutions analysed.In Brazil, which is one of the major players in climate 
finance, there has been a trend towards a reduction in this type of financing 
since 2012 because of the economic slowdown, which was particularly marked 
in 2015. Renewable energy auctions have also been suspended because of this 
slowdown. This reduction is in evidence at the National Bank for Economic and 
Social Development (BNDES). The bank’s disbursements fell by 28% in 2015, 
and in 2016 they were down by 35% and 53% on 2015 and 2014, respectively 
(BNDES, 2016). In 2017, although the institution’s disbursements continued 
to fall compared to 2016 (BNDES, 2019), the drop (25%) was considerably less 
than in previous years. In 2017, Brazil’s GDP growth was 0.7%, driven by 
budgetary adjustments and favourable economic conditions. The sectors in 
which the most resources were disbursed were infrastructure, with growth of 
4% over the previous year, and agriculture, which grew by 3%. The amounts 
mobilized for the green economy increased by nearly 1%. It should also be 
noted that the major infrastructure works built for the world sports events 
held in 2014 and 2016, which included, for example, the modernization of 
public transport, were completed in the period under study.
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In terms of the destination of climate financing, mitigation dominates 
(see figure V.16). Of the total climate resources approved by local and regional 
development banks (BNDES, IDB, EIB, CDB, BANCOLDEX, Banco del Estado, 
CABEI, CAF and NAFIN) in 2016 and 2017, 77% went to mitigation. In 2015, 
this proportion had been 87%. In 2017, adaptation accounted for 17% of 
resources, two percentage points more than the previous year.
Figure V.16 
Latin America and the Caribbean: climate financing by destination, 2016 and 2017



















Mitigation and adaptation Adaptation Mitigation Other environmental
2016 2017
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from the 
different institutions; J. Samaniego and H. Schneider, “Cuarto informe sobre financiamiento para el 
cambio climático en América Latina y el Caribe, 2013–2016”, Project Documents (LC/TS.2019/15), 
Santiago, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2019. 
Table V.14 shows the destination of climate finance by sector. In 2017, 
the focus of mitigation projects was energy generation from renewable 
sources, together with transport and energy efficiency (64% of the total). 
There was very substantial growth in renewable energy investments, from 
27% of the total in 2016 to 45% in 2017. The focus of investments in 2016 was 
also on these three sectors (48%), which by 2015 had accounted for 69% of 
total investments. The decrease observed between the two years was mainly 
due to the transport sector. Resources for adaptation increased in all three 
years analysed. In 2015 and 2016, the focus was on agriculture, forests and 
land use, while investments in 2017 centred on water sources, wastewater 
and disaster risk management.
With regard to financial instruments, according to data from IDFC, a 
grouping in which the Latin American banks included in the ECLAC studies 
participate, 97% of resources are mobilized through loans, of which 82% are 
non-concessional. In 2015, 72% were non-concessional (IDFC, 2018).
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Table V.14 
Latin America and the Caribbean: funding approved by national and regional 
development banks, by sector, 2015–2017
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
Sector
2015 2016 2017





Renewable energies (generation 
and transmission)
6 393.33 40.0 3 074.56 27.4 6 925.07 45.3
Energy efficiency 513.76 3.2 842.56 7.5 678.60 4.4
Transport 4 187.34 26.2 1 517.47 13.5 2 126.12 13.9
Agriculture, forestry and land use 828.04 5.2 679.78 6.1 1 358.20 8.9
Waste and wastewater 129.13 0.8 130.13 1.2 567.05 3.7
Infrastructure 110.05 0.7 150.00 1.3 - 0.0
Intersectoral investment 8.80 0.1 997.45 8.9 54.50 0.4
Other mitigation 1 702.13 10.6 1 263.23 11.3 60.84 0.4
Total mitigation (M) 13 873.38 86.8 8 655.17 77.2 11 770.38 77.0
Agriculture, forestry and land use 131.70 0.8 274.28 2.4 113.80 0.7
Adaptation policies, technical 
support, institutional capacity
10.00 0.1 67.87 0.6 0.70 0.0
Infrastructure 43.40 0.3 - 0.0 45.86 0.3
Energy, transport and other 
environmental constructions and 
infrastructure
- 0.0 20.57 0.2 98.70 0.6
Water sources, wastewater and 
disaster risk management
154.28 1.0 136.38 1.2 459.80 3.0
Financial services - 0.0 3.04 0.0 - 0.0
Information and communication 
technologies
- 0.0 1.95 0.0 - 0.0
Intersectoral investment 6.06 0.0 101.90 0.9 65.40 0.4
Other adaptation 1 082.00 6.8 1 081.17 9.6 1 817.19 11.9
Total adaptation (A) 1 427.44 8.9 1 687.16 15.0 2 601.45 17.0
Total mitigation and adaptation 
(M/A)
11.76 0.1 49.05 0.4 200.00 1.3
Other environmental destinations 
(OE)
673.27 4.2 819.26 7.3 714.80 4.7
Total (M+A+M/A+OE) 15 985.85 100.0 11 210.64 100.0 15 286.63 100.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from the 
different institutions; J. Samaniego and H. Schneider, “Cuarto informe sobre financiamiento para el 
cambio climático en América Latina y el Caribe, 2013–2016”, Project Documents (LC/TS.2019/15), 
Santiago, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2019. 
4. The private sector
The private sector is increasingly involved in financing climate change 
mitigation and adaptation projects. It comprises a wide range of local and 
international banks and financial institutions, private and pension funds, and 
other funds specially created to address the issue. This group also includes 
domestic savers and carbon finance companies.
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A total of US$ 437 billion was mobilized worldwide in 2015 and 
US$ 383 billion in 2016. Of these totals, 68% and 62%, respectively, were 
resources from the private sector. The private financing flow of the Climate 
Policy Initiative (CPI) includes resources committed by corporations and 
project developers implementing new renewable energy projects, loans 
from commercial banks, direct infrastructure investment by institutional 
investors and household savings (Buchner and others, 2017).
Of the US$ 237 billion invested by the private sector in 2016, project 
developers accounted for 52% of initiatives, totalling US$ 125 billion. This 
group is led by China and the United States, which finance such activities in 
their own countries. They are followed by commercial financial institutions, 
which account for 23% (US$ 60 billion). The remaining 25%, totalling 
US$ 54 billion, are resources from corporations, savers, financial instruments 
such as shares, venture capital and infrastructure funds, and institutional 
investors (Buchner and others, 2017).
Bloomberg’s quantification exercises for renewable and clean energies, 
whose data are used by CPI and other institutions, are helpful for information 
purposes, but data on private sector climate action are difficult to track and 
measure.28 The actors involved and the instruments that can be used are many 
and very diverse; there are transactions between private parties that take 
place outside the conventional financial system and there are initiatives that 
can migrate to different territories and actors. Moreover, these institutions 
do not usually publicize this type of information. In the case of banks, only 
some account for these data separately. And, of course, there is also the risk 
that the same investment project will be counted twice or more.
Progress has been made by commercial banks in Latin America and 
the Caribbean (see annex V.A2). Several institutions have established lines 
of financing for environmental protection and climate change mitigation. 
However, few of them as yet allocate resources of their own for these purposes 
and publish this information. In most cases, these lines of financing are 
resources from multilateral banks or national development banks that are 
being lent on. Annexes V.A2 and V.A3 summarize some examples of the 
programmes and lines of finance available from private banks and national 
public banks, respectively, and put to use in the region.
5. Green bonds
These bonds work like conventional bonds, with the difference that they are 
labelled as green by the issuer and specify that the resources raised from 
the debt issuance will be used in projects that generate environmental and 
28 Bloomberg regularly publishes its Clean Energy Investment Trends reports. See [online] https://
about.bnef.com/clean-energy-investment/.
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climate benefits.29 Green bonds finance climate and environmental activities 
that have a clear purpose. The universe of this type of bonds also includes 
those serving to finance climate change-related activities or generating 
environmental benefits but not labelled as green by the issuer, since they 
have not been explicitly identified with this purpose. These are called 
“unlabelled green bonds”.
In 2017, green bonds ranked third as a source of climate finance and 
the amount issued increased to US$ 4.1 billion from US$ 1.7 billion the 
previous year. The private sector was clearly dominant, accounting for 57% 
of green bonds issued in Latin America and the Caribbean. This is a well-
known financial instrument in the sector, much in demand in the market 
and providing a quick and easy way of raising resources, unlike other 
sources of climate finance. While these bonds have the capacity to capture 
fresh resources for climate and environmental purposes, they need to be 
made more transparent to ensure that they are credible and that the funds 
come from legitimate sources and are used appropriately. The labelling is 
governed by the Climate Bonds Taxonomy, which sets standards for bonds 
and their certification mechanisms.30
As can be seen in table V.15, the amounts associated with green bonds 
more than doubled worldwide in the five years from 2013 to 2017, inclusive. 
In addition, the quantity of labelled bonds increased significantly from 11% 
of total bonds issued in 2015 to 17% in 2016 and 25% in 2017. Labelled bonds 
are those that explicitly provide for the financing of new or existing projects 
yielding climate and environmental benefits.
The global trend has been replicated in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
where matters have moved very quickly. As of 2013, no bond of this type 
had been issued in the region. In 2014, the first two were issued in Peru, 
one by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) for an amount in soles 
equivalent to US$ 42 million (Kidney, 2014) and the second by Peruvian wind 
energy producer Wind Energy S.A. for US$ 204 million. Two other bonds 
were issued in 2015, one in Mexico and one in Brazil. The Mexican bond was 
worth US$ 500 million, while the Brazilian bond was issued in euros and was 
worth the equivalent of US$ 563 million. In 2016, 10 bonds were issued for 
a total value of some US$ 3.6 billion (see table V.16), three times the amount 
issued in 2015. These bonds represent 22% of the total resources mobilized 
for climate change in the region.
29 See Climate Bonds Initiative, “Labelled green bonds data: latest 3 months” [online database] 
https://www.climatebonds.net/cbi/pub/data/bonds.
30 The Climate Bonds Taxonomy contains the definitions of the Climate Bond Standard and 
Certification Scheme. See Climate Bonds Initiative (2019).
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Table V.15 
Climate bonds worldwide and sectors targeted, 2013–2017
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Bonds accumulated (billions of dollars)
Climate bond total 346.0 502.6 597.7 694.0 895.0
Labelled 36.6 65.9 118.0 221.0
Unlabelled 346.0 466.0 531.8 576.0 674.0
Number of issuers 260 280 407 780 1 128
Sector (percentages)
Transport 76.0 71.3 70.1 66.8 61.0
Energy 11.8 14.9 19.8 18.8 19.0
Multiple sectors 4.7 8.2 13.0
Financial sector 9.2 10.0
Water 0.1 0.5 2.6 3.0
Construction and industry 1.4 2.7 3.3 2.0 2.0
Agriculture and forestation 0.4 0.8 0.4 0.9 1.0
Waste and pollution control 1.2 0.3 1.2 0.7 1.0
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Climate 
Bonds Initiative annual data.
Table V.16 





Share of total 
(percentages)
Mexico City Mexico 53.59 1.5
Bancolombia Colombia 114.59 3.1
Suzano Papel y Celulosa Brazil 286.53 7.8
Mexico City Airport Trust Mexico 1 000.00 27.1
Mexico City Airport Trust Mexico 1 000.00 27.1
Nacional Financiera (NAFIN) Mexico 107.181 2.9
Central American Bank for Economic Integration Central America 70.16 1.9
Suzano Papel y Celulosa Brazil 500.00 13.6
National Bank of Costa Rica Costa Rica 500.00 13.6
CPFL Energias Renováveis Brazil 57.31 1.6
Total 3 689 366 100.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Climate 
Bonds Initiative data.
Note: The exchange rates used were 3.49 reais, 18.66 Mexican pesos and 3 054.12 Colombian pesos 
per United States dollar.
Of the bonds shown in table V.16, 60% were issued in the private sector. 
The interest of the private sector in this instrument could be due to the fact 
that bonds are a well-known and easily managed instrument for the financial 
departments of private sector organizations. The issuance of green bonds 
is similar to that of the normal debt bonds often issued by large companies, 
which is seen as an advantage. Companies appreciate the fact that the costs 
of having these bonds certified by third parties are not high, and that their 
acceptance in the market has been very positive (see annex V.A4).
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Green bonds have not gone uncriticized. For example, it has been 
argued that they can be used as vehicles for greenwashing because it is 
not certain that they will actually be used for environmental purposes and 
because the information published by issuers and buyers is not entirely 
transparent. Furthermore, the information from issuers does not allow the 
origin of the funds to be traced, so there is a risk of funds from illicit sources 
being used. The Climate Bonds Initiative, a non-profit organization registered 
in England and Wales, was set up to palliate this situation somewhat and 
has been monitoring green bonds and publishing the findings on its website 
since its creation in 2009.31 It does not trace the origin of resources, however. 
It acts as a public data source providing guides to green bond investing for 
issuers and investors. The purpose of the organization is to promote the use 
of common definitions across the different markets. Similarly, the World 
Bank, one of the world’s largest issuers, uses the criteria set out in the Green 
Bond Framework as selection criteria for its projects.
Besides these initiatives, others have been implemented or are being 
designed to provide transparency and greater clarity to investors after some 
companies and other organizations also began to take an interest in and 
issue these types of bonds. These initiatives include the following:
• The Green Bond Principles, which the International Capital Market 
Association (ICMA) published in March 2015 and updated in 2016.
• The Expert Network on Second Opinions (ENSO) set up by the 
non-governmental organization Centre for International Climate 
Research (CICERO).32
• The Statement of Investor Expectations for the Green Bond Market, 
an investor initiative led by the Coalition for Environmentally 
Responsible Economies (CERES).
• The Climate Bonds Standard and Certification Scheme, a certification 
mechanism belonging to the Climate Bonds Initiative.
• The ASEAN Green Bond Standards, published in 2017 (ASEAN, 2018).
• The green bond standards that the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) is considering launching.33
31 See Climate Bonds Initiative, “Labelled green bonds data: latest 3 months” [online database] 
https://www.climatebonds.net/cbi/pub/data/bonds.
32 CICERO is an independent non-profit entity that operates as a research institute and provides 
institutions with a second opinion on the framework and orientation applied to evaluate and 
select projects that provide the option of investing in green bonds. It also assesses the soundness 
of the framework in terms of meeting institutions’ environmental objectives.
33 See Environmental Finance, “ISO to consider green bond standard” [online] https://www.
environmental-finance.com/content/news/iso-to-consider-green-bond-standard.html.
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Since 2014, three different indices have been available for green bonds: 
the Solactive Green Bond Index,34 the S&P Green Bond Index35 and the 
Bloomberg Barclays MSCI Global Green Bond Index.36 These initiatives are 
aimed at increasing the liquidity of the instrument. In Mexico, the Mexican 
Stock Exchange (BMV) introduced the Bono Verde instrument, thereby 
strengthening its commitment to the creation of environmental markets 
and Mexico’s transition to a low-carbon economy. This made the BMV the 
first exchange in Latin America to offer a segment dedicated to green bonds 
(Grupo BMV, 2017). Via this segment, investors will be able to identify green 
label emissions by their ticker symbol, which facilitates the financing of low-
carbon projects aimed at combating climate change. In addition to the BMV, 
the initiative is led by the Mexican Carbon Platform, Mexico2, and supported 
by a coalition that is committed to developing the green bond market. 
The members of this coalition are the Mexico Bankers Association (ABM), 
HSBC bank, the International Finance Corporation (IFC, a member of the 
World Bank Group), the British Embassy and the Secretariat of Environment 
and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT). The country has already issued several 
bonds of this type and is the largest issuer in the region.
In 2016, the Brazilian Federation of Banks (FEBRABAN), in conjunction 
with the Brazilian Business Council for Sustainable Development (CEBDS), 
published a guide to issuing green securities in Brazil. It is based on 
benchmarks from the international market for green securities or bonds, such 
as the World Bank, IFC, the Climate Bonds Initiative and the Green Bond 
Principles published by ICMA. The guide is indicative and is intended for 
agents in the Brazilian green securities market, including potential issuers 
(such as companies and financial institutions), underwriters, investors, 
external assessors and other participants.
In Chile, green bonds are also viewed as a financial tool for achieving 
energy goals. A study titled “Perspectivas del financiamiento de las energías 
limpias en Chile: ¿oportunidades para los bancos verdes y los bonos verdes?”, 
prepared by the Natural Resources Defence Council (NRDC) with the support 
of the Chilean Renewable Energy and Storage Association (ACERA), was 
published in April 2016. The study indicates that the resources created using 
this type of instrument could help the country close clean energy financing gaps 
and support subsectors that capital does not flow to, despite their commercial 
potential. In addition, the Santiago Stock Exchange is looking at the feasibility 
of launching a segment for green bonds in 2018.
34 See Solactive, “Indices” [online] http://www.solactive.com/equity-indexing/faz-indices/?index= 
DE000SLA0FS4.
35 See [online] https://us.spindices.com/indices/fixed-income/sp-green-bond-index.
36 See [online] https://www.msci.com/documents/10199/242721/Barclays_MSCI_Green_Bond_
Index.pdf/6e4d942a-0ce4-4e70-9aff-d7643e1bde96.
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F. Sectoral drivers
There are some promising drivers that could give a major boost to sustainable 
development, enhancing its quality and dynamism while contributing 
to climate action. This section provides data on three preferred sectors 
for climate action: renewable energies, public mobility and lower-carbon 
cattle ranching. These sectors have the potential to reduce carbon and 
other environmental footprints, offer advantages in terms of inclusion or 
employment and economic dynamism, and also show good prospects for 
carrying out production in the region or easing the external constraint. 
Because of the availability and importance of information on energy, this 
sector goes into greater depth than the other two. Other promising sectors 
include the care economy, appropriate waste management and the design 
of a circular economy, construction with materials based on carbon capture 
and biological production based on sustainable ecosystem management. 
This section does not discuss these sectors for reasons of space. For the 
sectors it does deal with, it documents simultaneous economic, social and 
environmental contributions that interact or have the potential to interact 
virtuously. This interaction increases the capacity for growth by easing 
the external constraint, since net additional imports to the region rise only 
slightly or actually fall as a result of it, the reasons being that these sectors 
become more employment-intensive or generate positive social inclusion 
dynamics, while pressure on the environmental frontier of climate change 
and on other natural resources is reduced.
1. Renewable energies for the energy transition
(a) The contribution of renewable energies to the sustainability 
of development
This contribution can be seen in all three pillars of sustainable 
development: the economic, the social and the environmental, in that order. 
One of the economic contributions made by renewable energies is the fact 
that the cost of generation is lower than for fossil fuel-based energies. The 
cost of generating electricity from renewable sources is no longer the main 
barrier to the energy transition. Figure V.17 shows that, in 2018, the average 
normalized cost of wind energy was between US$ 0.044 and US$ 0.10 per kWh, 
that of solar energy was between US$ 0.058 and US$ 0.14, and that of energy 
generated by fossil fuels was between US$ 0.049 and US$ 0.174 (IRENA, 2019).
Another contribution made by renewable energies is that they ease 
the external constraint. The hydrocarbon trade balance in Latin America and 
the Caribbean is increasingly unfavourable, reproducing the dynamics of other 
natural resources: crude oil is exported and semi-finished and refined fossil 
fuel products are imported. This is compounded by the gradual depletion 
of reserves and the decline in primary production. The hydrocarbons trade 
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surplus is slowly disappearing (see figure V.18). The transition to renewable 
sources is easing both the external constraint and the environmental constraint 
entailed by compliance with NDCs.
Figure V.17 
Latin America and the Caribbean (12 countries): average normalized cost  




































































Solar energy Wind energy Low fossil fuel averageHigh fossil fuel average
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Bloomberg, 
New Energy Outlook 2019, New York, 2019; International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), 
Global Energy Transformation: The REmap Transition Pathway, Abu Dhabi, 2019.
Note: The cost of generating electricity from fossil fuels varies by country and source, but in 2018 the 
average cost worldwide was between US$ 0.049 and US$ 0.174 per kWh (IRENA, 2019).
Figure V.18 
Latin America and the Caribbean (33 countries): trade balance in unrefined,  














































Fossil fuel commodity trade balanceDerivatives and refined products trade balance
Overall trade balance
Source: United Nations, International Trade Statistics Database (UN COMTRADE) [online] https://comtrade.
un.org/.
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Another contribution of renewable energies is that they boost the 
economy. Taking the 2016 input-output matrix as a basis, data from Chile 
were used as a benchmark to estimate the relationship between the value 
added of each technology (its contribution to GDP) and the level of electricity 
generation in GWh corresponding to each (see table V.17). The GDP contribution 
of renewable energy sources, such as hydroelectric, solar and wind, is double 
that of fossil fuels per GWh generated.
Table V.17 
Chile: contribution of each GWh generated to GDP, by technology, 2016 
 
Generating technology
Total Fossil Total renewable Hydroelectric Biomass Solar Wind
Generation GWh 73 877 47 281 26 595 19 208 2 955 2 216 2 216
Value added Millions 






54 40 80 82 61 83 83
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Central Bank 
of Chile, Cuentas Nacionales de Chile 2013–2018, Santiago, 2019.
Note: Pesos were converted to dollars at the average 2016 exchange rate (676.9 Chilean pesos).
The relationship between the sectoral contribution to value added 
and final demand in the electricity generation sector shows the investment 
multipliers in each of the generation technologies. Table V.18 shows that 
hydroelectric, solar and wind generation have similar investment multipliers,37 
and that all of them are close to 1. In other words, for every million dollars 
invested in renewable energies, their contribution to GDP or value added 
through the multiplier will be just over a million dollars. This is considerably 
higher than the fossil fuel multiplier.
Table V.18 
Chile: GDP multipliers for each million dollars invested in electricity  
generation, by technology, 2013–2018
Direct GDP Indirect GDP Total GDP
Fossil energies 0.385 0.204 0.588
Hydropower 0.795 0.237 1.032
Biomass 0.589 0.395 0.984
Solar energy 0.795 0.226 1.021
Wind energy 0.795 0.237 1.032
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of Central Bank of Chile, Cuentas Nacionales de Chile 2013–2018, 
Santiago, 2019.
37  The investment multiplier is the cascade effect that energy investment has in other sectors.
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The contribution to GDP per worker is also higher in the renewable 
energy sector. This is because these energies are more capital-intensive, so 
workers are more productive for the Chilean economy than those employed 
in fossil fuel-based generation (see table V.19).
Table V.19 
Chile: GDP per worker in the renewable energy sector, 2016
 GDP  (millions of dollars)




Country total 225 775 8 216 000 27 480
Electricity generating sector 4 008 7 623 525 744
Fossil energies 1 882 5 990 314 190
Hydropower 1 581 1 385 1 141 259
Biomass 180 28 6 436 535
Solar energy 183 115 1 592 848
Wind energy 183 105 1 744 547
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Central Bank 
of Chile, Cuentas Nacionales de Chile 2013–2018, Santiago, 2019.
In Latin America and the Caribbean, the energy transition has the 
potential to create a significant number of new “green” jobs that could 
represent an increase of up to 66% in the period 2020–2030 (see figure V.19).
Figure V.19 
Brazil, Mexico and rest of Latin America and the Caribbean: net job creation  
in an energy transition scenario, 2020–2030










Rest of Latin America
and the Caribbean
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean/International Labour Organization 
(ECLAC/ILO), “Environmental sustainability and employment in Latin America and the Caribbean”, 
Employment Situation in Latin America and the Caribbean, No. 19 (LC/TS.2018/85), Santiago, 2018.
It is estimated that, in Chile, the quantity and quality of employment 
created by non-conventional renewable energies could be greater if the 
country settled on a production development policy that encouraged local 
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production and import substitution, at least in part. This would harness 
the capacity of each of the renewable energies to attract employment. The 
estimated employment multipliers for Chile’s different generating technologies 
are presented in table V.20.
Table V.20 
Chile: employment multipliers for each million dollars of electricity generation, 
by technology, 2013–2018
Direct employment Indirect employment Total employment
Fossil energies 1.427 0.757 2.183
Hydropower 0.671 0.200 0.871
Biomass 0.105 0.070 0.176
Solar energy 0.537 0.153 0.690
Wind energy 1.064 0.317 1.381
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Central Bank 
of Chile, Cuentas Nacionales de Chile 2013–2018, Santiago, 2019.
The data available for the region are consistent with those reported by 
the United States National Association of State Energy Officials (NASEO), 
whose annual report, the U.S. Energy and Employment Report, seeks to 
promote effective, informed and robust energy policies and programmes and 
to identify trends and important skill sets for the energy workforce of the 
future (NASEO/EFI, 2019). According to these data, renewable energy-based 
electricity generation is much more dynamic in terms of job creation (64% of 
the total) than fossil energy-based electricity generation, which created 24% of 
jobs in the sector in 2018 (see table V.21).
Table V.21 
United States: employment in electricity generation, by main energy technology 
and subcategories, 2016–2018
(Numbers of workers)
Energy source 2016 2017 2018
Non-conventional 
renewable energies
Solar 373 807 349 725 334 992
Wind 101 738 107 444 111 166
Geothermal 5 768 7 927 8 526
Bioenergy Combined heat and power 26 014 27 239 29 245
Bioenergy 12 385 12 976
Hydropower Low-impact 9 295 11 531 11 578
Traditional 56 259 55 341 54 870
Nuclear energy Nuclear 68 176 64 743 62 987
Fossil energies Coal 86 035 92 843 86 202
Petroleum and oils 12 840 12 407 12 582
Natural gas Advanced (low-emission) 36 117 66 385 69 159
Traditional 52 125 41 034 43 526
Other Other types of generation/other fuels 32 695 34 839 37 775
Total 860 869 883 843 875 584
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of National 
Association of State Energy Officials/Energy Futures Initiative (NASEO/EFI), The 2019 U.S. Energy 
and Employment Report, Arlington, 2019.
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Another advantage offered by renewable energies is that they leave 
a smaller environmental footprint per unit generated. Obviously, energy is 
consumed and greenhouse gases are emitted in the different stages of building, 
manufacturing and installing generation plants, whether generation is from 
fossil or renewable energies. Data on this process and on the behaviour of the 
plant during its life cycle should be the basis for comparing the technologies 
and their respective energy sources. The environmental gain offered by 
renewable energies lies in their near-zero emissions when operational;38 
however, emissions are also lower in the preceding and subsequent stages, 
and are significantly lower than those released over the life cycle of fossil 
fuel power plants (see table V.22). Besides greenhouse gases, these plants 
emit other pollutants that have a local impact, such as nitrogen and sulphur 
oxides, mercury, carbon monoxide and particles. This is in addition to the 
emissions generated by transport to supply them, which are further increased 
if the input has to be transported over long distances and, for example, ships 
have to be used. Over the lifetime of renewable energies, net emissions 
become virtually zero.
Table V.22 
Greenhouse gas emissions over the life cycles of six technologies, various years
(Grams of CO2eq/kWh of electricity)








22.3 42.8 104 24.4 11.7 10.8
Operation 442 442 881 13.7 0.09 0.21
Downstream (dismantling, 
processing and disposal 
of materials and 
infrastructure)
0.0 0.0 0.02 1.1 0.2 0.18
Total 465 486 985 39.3 11.9 11.2
Source: A. Louwen, “Comparison of the life cycle greenhouse gas emissions of shale gas, conventional 
fuels and renewable alternatives from a Dutch perspective”, master’s thesis on energy science, 
Utrecht, University of Utrecht, 2011.
(b) The situation with renewable energies in Latin America 
and the Caribbean and policies to increase their share  
in the electricity mix
To summarize briefly, it can be said that the energy situation in 
Latin America and the Caribbean is one in which hydropower is declining, 
despite the investment made in it. This is due in part to the reduction in 
rainfall, but also to investment based on fossil fuels, with a persistent role 
for shale gas in particular. The share of renewable sources in the energy mix 
38 See Louwen (2011), Vattenfall (2019), UCS (2017), Pehl and others (2017), WNA (2011) and Hardisty, 
Clark and Hynes (2012) for information on these emissions and their life cycle.
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barely increased from 24% to 25% between 2000 and 2017 (see figure V.20), 
and some countries in the region are carbonizing instead of decarbonizing.39 
Fossil energy consumption subsidies are significant and in some cases higher 
than health spending, for example, as seen above. Despite the advantages 
offered by renewable energies, there are obstacles that derive from fossil path 
dependency, such as sunk costs,40 a lack of renewable energy transmission 
and storage infrastructure, delays in internalizing externalities and the 
importance of hydrocarbons in some countries’ exports.
Figure V.20 






















Central America South America Latin America
and the Caribbean
The Caribbean Andean area Brazil Mexico
2000 2017
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Latin American 
Energy Organization (OLADE), Energy Information System of Latin America and the Caribbean 
(SIELAC) [online database] http://sielac.olade.org/.
According to IEA (2018), non-conventional renewable energies grew 
at an average rate of 3% per year between 2000 and 2016 and fossil energies 
at a rate of 2% per year, but the latter make up a much larger share of 
the energy mix. Hydroelectricity grew in absolute terms, but its share is 
declining because it is expanding more slowly than any other source except 
oil, the largest source in the mix, whose annual growth was even lower (see 
tables V.23 and V.24).
39 The share of renewable sources in the energy mix is defined as the percentage of renewable 
primary energy in the total energy supply. The total supply includes fuels for generation and 
those for direct consumption in burners and vehicles.
40 Investments which were made in the past and are no longer considered for accounting purposes, 
but which were essential expenses for current profitability.
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Table V.23 




















Coal  27 291 4.6  44 854 5.4 3.2
Oil  296 716 50.0  353 569 42.6 1.1
Natural gas  118 235 19.9  206 973 24.9 3.6
Fossil  442 242 74.6  605 395 72.9 2.0
Nuclear energy  5 327 0.9  9 046 1.1 3.4
Hydropower  50 216 8.5  62 599 7.5 1.4
Geothermal 
energy
 6 350 1.1  6 586 0.8 0.2
Solar, wind and 
others
  152 0.0  6 273 0.8 26.2
Biofuels and 
waste





 95 000 16.0  153 275 18.5 3.0
Other   148 0.0   249 0.0 3.3
Total  592 934   100   830 564   100 2.1
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of International 
Energy Agency (IEA).
a Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Suriname.
Table V.24 
















Coal  43 335 4.4  107 420 6.7 5.8
Oil  167 167 17.1  150 720 9.5 -0.6
Natural gas  139 352 14.3  429 798 27.0 7.3
Fossil  349 854 35.8  687 938 43.2 4.3
Nuclear energy  20 444 2.1  34 716 2.2 3.4
Hydropower  584 010 59.8  728 026 45.7 1.4
Geothermal energy  7 817 0.8  10 109 0.6 1.6
Solar, wind 
and others
248 0.0  60 345 3.8 41.0
Biofuels and waste  13 867 1.4  70 381 4.4 10.7
Non-conventional 
renewable energies
 21 932 2.2  140 835 8.8 12.3
Other 372 0.0   391 0.0 0.3
Total 976 612   100  1 591 906 100 3.1
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of International 
Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Balances 2018, Paris, 2018.
a Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Suriname.
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According to the projection for the policies currently applied in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, there will only be marginal changes in 
the energy mix by 2040 (OLADE, 2018), since the investments provided for 
in national energy plans are not sufficiently transformative (see figure V.21). 
According to the review of the policies to be applied, the transition will not 
occur fast enough to comply with NDCs unless both regulatory and economic 
disincentives for fossil fuels and incentives for renewables are applied, and 
unless governments provide clear guidance on the way forward.
Figure V.21 


























Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Latin American 
Energy Organization (OLADE), Panorama Energético de América Latina y el Caribe, 2018, Quito, 2018.
Box V.2 
Uruguay: the big push for energy sector sustainability
Uruguay’s energy mix has undergone a profound change that can be considered 
a major boost to sustainability. Policies promoting technological development 
have been successfully coordinated, oil imports have been reduced, the shares 
of indigenous non-traditional renewable energy sources and locally sourced 
energy have been increased, local capabilities and jobs have been created, care 
for the environment has been promoted and emissions have been reduced. 
Total energy investments in the period 2010–2015 were US$ 7.1 billion, of 
which US$ 4.7 billion came from the private sector. Investments in the energy 
transition represented over 3% of Uruguay’s GDP each year in that period 
(Kreimerman, 2019).
In 2017, Uruguay’s national energy assessment (MIEM, 2018) shows that 
the share of renewable energies in the electricity generation mix was 98%, with 
243 MW of photovoltaic panels installed and 1,511 MW of energy produced 
by wind farms. Electricity generation grew by 3% from 2016 to 2017, but the 
consumption of fossil fuels for this purpose fell by 46% and their share of the 
electricity generation mix fell from 3% to 2% in 2017.
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The primary energy mix in Uruguay has therefore changed dramatically, as 
can be seen in figure 1 comparing the mix in 2000 and 2017. The advance of 
renewable sources has been very significant, as has the reduction of fossil sources.
Figure 1 

























Source: Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mining, Balance Energético 2017, Montevideo, 2018.
The 2008 crisis checked CO2 emissions, and structural change in the 
energy mix had the same effect from 2012 (see figure 2). 
Figure 2 
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Source: Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mining, Balance Energético 2017, Montevideo, 2018.
If public transport in Uruguay were also electrified, it would be a firm step 
towards renewability in the entire energy mix.
Source: R. Kreimerman, “¿Un big push energético? Reflexiones a partir del caso 
de Uruguay”, document presented at the third meeting of the Forum of the 
Countries of Latin America and the Caribbean on Sustainable Development, 
Santiago, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
22–26 April 2019; Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mining, Balance Energético 2017, 
Montevideo, 2018.
Box V.2 (concluded)
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From the point of view of sustainability, the increase in investment in 
renewable energies and their greater shares of the primary energy mix and 
final consumption offer quantifiable advantages in all three dimensions: 
the economic, the social and the environmental. And they offer even more 
advantages if, in addition to the limited survey carried out in this section, efforts 
to strengthen production chains and decentralize generation are considered. 
The expansion of fossil energies is only possible in a context of tolerance 
for their negative externalities and insufficient complementary investments 
in the renewables sector. The available data show that the development of 
the renewable energy sector is a contribution to sustainable development.
2. Clean mobility as a driver of sustainable development 
and urban productivity
“Urban mobility patterns in the region show exponential growth in 
the number of motor vehicles and a marked user and investment bias 
towards private transport, increasing the inefficiency of the system”  
(ECLAC, 2019e, p. 168).
Urban mobility is increasingly inefficient in the region’s cities, which are locked 
in a vicious circle of economic inefficiencies, since the proliferation of cars 
and the fuels they run on increases the external constraint and constitutes a 
poor collective solution for mobility. This solution leads to health productivity 
losses due to emissions and noise, economic losses due to traffic congestion, 
degradation of urban spaces, low passenger carrying capacity per vehicle 
and high greenhouse gas emissions (Vasconcellos, 2019a). At the same time, 
investment in public mobility is insufficient to achieve the necessary quality 
in terms of reliability, efficiency, modal links and comfort to make this type 
of mobility a viable substitute for the private variety. The interaction between 
private solutions, the fact that public investment is biased towards private 
transport infrastructure and the low quality of public services are mutually 
reinforcing. Moreover, 97% of final demand in the transport sector is for oil 
derivatives (OECD/IEA, 2017). Radically improving public mobility and 
electrifying it in order to break the vicious circle can be a major driver of 
sustainable development and a great boost to productive development in the 
region. The electrification of private mobility is also undoubtedly a factor 
that can promote development and reduce the environmental footprint, 
but it does not prevent either congestion or the indirect impact on natural 
resources through mining.
(a) The contribution of clean mobility to the sustainability 
of development: electric buses
The cost of battery manufacturing is key to the total cost of electric 
vehicles. From 2010 to 2017, the average price of batteries fell from US$ 1,000 
to US$ 209 per kWh, a reduction of 79% in seven years (Bloomberg, 2018b). In 
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addition, their density or ability to deliver energy continues to increase at a 
rate of 5% to 7% per year, which resulted in electric vehicle range increasing 
by 41% between 2012 and 2016 (OECD/IEA, 2018).
The cost of batteries makes the initial (purchase) price of electric 
buses compared to conventional ones the main barrier to the electrification 
of buses. This is leading to the design of new business models that involve 
the implementation of, for example, initial subsidies, battery leasing systems, 
shared ownership mechanisms or separation of ownership and operation, 
among others. Bloomberg (2018a) suggests that by 2030 electric and conventional 
vehicles will cost the same and batteries will constitute 8% of the total cost 
of electric buses, compared to 26% in 2016. The increase in demand could 
mean that parity is reached earlier, in 2025.
In contrast to the initial cost, the total cost of ownership is lower 
for electric buses than for those with internal combustion engines. This 
cost includes that of purchasing and maintaining the unit, plus the fuel or 
energy consumed over its lifetime. In the example of Mexico City shown in 
figure V.22, the total ownership cost of electric buses is the lowest of those 
analysed for a 10-year lifespan (World Bank, 2019a).
Figure V.22 
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Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators [online database] https://databank.bancomundial.org/
source/world-development-indicators.
a The cost is calculated on the basis of a 10-year lifespan.
According to OECD/IEA (2018), typical battery manufacturing plants 
will increase the density of batteries and lower their price. In addition, lithium 
batteries, which are reaching their maximum density (Soam, 2019), will be 
the main technology of the next decade. According to Bloomberg (2018b), 
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world production capacity will increase from 131 GWh/year, the current level, 
to approximately 400 GWh/year in 2021, with 73% of production coming 
from China. Expected demand by 2030 is 1,500 GWh/year and demand for 
materials such as cobalt, lithium and nickel is expected to increase from 
approximately 0.7 million cubic metres in 2018 to over 10 million cubic metres 
in 2030. Solid state batteries hold out promise when it comes to increasing 
density and reducing size, weight and limitations associated with raw 
materials, among other issues.
The economic dynamism of this sector could be captured in the region 
if the demand for electric vehicles in cities were planned in such a way as to 
send a signal strong and large enough to elicit a response from the regional 
automotive industry. In the absence of such planning and coordination, 
vehicles will be supplied by Chinese companies, especially electric buses, but 
also the bicycles and scooters that have recently been added to the mobility 
menu, and possibly other vehicles, such as drones, in the future.
In the Chilean capital, Santiago, following the expiry of the original 
contracts for the public transport system in 2018, the system’s business 
model was renewed and the Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications 
incorporated 200 electric buses into the system’s tendering process. This was 
the trigger for a number of measures aimed at bringing electric buses into the 
fleet. Thus, 300 buses acquired by two electricity generators, Engie and the 
Italian firm Enel, had been introduced by August 2019, with Enel considering 
introducing another 83 buses by the end of this year (Enel, 2019). According 
to a personal communication from the Metropolitan Public Transport Board 
(DTPM), another 25 electric buses purchased by the financial company NEoT 
Capital with funds from its strategic partners Mitsubishi Corporation and the 
French electricity company EDF Energy will be incorporated into Santiago’s 
urban transport system in December 2019.41 With this, four operators in the 
city, Metbus, Vule, Servicio de Transporte de Personas (STP) and Redbus, 
will be running more than 400 electric buses made by three different 
manufacturers, namely BYD, Yutong and King Long, and leased by three 
companies, Enel, Engie and NEoT Capital. When they are all operational, 
these buses will make up 6% of the fleet and the country will be among 
those with the most vehicles of this type in its urban public transport fleet 
(Schneider, 2019).
The BYD buses purchased by Enel are 12 metres long and have a range 
of 250 kilometres. Metbus operates them under a 10-year leasing contract, at 
the end of which it will become the owner of the buses. The monthly leasing 
fee for the electric buses is approximately 60% higher than for diesel ones, 
but operating costs (energy) and maintenance costs (chassis, engine and 
41 NEoT Capital is an investor specializing in distributed renewable energy and electric mobility 
services. See [online] https://neotcapital.com/.
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bodywork) are 70% lower (DTPM, 2018) (see table V.25). Thus, Santiago’s fleet 
of electric buses for public mobility is increasing: the vehicle consumption 
pattern is improving, but the production pattern is not.
Table V.25 
Santiago: monthly cost of leasing, operating and maintaining diesel  
and electric buses, 2018
(Chilean pesos)
 Diesel Electric Difference
Leasing instalment 2 212 943 3 520 591 1 307 648 
Operating cost 1 980 000 508 200 -1 471 800 
Maintenance cost 1 320 000 396 000 -924 000 
Total 5 512 943 4 424 791 -1 088 152
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Metropolitan 
Public Transport Board (DTPM), Informe de Gestión 2018, Santiago, 2018. 
Note: Operating costs include the high-, medium- and low-voltage charging system, a transformer station 
at each site, three back-up generators and the array of 100 slow overnight chargers in periods of 
three to four hours.
According to data provided by Metbus, over a period of 10 years the 
total cost of electric buses ends up being lower than that of diesel buses 
because of their lower operating and maintenance costs. The present value 
of the total cost considered by the company, which includes the costs of the 
charging infrastructure, leasing, operation and maintenance, is 40.695 billion 
Chilean pesos in the case of diesel buses and 32.626 billion in the case of 
electric buses. This means that the present value of the total cost of the latter 
is almost 20% lower.
The social gains that electric buses offer in terms of public mobility 
are potentially enormous. Of course, the transport benefits that buses of 
this type provide are numerous, as they reduce local emissions and prevent 
health damage, engine vibration and noise, while they are also quieter and 
cleaner inside and can offer a wireless signal and air conditioning, among 
other services. But the greatest gain is in the way transport is organized, 
since if this is done on the basis of improved infrastructure and modal and 
payment method integration, it increases the productivity of the public 
transport system, of each user and of the city as a whole. From this point 
of view, a policy that fostered a radical improvement in public transport 
performance would make climate action a social policy of real significance. 
The social benefits could be as great as the climate benefits.
In terms of employment, the manufacture of electric buses would not 
lead to significant changes, although it is estimated that there would be job 
losses in the maintenance sector. On the other hand, when surface public 
transport is organized in bus rapid transit systems, there is usually a net 
gain in employment compared to atomized or traditional concession systems.
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As far as the environmental footprint is concerned, CO2 emissions by 
vehicle type, passenger transported and kilometre are obviously lower with 
electric vehicles, particularly where public transport is concerned, owing 
to the volume of passengers transported. This last point also applies to 
internal combustion vehicles. An evaluation carried out by SEDEMA (2016) 
in Mexico City compares the CO2 emissions per passenger transported of 
collective and individual means of transport, without considering electric 
buses (see figure V.23).
Figure V.23 
Mexico City: CO2 emissions by vehicle, 2014


















SUV Sedan Motorbike Hybrid car Electric car Bus Metrobus
Source: Secretariat of the Environment (SEDEMA), Inventario de emisiones de la CDMX 2014: contaminantes 
criterio, tóxicos y de efecto invernadero, Mexico City, 2016.
Note: Metrobús is a transport system operating in Mexico City that consists of buses running in 
dedicated lanes. 
The potential of electric vehicles to reduce emissions is directly 
related to their use and, to a lesser extent, their production. The emissions 
benefits of these vehicles depend on the configuration of the energy system 
forming the electricity grid that supplies their batteries. The cleaner the 
electricity grid, the greater the contribution of this technology to the fight 
against climate change. CO2 emissions during the manufacturing stage 
are determined by the way commodities are extracted and produced and 
materials are transported and assembled. As with the energy used by these 
vehicles, emissions in the manufacturing process are critical and must be 
considered when assessing the impact of implementing electric mobility 
in the fight against climate change. Special attention should be paid at this 
stage to ensure that one lot of emissions does not end up being replaced 
by another.
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The Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO) 
produced a study in which it quantified the CO2 emissions of pure electric 
cars and plug-in hybrids and compared them with those of cars running on 
petrol and diesel in the Netherlands. The research took in the whole life cycle 
of the vehicle, from manufacturing to recycling and disposal, and concluded 
that, at the manufacturing stage, pure electric vehicles and plug-in hybrids 
emitted between 28% and 39% more CO2 than petrol, diesel, and petrol hybrid 
vehicles (see figure V.24) (TNO, 2015). When the full production cycle from 
manufacture to use of the vehicles (well-to-wheel or WTW)42 was considered, 
the conclusion was that electric vehicles emitted 35% less on average than 
similar petrol or diesel vehicles over a distance of 220,000 km (TNO, 2015). 
This is consistent with information from other reports (Schneider, 2019).
Figure V.24 
CO2 emissions of conventional and electric vehicles over a distance 
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Source: Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO), “Energie- en milieu-aspecten van 
elektrische personenvoertuigen”, TNO Rapport, Delft, 2015.
Note: Manufacturing includes maintenance and recycling (disassembly). Green energy is energy 
produced from non-conventional renewable sources and grey energy is the combination of this 
with fossil energy. 
(b) Public transport quality as a driver of development 
A number of improved public transport systems have been introduced 
in the region, such as bus rapid transit systems, cable cars, escalators in 
residential areas, expanded underground railway systems, trolleybuses 
and vehicles such as bicycles and scooters made available for public use. In 
42 Well to wheel (WTW) refers to the amount of energy in the stage from manufacture to use, well 
to tank (WTT) the amount of energy in the stage from fuel production to use, and tank to wheel 
(TTW) the energy provided by the fuel in the vehicle tank.
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terms of cost-effectiveness, bus rapid transit systems have been particularly 
successful, but their vehicles have considerable room for improvement and 
service could also be greatly improved by electrification. As regards the 
transition to the latter, however, as of 2019 there are only two electric vehicle 
plants in the region. These plants belong to BYD, China’s largest manufacturer, 
which has a plant in Campinas in Brazil and another in Buenos Aires that 
is not yet producing.
The vicious circle triggered by poor service quality leads to the service 
becoming financially compromised, in a spiral of underfunding that results 
in passengers leaving the system as soon as they can, making the operation 
more expensive for the remaining users (Vasconcellos, 2019b). Figure V.25 
illustrates this phenomenon in relation to Curitiba (Brazil), the city where 
the region’s bus rapid transit systems were launched. Vasconcellos (2019b) 
has also documented the phenomenon in other Brazilian cities.
Figure V.25 
Curitiba (Brazil): demand for collective transport per inhabitant, 2004–2016
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Source: E. Vasconcellos, “Mobilidade urbana em Curitiba: os limites do sonho”, Revista dos Transportes 
Públicos, vol. 41, São Paulo, National Association of Public Transportation (ANTP), 2019.
Regulatory frameworks channel investments in the desired direction 
and, as was seen earlier, to make them viable it is necessary to provide the 
right incentives, redesign institutional frameworks, apply governance at 
local, national and regional levels, create appropriate regulations and provide 
greater stimulus to public investment and public-private partnerships. Electric 
vehicle penetration targets are a good sign (see table V.26). Chile has set a 
goal of total electrification of the public transport system, a situation that is 
still exceptional in the region.
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Table V.26 
European Union and selected countries: examples of announced targets  
for electric vehicles, 2020–2030
Country Target
China Five million electric vehicles by 2020, including 200,000 buses.
European Union 15% and 30% of vehicles sold by 2025 and 2030, respectively, must be electric. 
Finland 250,000 electric vehicles by 2030.
India 30% of vehicles and 100% of buses sold by 2030 must be electric.
Ireland 500,000 electric vehicles by 2030; 100% of the vehicles sold that year must 
be electric.
Japan 20% to 30% of vehicles sold by 2030 must be electric.
Netherlands Electric vehicles must have a 10% market share by 2020 and 100% by 2030; 
100% of buses sold by 2025 must be electric and 100% of the public bus stock 
must be by 2030.
New Zealand 64,000 electric vehicles by 2021.
Norway 100% of vehicles and buses sold by 2025 must be electric; 75% of 
the long-distance bus fleet and 50% of trucks must be electric by 2030.
Republic of Korea 200,000 electric vehicles by 2020.
Slovenia 100% of vehicles sold by 2030 must be electric.
United Kingdom 396,000 to 431,000 electric vehicles by 2020.
United States 
(eight states)
3,300,000 electric vehicles by 2025.
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/International Energy Agency (OECD/IEA), 
Global EV Outlook 2018: Towards cross-modal electrification, Paris, 2018.
Fostering domestic demand has been one of the main incentives for 
Chinese industry, along with State subsidies and poor air quality in many 
municipalities. Only electric buses are purchased in cities like Shanghai 
and Shenzhen. In 2011, 0.6% of all buses sold in China were electric. 
By 2017, these already made up between 22% and 26% of the country’s stock 
(Bloomberg, 2018a; ITDP, 2018). In 2017, the share of electric and hybrid buses 
reached 39.5% of the total in China (ITDP, 2018) and about 1.6% in Europe, with 
2,100 units (Bloomberg, 2018a). China is the largest producer and consumer 
of this type of vehicle: it accounts for 99% of the world’s electric bus stock 
and 99% of sales, which places it in a privileged position to capture demand 
from other countries.
In 2009, the city of Shenzhen, which has 12 million inhabitants, was 
the first of 13 cities selected by the State to showcase and promote electric 
vehicles in China, including buses, as part of a planned process to stimulate 
industrial production. By the end of 2017, 16,359 buses of this type (ITDP, 2018) 
made up the city’s entire fleet, making Shenzhen the first city in the world to 
have fully electrified public passenger transport mobility. In 2016, according 
to the Shenzhen Municipal Transport Commission, technological change 
resulted in emissions savings equivalent to what would have been produced 
by the consumption of 366,000 tons of coal (ITDP, 2018).
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Maintaining and even increasing the modal share of public transport 
requires a radical rise in service quality. Low quality produces a vicious 
circle of abandonment of the service in favour of private transport that needs 
to be broken in the interests of greater inclusiveness and environmental 
and time use improvements. The policy lesson is that urban demand for 
sustainable electrification needs to be planned for to achieve the scale and 
sustainability the regional industry requires. There is also a need to move 
from an approach that considers only the capital expenditure involved in 
introducing buses to one that takes into account both capital and operating 
expenditure, a framework in which the electric option proves cheaper. 
This means adjusting both urban regulatory frameworks and the financial 
mechanisms tried so far, to facilitate their introduction.
3. The contribution of low-carbon livestock to sustainable 
development: the case of Brazil
Land use change and agriculture are major sources of emissions in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, as was seen in chapter II, and sustainable ecosystem 
management is important.
Three paths can be followed in the low-carbon livestock sector 
(FAO/AGROSAVIA, 2018)
(i) improve productivity and reduce the emissions intensity of livestock 
by improving feed, genetics, health and animal husbandry, which 
has the potential to increase food production and income; 
(ii) manage soil carbon by restoring degraded and fragmented 
landscapes through selective intensification of production, thereby 
creating favourable conditions for biodiversity and climate, the 
provision of critical ecosystem services, watershed protection 
and carbon sequestration. About 30% of the global potential to 
sequester carbon through improved grazing management is in 
the Latin American and Caribbean region; 
(iii) integrate livestock into the circular bioeconomy through the 
utilization of waste, e.g., manure and crop residues, which can 
be converted into energy (biomass) and enable nutrient recovery.
These three practices stimulate rural development, curtail the physical 
expansion of the sector and free up large amounts of land for other uses or to 
promote environmental recovery. Practices that enable carbon to be sequestered 
in grasslands increase resilience to climate variability, enhance long-term 
adaptation and create additional benefits in food security, biodiversity and 
water conservation.
Economically and environmentally proven methods include silvopastoral 
systems, agroforestry arrangements that combine fodder plants, grasses and 
legumes with shrubs and trees for animal feed and other complementary uses 
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(FAO/CIPAV, 2019). These production systems make it possible to intensify 
production based on natural processes and achieve greater sustainability 
than with conventional land use. Ecological interactions increase productivity, 
efficiency, the provision of environmental services and, ultimately, the 
economic performance of estates.
FAO/CIPAV (2019) highlights the benefits of better-quality fodder 
plants, which reduce the need for supplementation from external sources and 
increase the number of livestock per hectare up to fourfold. In addition, they 
increase carbon sequestration in the soil and plants, improve soils and fix 
nitrogen, optimize water infiltration and the hydrological cycle, and increase 
bird and insect biodiversity, which improves pollination and pest control. A 
number of variations on the method are described in the literature, such as 
crop-livestock-forest systems, forest-livestock integration or crop-livestock 
integration, depending on the characteristics of each initiative.
Low-carbon cattle farming offers a number of economic advantages. 
The recovery of grasslands and the implementation of integrated systems 
would make it possible to reduce cultivated and grazed areas by up to 
1.4  million hectares and between 4 and 5 million hectares, respectively. 
These areas could be removed from the production system and used for 
forest restoration. This increase in productivity would also make it possible 
to increase the animal stock per hectare. While in degraded areas the rate 
is 0.7 animal units per hectare (AU/ha), the load is 1.5 AU/ha in recovered 
areas and 2.5 AU/ha in areas of integrated forest-livestock systems.
On the basis of the results of pasture recovery and integrated 
production, the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA) 
created the “carbon neutral meat” seal (Alves and others, 2015 and 2018) 
certifying beef whose emissions are neutralized or captured during the 
production process. The system is audited and serves to evaluate enteric 
emissions and sequestration achieved via vegetation and soils. EMBRAPA 
(2018) estimates that 1.5 million hectares in Brazil can be certified under 
this system, the equivalent of 1% of the Brazilian herd, or approximately 
2.2 million head of cattle.
Another certification process is for “low-carbon meat”, namely meat 
that can be produced from properly managed grasslands which sequester 
carbon, whether in integrated systems or otherwise, thereby mitigating 
animal emissions. The concept of low-carbon meat centres on improving soil 
quality by fixing emissions. Potential coverage of up to 50 million hectares 
is being evaluated (EMBRAPA, 2018).
Another important innovation in the meat production sector is the 
more thorough exploitation of animal products throughout the production 
chain. Exploitation of animal products employed 53,943 people directly 
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in Brazil in 2014 (ABRA, 2016). The same source indicates that there were 
344 processing plants in operation, producing more than 12 billion kilos of 
derivatives with a value of more than US$ 2 billion. Table V.27 shows that 
animal processing percentages are still low, so growth in the sector could 
reduce environmental impact and create more jobs and income.
Table V.27 
Brazil: animal products produced as a proportion of live weight, 2014
(Percentages)
Animal species Raw material Proportion













Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of Brazilian Association of Animal Recycling (ABRA),  
II Diagnóstico da Indústria Brasileira de Reciclagem Animal, Brasilia, 2016.
Figure V.26 shows the destination of fat and meal production in 2014. 
There is clearly a consumer market for animal products that could be expanded.
Figure V.26 













Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Brazilian 
Association of Animal Recycling (ABRA), II Diagnóstico da Indústria Brasileira de Reciclagem Animal, 
Brasilia, 2016.
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Therefore, moving towards a low-carbon livestock sector can deliver 
a net gain to the sector.
Identifying and selecting the best landscape management strategies 
makes it possible to increase productivity (per animal and per area), reduce 
the environmental footprint and restore degraded areas that have negative 
emissions. Thus, converting agricultural production means creating wealth 
and employment and obtaining a wide range of economic and social benefits.
Increasing productivity in livestock farming without an increased 
environmental footprint makes it possible to relax the external and environmental 
constraints simultaneously. In Brazil, Cardoso and others (2016) and Barretto 
de Figueiredo and others (2017) studied the carbon footprints of different 
cattle production systems, including extensive, semi-intensive, degraded 
pasture, reclaimed (productive) pasture and agroforestry and grazing 
integration systems (see figure V.27). Non-integrated and degraded systems 
are the ones that emit the most greenhouse gases. It is vital for production 
practices to evolve, especially in countries where livestock farming is an 
important activity, both because of soil degradation and because of enteric 
fermentation in cattle (MCTIC, 2017).
Figure V.27 
Brazil: emissions of different bovine production systems, various years



















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of A. Cardoso 
and others, “Impact of the intensification of beef production in Brazil on greenhouse gas emissions 
and land use”, Agricultural Systems, vol. 143, Amsterdam, Elsevier, 2016; E. Barretto de Figueiredo 
and others, “Greenhouse gas balance and carbon footprint of beef cattle in three contrasting 
pasture-management systems in Brazil”, Journal of Cleaner Production, vol. 142, No. 1, Amsterdam, 
Elsevier, 2017.
Oliveira and others (2018) evaluated carbon sequestration in different 
beef cattle production systems in south-eastern Brazil, selecting areas that 
were homogeneous in terms of relief and soil, and found greater incorporation 
of carbon into soils and plants with integrated systems (see figure V.28).
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Figure V.28 
Brazil: carbon sequestrated in different beef cattle production systems, various years












Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of P. Oliveira 
and others, Produção de carne carbono neutro: um novo conceito para carne sustentável produzida 
nos trópicos, Brasilia, Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA), 2018.
Grassland reclamation technologies and the adoption of integrated 
production systems are turning farming into a carbon sink, mainly thanks to 
the incorporation of carbon into the soil. Carbon fixing potential is 10.7 million 
tCO2eq in integrated systems and over 123.0 million tCO2eq in reclaimed 
grasslands (see figure V.29). For comparison, this carbon sequestration would 
be equivalent to approximately 1.5 times Ecuador’s total current emissions.
Figure V.29 
Carbon sequestration potential with different technologies, 2017
(Millions of tons of CO2eq)













Source: Observatorio ABC, Agricultura de baixa emissão de carbono: avaliação do uso estratégico das 
áreas prioritárias do Programa ABC, Brasilia, 2017.
Note: Estimated potential carbon capture if the Low-Carbon Agriculture (ABC) Plan were applied in full. 
Negative numbers indicate carbon sequestration (negative emissions).
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The Low-Carbon Agriculture (ABC) Plan was launched in Brazil in 
2010 as a credit line for the purpose of changing production methods and 
processes to create systems with lower carbon emissions, thereby reducing 
the environmental impact and increasing the efficiency of agriculture. An 
observatory (Observatorio ABC, 2017b) monitors the effects of the plan 
and reports on its results. The plan aims to reduce emissions so that up 
to 163 million fewer tons of CO2eq are emitted and is a clear example of a 
climate-smart production development policy.
Pasture recovery and the implementation of integrated systems costs 
approximately US$ 530 per hectare. The rate of implementation of the plan 
has been low in recent years, since of the 152.33 billion reais budgeted, 
only 20.5 billion had been allocated by 2016 because of an increase in the 
programme’s interest rate.
Changing processes poses a number of policy challenges, such as 
providing appropriate incentives for farmers to opt for these systems and 
overcome initial cost barriers, approving public policies that promote rural 
outreach and producer training, and creating measurement and monitoring 
systems and tools. Integrated agricultural and forest-livestock systems offer 
economic advantages thanks to increased productivity, and simultaneously ease 
the external and environmental constraints, which shows their transformative 
potential and their contribution to climate action.
Other experiences in Latin America and the Caribbean also show 
the benefits of implementing crop-livestock-forest systems. In the Eastern 
Plains region of Colombia, crop-livestock-forest models with large pastures 
suitable for mechanization have made it possible to renew pastures given 
over to agriculture at low cost. This reduces stress on the animals and 
complements their feed with grazing, while generating ecosystem services. 
In crop-livestock-forest systems, pastures are renewed every 4 or 5 years and 
a large number of animals can be kept per hectare: 2.5 AU/ha, as compared 
to the usual 0.8 AU/ha (Restrepo, 2018).
In Uruguay, Oyhantçabal and Jones (2018) point to the potential of 
livestock-forest systems to reduce emissions intensity per kilogram of beef 
while boosting carbon sequestration in soils and biomass through the adoption 
of good practices, such as improving the quantity and quality (digestibility) of 
livestock feed, working to increase soil organic matter and carbon, restoring 
soils where organic matter has been lost and degradation is observed, and 
increasing afforestation for shelter and shade. This set of practices, which 
make it possible to achieve greater efficiency and convert low-productivity 
livestock systems into high-productivity ones, has been applied on a pilot 
scale in the Climate-smart Livestock Production and Land Restoration in the 
Uruguayan Rangelands project, implemented with the support of the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations (FAO) with climate-smart livestock practices on 35,000 ha 
directly and 400,000 ha in the indirect intervention area.
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Argentina established a national control system for organic production 
in 1992, and in 1999 the policy was reinforced by Law No. 25127 on Ecological, 
Biological or Organic Production and its complementary regulations. This 
created a legal framework for the development of organic livestock farming, 
something that was recognized by the European Union, which granted 
Argentina the status of a country with an equivalent control system. Today 
3.2 million hectares in the country are certified organic, which represents 7.3% 
of the global total (43.7 million hectares). Between 1997 and 2017, Argentina’s 
organic product exports grew at an average annual rate of 13%. The land 
area dedicated to organic livestock (2.9 million hectares) is mainly given 
over to sheep (94%) and cattle (6%): the former are located in the Patagonian 
region and the latter throughout the country. In the organic sheep business, 
762,000 head intended for wool and meat production are grazing on natural 
pastures (Güelvenzú, 2018).
Although the sectoral examples presented are very limited, it has 
been possible to demonstrate that climate action is contributing to the 
objectives of the 2030 Agenda and clearly helping to increase productivity, 
social inclusion or employment, and to reduce the carbon footprint and other 
environmental footprints. The same exercise remains to be carried out to 
document the economic, social and environmental footprint of activities 
such as the penetration of organic materials in the construction industry, the 
production of ecosystem services, the development of the care economy and 
investment in the circular economy and the treatment of solid and liquid 
urban waste. These sectors are the targets of the dynamic and progressive 
structural change that will give a great boost to sustainability and the 
fulfilment of the Sustainable Development Goals. In the sectors mentioned, 
there is no dilemma: change provides net gains over the status quo and 
public policies should be designed to help realize them as soon as possible.
G. Conclusions: social participation as a public 
policy tool
This publication aims to draw attention to the importance of society’s 
participation as part of the public policy toolkit for climate change. This 
participation has three dimensions: access to environmental and climate 
information, involvement in decision-making, and access to environmental 
justice.43 This issue, linked to the forthcoming application of the Escazú 
Agreement on access rights, is the necessary complement to the climate 
 
43 Given the length of this book and the ramifications of the subject of social participation, it is 
dealt with in ECLAC/OHCHR (2019), a publication that reports on institutional advances in the 
region, as well as policies and actions originating in society that have led to the defence of rights 
through administrative and judicial mechanisms.
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policies pursued by governments, as a response by society to the growing 
threat that global warming poses to the well-being and quality of life of 
large sectors of the population.
As has been seen in this chapter, the number of economic policy 
instruments is growing and their application is becoming more and more 
far-reaching, enabling progress to be made in the right direction. But 
this implementation is not fast enough or ambitious enough to respond 
adequately to the commitment represented by the Paris Agreement or, more 
importantly, to the climate emergency. In the light of what has been said 
in this and earlier chapters, it is clear that institutional arrangements, the 
pace at which alternative technologies spread and the operating rules of the 
markets that currently exist will not be adequate to drive the development 
style in the right direction unless public adaptation and mitigation policies 
are implemented.
It is also evident that each measure, negotiated separately, comes up 
against multiple forms of resistance that ultimately explain why effectiveness 
in achieving climate objectives is low. With regard to the carbon taxes applied 
in the region, it has become clear that these were one-off negotiations in all 
but one case. The same has happened with the modification of fossil fuel 
subsidies, and the change from the previous situation has therefore been 
marginal. This is also the case in relation to the NDCs, in two ways: because 
it can be seen that they are inadequate to achieve the reduction required 
to meet the Paris Agreement goal, and because national efforts have so far 
been insufficient to increase the rate of decarbonization to a level consistent 
with the goals set by the NDCs. Thus, the NDCs have not yet been truly 
recognized as an element capable of integrating and structuring effective 
public policies.
Although the changes may be marginal, they certainly point in the 
right direction. But, at the risk of simplification, it could be said that these 
processes look back towards the status quo and the change possible within 
it, which becomes the benchmark. As an alternative, a very different situation 
could be imagined in which changes were made by looking forward, i.e. 
towards the transformations that are needed. In this other scenario, the 
NDCs could be the point of reference, the compass guiding the whole set 
of public policies, and they could be contrasted not so much with change 
relative to the previous situation, but with their contribution to the fulfilment 
of their objectives.
Accepting NDCs as a guide means adopting a carbon budget, either 
annually or for the whole compliance period. It is best to do it both ways, as 
this makes it easier to calibrate each of the set of measures so as to match 
the overall change to the speed of decarbonization required and obtain 
the highest level of co-benefits and the most virtuous interactions between 
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the instruments for mitigation purposes. Something similar applies to the 
adaptation discussed in the previous chapter, when there is a clear indicator 
for it. The idea of moving towards carbon neutrality is gaining ground, and 
that involves moving towards emission reduction targets, which differ from 
targets related to the carbon intensity of GDP or the electricity mix. Emission 
reduction targets, such as those of Costa Rica, Argentina and Chile (where 
such targets were being discussed at the time of writing), are clearer for the 
purpose of giving coherence to cross-cutting and sectoral public policies.
There are still counterproductive instruments, such as subsidies 
for fossil fuel consumption and encouragement of private mobility, which 
make expanding the environmental frontier for development difficult, serve 
sectoral goals and, as noted in the relevant section, have a regressive social 
distribution. Maintaining the social objective even as efforts to expand the 
environmental space continue requires a shift away from support for the 
consumption or production of things that benefit lower-income sectors at a 
very high cost towards direct support for the individuals and populations 
targeted. The political context is undoubtedly very important for giving 
consistency to public policies, and having a common objective to organize 
them around is of no small importance.
Funds labelled as climate funds are marginal compared to what 
needs to be invested to shape a style of development that can simultaneously 
increase social prosperity and care for the planet. The financial system itself 
has much to improve in terms of risk management and internalization of the 
climate impacts of financing. Within countries, too, a great deal needs to be 
improved when it comes to designing financial and fiscal strategies that are 
aligned with climate objectives. The resulting investments would generate 
legitimate profits, i.e. profits not arrived at by externalizing damage, to the 
detriment of investments whose profitability is spurious because it comes 
at the cost of aggravating climate change or failing to take adaptation needs 
into account. This would lead to climate finance gradually becoming the 
normal way to finance both governments and public and private investments.
Each country, as its economic and political circumstances dictate, will 
have to find the combination that works best to redirect investment and 
consumption and spread the effort of change between the present generation 
and future generations. But all the instruments described, namely annual 
and total carbon budgets allocated by sectors and territories, CO2 taxes and 
emissions trading markets, must be involved to at least some extent.
NDCs have been prepared on the basis of public consultation processes 
(Samaniego and others, 2019). There are far-reaching issues, such as the 
implementation of the instruments described and the periodic adjustment of 
NDCs called for by the Paris Agreement, which require a structured forum 
for discussion over and above government interministerial committees. 
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Access to information, participation and justice in environmental matters 
is indispensable. The Escazú Agreement offers a benchmark and a guide 
for countries to give legitimacy and support to these processes of change.
Monitoring progress towards compliance with NDCs and the Paris 
Agreement requires strengthened oversight, reporting and verification 
mechanisms that enable annual adjustments to be made to the policies 
implemented to keep economies on the right track, thus allowing policies to be 
related to results. And it is worth emphasizing that regional intergovernmental 
coordination has the potential to make information comparable, to harmonize 
the design and application of instruments, and even to attempt some solutions 
on the appropriate scale. Lastly, it brings out the importance of the sectoral 
dimension which, because of its heterogeneity, calls for solutions on very 
different scales and with territorial peculiarities.
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Annex V.A1.1
Methodology for measuring climate expenditure
Calculating gross climate expenditure involves collecting a considerable 
amount of information from national statistics and even designing surveys 
to apply in the public and private sectors. Agreement must be reached on 
expenditure that varies in terms of the goals identified, such as environmental 
expenditure, whose main object is to reduce pollution, and expenditure that 
has other environmental objectives.
The challenge with regard to climate spending is greater, since there 
is no consensus on how to define it or internationally validated standards 
for classifying policies relating to it. In quantifying climate spending, as in 
measuring environmental protection spending, three questions must be 
answered: (i) Who does the spending? (ii) How is the money spent? (iii) To 
what purpose is it spent? (ECLAC/INEGI, 2015).
For the purposes of measuring environmental protection and climate 
expenditure, it is necessary to have information gathering protocols, as well 
as estimation methodologies, indicators and statistical analyses, which are 
the components of the system (see diagram VA1.1). The dynamism of the 
environmental sector, the requirements of each country and international 
comparability must also be considered.
To classify public sector climate expenditure, it is advisable to apply 
the primary purpose criterion, which makes it possible to identify the main 
goal of budgetary expenditure and to account for allocated expenditure 
whose primary purpose is to combat climate change or adapt to its impact. In 
practice, however, it is difficult to determine the primary purpose of spending 
because investments and expenditures usually have multiple objectives. Nor 
is it easy to know whether climate change adaptation or mitigation was the 
real objective of the expenditure: sometimes the aim is to make more efficient 
use of inputs, and only after the event can the objective be interpreted as 
climate-motivated. Furthermore, many budget lines do not make it explicit 
that the expenditure is for climate change mitigation or adaptation, so this 
approach would exclude such expenditure from the accounting.
The budget structure does not yet allow for the generation of information 
on a subject as particular as climate change, and budget labels are usually 
framed by criteria of a more administrative nature. Although there is an 
environmental function classifier within government spending, climate 
spending is even more specific, so the identification process begins at the 
most basic level of information. This means that grouping climate spending 
is a process that involves going case by case or from the particular to the 
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general. The analysis also needs to review the policies involved case by 
case and be clear and consistent about the conceptual differences between 
mitigation and adaptation. The first concept is clearer, as it relates directly 
to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions; the second may be less easy 
to identify, as noted in the previous chapter.
Coverage is also important. The quantification of expenditure is linked 
ex ante to the ministries and institutions that have environmental or climate 
responsibilities. However, all institutions are involved in environmental and 
climate spending, so it is necessary to analyse each budget sub-item, which 
requires a greater effort to identify the objectives of spending in its different 
institutional components: general government, financial corporations, 
non-financial corporations (industries), households, non-profit institutions 
serving households and the rest of the world.44 In turn, general government 
is made up of central, regional and local governments. ECLAC/INEGI (2015) 
recommends starting with the analysis of public expenditure by central 
government. As noted, this exercise was done in relation to environmental 
protection expenditure in Chile (ECLAC/MMA, 2015) and Costa Rica 
(ECLAC, 2018c). Spending that affects climate is widely dispersed among 
different institutions and at different administrative levels, and there are 
major difficulties in identifying, classifying and, in particular, collecting 
and processing the information.
In economies where different economic actors interact, expenditure 
associated with efforts to combat climate change can be recorded in more than 
one institution, resulting in double counting. For this reason, transfers and 
subsidies must be carefully considered and included so as not to overestimate 
spending in any one sector (OECD, 2007a). It is generally possible to access 
data on who makes environmental service payments and purchases, but it is 
not always possible to obtain information on the financing source. To avoid 
the problems of double counting, two approaches are used that theoretically 
lead to the same result (although they do not usually coincide in practice): 
(i) accounting for spending by whoever undertakes and implements climate 
action, and (ii) allocating it to whoever finances it.
44 Climate spending, like all fiscal spending, can finance current or capital expenditure. Current 
expenditure is operational and includes workers’ wages, use of goods and services, and 
consumption of fixed capital. It also includes interest, subsidies, donations, social benefits and 
other expenses related to current transfers, among other things. Capital expenditure is that on 
investments to acquire movable and immovable goods that will be used continuously during one 
or more accounting periods. These investments include the purchase of machinery and equipment, 
transfers of resources for capital, the execution of works and others (ECLAC/INEGI, 2015).
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Diagram V.A1.1 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean/National Institute of Statistics and 
Geography (ECLAC/INEGI), “Guía metodológica: medición del gasto en protección ambiental del 
gobierno general”, Project Documents (LC/W.653), Santiago, 2015.
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Annex V.A3.1
Climate development finance initiatives in Latin America 
and the Caribbean: Nacional Financiera (NAFIN) and National 
Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES)
Table V.A3.1 
Credit lines applicable to sustainability and climate change available from Nacional 
Financiera (NAFIN) and National Bank for Economic and Social  
Development (BNDES) as of 2018
Institution Credit lines applicable to sustainability and climate change
NAFIN, 
Mexico
1. Sustainable Project Financing Programme.
Short-, medium- and long-term financing for Mexican and international companies or 
financial intermediaries, involving the design, structuring and implementation of financial 
mechanisms in accordance with the particular characteristics of each priority and strategic 
project: medium-sized or large enterprises or special-purpose vehicles incorporated in 
Mexico for the development of energy projects, financial institutions (domestic or foreign) 
and multilateral financial organizations that provide financing for energy projects.
This product contributes to the fulfilment of the objectives of the National Development Plan 
2013–2018, which establishes the necessary lines of action to foster and guide inclusive 
and enabling green growth that preserves the country’s natural heritage while promoting 
competitiveness and employment.
The following are financed under the Programme:
• Photovoltaic projects. Financing to design, build and implement solar projects in order 
to produce electricity from renewable sources and to promote the development of 
infrastructure and electrical coverage in the country, in alignment with the energy reform, 
by designing financing structures, participated in by development banks, that make the 
development of renewable energy projects viable.
• Wind projects. Financing for the design and construction of wind farms to support 
private investment in the country and act as a promoter of energy reform, through large-
scale financing aimed at developing strategic sectors that will help increase electricity 
transmission infrastructure and coverage.
• Hydroelectric projects. Financing to design, build and develop hydroelectric plants in 
order to boost the development of electrical infrastructure and coverage in the country, 
in alignment with the energy reform.
• Energy efficiency projects: combined cycle and cogeneration.
 - Electricity generating plants: financing to build and operate cogeneration plants for 
the purpose of producing electricity.
 - Transmission and storage plants. Innovative technologies: financing for waste processing, 
an alternative way of generating electricity without using non-renewable fuels by using 
waste as a heat source. This type of project contributes to the progressive replacement 
of traditional fuels (sustainable development) and is a long-term productive investment 
with high environmental and socio-economic impact, both locally and regionally.
• Public-private partnerships. These are a mechanism for enlisting private capital to build 
public infrastructure and its associated services. A central element in public-private 
partnership projects is the optimal distribution of risk between the public and private sectors, 
with the aim of making the cost of the project lower than that of traditional public works.
• Value added tax (VAT): financing of VAT to be paid from the investments required for 
the construction of the project.
• Corporate finance. Medium- and long-term direct financing for companies involving the 
design, structuring and implementation of financial mechanisms in accordance with 
the particular characteristics of each strategic project considered a priority for Mexico. 
Corporate financing methods include the following: 
• Transmission lines. Financing to design, construct and implement transmission lines (a set 
of devices to transport or guide electrical energy from a generating source to centres of 
consumption), in order to promote the development of transmission infrastructure and 
electrical coverage in the country, in alignment with the energy reform.
• Petrochemicals, steel and gas pipelines.
318 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
Table V.A3.1 (continued)
Institution Credit lines applicable to sustainability and climate change
NAFIN, 
Mexico
3. Investment programmes: 
Nacional Financiera Indirect Equity Investment. This promotes and develops the venture 
capital industry in Mexico through the Mexican Capital Investment Corporation (CMIC) 
or Fund of Funds. The corporate structure of CMIC is divided into vehicles with specific 
investment theses in private equity, venture capital, mezzanine debt and the energy sector.
4. Credits handled through the Electricity Saving Trust (FIDE):a
• Sustainable improvement of housing: credit for the installation of equipment to harness 
solar energy and increase the efficiency of electricity use in existing homes in order to 
generate gas and electricity savings.
• Ecocredits: 
 - Mass corporate. Credit for replacing obsolete equipment with new equipment using 
state-of-the-art technology, obtained from FIDE-certified suppliers.
 - Individual. Credit for the company to save on energy consumption by using small-scale 
clean energy. Current devices are replaced by more efficient ones, and production 
processes are adapted.
5. New programmes. 
Funding for service station operators to invest in modernization to cope with the new 
competition conditions in the energy industry. This funding is processed through other 
financial institutions, such as BanBajío, BanRegio, Multiva and Santander.
6. Products for financial intermediaries (network of NAFIN-accredited financial intermediaries): 
• Guarantees allowing them to lend to Mexican companies, in order to promote the latter’s 
financial inclusion and improve their credit conditions.
• Funding. Financing is received to lend on to companies that need to consolidate and develop.
7. Management of international credit line projects.
BNDES, 
Brazil
Manages resources through credit lines, programmes and funds and other initiatives.
1. Credit lines:
• BNDES Forestry. Line of credit for reforestation, conservation and forest recovery 
of degraded or converted areas, and sustainable use of native areas in the form of 
forest management.
• BNDES Energy Efficiency.
• Financing lines applicable to climate projects:
 - BNDES Finem - Energy Efficiency. For projects focused on reducing energy consumption 
and increasing the efficiency of the national energy system.
 - BNDES Finem - Power Generation. To expand and modernize the infrastructure for 
generating energy from renewable sources and natural gas thermoelectric plants.
 - BNDES Finem - Electricity Distribution. To expand and modernize the energy 
distribution infrastructure.
2. Programmes:
• BNDES Forest Offset. Supports the regularization of legal reserve liabilities on rural 
estates devoted to agribusiness and the preservation and enhancement of native forests 
and remaining ecosystems.
• BNDES Proplastic - Socioenvironmental. Supports investments aimed at rationalizing 
the use of natural resources, creating clean development mechanisms and systems 
for managing and recovering environmental liabilities, and financing social investment 
projects and programmes carried out by companies in the plastics production chain.
• Programmes eligible for guarantees specifically aimed at climate change. These include 
the Climate Fund Programme, which offers the following subprogrammes:
 - Urban mobility (operations within the sphere of BNDES Automatic).b
 - Efficient machinery and equipment (operations within the sphere of the products of 
BNDES Finamec and BNDES Automatic).
 - Renewable energies (operations within the sphere of BNDES Automatic).
 - Sustainable cities and climate change (operations within the sphere of BNDES Automatic).
 - Native forests (operations within the sphere of BNDES Automatic).
 - Carbon management and services (operations within the sphere of BNDES Automatic).
 - Solid waste (operations within the sphere of BNDES Automatic).
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Table V.A3.1 (concluded)
Institution Credit lines applicable to sustainability and climate change
BNDES, 
Brazil
3. Funds and other initiatives:
• Amazon Fund. The central objective of the Amazon Fund is to promote projects to 
prevent and combat deforestation and to conserve and sustainably use the forests of 
the Amazon biome, in accordance with decree No. 6527 of 1 August 2008. The Amazon 
Fund is managed by BNDES, and resources are raised exclusively from donations.
• Climate Fund Programme. The purpose of this is to implement the package of reimbursable 
resources of the National Climate Change Fund, or Climate Fund, created by Law No. 12114 
of 9 December 2009 and regulated by decree No. 7343 of 26 October 2010. It is an 
accounting fund, linked to the Ministry of the Environment with the aim of guaranteeing 
resources to support projects or studies and financing for ventures aimed at mitigating 
climate change.
• BNDES Atlantic Forest initiative. This selects projects aimed at reforesting the region 
with native species, in order to provide them with non-reimbursable financial resources 
from the BNDES Social Fund.
• BNDES Clean Development Fund. Support for firms and projects with the potential to 
generate certified carbon reductions, via equity holdings in companies.
• Investment and Equity Fund – Forestry. Investment fund to take equity stakes in companies 
or ventures whose emphasis is on forest assets.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from 
the different institutions.
a See [online] http://www.fide.org.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=108&Itemid=180. 
FIDE is a private non-profit trust established on 14 August 1990 at the initiative of the Federal Electricity 
Commission (CFE) in support of the Electricity Saving Programme. Its purpose is to contribute to actions 
for saving and efficiently using electricity. It is made up of the following:
 -  Settlors: Confederation of Industrial Chambers (CONCAMIN), National Manufacturing Industry Chamber 
(CANACINTRA), National Chamber of Electrical Manufactures (CANAME), Mexican Construction Industry 
Chamber (CMIC), National Chamber of Consulting Companies (CNEC) and Mexican Union of Electrical 
Workers (SUTERM).
 -  Fiduciary: Nacional Financiera (NAFIN), which grants powers to a fiduciary delegate who acts as a 
proxy for the trustee and in turn delegates powers to the director general of FIDE, with the latter then 
delegating powers to the deputy directors in their areas of competence.
 -  Trustees: CFE and electricity consumers who are beneficiaries of the services provided by the trust.
b Investments to implement, expand, restore and modernize facilities or activities in the industrial, agricultural, 
infrastructure, trade, service, forestry production, fisheries and aquaculture sectors.
c Financing for the production and acquisition of Brazilian machinery and equipment accredited by BNDES.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The information and analyses presented in this book are stark: the world 
is experiencing an environmental emergency. There is ample evidence 
for the extent of global warming and its close dependence on greenhouse 
gas emissions produced by human activities, in particular fossil fuel use, 
hydrocarbon-based energy generation and land use changes that are 
accelerating deforestation.
The emergency is global in scale, as are its determinants and 
consequences. However, this should not obscure the fact that the local and 
territorial dimensions are often those that directly affect people’s quality 
of life and health. A notable example is the close relationship between the 
increasing pollution of cities and the pattern of mobility consumption based 
on fossil fuel-powered vehicles.
A further consideration is that the speed of temperature increase, with its 
direct correlates in the form of melting Arctic ice and sea level rise, has almost 
certainly been underestimated. This has led to a progressive recognition that 
the world has moved from a climate crisis which has unfolded over many 
decades to an environmental emergency that is now destroying biodiversity 
and increasing the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events.
In this context, the pace of the international community’s response 
has been inadequate, a view that has particularly taken hold among younger 
generations, who perceive that the effects of climate change will catch up 
with them in their maturity. The Paris Agreement of 2015 was a step forward, 
but the conviction has rapidly grown that its targets, and the commitments 
accordingly entered into at the national level, will not suffice to curb global 
warming. Targets need to be more ambitious, particularly those that depend 
on international collaboration.
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In the face of these dynamics, the situation in Latin America and 
the Caribbean is paradoxical. The region produces only 8.3% of the world’s 
greenhouse gas emissions, which is similar to its share of the global population 
and economy, but it bears a disproportionate share of the human and 
material costs of climate change. Ultimately, the historical inequity between 
the developed and developing worlds remains, or is even widening, in the 
environmental dimension. The most developed countries have been and are the 
ones that are depleting the world’s carbon budget and still failing to provide 
significant resources to support mitigation and adaptation in the poorest 
countries. There is still no recognition in practical terms that responsibilities 
are shared but unequal, and that the damage caused merits compensation.
This book places particular emphasis on the analysis of two cases in 
which this inequity manifests itself in an extreme form: Central America and 
the Caribbean. Both subregions periodically suffer the devastating effects of 
extreme weather events, which entail high costs and long recovery periods. 
The case of the Caribbean countries is particularly worrying because of the 
additional cost imposed by an unsustainable debt situation, which needs to 
be resolved through mechanisms to reduce the debt burden while supporting 
meaningful adaptation programmes.
The impact of the environmental emergency at the subnational and 
sectoral level in the region’s countries is heterogeneous. Although the effects 
are and will continue to be negative in most territories, their intensity varies 
greatly and in some cases (the minority) there could even be economic 
advantages. This heterogeneity is particularly serious in the case of agricultural 
production, which is highly dependent on climatic conditions. This is not only 
because agriculture plays such a major role in the production and exports of 
numerous countries in the region, but above all because, in many of them, 
the farming population tends to be the poorest and the most vulnerable 
when the productivity of cultivated land decreases. Climate change is thus 
an additional obstacle to efforts to combat extreme poverty, for example in 
the dry corridor of the countries of northern Central America.
In response to this broad diagnosis, the book concludes with two 
chapters suggesting strategies, policies and actions to address the effects 
of the environmental crisis. The first strategic proposal is that, despite the 
relationships and synergies between mitigation and adaptation measures, 
the latter may need to be prioritized in the region, as they are not only 
inevitable but may yield economic benefits far outweighing the costs. A 
wide spectrum of adaptation measures are at once realistic, cost-effective 
and efficient. In particular, there is great potential for developing or 
strengthening natural ecosystems that can be realized if there is appropriate 
charging for environmental services and an effective local governance 
structure. The urgent need for adaptation actions is seen most clearly in the 
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increasing migration flows driven by climate change, especially those from 
low-productivity agricultural areas. This is a striking example of the close 
relationship between environmental, social and economic dynamics, and 
of how problems are transmitted between them.
The second proposal is for a comprehensive approach to be taken when 
formulating and, above all, implementing environmental policies, something 
that also holds true for the mechanisms used to put them into effect. The book 
examines a wide variety of instruments associated with both price signals 
and direct regulation. The conclusions are similar: no single instrument 
can achieve the desired results, but rather integrated intervention packages 
must be implemented. In addition, environmental issues must be effectively 
incorporated into the public policy system, despite the difficulties involved.
This holistic policy perspective also needs to permeate the approach 
taken to the environmental emergency. The region is facing an environmental 
crisis, but also one of inequality and growth too slow to generate the jobs 
needed to reduce unemployment and informality and absorb new entrants 
into the workforce. Moreover, without structural changes in production and 
consumption patterns, it will not be possible to expand the now limited scope 
for reconciling employment growth, poverty reduction and sustainability.
On this view, growth, equality and sustainability are inseparable 
in Latin America and the Caribbean. Not only do objectives and policy 
instruments interact in these three dimensions, but so do problems. What 
particularly stands out is the short-sightedness or short-termism of public and 
private decision makers: the true extent of the environmental emergency is 
not recognized, and nor is the urgency of addressing it; there are groundless 
hopes that increased consumption will mask inequality based on the culture 
of privilege; and investment decisions are often dissociated from the need 
to achieve growth and employment through technical progress and the 
diversification of production structures.
Given this situation, the answer suggested in the present book, which 
summarizes the ECLAC view, is to grow with equality and sustainability. To 
achieve this, progressive structural change based on an environmental big 
push is needed. Adaptation efforts, which are synergistic with mitigation 
efforts, have a central role to play in this strategy. This needs to be put into 
effect through actions in the sectors driving decarbonization: renewable 
energies (especially non-conventional ones), urban and long-distance 
electromobility, digitization, low-carbon agriculture and other solutions based 
on nature and the circular economy. The pursuit and coordination of public 
and private measures and investments aimed at changing the energy mix 
and production and consumption patterns is a path that will make it possible 
to gradually move away from an unsustainable development style that has 
failed to deliver on the economic, social and environmental fronts alike.
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